To ask the Acting Minister for Manpower (a) which Progressive Wage Model sectors have basic wage schedules that now exceed the threshold of $2,600 in Part 4 of the Employment Act; (b) how many employees have moved outside the coverage of Part 4 as a result; and (c) whether the threshold is reviewed when a wage schedule is set.

To ask the Minister for National Development (a) how many nature reserves are gazetted under the Parks and Trees Act, and when each was gazetted; (b) what criteria govern such designation and whether Tagore forest has been assessed against them; and (c) whether the Ministry will consider designating Tagore forest as a nature reserve.

To ask the Minister for Transport since Singapore Airlines became a designated operating entity under the Civil Aviation Authority of Singapore Act 2009 (a) whether losses from and carrying amount in its foreign associates have been assessed against its capacity to provide essential transport services; and (b) whether such losses, or a continuing pattern thereof, would engage the notification duty in section 67B, and on what criterion.

Sitting on 8 September 2026 - Written

To ask the Minister for National Development (a) what the policy basis is for incorporating soft facilities management services into Integrated Facilities Management contracts, and whether any cost or service-quality evaluation supports it; (b) whether there is information on (i) what proportion of such services is now bundled (ii) how many suppliers have moved from prime to subcontractor as a result; and (c) whether a nominated subcontractor model can be applied.

To ask the Prime Minister and Minister for Finance (a) whether the removal of the 5% cap on physical investment precious metals under tax incentive schemes for funds applies to metal vaulted outside Singapore; (b) whether palladium qualifies as investment precious metals and, if not, why not; (c) what criteria determine whether an investment precious metals fund is bona fide; and (d) what role increasing Singapore-based metal vaulting plays in these policies.

Sitting on or after 9 September 2026 - Oral

To ask the Acting Minister for Manpower (a) how many discrimination complaints have cited National Service obligation as the reason; (b) why National Service liability is not protected under the Workplace Fairness Act and what would prompt inclusion; (c) whether the Ministry knows of any enforcement action under Part 6 of the Enlistment Act; and (d) what protection a serviceman has against being passed over for promotion because of in-camp training.

To ask the Minister for National Development in relation to sand infilling for Long Island (a) what particulate concentration will be modelled at the East Coast Park boundary and at the nearest residential facade; (b) whether any particulate concentration will require sand infilling to be suspended, and at what reading; and (c) whether any part of East Coast Park will be closed to the public, and for how long.

To ask the Minister for Transport in view of an Australian ruling that an engineer was unfairly dismissed by his employer after Singapore Airlines complained about a 17-minute delay while clearing fault diagnostic messages on its aircraft (a) whether CAAS requires such disciplinary action to be reported where the aircraft is Singapore-registered; (b) if so, what action follows; and (c) how CAAS ensures engineers are not penalised for safety-related delays.

Sitting on or after 9 September 2026 - Written

To ask the Minister for Culture, Community and Youth (a) why the People’s Association does not publish information on tender bids and awards for commercial space in the same manner as the Singapore Land Authority; (b) how many such tenders were awarded in the past three years; and (c) whether a common disclosure standard will apply to all State landlords.

To ask the Minister for Digital Development and Information (a) what proportion of new generation capacity sought by the Energy Market Authority (EMA) is attributable to projected data centre demand; (b) whether processing data overseas and returning the results via optical-fibre has been assessed as an alternative and what was concluded; and (c) if so, whether a regional optical-fibre network with financing arrangements equivalent to the ASEAN Power Grid will be advanced to enable this.

Sitting on or after 10 September 2026 - Oral

To ask the Minister for Education (a) in each of the last five years, what proportion of resigning teachers joined the Flexi-Adjunct Teaching Scheme within 12 months; (b) whether a Flexi-Adjunct Teacher may decline form teachership or co-curricular duties and remain engaged; (c) how duties exceeding the paid hours are treated; and (d) whether those who resigned and those on no-pay leave are engaged on the same terms.

To ask the Acting Minister for Manpower (a) what is the distribution of declared salaries of services-sector S Pass holders relative to the qualifying salary; (b) whether declared salaries are routinely verified against IRAS and salary crediting records; and (c) how many salary kickback prosecutions since 2021 involved S Pass holders.

To ask the Minister for Sustainability and the Environment (a) why work permit holders may be employed in coffee shops and food courts but not in NEA hawker centres, given all are cooked-food trades; (b) how many Long-Term Visit Pass (LTVP) and Long-Term Visit Pass Plus (LTVP+) holders work as hawker stall assistants as at 1 September 2026; and (c) whether the venue-based distinction will be reviewed.

Sitting on or after 10 September 2026 - Written

To ask the Minister for Education (a) how many students participated in school-organised attachments to Members of Parliament (MPs) at Meet-the-People Sessions, such as the MP Attachment Programme, in each year since 2020; (b) what percentage were attached to MPs in Aljunied GRC, Hougang SMC or Sengkang GRC; (c) who selects the constituency, and on what criteria; and (d) whether the criteria will be published.

To ask the Minister for Education (a) whether Computing can be offered as a core subject in secondary schools; (b) how many secondary schools teach Computing in-house and how many via the centre-based programme; (c) what proportion of the cohort takes Computing; (d) whether Computing can be given its own Curriculum Planning and Development Division post and Master Teacher portfolio; and (e) whether Computing will become a subject before upper secondary.

I. Opening the Motion

Delivered 12.02pm, 5 August 2026.

Why this Motion? Why now?

Singaporeans face a uniquely challenging set of circumstances. The major model of Singaporeans getting on the economic ladder has been jobs. Without a job, you’re not able to afford renting a place or buying a Housing and Development Board (HDB) flat.

Without your own place, it is difficult to think about having children. And for these children, few dream of being entrepreneurs, with nine in ten working here becoming someone’s employee. For almost all of us, the jobs ladder is the main route up, with not many Singaporeans becoming entrepreneurs.

The reasons given are variously these: that the market is small and the cost of business daunting, that they lack social safety nets for risk taking, that not enough true growth capital exists for all the private wealth attracted here [1], that the biggest competitor to Singaporean startups and small and medium enterprises (SMEs) are the Singaporean Government-linked Companies (GLCs). [2] These we have the power to influence.

Property has been a lottery ticket to many Singaporeans, but with asset prices as high as they are, it is highly questionable if a new generation can follow this model without parental support, given initial conditions of wages lagging asset prices and declining employment prospects [3].

The persistence of property as a wealth vehicle breeds a rentier mindset. One generation’s ideology hardens into the next generation’s psychology. As inter-generational transfers come to dominate socio-economic status, they threaten to entrench inequity [4].

Let me recap why our job structure is threatened, though I suspect this is not news to many. Our job structure rests on being the best place in the region for foreign companies to base themselves. We host many large companies but build few of them.

Singapore has three companies in the Fortune Global 500. All three are commodity traders. Two were founded elsewhere and moved here. Korea has 13. Taiwan has six. Theirs make semiconductors and ships [5]. Theirs were built by their own people. Ours came here, and can as easily go.

At the high value end, tariffs are pulling production home and to friendly countries, reducing the supply of marginal new investment available to Singapore. And less of what moves can be won on tax competition. For an increasing number of research and development (R&D) and manufacturing jobs, speed of iteration, equipping and supplying are decisive factors.

At the cost sensitive end, high business costs and slow manpower approvals [6] accelerate offshoring to regional centres based in countries like Malaysia and Vietnam. [7] The examples are not unfamiliar to this house. H&M moved its Southeast Asia Regional headquarters (HQ) from Singapore to Kuala Lumpur. Tiger Beer has been brewed here since 1932. By the end of next year, it will not be. Heineken is winding down brewing at Tuas and moving production to Malaysia and Vietnam, and about 130 jobs go with it. [8]

For a younger generation, they face a changed playbook. The high paying entry level tech jobs that many aspired to have largely dried up. Many entry level roles have been offshored due to the high cost of business. And capable artificial intelligence (AI) agents and models are set to reduce the need for entry level hiring [9]. But whatever the cause, it is undeniably hard for young Singaporeans to find a job today.

What follows is adaptation. Entrepreneurship by necessity, rather than by choice, second and third jobs, structural underemployment [10].

In a high-cost economy, the work most likely to stay is work that cannot be done more cheaply somewhere else.

The standard answer for advanced economies has been R&D. Build what others cannot easily copy so that firms come here in spite of our costs. But after decades and tens of billions, not one local R&D champion has emerged worth more than a billion dollars [11].

Of course, we should continue to invest, but the upshot is that our R&D complex is sadly not ready to be our growth engine. And as individual Chinese provinces and groups thereof become increasingly fiercely competitive ecosystems, every economy will need to reckon with the necessary scale, energy availability, and the cost required to compete.

Alone, it is difficult. That is why I believe we must have greater industrial coordination between Southeast Asian countries and engage in transnational industrial policy, as I elaborated in both my maiden speech last September and my Adjournment Motion this July.

These are structural challenges to the industrial underpinning of jobs. I acknowledge the Government continues to try to do its best under these circumstances. [12] Investment into Singapore is holding up. The Economic Development Board (EDB) committed $14.2 billion of fixed asset investment last year, up from $13.5 billion the year before, and $12.7 billion the year before that, so three years rising.

But for it, we get the opposite trend in jobs. In 2023, 20,000 jobs; in 2024, 18,700 jobs; and last year 15,700 jobs. The value added expected went from $26.7 billion to $23.5 billion to $18 billion. So, even on official statistics, the engine of investment to jobs is faltering. Faced with such a panoply of problems, what can and should we hope for?

First, we need an updated growth model that cares not only about the headline gross domestic product (GDP) growth figure, but the structure of growth. If we truly believe this is a changed world, then our policies must change with it [13]. The structure of growth matters, and growth and distribution are not two things to be done in sequence.

It is acceptable as an exigency to grow first and then redistribute by vouchers and rebates. But over the medium and long term, we should be building an economy where a fair distribution is produced by the growth itself, rather than repaired afterwards out of the proceeds. Pre-distribution over redistribution.

And that is why we need an economic engine driven by dynamic local companies, healthy domestic demand, and Singaporeans and Singaporean capital venturing abroad. Only when Singaporeans thrive and believe the ladders of opportunity are fair to all, can this country be open.

Second, we need honest measurement and prioritisation of what matters from growth. Let me offer three North Stars for the distributional aspect of growth.

One, the indigenous share of national income, which captures the contribution to national income of Singaporeans as workers, owners and entrepreneurs. Its internationally comparable cousin is the labour share -how much of what stays in Singapore goes to the people who work here. [14] Ours, at about 40%, lags most advanced economies. We should resurrect the indigenous income series and measure the whole of what Singaporeans contribute [15].

Two, real income growth that keeps pace with productivity, not lag it. Overall, labour productivity has grown by 2.5% per year [16] from 2016 to 2024. But over the same period, real mean income only grew at 1.3% per year.

Singaporeans have always been model workers. From 2016 to 2024, according to the International Labour Organization (ILO), Singapore’s output per worker grew 2.3% per year, outstripping major economies, such as the United States (US) at 1. [17]6%, Israel at 1.6%, Hong Kong at 1.3%, Korea at 1.3% and Switzerland at 1.1%.

We need to repair this lag. Singaporean workers have kept their end of the bargain. Their compensation has not kept up with it.

Three, whether Singaporeans can still afford the city they built, not how much we produce, but how much variety ordinary Singaporeans on an ordinary wage can enjoy. The diversity of services available, how much they can afford, and the leisure they can afford to take.

The independent kitchen, the second-hand bookstore. We cannot in one breath lose our heritage businesses and our art spaces, and in the next tell Singaporeans that the city is thriving. Cities compete on the variety of things there are to consume, not only on what they produce, and high-amenity cities grow faster [18].

So, we should measure it. How varied the choices are and how many choices an ordinary wage can afford [19].

These three North Stars point us towards a more equal and inclusive economy, with opportunities for entrepreneurs to experiment, households and businesses to succeed, workers to thrive, and ideas and innovation to flourish.

Mr Speaker, the various Members of Parliament of the Workers’ Party (WP) will touch on eight questions to answer the challenges I have laid out.

First, I will discuss innovation under constraint. How do we foster a dynamic enterprise and innovation system that maximises value regardless of the high business cost and physical constraints?

Second, my colleague, Jamus Lim, will discuss dynamic local firms. How can we create a business climate in which dynamic local firms emerge as drivers of innovation and become future cornerstones of the economy?

Third, my colleague, Louis Chua, will discuss land and the roof over the household. How do we ensure that attractive affordable housing is available for every Singaporean household?

Fourth, my colleague, Andre Low, will discuss the start of a working life and ask how we ensure our tertiary students and young workers find meaningful opportunities and good jobs in a challenging economy.

Fifth, my colleague, Gerald Giam, will discuss pathways to a middle-class livelihood. Taking tradespersons as his exemplar, he will ask how we create accessible pathways for them to earn a middle-class livelihood.

Six, my colleague, Fadli Fawzi, will discuss replacement and re-entry and ask whether our system of continuing education actually works. The journey, the destination and the proof.

We close the WP contributions with our two most expansive views of the economic model.

Seventh, my colleague, He Ting Ru, will discuss the lesser measured parts of the economy, in the domestically oriented sectors, and ask what parts of this economy our national statistics fail to capture?

And eighth, my colleague, Eileen Chong, will discuss venturing abroad. How do we empower Singaporeans to seize opportunities in the region and beyond?

Mr Speaker, beyond these questions, there really is one question. What does it mean to take a changed world seriously?

If we mean to rebuild the ladder of opportunity in this generation, the answers to these problems must be the centre-piece of our evolved economic model. In these speeches, my colleague will lay out in eight steps, structural solutions to structural problems.

Today, the problem I will tackle is enterprise and innovation under constraint.

For two generations, we have been good at bringing other people’s companies here. We have been slow to put the same land that we own behind our people building their own. Why do we take a high land price as a law like gravity? Universal land pricing is a coherent and convenient accounting ideology, but in the last accounting, the people of Singapore need to decide if this ideology still serves them.

Families already know this. Tuition is expensive, and no tutor can promise a good job 20 years out. We pay anyway. Investments require outlays. We do not ask a child for an immediate pay-off.

So, the proposition: Singapore should stop treating market land value as a natural price for every socially productive use of land. And the test – a university-centred special zone where state land is priced at development cost rather than market scarcity value.

What is our offer to the young? We should remake the system with the young as the first consideration rather than the last adjustment.

Today, we tweak – a discount on a co-living room, a grant, a priority band in a ballot. Adjustments at the edge of a system designed around somebody else in a different decade. Treating the young as a first order principle means the opposite. We design for the 20-something year old foremost.

This is a supply side problem of policy.

Before we can remake society to be young, we must remake society for the young. The bargain has four parts: a place to live, near where the work and the research happen; at a price a starting salary can carry, in service of something the country needs – more local enterprise and R&D; with upside staying with the risk-takers; and a say in the rules.

What we should create: a special zone surrounding Nanyang Technological University [20] (NTU), where the state land is charged as cost recovery rather than market scarcity value, and takes its returns in the companies that grow there, rather than rent. This experiment will span land-rates for both residential and commercial space, spanning co-living, local enterprise and R&D.

It must be centred around an existing core, a university – because one cannot rustle up a cluster from nothing. But one can take one that exists and play to its strengths [21]. It will be zoned for organic messiness, a district that is pro-worker and pro-business, built around the needs of young people and young companies.

And this experiment is reversible. If it does not work, we can simply revert to the Master Plan. But surely, today’s Singaporeans should have as much say over scarce land as the master planners of decades ago.

So, let me take the argument in this order: land, our tertiary institutions, then governance and money.

First, land. Thirty years, tens of billions in R&D and more again on fostering entrepreneurship. Both R&D and the ladder of growing local giants have underperformed. We are worldclass at marshalling inputs but commercial outcomes, in terms of Singaporean-grown companies, have not appeared at the rate the spending implies [22].

On talent, we want to attract the very best to work alongside a strong local core.

On capital, we disagree about design but perhaps not ideology. But there is a serious methodological point. The state runs on taxpayers’ money. Prudence is its duty. Innovation requires the opposite: calibrated risk-taking. Which is why risk capital belongs in a policy investment bank rather than inside Government, as the Prime Minister proposes. A prudent-first posture is difficult to unlearn [23].

Where we do have an ideological disagreement is the price of land. My colleague, Mr Louis Chua will also speak about this later.

The Economic Strategy Review (ESR) organises itself around inputs to production: capital, labour, productivity. But land is an input distinct from capital. It is discussed as revenue and not as a cost – a constraint to live within and not as a lever to change. And it is not a small cost.

In December 2022, the Government put the development cost of that year’s 13,506 completed flats at $396,000 each – $234,000 of land against $154,000 of construction. [24] Land was 59% of the cost of a flat.

But of course, we can test and change this cost. We have been here before. The Centre for Livable Cities, the Government’s own urban research arm, records what happens when One-North was planned: “The idea of providing residential uses in the form of affordable housing was put forth. However, it was difficult for HDB to change its public housing policies for a single project like One-North. [25] Therefore, the JTC approached the private sector.”

National policy then could not bend for One-North. But it should have. What we need for R&D and entrepreneurship matters more than dogmatic inflexibility.

A high price homogenises. It prices out the independent kitchen and the lab with no revenue yet, and leaves whoever can pay the rent – chains and franchises [26].

It also programmes space. A market scarcity rate, selects for what can be proven in advance – and nothing new can be proven in advance.

By definition, the novel has no track record. Thus, the experimental messiness of life is competed out.

A zone of lower commercial pressure is a zone for messiness, a zone where land is cheap enough for the young to make their own places and their own future organically – the first variable and not an accommodation.

If land pricing is an unnecessary drag on the young, on enterprise, on an R&D cluster, how do we test it? There is a formidable constraint: Singaporeans need land prices low - to start something, to live somewhere - and we need them high, because many of our savings sit in HDB flats and the state leans on land revenue.

To have both high land pricing and low land pricing simultaneously, we must do away with the constraint of universal land pricing. There are at least three ways to vary a price. First, across time, the island-wide price itself. Second, across a policy targeted group, as the Build-To-Order (BTO) does for young parents. Third, across a geographic boundary – fence one area and change the pricing function inside, in service of agglomeration and enterprise, people and firms packed close enough to make each other more productive.

I believe that the third is the least disruptive theory of change if one believes that our land pricing assumptions need to be tested. And the question becomes where to test such a zone. For the young, for the R&D economy and for an entrepreneurial spirit. It belongs around our tertiary institutions. And looking at the map, I believe NTU is the obvious candidate.

Why NTU? The research cluster is already there. A large number of labs are sited on campus. And unlike the National University of Singapore (NUS), whose Kent Ridge and One-North districts have little room left, NTU can still expand [27]. And yet, what is planned for Bahar and CleanTech Park, with 116 hectares adjoining NTU, is another industrial park – the same answer the Party opposite has given again and again [28].

If we are to clear scarce greenery, the use case must be distinctive enough to be worth the sacrifice. I believe ours is, and another industrial park is not. That is something priceless and irreversible, traded for something cookie cutter [29].

Take Punggol Digital District. It is 50 hectares, JTC developed and anchored on Singapore Institute of Technology’s (SIT’s) campus. It proves that the Government will build a district around a university. But it is more of the same we have done – a business park with a campus in it, on market terms [30].

If one accepts the first-principle case for a special zone, then two empirical facts must be dealt with.

First, the Jurong Region Line is being dug into NTU, with campus stations arriving at the end of the decade [31]. Tengah’s flats are rising beside it. Kept as separate plans, they make one more park that people commute into. The Jurong Innovation District, 620 hectares, holds in Bahar the next greenfield precinct, already zoned, with the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) underway. The better bargain is a district for living, working and playing, and for enterprise, and this new district around NTU would be our last chance to run this sort of experiment. Whatever we settle on this parcel becomes how we price the ground beside every campus after it.

Second, the Johor Zone Agreement was signed in January 2025. It is an experiment we must try to make succeed. But for all our hopes on foreign economic policy, it sits in another country and carries the risk that comes with that. We can and should run these experiments for ourselves, by ourselves, if we can – and we can [32].

If we want to re-orient our culture towards the spirit of independent living, towards the spirit of risk taking, towards the spirit of collaboration, then we must provide the conditions for the spirit to flourish. We should not be distracted by procedural arguments that Bahar and Jurong are already zoned in a Master Plan. The experiment can be run as things stand. The question is whether we will.

So, NTU as a centre of a live, work, build district, distinguished by charging land for housing at cost recovery. By cost, I mean cost in the ordinary sense, with all scarcity value excluded – the actual cost of constructing, financing, servicing, maintaining and renewing the buildings, not the hypothetical market value of the ground beneath them.

What would that come to? We have a few indications. At NTU this academic year, a non-air-conditioned double room costs about $412 a month, and an air-conditioned single room about $657. At NUS, a double in hall runs about $494 [33]. Under the co-living scheme announced in late July this year, under the SG Youth plan [34], a room starts at $1,800 a month at 1925 Quarters; $1,950 at Coliwoo Boon Lay and $2,000 at Coliwoo Lutheran, before utilities and deposits – roughly 30% below the usual rate, with operators absorbing the difference.

The one at Boon Lay is about four kilometres from NTU and cost roughly five times what the university charges its own students [35]. Is it affordable? I do not think it is. The median fresh graduate from our six autonomous universities earns $4,500 a month last year. After Central Provident Fund (CPF), about $3,600 in hand. The Boon Lay rate, plus its fixed utility charge, takes about 60% of it after the discount [36].

This is not treating our young as a first order consideration. Our young want space of their own and financial autonomy as a precondition for life, not as a byproduct of marriage.

And 30% below market is measured against the scarcity market. Before the discount, the same room took more than three quarters of a graduate’s take-home pay. Affordability must be benchmarked against what a young Singaporean actually has to spend rather than market rate discounts.

So, what can we offer with a different basis?

On a cost recovery basis, a room comes to well under the half the going rate, closer to a third. Take one calculation that owes nothing to a university subsidy. A 500 square foot unit at $200 a square foot - above the construction cost implied by the Government’s own 2022 figures, so, it is a conservative assumption and not a hopeful one - if you put three people in it and amortise over 10 years at 5%, it comes out to about $1,061 a month, or $2.12 per square foot, roughly $380 a head, with a sinking fund in. Stretch amortisation to 20 years and it is $1.32 per square foot. Other calculations land in the same place. The university’s own rate, annualised over 12 months rather than the 35 weeks a term actually runs, comes out to about $478 to $549 a room.

The universities are already housing people at close to cost. So, we can arrive at a figure between $350 and $550 a month a room. [37]

I know the reply this will draw. All state lands form part of the reserves. Land must be sold at fair market value. Otherwise, the reserves are depleted [38]. So, let us look at practice and not just theory. Start with an instrument we have already written.

The Land Betterment Charge (Concessionary Relief) Order 2022, waives the betterment charge on state-leased university land, put to education and institutional use, and defines “university” as NUS and NTU. So, concessions already exist for the universities.

Nor is that the only place the state prices by decision. Land for a place of worship or a civic and community institution is already valued at half of full land value. On the Land Betterment Charge Table effective this March, this is about a tenth of what residential land in the same sector is assessed at [39].

That rate line is not only for rates of places of worship. Educational and institutional use sits in the same group, and is charged at three rates across the whole island, while every residential and commercial rate moves across 118 sectors.

For one class of use, the state already sets a price by decision rather than location. [40] And in 2023, the Government moved places of worship from competitive tender to fixed price ballot, precisely because bidding had driven prices to levels that distracted religious bodies into fundraising. Prices fell. Apparently, nobody raided the reserves.

What can we surmise?

For the Party opposite, fair market value is already a function of the interest granted. It is not a single number attached to a plot. Once you change the use class, the fair market value changes with it lawfully, with the Chief Valuer still doing the valuing. The Government identified that a market mechanism was pricing a use out of its own purpose, replaced it with an administered price, got a lower number, and the Chief Valuer still called it fair market value [41]. So, let us use the rules as they are. Let us create a use category for non-tradable restricted-tenure, mixed housing and enterprise land, and let the Chief Valuer value that restricted interest.

A clear valuation to build productive capacity for the next generation is not a raid on the reserves. It is the outlay side of an investment. It is what every family who pays for tuition for better economic prospects for their kids already knows: it is long-term economic foresight over short-term economic thinking.

How would the zone work if demand exceeds supply? We could ballot. Once in, the rent stays low once you are part of the zone, studying, working, building or serving it. A firm gets a fixed term and an option to renew and graduates out upon success. And a person who loses a job or whose startup dies, gets a year’s grace before the rent resets. [42] And if the housing is rented, never sold, it does not become an asset to be traded.

Mr Speaker, the price of land matters greatly. But it is not sufficient on its own. You must get the other conditions right too.

On governance, an innovation district is a place where things are tried and most of them fail. That requires us to tolerate some untidiness. Most of what I am asking requires no new legislation. JTC let its land on contracts it writes itself – rent formulas, renewal test, quotas, carve outs, occupancy covenants. [43] These are lease terms and not statutes, with already existing latitude.

We should lift the Urban Redevelopment Authority’s (URA’s) planning circular, capping non-academic use of a campus at 5% of floor area or 30,000 square metres. We can hasten visa decisions for deep-tech researchers and for the people the enterprises need, and aim to have every major decision in such a zone made within two weeks [44].

We should aim to devolve operational decisions to the zone’s own board, small and nimble, with the anchor university on it, able to make the bundled decisions on space, pilots, housing allocation, visas and procurements. And the board should be responsive to the people living in the zone who should have a say in how it is run [45].

On money, we should give this zone the ability to back its founders and enterprises. Lower rent is part of a draw. The bigger draw should be growth capital – the zone taking a stake in the enterprises that grow inside it.

Singapore and China established Suzhou Industrial Park in 1994. The zone grew its own investment arm, Oriza Holdings – state-owned, controlled by the Park’s Administration Committee, incorporated in 2001, with about US$14 billion under management today [46].

So, while we are not involved in Oriza Holdings, a zone-based financing body is not unknown to us. Many financial innovations have come from zones. China’s New Third Board, its national over-the-counter equity market for unlisted small companies, began in 2006 as a Zhongguancun Science Park Share Transfer pilot and went nationwide in 2013 [47].

So, we should capitalise a zone authority that can invest while providing optimal conditions for its startups and enterprises to succeed, taking a capped equity or revenue stake [48], and allow it to appropriate a portion of the funds it generates to further develop the zone. A zone of lower immediate commercial pressure for these enterprises is a place where experimentation and diversity can flourish.

Speaker, the zone is one bounded, reversible way to try on available land at a price that takes nothing from the reserves, with land prices outside the zone exactly the way they were – a way to make more Singaporeans involved in enterprise and R&D, and not only employees.

So, the ask is threefold: a zone around NTU; a new use category for restricted tenure, non-tradable, mixed housing and enterprise land, valued as the restricted interest it is; and a zone authority that runs its own operations and takes stakes in the enterprises it grows.

It is a controlled experiment in whether Singapore’s land pricing regime is suppressing agglomeration, entrepreneurship and indigenous capital formation. If there is a Singaporean secret sauce that inheres beyond the cost pressures of land and wages, then a zone here, alongside the one in Johor, will tell us. It is a test we should run for our younger generation.

We have spent 30 years making this country a good place for other people’s companies to succeed. I am asking that we spend the next 30 making it a place where our own can – not just a better deal for the young, a country which is built categorically for the young.

Speaker, in closing, there has been much talk that the world has changed and it is not changing back. [49] We can all feel it. So, here is the test of whether we are serious. We must reform significant parts of our present economic structure to deal with a changed world, to pursue growth that distributes more fairly, and to measure what makes that growth worth having – a fair share of national income, real income growth in line with productivity and a widening range of what an ordinary wage can afford.

Many of these changes must come at the national level, but some are assumptions, long in the tooth, that must be tested. Universal market land pricing is one. And a policy laboratory at real scale is how we test it. The zone is one part. In this Motion, each of my honourable friends will bring another - structural solutions to structural problems. Singaporeans deserve serious answers; and serious answers are what the Workers’ Party will provide. That is why we have moved this Motion to create an economy of the future that works for all. Sir, I seek to move.

II. Closing the debate

Delivered that evening, at the end of the debate.

Speaker, I thank every Member who spoke on both sides of this House.

We filed this Motion to provide answers to the economic worries top-of-mind for every Singaporean: whether there is a job and whether it lasts; whether the young person who has done everything asked of them can find work that goes somewhere; whether a flat is within reach; whether a small shop can survive its rent; whether the course a worker is sent on leads to a job; whether the growth we announced is felt in a wage; whether a Singaporean who wants to build something can afford to do it in spite of the high cost structure here.

This is our structured view across the factors of production, land, labour, capital, productivity. In this Motion, we have addressed nine of those questions and answered them systematically. I will recap them again.

First, how do we foster a dynamic innovation ecosystem that can overcome and maximise value in spite of high business cost and physical constraints?

I proposed a special zone around NTU, where state land is charged at development cost rather than market scarcity value. To take a different tack from the lack of flexibility, once shown to NUS and the One-North area. A zone authority that is able to make fast decisions on visas, space and procurement within weeks, with its own investment body to provide growth capital and take equity stakes in emerging enterprises.

It is an investment in our young and Singapore’s future.

I thank Mr Azhar Othman, who asked for wider R&D tax incentives and industry academia co-funding pools.

I thank Dr Neo Kok Beng for his observation of how A*STAR and our universities are still not adequately integrated with our SMEs, and his suggestion to encourage lab sharing during off hours. While we agree with his call for high-failure, high-impact state funding, we believe such public R&D spending must be paired with sovereign return mechanisms.

And I thank Mr Ng Shi Xuan for his relaying of the five C’s approach to the startup lifecycle.

I thank the Minister Jeffrey Siow for making my point on land pricing. Fair market value is already a function of the interest granted and not a number attached to a plot.

So, our state land and our rental policies should exercise maximum flexibility for our young and our young companies. Wherever land is priced, market scarcity value remains the default benchmark. We propose one zone where the benchmark is developmental cost and not scarcity, and welcome what we perceive to be the Minister’s posture of being more flexible.

Second, dynamic local firms. How can we create a business climate where dynamic local firms can emerge as drivers of innovation and become future cornerstones of the economy?

Assoc Prof Jamus Lim, proposed turning the machinery from push to pull. Support offered to firms automatically – grants paid upfront, rather than on reimbursement, because small firms’ binding constraint is cash and time, and not the existence of a scheme. He proposed widening qualifying research spending and seconding experts into SMEs, because domestic enterprises carry one dollar in five of this economy’s business research spending, and that gap does not close by a company deciding to try harder. And he proposed tying Catalist listing to State co-investment because the capital that is missing is pre-IPO.

I thank Mr Mark Lee, who mentioned his belief that the bridge between headline growth and lived business reality is a tripartite process. We appreciate his support for our core aspirations of a more inclusive economy.

I thank Mr Edward Chia, who advanced his belief that the existing toolkit was the answer. Progressive wages, Workfare, SkillsFuture, Forward Singapore. We agree at least on the vital goal of building a vibrant local ecosystem.

I thank Mr Azhar Othman for his speech. We share his concern for the ground pressures facing micro-businesses, particularly rising rents and labour costs that mid-career workers face today.

I thank Mr Saktiandi Supaat, who asked us to move beyond identifying these challenges to naming concrete policy choices. We gently note that we have already laid out these specific choices, including our positions on labour, rent and structural support throughout our speeches on this debate. Indeed, Mr Saktiandi Supaat asked whether our transmission mechanisms are strong enough to reach smaller firms and did not really answer his own question. So, if I may just ask him, what policy choices of transmission mechanisms to create upward convergence of smaller firms should we make?

Third, the roof over the household. How do we shed our rentier mindset by assuring that attractive affordable housing is available for every Singaporean household?

Mr Louis Chua proposed that land revenue maximisation stops being the primary aim of land policy. Because rent is not just one cost, it is already inside all of the others. He proposed concept and price tenders as the default for strategic sites, because a system where the highest bidder wins, the reserve price is unpublished, and unawarded sites simply wait, can only ratchet upward. And he proposed a HDB model for compute, because we take some $20 billion a year in land sales and set aside only about $150 million for a one-year compute programme.

Fourth, the start of a working life. How do we ensure our tertiary students and young workers find meaningful opportunities and good jobs in a challenging economy?

Mr Andre Low proposed a Fair Start Promise, a national commitment to work towards a simple goal: that young Singaporeans under 30, making the transition from education or National Service into working life, will get a fair start, through stable employment or a proper paid career-building pathway. He proposed to make entry-level hiring genuinely skills-based using verified skills evidence and practical assessments to match capable beginners to existing labour market demand.

He also advocated expanding the supply of properly paid apprenticeships, creating a national market, coordinating employers and shared training capacity, especially for SMEs, with paid employment, CPF, structured learning and portable competence. He proposed creating genuinely net new job opportunities via the use of targeted temporary risk-sharing arrangements and giving appropriate credit in suitable Government tenders for additional employee jobs and apprenticeships.

Minister of State Dinesh broadly agreed with Mr Andre Low’s proposals and acknowledged that he shared our aspiration of giving every young Singaporean a fair start. In particular, he agreed on the importance of expanding and strengthening work-based pathways, including apprenticeships.

Assoc Prof Kenneth Goh suggested a one-time course correction allowance,so a first-year university course transfer does not depend on family means. He suggested one or two subsidised semesters could be disregarded. I thank him for championing the very inclusivity our Motion seeks to entrench for all Singaporeans.

Fifth, pathways to a middle-class livelihood. How can we create accessible pathways for tradespersons to earn a decent middle-class livelihood?

Mr Gerald Giam proposed a practitioner-led guild, with chambers grown out of the trade societies we already have, because an employer federation cannot impartially certify a worker’s competence against his own members’ interest in keeping him. He proposed task-specific endorsements on a digital skills ledger, verified by practical assessment and he proposed licensing built into ITE curricula with an independent panel, an apprentice can appeal to.

We thank Assoc Prof Terence Ho for his valuable insights on the Career and Skills Passport and the importance of valuing workplace learning, acknowledging the gaps requiring enhancement to truly promote skills-first hiring, as my colleague Mr Andre Low pointed out.

Sixth, displacement and re-entry. Does our system of continuing education actually work? The journey, the destination and the proof.

Mr Fadli Fawzi proposed a universal redundancy insurance scheme, employer and employee together combining one-tenth of 1% of monthly salary, paying 40% of last drawn pay, capped at 40% of median, up to six months, with no application to make, because a worker who must apply and may be refused cannot plan.

We thank Minister of State Dinesh for mentioning that our positions are not very far. We hope this means that we will soon have universal redundancy support for all workers, rather than just the Jobseeker Support Scheme for the 60%.

Mr Fadli also proposed mandatory retrenchment benefits because they are discretionary today and can lawfully be zero, and a worker who has given years of service should not depend on goodwill. He proposed interest free postgraduate loans, CPF for Master’s programmes and outcomes published by course and by provider because deep reskilling is where the money runs out and we need to know which courses work.

Mr Azhar Othman asked for stronger monthly income support during retraining. We agree with the principle. We also could not agree more with Dr Wan Rizal when he says that effort without direction builds frustration. We need to give more direction to our people.

Seventh, the worker who is let go. What does the Singaporean worker actually receive when the retrenchment comes?

Our Party Leader Mr Pritam Singh asked what a retrenched worker in Singapore is entitled to and answered it. As a matter of law, currently, there is nothing. He proposed legislating a statutory floor for retrenchment benefits at a tripartite norm of two weeks’ salary for each year of service. He also proposed subsidiary legislation directing higher payouts for larger firms, up to the union norm of a month’s salary a year, and he proposed doing it now because the Courts have confirmed a gap.

This year, the Employment Claims Tribunals held that section 45 of the Employment Act creates no entitlement, and the tripartite guidelines create no legal basis for one. Every developed economy around us – China, South Korea, Taiwan, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, the Philippines – legislates for this, but we do not.

We thank Mr Patrick Tay for his valuable contribution to the debate. We find shared ground in our conviction that workers must never be treated as collateral damage during economic transitions and that we must proactively protect our PMEs from the displacement risk of AI. However, we respectfully frame our Motion as providing some of the legal force for the very protections NTUC has long lobbied for. So, we invite the Labour Movement to support legislative mandates for retrenchment benefits.

Eighth, what our accounts do not count. What parts of our economy do our national statistics fail to capture.

Ms He Ting Ru proposed a formalised wage ladder for care work, because a registered nurse, a social worker and a preschool teacher all earn below the national median in the very sectors that the ESR calls resilient. A wage floor was not built currently to reach them. She proposed compensation for family caregivers, expanded respite care and regular official time-use studies, because informal caregiving for seniors was valued at $1.28 billion a year and appears in no national account. We have not measured what it costs to the people who provide it. She proposed an environmental dashboard tracking the environmental outcomes of our policies.

Ninth, venturing abroad. How do we empower Singaporeans to seize the opportunities in the region and abroad?

Ms Eileen Chong proposed funding the OMIP to the person rather than through the employer, on the French model, where a state agency holds the contract, because tying a placement to a sponsoring employer’s growth plan caps it at that employer’s ambition. [50] She proposed scaling the places rather than only widening the gate, because the SG Youth Plan drops the two-year eligibility rule without committing to send anyone more. [51]

And she proposed publishing outcomes at two years and at five, because the 2018 scheme came with targets and no published outcome, and we still do not know whether going out pays you when you come home. She proposed tearing down the walls on coming home, around BTO queues, CPF and schooling re-entry for children.

We thank Mr Azhar Othman, who made policy suggestions for warehousing abroad, deal-making officers and tax incentives for reinvesting overseas profits back into R&D and capacity building.

I would like to address some points raised in relation to the Workers’ Party’s policies.

Ms Mariam Jaafar said, create before you capture. The sentiment is real but the diagnosis is wrong. Capability is what makes ownership possible, rather than the other way around. If we make rebalancing the organising principle of our strategy, we may not end up with more of these companies, we may end up with fewer. Target ownership without capability and competitiveness and we do not own more of the pie, we own more of a smaller one.

Of course, we have to have capability. We do not disagree. But let us use the PSA example from her speech. PSA did not acquire terminals because it had a data advantage. It got the data advantage because it owned the terminals. Ownership came first and capability compounded from it. Ownership without capability is a dead end, but capability without ownership does not build resilience in a fracturing world. Our position is that both are necessary.

While we agree on the goal of building globally competitive Singaporean companies, we see ownership not as a premature target, but an essential next chapter. After 60 years of successfully creating value through MNCs, our Motion seeks to ensure that Singaporeans move through value creation to capturing and owning more of that value today.

I believe Minister of State Dinesh was making some suggestions that some people were saying that Singapore’s economic model is failing. May I gently suggest that he may have misheard because I did not hear anyone making this point.

Minister Jeffrey Siow, I believe, mischaracterised our policies as saying we want to rely on the domestic market as a primary source. That is of course a non-starter to anyone who spends more than two seconds thinking about it. What we are saying is that domestic demand is necessary. We are not saying that domestic demand is sufficient.

I thank Minister Tan See Leng for making our point, about the domestic market being the platform for Parkway to enter foreign markets.

Onto the amendments. The hon Member Edward Chia moved four amendments.

AN ECONOMY OF THE FUTURE THAT WORKS FOR ALL:

That this House, notwithstanding the suggestions in the Economic Strategy Review on the future Singapore economy, believes: [line 1]

(a) in a more equal and inclusive economy, with opportunities for entrepreneurs to experiment, households and businesses to succeed, workers to thrive, and ideas and innovation to flourish; and [line 3]

(b) in an economic engine driven by dynamic local companies, healthy domestic demand, and Singaporeans and Singaporean capital venturing abroad. [line 5]

(1) In line 1, to delete “notwithstanding” and insert “in line with”;

(2) In line 5, to delete “economic engine driven” and insert “economy powered”;

(3) In line 5, after the words “local companies,” to insert “global enterprises,”; and

(4) In line 5, after the words “healthy domestic” to insert “and external”.

---

[Motion as amended]

AN ECONOMY OF THE FUTURE THAT WORKS FOR ALL

That this House, notwithstanding in line with the suggestions in the Economic Strategy Review on the future Singapore economy, believes:

(a) in a more equal and inclusive economy, with opportunities for entrepreneurs to experiment, households and businesses to succeed, workers to thrive, and ideas and innovation to flourish; and

(b) in an economic engine driven economy powered by dynamic local companies, global enterprises, healthy domestic and external demand, and Singaporean capital venturing abroad.

On Amendment No 1, to delete “notwithstanding” and insert “in line with”, the Workers’ Party cannot accept this amendment. This amendment does not simply remove a word. It turns the sentence around. Our Motion says this House believes in these things. The amendment says these things will follow from adopting the review. Ours commits the House to ends, but this amendment commits it to a document. A standard that is stated separately can test any plan, the Government and ours.

Let me be clear what the word is set against – “notwithstanding”. It is not the Review’s recommendations. Many of the diagnoses we shared are set against the risks that one Government document comes to be treated as the whole of the House’s thinking on the economy. “Notwithstanding” says only that our commitments are neither exhausted by that document nor derived from it.

That is how the word “notwithstanding” is used in our Constitution. Article 148A of the Constitution allows the President to assent to a Supply Bill, notwithstanding his opinion that it is likely to draw on past reserves. [52] If he does, that opinion must be stated in writing to the Speaker and published in the Gazette.

So, the word “notwithstanding” does not overrule the President, it does not say his opinion is wrong, it just requires that the opinion be genuinely held, that it stands on the record and it does not settle the outcome. And that is three things at once. That is our use precisely. The ESR proceeds, our belief stands on the record, and neither one decides the other.

We have no issues accepting Amendment Nos 2 and No 4. We had some reservations accepting Amendment No 3. The reason is because it is not a matter of simply including “global enterprises” into the text of the Motion. Had the amendment been “an economy powered by dynamic local enterprises supported by global enterprises”, we would have less of an issue with the change.

We are not choosing between being global and local. That is a false dichotomy.

The Workers’ Party believes categorically in an open economy. As my hon friend Jamus Lim has said, we are “not calling for a wholesale overhaul of our GLC-heavy, MNC-led and foreign capital-reliant model.”

We must acknowledge the long history of how our domestic firms have not felt sufficiently supported by the state in their effort to grow their companies and compete in their home economy and beyond. The proof of the pudding is in the eating. If this model has succeeded historically in delivering for so many domestic firms, then why and wherefore the history of these concerns? I ask all Members and especially Members opposite to honestly reflect upon these questions.

At this point, it is worth underscoring, as my honourable friend Jamus Lim pointed out at the end of his speech, that we are not seeking to undermine the contribution of MNCs to our economy, nor to stem access to foreign capital. Rather, we are calling for an evolution of how dominant MNCs and GLCs have been in our economy and to re-orient it towards the younger local companies and SMEs as they are more inherently rooted and can be a source of disruptive innovation.

To be clear, we are not pitting foreign versus local. Both are necessary. Suggesting otherwise is a false binary and it is a convenient strawman, but it is not an argument that we are making.

However, we will not nitpick on the semantics of Amendment No 3 and hence, will accept this amendment.

Back to Amendment No 1. Can the ESR carry the standing that is placed on it?

There is much to like about the ESR. It is diligently put together, has consulted widely and it outlines real challenges. But it is incremental and it sits within a tradition of reports that say the same thing.

This is not about the ESR in itself, this is about the whole continuity of reports since 2010.

The ESR is the fourth national economic blueprint since 2010. The 2010 Economic Strategies Committee, the 2017 Committee on the Future Economy, the 2021 Emerging Stronger Taskforce, and now this 2026 Review, with the same ambitions recurring in near identical language across all four: move up the value chain; grow home-grown champions; internationalise; reskill [53].

What is new in this report is AI. But that is a new exogenous factor that all countries must react to. Adding new chapters and footnotes to an existing playbook does not make a new playbook.

Have we arrived at those past reports’ medium- to long-term targets or not? It is hard to tell with the decreasing level of tracking with each report.

The 2010 Economic Strategies Committee set two targets.

One on productivity - to “achieve productivity growth of 2% to 3% per year over the next 10 years.” This goal was met [54].

One on enterprises. “We can raise this number significantly to reach 1,000 such enterprises over the next 10 years. [55]” Local companies with revenue over $100 million. This goal of 1,000 local companies with revenue over $100 million was not tracked after 2017, when the report recorded about 800 such companies. So, we do not know whether it was met [56].

The 2017 Committee on the Future Economy (CFE) set two targets.

One on growth – 2% to 3% per year – which was met. Again, a topline figure, necessary but insufficient by itself as a goal.

One on manufacturing. “The CFE recommends building a globally competitive manufacturing sector at about 20% of GDP over the medium term”. [57] This was not met. Manufacturing was 17.4% of GDP in 2016 and remains 17.4% in 2025.

From the 2021 Emerging Stronger Taskforce, I could find no macroeconomic targets at all. A pivot away from target setting altogether.

And in this 2026 ESR, the only target-shaped sentence, appearing twice, reads – “we should set an ambitious target to significantly increase the number of Singapore headquartered companies with more than one billion in revenue. [58]”

In 2010, the target was 1,000 local companies by 2020. In 2026, it is a recommendation that a target be set, and the companies counted have shifted from local to Singapore headquartered.

This strikes me as a government that maybe has become a little bit averse to being measured.

In May 2017, MTI wrote that every Industry Transformation Map has “tangible indicators and targets to measure the effectiveness of its strategies”. In July 2024, its own retrospective told readers that sector outcomes “should not be compared against these initial projections [59]”.

Targets are be watered down to projections, goals into aspirations. We are getting a bit familiar with this. The food policy “30 by 30” was dropped last November for narrower targets, five years later. An unambiguous goal became a bit more of a challenging aspiration [60].

I have not understood from this Government what is the next level of economic target detailed beyond topline growth targets, such as the type of growth or its distribution, that it will hold itself to. The Government wants us to know it will react swiftly once the monitoring alarms are triggered. The Review says so itself: on AI and workers, it recommends monitoring the impact closely and adjusting policies when needed. [61]

Mr Speaker, reacting swiftly is the basic expectation of any government. What matters far more is which structural and falsifiable targets it will set itself between now and 2030. After all, what is the vision and what would tell us whether we had reached it? Here is what we would hold ourselves accountable to beyond top-line growth: the indigenous share of national income rising, real wages in line with productivity growth, and a widening range of what an ordinary wage can afford. [62]

I have read the Review and, in my view, it is short of report cards and targets. Nor has a consolidated report card for any of the four blueprints been published. Our party leader, Mr Pritam Singh, asked for one in February. Separate the rhetoric about promises kept, from measurable outcomes. Untracked, consistency is indistinguishable from repetition. Surely, in spite of the uncertainties, there are macroeconomic targets beyond top-line growth that we can commit to.

So, let me put the question plainly. A Member who supports the Review because he wants a more equal and inclusive economy, and an engine driven by dynamic local companies already believes (a) and (b). These are the ends the Review is meant to serve. Voting for the Motion says that and nothing more. It does not criticise the Review and binds no one to our proposals.

Our Motion asks this House to commit to principles, the amendments ask it to commit to one set of operational plans.

So, I would like to ask Members of the House, especially Members opposite, to let the word stand and accept the Motion as originally worded.

Sir, in closing, we want to show Singaporeans a future, in which they see themselves thriving in a global environment that is increasingly challenging. Singaporeans deserve a country that is prepared to try what is necessary to give them that strongest shot of success.

Our Motion is thus written: opportunities for entrepreneurs to experiment because the ground and the capital to try are priced for incumbents; households and businesses to succeed because high land prices working their way through the economy make it structurally challenging; workers to thrive because the ladder above the wage floor must work; and for the wider swath of society, workers need room to experiment, pathways to succeed and a financial cushion to recover or pivot if retrenched; ideas and innovation to flourish because we need our R&D spending to lead to meaningful commercial outcomes; and an economic engine driven by dynamic local companies, healthy domestic demand and Singaporeans and Singaporean capital venturing abroad because Singaporeans need to understand that there is a system that encourages their economic flourishing and their dreams of tomorrow. [63]

Singaporeans do not lack drive, ambition or imagination. What we need is to be further empowered and supported to achieve our next successes in a different global context. We will leave no stone unturned in trying to better secure Singaporeans in uncertain times.

Mr Speaker, I thank this House for debating the future structural direction of our economy and I commend the Motion as originally worded to this House. Thank you.

Notes and sources

1. Singapore’s single-family-office count passed 2,000 in 2025 with combined assets under management of about US$66.8bn, up 43% year on year. Over the same period, Southeast Asia-focused venture funds recorded four final closes in all of 2025, against 33 two years earlier. On the debt side, venture debt accounts for under 5% of Singapore startup funding, against roughly 25% in the United States — EY-Parthenon, Singapore Venture Funding Landscape Report 2025, p32, a figure placed on the record by a member of the Economic Strategy Review’s Committee on Entrepreneurship.

2. This concern has been before the House before. On 27–28 August 2002 Parliament debated the Motion “New Charter of Government-Linked Companies”, moved by Mr Leong Horn Kee and standing also in the name of Mr Inderjit Singh, and agreed to it: “That this House… in view of the concerns of the private sector regarding GLCs, urges the Government to implement the recommendations of the EISC which define the new roles and positioning of the Government and GLCs in business and, in so doing, support the growth of private enterprise and entrepreneurship in Singapore.” The mover set out three concerns — “(1) Unlevel playing field; (2) Crowding out of the private sector; and (3) Transparency and trust” — following consultation with the Association of Small and Medium Enterprises, the Singapore Confederation of Industries and the Chambers of Commerce. He told the House that a Department of Statistics occasional paper of March 2001 found government-linked companies accounted for 12.9% of GDP in 1998, about a third of the locally controlled economy, and that Temasek’s own release put seven listed GLCs at 21% of Stock Exchange market capitalisation, or S$72 billion. Hansard: 27 August 2002 · 28 August 2002. Later independent work put GLCs at 37% of stock market value on 2008–2013 data: Sim et al., NUS Business School Centre for Governance, Institutions and Organisations (2014), cited in NUS Law Working Paper 2015/003. Replying to that Motion on 28 August 2002, DPM Lee Hsien Loong stated that “GLCs enjoy no protectionist measures from the Government”, while accepting the EISC’s “Yellow Pages rule” in principle: “If you can look it up in the book, why do you want to start a company to go and compete with the private sector?” An IMF working paper testing the question found no evidence that GLCs enjoy easier access to credit, but did find that GLC status carries a positive valuation premium beyond what the usual determinants of Tobin’s q explain — Ramirez and Tan, IMF Working Paper 03/156.

3. HDB Resale Price Index (SingStat M212161, 1Q2009 = 100): 131.0 in 1Q2019 to 203.4 in 1Q2026, a rise of 55% in seven years. Median monthly household employment income including employer CPF, resident employed households (SingStat 17870): $9,442 in 2019 to $12,027 in 2025, a rise of 27%.

4. Singapore levies no inheritance tax, and household wealth is concentrated in property: of $3,756,110m in household assets at 2026 Q1, residential property accounted for 42.9% and listed shares and securities for 4.4% (SingStat M700981). A 2025 industry survey found 53% of Singaporeans have received or expect to receive an inheritance, rising to 62% among those under 24. Children of parents who rented inherit nothing. On the income side over the same period, the Gini coefficient based on household income from work per household member was 0.470 in 2013 and 0.435 in 2025 before taxes and transfers, against 0.364 after. The pre-transfer figure is the one that has moved least, which is the distinction this Motion draws: the market distribution has barely improved, and the correction is applied afterwards out of the proceeds.

5. Fortune Global 500, 2026 list, published 28 July 2026. Singapore has three entrants — Trafigura (25), Wilmar International (195) and Olam Group (302) — all commodity traders; Trafigura was established in Lucerne in 1993 and Olam founded in Nigeria in 1989. South Korea has thirteen: Samsung Electronics, Hyundai Motor, SK, Kia, SK Hynix, Korea Electric Power, LG Electronics, Hanwha, HD Hyundai, POSCO Holdings, Hyundai Mobis, KB Financial and LG Chem. Taiwan has six: Hon Hai Precision, TSMC, Wistron, Quanta Computer, WT Microelectronics and Pegatron. Semiconductors (Samsung, SK Hynix, TSMC) and shipbuilding (HD Hyundai, Hanwha) are both represented.

6. The Complementarity Assessment Framework was announced in March 2022, applied to new Employment Pass applications from 1 September 2023, to renewals from 1 September 2024, and extended to the S Pass from 1 September 2025, with a minimum of 40 points required; S Pass sub-quotas stand at 10% of the workforce in services and 15% elsewhere, at a harmonised levy of S$650 a month. Three changes to the qualifying rule in three years is a planning cost for any firm deciding where to site a cost-sensitive regional function, distinct from any question of headcount policy, and it is one within the Government’s control. The terms of entry need to be stable enough to plan against.

7. H&M informed staff on 11 May 2026 that its South-east Asia head office would move from Singapore to Kuala Lumpur, with about 30% of regional support headcount removed — 78 of 256 positions in the former East Asia region, the majority of them in Singapore. Malay Mail, 13 May 2026 · Mothership. The same restructure created a new Asia-Pacific “continent” headquartered in Shanghai, with the North-east Asia market moving to Tokyo, India to Bangalore and Australia and New Zealand to Sydney.

8. Heineken announced in March 2026 that large-scale brewing at the Tuas plant would be progressively phased out by 2027, with output shifting to breweries in Malaysia and Vietnam. Asia Pacific Breweries Singapore moves to an import-led supply model, and about 130 roles are affected in phases, with severance and reskilling support. The company states that Tuas will become a regional logistics hub and product-development brewery, and that Singapore remains the global home of the Tiger brand. Mothership, March 2026 · Heineken newsroom · Bloomberg, 25 March 2026

9. Brynjolfsson, Chandar and Chen, Canaries in the Coal Mine? Six Facts about the Recent Employment Effects of Artificial Intelligence, Stanford Digital Economy Lab, revised November 2025, use payroll microdata from ADP covering millions of United States workers and report a relative decline of about 13% in employment for workers aged 22 to 25 in the most AI-exposed occupations since late 2022 — 16% in specifications controlling for firm-level shocks — persisting after those controls and concentrated in occupations where the technology automates rather than augments. The mechanism matters for the argument here: the adjustment runs through reduced hiring of new entrants rather than through separations of incumbents, so the burden falls on those trying to enter rather than on those already employed. Stanford Digital Economy Lab. The data is American; no equivalent payroll study has been published for Singapore, which is itself a gap worth closing.

10. Graduate Employment Survey 2025, published March 2026: overall employment 88.9%, down from 91.2%; full-time permanent employment down from 79.4% to 74.4%; median gross monthly salary unchanged at $4,500. MOE

11. Where research-origin companies have reached that scale, the listing has tended to happen elsewhere. Mirxes, an A*STAR spin-off founded in 2014, listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange on 23 May 2025, raising HK$1.09bn and closing above a US$1bn valuation — South-east Asia’s first biotech unicorn, listed offshore. On the research base beneath this: local enterprises, government-linked companies included, perform about S$1.7bn of Singapore’s roughly S$9bn of business R&D, and the Ministry of Trade and Industry gave no separate figure for government-linked companies when asked in a written reply of 7 April 2026.

12. EDB Year 2025 in Review, published 9 February 2026. Prior years: EDB Year 2024 in Review, 6 February 2025 — fixed asset investment S$13.5bn, 18,700 jobs, S$23.5bn value-added; and EDB Year 2023 in Review — S$12.7bn, 20,045 jobs, S$26.7bn value-added. All three releases describe the jobs and value-added figures as expected, when the commitments are realised over the following five years; the investment figures are commitments made in the year.

13. Prime Minister Lawrence Wong, May Day Rally, 1 May 2025: “the world has changed — and it is not changing back anytime soon.” PMO. See also his video message on the United States tariffs of 4 April 2025 — “the era of rules-based globalisation and free trade is over”, and we are entering a phase “more arbitrary, protectionist, and dangerous” PMO — and the Ministerial Statement of 8 April 2025: “the new era will be more volatile, with more frequent and unpredictable shocks.” PMO

14. On the International Labour Organization’s series for SDG indicator 10.4.1 — compensation of employees plus imputed labour income of the self-employed, over gross domestic product, a definition that already grants the largest measurement objection available — Singapore’s 2020–24 five-year average is 43.8%, the second-lowest of twenty-five advanced economies, ahead only of Ireland. Five-year blocks are used because the ratio rises mechanically in downturns. The comparators on the same basis: Switzerland 69.8%, Belgium 62.8%, Germany 61.4%, France 60.2%, Korea 58.4%, the United States 56.8%, Japan 55.6%, Hong Kong 54.0%, Taiwan 52.1%, Norway 45.1%, Ireland 31.7%. Singapore’s own published compensation-of-employees share of GDP, on the narrower national definition, was 37.8% in 2025, and the 2021–25 block is the lowest five-year reading in the forty-five-year series; “around forty per cent” spans the two. Three common explanations do not survive the panel. Advanced East Asia clusters between 52.1% and 58.4%, and Taiwan, Hong Kong, Japan and Korea all rose between the 2005–09 and 2020–24 blocks while Singapore fell 2.5 points. Hong Kong, the closest city-state comparator — no hinterland, entrepôt and finance-led, a very large migrant workforce, a higher Gini, no minimum wage until 2011 — reads ten points higher and has stayed between 51.8% and 55.7% in every year since 2004. And a multinational-denominator distortion of the Irish kind shows up as a break: Ireland moved from 54.4% to 31.7%, concentrated in 2015 on intellectual-property onshoring, whereas Singapore’s series contains no such break and its low share is a level present throughout. The honest qualification is that small economies with large non-labour income streams do run lower shares for real reasons — Norway on resource rents — but Norway answered that by building the Government Pension Fund Global and Ireland by constructing GNI*, while Singapore built indigenous GNI and discontinued it after reference year 2016, which is what the text asks be reversed. The ILO series is modelled for every country, which supports ranking and comparison rather than a precise level claim for any one of them.

15. The indigenous GDP and GNI series are no longer compiled. In a written reply of 12 January 2022, the Ministry of Trade and Industry said the series had ceased for “a lack of public demand”, and that they are “not national accounts concepts nor are they compiled by other countries.” MTI. A resident-share breakdown of GDP growth was subsequently said to be “not available” in a further written reply of 9 September 2024.

16. National Wages Council 2025/2026 Guidelines, 11 November 2025, paragraphs 2 and 3: “Over a longer period from 2016 to 2024, overall labour productivity grew by 2.5% per annum”, and “Over a longer period from 2016 to 2024, real income (mean) grew by 1.3% per annum” — followed by the Council’s own conclusion that “Productivity growth exceeded wage growth over the longer term, even though the productivity-wage gap narrowed in the first half of 2025.” MOM. Three specifications, because the pairing can be contested on each. The income figure is the mean, defined at the Council’s note 4 as gross monthly income including employer CPF and excluding bonuses, for full-time employed residents excluding full-time national servicemen; computed on the median instead, from Department of Statistics Table M182981 deflated by the all-items Consumer Price Index (M213801), real income grew 1.73% a year over the same window — the lag narrows on a median basis but does not close. The productivity figure of 2.5% is real value-added per actual hour worked; per worker, which is the closer match to a per-worker income series, the Council’s note 3 gives 2.0% a year. And the direction reversed in the most recent half-year the Council reports: real mean income grew 3.2% year-on-year in the first half of 2025 against productivity growth of 2.9%.

17. International Labour Organization, annual growth rate of real GDP per employed person — the ILO series for SDG indicator 8.2.1, DF_SDG_0821_NOC_RT — retrieved from the ILO SDMX endpoint in August 2026. The rate is the geometric mean of the eight annual growth observations for 2017 to 2024, which is the change from 2016 to 2024; compounding is used rather than a single year because single years are volatile, Singapore’s own running from −1.6% in 2020 to +8.7% in 2021. On that basis Singapore grew 2.26% a year, third of the twenty-five advanced economies in the panel, against a median of 0.47%. Two economies grew faster and are not among those listed above: Taiwan at 3.33%, and Ireland at 3.67%, whose reading is an artefact of the multinational profit booking that inflates its GDP denominator. The measure is output per employed person rather than per hour; average hours in Singapore are long by advanced-economy standards, so a per-hour panel would be more favourable to Singapore rather than less, which makes this the conservative basis. It agrees with the domestic figure: 2.26% a year here against the National Wages Council’s 2.0% a year per worker on the identical window.

18. Glaeser, Kolko and Saiz, “Consumer City”, Journal of Economic Geography 1(1), 2001 (NBER Working Paper 7790). High-amenity cities grew faster than low-amenity cities, and urban rents rose faster than urban wages, indicating that demand for city living rose for reasons beyond wages; continued agglomeration is sustained by a preference for variety in urban services and amenities, and as firms become more mobile the success of cities depends increasingly on their role as centres of consumption. NBER · Harvard

19. No official services diversity index is published, and no chain-versus-independent split is published by the Department of Statistics, the Urban Redevelopment Authority or the Singapore Land Authority. The underlying data is already collected: establishments by five-digit SSIC in services, numbering 320,595 in 2024 (SingStat M601481); the licensed food-establishment register (M890531); and the ACRA register of companies with addresses and activity codes. A standard construction would be a Shannon entropy index over SSIC-class shares by planning area, together with the single-outlet share of food-and-beverage and retail establishments. On the underlying pattern, the Competition and Consumer Commission’s Market Inquiry into the Leasing of Private Retail Spaces of 1 August 2023 found that chain operators “tend to form the bulk of the tenants at centrally managed non-strata-titled retail developments.”

20. A concession of this kind already exists in law. The Land Betterment Charge (Concessionary Relief) Order 2022, paragraph 12, provides that the charge is not payable on land under a State lease granted to a university for “Educational Institution or educational and institutional related uses”, with relief capped by a formula using a deemed plot ratio of 1.4; paragraph 12(3) defines “university” as the National University of Singapore and Nanyang Technological University. AGC. The relief is limited in two respects: the deemed plot ratio of 1.4, and the restriction to educational use.

21. Greenfield sites have a much higher risk profile.

22. Global Innovation Index 2025 (WIPO): Singapore ranks first in the world on innovation inputs, for the fifteenth consecutive year, and ninth on innovation outputs, which the Intellectual Property Office of Singapore reported as its strongest output showing in a decade. WIPO · IPOS

23. Singapore has run such an institution before. The Development Bank of Singapore was incorporated on 16 July 1968 to take over the industrial financing responsibilities of the Economic Development Board, beginning operations on 1 September 1968 under Hon Sui Sen, who was the Board’s chairman until that December. It made medium- and long-term loans, took equity participation, and guaranteed loans raised by entrepreneurs from other sources — described as “the first development bank to fully involve the private sector in financing manufacturing and other industrial projects in Singapore.” It rebranded as DBS Bank Ltd in 2003. NLB Infopedia. Singapore’s current instruments are of a different kind: a Growth Capital Workgroup was convened at Budget 2026 under Mr Chee Hong Tat, Minister for National Development and Deputy Chairman of the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS); Anchor Fund @ 65 stands at S$3bn following a second tranche; and S$1bn was added to Startup SG Equity. Each is an equity co-investment or market-development vehicle rather than a lending institution. The pattern is not confined to DBS. Temasek Holdings was incorporated on 25 June 1974 to hold and manage the Government’s investments in local companies, beginning with 35 companies transferred from the Minister for Finance, and began diversifying abroad from March 2002; its net portfolio value stood at S$518 billion at 31 March 2026, with about 52% of the portfolio in Singapore-headquartered companies and 27% of underlying exposure to Singapore. The observation is narrower: Singapore has twice built an instrument for financing local industrial development and twice allowed the function to lapse without a successor, so that what is proposed here is a restoration rather than an invention.

24. MND and HDB media statement, 7 December 2022. For FY2021/22 and 13,506 completed flats, total development cost was S$5.346bn — S$3.167bn of land, S$2.077bn of building and S$102m of acquisition from former owners — giving $396,000 per flat, of which $234,000 was land and $154,000 construction, land representing 59% of the total. The arithmetic is internally consistent: S$5.346bn divided by 13,506 is $395,824. Land cost alone in prior years was about $224,000 (FY2020/21) and $202,000 (FY2019/20). The disclosure has not been repeated: HDB’s FY2024/25 audited financial statements contain no per-flat split between land and construction. As an illustration of what would be forgone, letting a thousand homes at cost rather than at that assessed land value would forgo about $234 million in 2022 prices; alternatively, on the Land Betterment Charge table effective 1 March 2026 the gap between the non-landed residential rate and the educational and institutional rate in an outer sector is roughly $6,500 per square metre of gross floor area, which on a 46 square metre unit is about $300,000, or $300 million per thousand homes. Both are order-of-magnitude figures on stated assumptions rather than a costing.

25. Centre for Liveable Cities, one-north, Urban Systems Study, 2018. CLC

26. The Ministry of Trade and Industry’s Economic Survey of Singapore 2025, on 2024 data, puts rental at 22.5–32.2% in retail, 16.6–17.1% in food and beverage and 16.3% in accommodation. JTC’s posted land rent is likewise a small fraction of built-space rent: International Business Park at plot ratio 2.5 is $97.09 per square metre a year, about $0.69 per square foot a month, against market business-park asking rents of $4.00–6.50. Land cost therefore bears most heavily on housing, where it is the dominant share, and on the consumer floorspace that carries the diversity of services.

27. The characterisation of Kent Ridge and one-north having no allocatable land remaining is based on the built-out condition of both districts. On commercialisation output, the National University of Singapore’s GRIP 2.0 programme, launched in 2018, has produced around 100 spin-offs from some 170 teams, raising close to S$65 million in external funding; Nanyang Technological University’s LLP 2.0, launched in 2017, has produced about 60 spin-offs from over 250 teams, raising more than S$23 million. NUS Enterprise and NRF joint release. The case for siting the experiment at NTU turns on the availability of land whose price can still be set.

28. The Jurong Innovation District spans 620 hectares, covering Nanyang Technological University, JTC’s CleanTech Park and the Bulim, Bahar and Tengah areas. The current expansion phase covers the CleanTech Park and Bahar precincts, a 116-hectare site along Jalan Bahar near the Pan Island Expressway intersection, adjacent to NTU. JTC’s stated rationale for selecting these precincts is their adjacency to existing industrial zones such as Bulim and the upcoming Tengah Industrial Estate, with proximity to NTU intended to strengthen collaboration between academia and industry. Non-invasive site preparation, including soil investigation and surveys, was planned to commence in the first quarter of 2026. JTC — Jurong Innovation District · JTC — public feedback on the CleanTech Park and Bahar Environmental Impact Assessment

29. Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Trade and Industry Gan Kim Yong defended the clearance of 52 hectares of forest for the Jurong Innovation District expansion on 3 February 2026. The Environmental Impact Assessment was commissioned by JTC as lead developer, and mitigation measures include retaining 14.5 hectares of greenery together with wildlife management plans. Report of 3 February 2026

30. Punggol Digital District covers approximately 50 hectares at full completion, developed by JTC and anchored by JTC’s own campus and the Singapore Institute of Technology’s Punggol campus. It opened progressively from the third quarter of 2024, initially covering 21 hectares, with Teck Lee LRT station opening on 15 August 2024 and Punggol Coast MRT station on 10 December 2024. SIT began relocating in September 2024 and its campus opened officially a year later. The district is expected to create 28,000 jobs. JTC · EDB

31. Three Jurong Region Line stations serve the campus: Nanyang Gateway (JW3), which sits within NTU, Nanyang Crescent (JW4) and Peng Kang Hill (JW5), all in Phase 3. Sources differ on whether Phase 3 opens in 2028 or 2029; the line’s full completion is now given as 2029, moved from 2028 following pandemic delays. NTU — MRT construction on campus · Land Transport Guru · Nanyang Gateway MRT station

32. The Johor-Singapore Special Economic Zone Agreement was signed by Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Trade and Industry Gan Kim Yong and Malaysia’s Minister of Economy Rafizi Ramli and exchanged on 7 January 2025 at the 11th Malaysia-Singapore Leaders’ Retreat, witnessed by Prime Minister Lawrence Wong and Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim. The zone spans more than 3,500 square kilometres, over four times the area of Singapore, across nine flagship areas and eleven sectors. EDB

33. Rates for academic year 2026/27, following an increase of about 8.1% at NTU: non-air-conditioned double en-suite (Hall 2) $412 a month, air-conditioned single (Hall 5) $657. At NUS: double non-air-conditioned $114 a week and single non-air-conditioned $165 a week, about $494 and $715 a month as billed. NUS rate card, 25 March 2026; NTU rates reported by Mothership, 10 July 2026, NTU not publishing its rate table publicly. These are term-basis rates: NUS bills 35 weeks of 52, so the headline embeds roughly a third of vacancy that a year-round building does not carry. Annualised over twelve months, the NUS single is about $481 and the NTU air-conditioned single about $548.

34. SG Youth Plan Report. The rooms are reported at roughly 30% below usual market rates, with the operators absorbing the discount; no concession on the price of state land is involved.

35. The ratio depends on which room and which basis. Against NTU’s non-air-conditioned double at $412, $1,950 at Coliwoo Boon Lay is 4.7 times; against NTU’s air-conditioned single at $657 it is 3.0 times; and against that same single annualised over twelve months at $548 it is 3.6 times. The last is the like-for-like comparison — a private room against a private room, both on a twelve-month basis.

36. Graduate Employment Survey 2025: median gross monthly salary for fresh graduates of the six autonomous universities, $4,500, unchanged from the previous year. MOE. After the 20% employee CPF contribution that is $3,600 in hand. The room rate of $1,950 alone is 54% of that; the figure of sixty per cent includes the scheme’s fixed utility charge. Before the 30% discount, the same room at about $2,786 would take 77% of take-home pay. The single-income denominator is the one this proposal is designed around: spatial and financial autonomy is sought before partnership rather than after it, so a room that becomes affordable only once two incomes are pooled is priced for couples. Fresh-graduate income also understates earnings a few years into a career, which is why the design contemplates a defined window of eligibility rather than indefinite tenure.

37. The figure quoted in the speech. A 500 square foot unit at $200 per square foot is $100,000 of construction; amortised over ten years at 5% the payment is $1,060.80 a month, or $2.12 per square foot, and about $354 a head across three occupants before a sinking fund. Over twenty years it is $1.32 per square foot. The $200 rate is conservative against the Government’s own disclosure: $154,000 of construction on a flat of about 90 square metres implies roughly $159 per square foot, so the rate used here sits about a quarter above it. This route depends on no university subsidy and no concessionary land. The corroborating model. The build-up, with each assumption stated. Monthly cost equals construction floor area multiplied by build cost and by the capital recovery factor, divided by twelve, plus renewal, maintenance and utilities, all divided by one minus vacancy — where the capital recovery factor is r/(1−(1+r)^−n). Assumptions: net-to-construction-floor-area gross-up of 1.30–1.55; all-in build cost of $2,300–$3,650 per square metre including about 13% for fees and contingency and excluding land; discount rate 2.5–4.0%; asset lives of 30 and 50 years; renewal at 0.6–1.5% of capital a year; maintenance $80–250 and utilities $40–70 per room per month; vacancy 5–10%. GST is excluded, residential rent being exempt so that input GST is unrecoverable; about 9% should be added to capital for a complete figure. For a dorm-style private room of 12–20 square metres net this yields $256 to $1,119 a month, with a central case of $478 over fifty years and $549 over thirty. Two independent cross-checks support the band. First, the published university rates annualised: the NUS single at $481 against $478 modelled, and the NTU air-conditioned single at $548 against $549 modelled — the convergence of the bands, $478–549 modelled against $481–548 observed, is independently derived, though agreement to the dollar should not be read as precision. Second, a completed building: NESST Tukang, owned by the Ministry of Manpower and opened in January 2026, cost S$58 million for 2,400 residents, or S$24,167 per bed (written parliamentary answer, 2 March 2026), which grosses up to $211–319 per bed per month on a cost-recovery basis. For scale, the islandwide average dormitory bed rent was S$485 a month in the second half of 2025, up 79.6% from S$270 in the first half of 2019 (DASL H2 2025 Dormitory Report); the 2019 rate sat inside the cost-recovery band. Two further reference points: HDB builds at roughly half the private medium-quality condominium rate, so a model built on private costs is conservative against what the State can deliver; and HDB’s own Public Rental Scheme lets flats at $26–275 a month, between 10 and 50% of cost recovery, so the State already prices space well below cost as well as below market.

38. The doctrine as stated by the Government. Indranee Rajah, oral reply of 7 November 2022 to Leong Mun Wai and Pritam Singh: “Under the Constitution, all state land forms part of the reserves”, and if fair market value is not paid “the past reserves will be depleted.” MOF. Lawrence Wong, FY2023 Budget round-up of 24 February 2023, described below-market land as “a raid on the reserves” carrying a risk of “destabilising the entire property market”. The Government’s correction of 14 October 2022 adds that pricing below fair market value “would constitute a draw on Past Reserves”, which requires the President’s concurrence rather than being prohibited. Factually

39. The Singapore Land Authority states: “For Place of Worship and Civic and Community Institution use, the lands will be valued for sale based on 50% of the full land value, determined by applying the factor of 5/7 to the applicable LBC rate”, against a factor of 10/7 for other uses. SLA — Sale of Remnant Land. On the rate table effective 1 March 2026, Sector 1 carries Use Group E (place of worship, civic and community institution) at $1,022 per square metre against Use Group B2 (non-landed residential) at $11,340 — 9.0%; Sector 106 carries E at $812 against B2 at $7,350 — 11.0%. The 50% factor names place of worship and civic and community institution use, and does not name educational use, which shares the rate line but not necessarily the sale-valuation treatment. Civic and community institution use is secular: it covers such facilities as childcare centres, eldercare homes and community sports halls.

40. Land Betterment Charge Use Group E comprises “place of worship, community building, community sports and fitness building, educational and institutional uses, government building” (Annex F — Use Groups Table), so educational use does sit in the same group. Group E is not charged at a single island-wide rate: on the table effective 1 March 2026 it takes three values — $1,022 across sectors 1 to 91, $812 across 92 to 115 and $427 across 116 to 118 — while Use Groups A, B, C and D vary across all 118 sectors. Annex A — LBC Rates March 2026

41. “Revised Land and Pricing Allocation Framework for Place of Worship Land”, Ministry of Culture, Community and Youth, 28 May 2023. The Government’s stated reasons were that “land prices for places of worship (PW) have risen sharply over the years, as a result of competitive bidding”, and that religious organisations “have to spend more time and effort to do fundraising, which may sometimes distract them from the core work to serve society and promote religion.” The framework moved allocation “from a competitive price tender to a fixed price ballot”; the price is published upfront and “determined by the Chief Valuer based on fair market value”; and prices “are generally lower than the prices of similar sites that were recently tendered out”, because the Chief Valuer references “the price of PW land which had not been tendered before.” MCCY

42. The oldest precedent for renting rather than selling. Leland Stanford’s founding grant prohibited the sale of Stanford University’s land but permitted it to be leased. In 1951 Frederick Terman, dean of engineering, established what became the world’s first university research park on that basis; the first tenant, Varian Associates, took a 99-year lease on a ten-acre site in October 1951, and the lease income has supported the university since. Stanford Research Park · Stanford Office of Technology Licensing Eligibility could be tied to a window measured from graduation — of the order of one to five years — rather than to participation alone. A window fixes the population the zone is designed for, which is what makes a graduate-income affordability benchmark the correct one; it suits those willing to trade space and comfort for low cost and proximity to others doing the same; and it turns the population over by construction, which answers what happens if demand permanently exceeds supply.

43. JTC already conditions tenure on outcomes by contract. Its lease-renewal handbook states that renewal “is not guaranteed, and is subject to our assessment”, and is assessed on “the economic contribution and productivity of the project, creation of good jobs, synergistic linkages to other sectors of our economy, as well as the optimisation of land use”. Applicants file projected worker numbers, occupations and remuneration supported by audited financial statements, and “should there be a shortfall between the committed and actual figures, the lease term will be pro-rated accordingly.” JTC What is proposed is nonetheless distinct from the instruments now in use. On the business park estate, the Ministry of Trade and Industry’s position is that “JTC Corporation (JTC) does not provide incentives for the spaces at business parks, which are rented out based on market rates”, and the incentives that do exist — the start-up tax exemption, the Pioneer Certificate, the Development and Expansion Incentive — are national and firm-level, available anywhere in Singapore. None is a property of a district. The devolved board, the two-week decision clock, the lifting of the campus commercial-quantum cap and the resident voice would together constitute a rulebook attached to a boundary rather than to a company, which no existing industrial estate has.

44. Urban Redevelopment Authority Circular URA/PB/2003/08-DCD of 7 April 2003 caps non-academic use on a campus at 5% of gross floor area or 30,000 square metres, whichever is lower. URA. It is a planning guideline issued by the planning authority, not a statutory provision.

45. There is a domestic precedent for devolved authority in an innovation district. The Centre for Liveable Cities records that one-north functioned as a testbed because agencies were given leeway to depart from usual planning rules, and that a Steering Committee acted as a dispute-resolution body to settle cross-agency conflicts. CLC

46. Oriza Holdings (元禾控股), the investment arm of Suzhou Industrial Park, is a state-owned enterprise controlled by the Park’s Administration Committee. It was incorporated on 28 November 2001 as China-Singapore Suzhou Industrial Park Ventures, tracing its origins to the establishment of the Park by Singapore and China in 1994. It runs venture capital, private equity, private credit and fund-of-funds operations with assets under management of approximately US$14 billion as of 2023, and its fund-of-funds arm was China’s first professional, market-oriented fund-of-funds management team. Oriza Holdings · Oriza — About Us

47. China’s New Third Board — the National Equities Exchange and Quotations, its over-the-counter market for the shares of unlisted small companies — was launched in 2006 as the Zhongguancun Science Park Non-listed Share Transfer Pilot and extended nationwide in 2013. AllBright Law Offices · Zhongguancun. Land reform followed a similar sequence: China’s Constitution was amended in 1988 to permit transactions in land-use rights after the Shenzhen experiment had been run. Lincoln Institute of Land Policy

48. Three working models exist for a zone or state authority that finances the firms within it, and each prices its own exit. In Taiwan, TSMC’s seed capital came from the National Development Fund, which held 48% — deliberately kept below half so that the company would not be regarded as state-owned — and was diluted out through the 1993 Taiwan Stock Exchange and 1997 New York listings. In Israel, the Yozma programme of 1993 deployed US$100 million, US$20m directly and US$80m matching private capital at 40% across ten venture funds, with the Government retaining 40% of each fund and the private managers holding a five-year call option to buy that stake out if the fund succeeded; all but one exercised it, and Israeli venture capital was almost entirely private by 2000. In the United States, MIT anchored The Engine’s first fund with US$25 million and its second with US$35 million, alongside about 200,000 square feet of purpose-built space in an MIT-owned building beside the campus, so that space and capital come from one balance sheet. Yozma · OECD · MIT News. The China Quarterly, 2023

49. Prime Minister Lawrence Wong, May Day Rally, 1 May 2025: “the world has changed — and it is not changing back anytime soon.” PMO. See also his video message on the United States tariffs of 4 April 2025 — “the era of rules-based globalisation and free trade is over”, and we are entering a phase “more arbitrary, protectionist, and dangerous” PMO — and the Ministerial Statement of 8 April 2025: “the new era will be more volatile, with more frequent and unpredictable shocks.” PMO

50. OMIP: launched 15 Nov 2024, employer-tied by design (SWDA; MOM to Gerald Giam, 4 Feb 2025); “more than 70 local employees” against 250 places/$16m — MOM to Muhaimin, 15 Oct 2025 (MOM); “more than 120 local professionals” supported since launch — Tan See Leng, MOM Committee of Supply speech, 3 Mar 2026 (MOM) — the same speech claims “over 430” across all agencies’ overseas programmes and announces OMIP’s expansion to younger professionals; crowd-in doctrine — PM Wong, Budget 2026 (Budget); “We do not pick winners” — Iswaran, 2017 (ST).

51. Gan Kim Yong, 4 April 2022 — all electrical works are carried out by licensed electrical workers meeting industry technical and safety requirements (MTI); Gan, 4 November 2025 — new ITE diploma and mid-career pathways to the Licensed Electrical Worker qualification (MTI). The Specialists Trade Alliance of Singapore is an employer federation; the two-year post-qualification experience requirement and the employer sign-off are the operative bottleneck.

52. Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (2020 Reprint), Article 148A(1): the President may withhold assent to a Supply Bill if in his opinion the estimates are likely to draw on past reserves, “except that if the President assents to any such Bill notwithstanding his opinion that the estimates, supplementary estimates or statement of excess are likely to lead to a drawing on those reserves, the President shall state his opinion in writing addressed to the Speaker and shall cause his opinion to be published in the Gazette.” Article 22B(2), on the budget of a statutory board, and Article 22D(2), on the budget of a Government company, carry the same construction: “except that if he approves any such budget notwithstanding his opinion that the budget is likely to so draw on those reserves, the President shall cause his opinion to be published in the Gazette.” A separate and ordinary use of the word appears at Article 86, “Validity of proceedings notwithstanding vacancy in membership”, where it preserves the effect of a provision against a competing fact rather than against an opinion.

53. The four blueprints: Economic Strategies Committee, 2010 — quantified targets: productivity (”2 to 3 percent per year over the next 10 years… raise our productivity by one-third”, p.5) and enterprises (”reach 1,000 such enterprises over the next ten years”, revenue above S$100m, p.21); no “+30% median income” target exists in the report. Committee on the Future Economy, 2017 — the growth ambition, in the report’s own words in the executive summary and again at paragraph 71: “Over the next decade, our collective efforts should enable us to grow by 2-3% per year on average, exceeding the performance of most advanced economies.” Real GDP growth averaged 3.45% a year over 2017–2025, or 3.39% compounded, so the range has been exceeded, with the decade not yet run (SingStat M015721, computed 3 Aug 2026). The manufacturing ambition, at printed page 34: “the CFE recommends building a globally competitive manufacturing sector, at around 20% of GDP, over the medium term.” On the current series manufacturing was 17.4% of GDP in 2016, reached 20.6% in the 2021 semiconductor year, fell to 16.3% in 2024 and stood at 17.4% in 2025 — no durable movement toward 20% (SingStat M015731, current prices, SSIC 2020). Two measurement notes: manufacturing’s 2024 low of 16.3% recovered to 17.4% in 2025; and the CFE’s own text puts 2016 at “around 20% of GDP” on the older classification, so a baseline drawn across the two series is not comparable. Emerging Stronger Taskforce, 17 May 2021 — no macro-economic targets located in the report (the sole dated numeric targets are the Built Environment AfA’s, p.71, never accounted). The ESR — launched 4 Aug 2025, final report June 2026 (gov.sg). Continuity conceded: Budget 2026’s “Advance Our Refreshed Economic Strategy” (Budget 2026); the Review “build[s] on past economic reviews” (MDDI, 4 Aug 2025). Report-card demand: Pritam Singh, Budget 2026 debate (wp.sg).

54. Productivity grew 2.8% a year per actual hour worked from 2009 to 2019, “achieving the target set by the ESC” — MTI, Economic Survey of Singapore 3Q2020 (MTI PDF). Real median income from work rose 32.4% over 2010–2020, which compounds to about 2.85% a year (MOM, archived) The National Wages Council records overall labour productivity growth of 2.5% a year from 2016 to 2024 against real mean income growth of 1.3% a year (MOM). On a median basis over the same window the gap narrows to 1.73% a year but does not close.

55. Economic Strategies Committee, 2010 — productivity target at p.5, enterprise target at p.21. The 2017 restatement of the enterprise target (”around 800 such companies, up from 560 in 2009”) is at printed p.79 of the CFE report PDF.

56. Productivity: +2.8% p.a. per actual hour worked 2009–2019, “achieving the target set by the ESC” — MTI, ESS 3Q2020 (MTI PDF); real median income +32.4% 2010–2020 (MOM, archived). Enterprises: 530 (2007) → “around 800… up from 560 in 2009. Singapore should build on this progress” (CFE 2017, printed p.79) → ~800 as of 2016, “we remain on track… track the number… and review the indicators regularly” (written answer, sitting 5 Feb 2018 — Hansard PDF); no official count published since (absent from every MTI COS 2017–2025, Budget 2021, and MTI’s Jul 2024 retrospective — full texts searched). For comparison, the ESR’s Table 1 figure of 4,300 enterprises above S$100m (2024) counts ALL enterprises including foreign entities — a different universe from “local companies”. Indigenous GDP/GNI series discontinued for “a lack of public demand” — to Mr Louis Chua, 12 Jan 2022 (MTI). Mirxes: HK$1.09bn HKEX IPO, 23 May 2025, A*STAR spin-off (global offering; debut); Chinese cornerstones incl. a Fosun subsidiary.

57. The Committee on the Future Economy stated its growth ambition twice, in the executive summary and again at paragraph 71: “Over the next decade, our collective efforts should enable us to grow by 2-3% per year on average, exceeding the performance of most advanced economies.” Real GDP growth averaged 3.45% a year over 2017–2025, or 3.39% compounded, so the range has been exceeded, with the decade not yet run (SingStat M015721, computed 3 August 2026). The manufacturing ambition is at printed page 34: “the CFE recommends building a globally competitive manufacturing sector, at around 20% of GDP, over the medium term.” On the current series manufacturing was 17.4% of GDP in 2016, reached 20.6% in the 2021 semiconductor year, fell to 16.3% in 2024 and stood at 17.4% in 2025 (SingStat M015731, current prices, SSIC 2020). Two measurement notes: the 2024 low of 16.3% recovered to 17.4% in 2025, so the 2024 figure taken alone overstates the decline; and the CFE’s own text puts 2016 at “around 20% of GDP” on the older classification, so a baseline drawn across the two series is not comparable.

58. Economic Strategy Review, final report, June 2026 (esr-finalreport.pdf) — “we should set an ambitious target to significantly increase the number of Singapore-headquartered companies with more than S$1 billion in revenue”, at printed pages 6 and 38 (the report’s own pagination runs two behind the PDF’s); “MTI has said that it expects GDP trend-growth of 2-3 per cent per annum over the next decade… we can achieve the higher end of this growth range” (p.13/15); NAIIP 10,000 SMEs / 100,000 workers.

59. The promise: “All the Industry Transformation Maps (ITMs) have tangible indicators and targets to measure the effectiveness of the ITM strategies” — MTI, 16 May 2017 (MTI). The recast: “some sector agencies set projections… the sector outcomes presented in Annex B should not be compared against these initial projections” — MTI, Transforming the Singapore Economy, Technical Annex, Jul 2024, Annex A para 4 (Technical Annex PDF).

60. The original goal, on SFA’s own page: “produce 30% of our nutritional needs locally by 2030” (announced Mar 2019 — archived SFA page). Dropped 4 Nov 2025: Minister Grace Fu called it “a challenging aspiration” and replaced it with 20%-of-fibre and 30%-of-protein targets by 2035 — with 2024 actuals already at 8% and 26% respectively (CNA, 4 Nov 2025); confirmed in Parliament as “balanc[ing] ambition and pragmatism” (CNA, 13 Jan 2026).

61. “Closely monitor the impact of AI on workers and adjust policies where needed” is recommendation (D) of the Review’s chapter on workers, at printed pages 8, 56 and 61: “the Government must continue to closely monitor AI developments and their impact on the labour market, and adapt its policies as conditions evolve”, with the Skills and Workforce Development Agency to “unify skills intelligence with labour market data to monitor, assess and provide businesses and workers with more actionable insights”. The Review also asks the Government to “monitor take-up” of the overseas postings scheme at page 66. All of these monitor the economy; none measures the Review. The Review’s two hard numbers, at printed pages 27 and 65, are the National AI Impact Programme’s 10,000 enterprises supported and 100,000 workers made AI-fluent; both count inputs, with no outcome attached (esr-finalreport.pdf).

62. The two hard numbers attached to the Review’s own programmes — 10,000 enterprises supported and 100,000 workers made AI-fluent, at printed pages 27 and 65 — count inputs rather than outcomes (esr-finalreport.pdf).

63. Global Innovation Index 2025 (WIPO): Singapore ranks first in the world on innovation inputs, for the fifteenth consecutive year, and ninth on innovation outputs. WIPO · IPOS

1. We surrendered a sovereign capability — at the worst moment

• Singapore is a maritime nation in the fullest sense — the world’s busiest container transhipment port, the world’s largest bunkering hub, and by one global ranking the leading maritime city on the planet. The sea is not one sector among many for us; it is the foundation we were built on. We are an island that imports more than nine in ten of our calories across the water, and we sit astride the Strait of Malacca, through which roughly a quarter of all seaborne trade and nearly half the world’s seaborne crude oil moves. A nation this dependent on the sea cannot safely treat the capability to move on it as a commodity to be rented. Yet over two decades we quietly gave away one of its core sovereign capabilities — a shipping line of our own. Neptune Orient Lines (NOL), the national carrier, was sold to France’s CMA CGM in 2016, the last act in a long dismantling: the tanker fleet to Malaysia in 2003, the headquarters in 2012, the logistics arm in 2015, then the line itself. In so doing, we exited an entire strategic domain.

• We did this right as every serious maritime nation moved the other way. France is putting ten of the world’s largest ships under its flag as a “strategic fleet” — requisitionable in a crisis, crewed by its own officers — using CMA CGM, the very company that bought our line. Korea, after Hanjin collapsed the same year we sold NOL, poured state billions into rebuilding HMM into a top-ten carrier through a dedicated sovereign vehicle. China built COSCO into an arm of national power. Even Australia, down to a dozen trading ships, is legislating a national strategic fleet. These are not nostalgists. They are states that understand shipping is a strategic capability, not a commodity service to be rented.

• And our own Government knows this — in the air! “For Changi to work well and succeed,” it told this House, “you must first have an anchor national carrier, SIA”; when SIA neared collapse, Temasek put in up to fifteen billion dollars to keep it alive. SIA and NOL were both Temasek operators. We treat the airline, SIA, as strategic and rescue it; but we treat the sea carrier, NOL, as a commodity and sell it. Temasek has since bought into a different carrier — Pacific International Lines (PIL) — but we hold it for a return, not for a purpose; so Singapore stands as a major maritime hub with no national line of its own.

• It sold NOL on the argument that container shipping is fungible — the box does not care whose ship it rides in. It does not defend SIA on those grounds at all. It keeps the airline because a national carrier is a strategic asset in its own right: a capability the country controls, the people it trains, and the option to direct it in a crisis. The Government has not stopped believing a national carrier is strategic — it has only stopped believing it for the sea.

2. What a national line actually is — the full strategic value

• The case for selling NOL rested on a category error: that a shipping line is just freight, and freight is fungible. It is not. A national line is two strategic capabilities bound together.

• First, it is the academy that makes our maritime people. There is a ladder that runs from the deck of a ship to the command of a port, and every rung is built on the one below. It begins at sea: a cadet stands his watches and qualifies as an officer of the watch, then as chief mate, and — a decade or more on — as master; the engine room climbs the same way to chief engineer. None of it can be done in a classroom or bought with a grant, because each certificate is the legal product of documented sea time on a working ship. That sea time is then the entry ticket for the shore roles that keep a great port’s waters safe: the harbour pilot who boards and berths the largest ships afloat, and the surveyors who inspect them, must by the rules hold those certificates, and above them sits the Port Master — the statutory officer who can order any vessel in our waters to move, stop or stay. Singapore’s Port Masters have been a line of master mariners: Captain M Segar, who came up as a cadet, then a harbour pilot, then Port Master, and rose to Assistant Chief Executive of the MPA; and Captain Lee Cheng Wee, the harbour pilot of the early 1970s whom the Government held up in this year’s Budget debate as the example for the next generation. No one is made a master mariner by a scholarship.

• Marine command is the one part of the port that still requires a master’s ticket, and we are failing. Fewer than one in twelve officers on our own flag is Singaporean; our cadets must seek their sea time on foreign ships, and may face a lack of access. Britain watched its officer corps age and shrink as its fleet flagged out, then had to pay shipowners through the tax code to train cadets again; Australia, down from a hundred trading ships to about a dozen, is now legislating a strategic fleet to rebuild the skills it lost. Ships can be bought or chartered within a year; a generation of sea-experienced Singaporeans takes a generation to grow. When Temasek sold NOL it crystallised a financial gain, a one-time figure on a balance sheet, and sold the training ground the whole ladder stands on. Cut the fleet away at the foot of the ladder and, a decade and more on, the top of it empties. We have been in search of lost time ever since, in the long run, the seafaring core of our own port — our harbour pilots and the marine command above them — cannot be kept Singaporean; it must be staffed, like our flag already is, by other nations’ officers.

• Second, it is directable capacity — the difference between sovereignty and dependence in a crisis. Container space is rationed whenever effective capacity is squeezed faster than it can be replaced: a demand surge like the pandemic, when rates rose sevenfold; or a risk-driven diversion like the Red Sea, where rerouting every ship around Africa swallowed a tenth of the world’s capacity at a stroke. In such a crunch the market does not serve all comers equally — the carriers still sailing gave priority to exporters under their own flag, Korea ordered HMM to ring-fence space for Korean firms, and a nation relying on foreign lines is served last, at whatever price is named. A country that owns no capacity in a capacity crunch is a beggar for allocation, and will be served with all others.

3. The Government’s defence does not survive scrutiny

• I put this to the Government in April. Its answer was that our supply lines are secured by diversification, our standing as a trusted hub, and “a wide network of global shipping lines.” I respectfully disagree, and think it conflates the port and the carrier.

• It turns on an ambiguity in the word “node.” When we call ourselves a node, we mean leverage — some power to bend the flow of trade our way. But a hub port gives only half of that. It gives us centrality, the power to attract; but it does not give us leverage, the power to make the ships that call serve us first when it counts, or to train our own merchant navy.

• After all, a neutral hub holds its traffic only by staying competitive — and even winning that competition is not the same as holding leverage.

• While Singapore is still the world’s largest transhipment hub, the Maersk–Hapag-Lloyd “Gemini” network still chose Tanjung Pelepas over Singapore as its most important hub in 2025. The carrier picks its ports; the port cannot pick its carriers. And when space runs short, it is the carrier that rations it, not the port.

• The sale of NOL and the stripping before it were Temasek’s calls, the same Temasek that, in 2020, put fifteen billion dollars into rescuing SIA. One set of hands kept one national carrier and sold the other. It was a failure of strategic judgment, and the Government should not have allowed Temasek to sell off NOL.

4. The ask: rebuild the capability

• So, let us rebuild. I am asking the Government to treat sovereign shipping as what it is — a strategic capability to be rebuilt deliberately.

• If we wanted to rebuild a national carrier, we would not start from zero. Through Heliconia, Temasek holds the majority of Pacific International Lines (PIL), our largest home-grown carrier: a hundred-odd ships, profitable, strongest where the giants are thin, in Africa and the global South. But Heliconia holds it the way it holds any company, as an investment for a return — it calls itself, in its own words, an “SME enabler.”

• PIL is run as a profit-maximising line, by a professional chief executive, under no national duty of any kind: no obligation to reserve capacity for Singapore in a crisis, no Singaporean-crew requirement even on the ships that fly our flag, no training quota — the one voluntary scheme is winding down — and no mandatory routes it must run.

• So what is missing is a purpose. PIL could be given a national mandate: held both for a return and also to train our officers, to hold capacity that can be directed when a crisis comes — and backed to grow, over time.

• PIL’s moat is a niche — Africa and the global South. It is not fully the academy we need. Our port is an east-west machine: the Asia-Europe and transpacific arteries, the largest ships afloat, transhipment at a scale only those lanes generate. So the real questions are how much of the east-west capability we gave up with NOL we now have to rebuild, and how far up the ladder we are willing to climb to do it.

• Hard choices face this country again. At the floor: a national mandate over PIL as it stands — a training quota, reserved crisis capacity, a Singaporean-crew requirement on the ships that fly our flag — for a cost in the tens of millions a year. The next rung: back PIL to climb into the east-west trades, at first through slot-charters and vessel-sharing, rebuilding the operational skills our hub actually runs on. At the top: own mainline tonnage outright, the capital-heavy commitment a serious rebuild demands. Each rung costs more and buys more sovereignty; the judgment is how far to climb. Standing still is also a choice — the one that ends in a port unable to crew its own senior ranks.

• We should study all the proven models. Korea’s KOBC is a statutory body charged by law with maintaining an “essential national shipping system,” financing the fleet and guaranteeing tonnage. We too should consider a binding obligation to train our Singapore cadets.

• And be clear-eyed about the cost. Scale in the mainline trades is brutal and capital-hungry — which is why it must be state-backed, phased, and built with strategic patience. Korea built HMM over five years and several billion dollars. If we were to do it, it would cost us billions too. But to balk at that cost means having almost no Singaporean sailors manning Singapore’s ports.

• Ultimately, we need to decide if we are going to create a system to perpetuate Singaporeans in our own maritime industry and ports. To rebuild our own leverage over shipping capacity. Whether we are a country that means to own the ship, or one content to crew someone else’s.

• Or if we want a country that doesn’t have the ships to train our own people in shipfaring, and that will, in the next supply shock, stand as a price-taker in its own port.

5. What is finally at stake

• Speaker, in conclusion.

• France is our counterparty and a mirror: it treats the company, CMA CGM, that bought our line, NOL, as a sovereignty asset and is enlarging its national fleet, while we dismantle ours and call the matter settled. It is not settled.

• I have three questions for this Government:

  • One, by the same logic that makes SIA the anchor in the air, why does a national carrier stop mattering at the water’s edge?

  • Two, if we mean to grow our own seafarers, how do we make a master mariner with no fleet to make him/her on — and who then fills the marine command our own port depends on?

  • And three, when shipping space is next rationed, what capacity can Singapore actually direct?

• That the sale of Neptune Orient Lines was a very poor decision, CMA CGM’s ability to turn a net profit less than one year after acquisition clearly proves.

• My belief is that we must draw a line on Temasek’s very poor decision to sell Neptune Orient Lines in 2016, and move on to rebuild our shipping capacity, and make back the time we have lost.

1. The window: get richer before we grow old — and before the gradient closes

• Speaker,

• Southeast Asia is about 680 million people and a US$4 trillion economy. And it is young where we are old: median age of Malaysia and Indonesia around 31, Vietnam 34, the Philippines 27, against our own citizens’ median of nearly 44.

• But youth is a window, not a promise. A demographic window buys a country growth — more workers — not wealth. Since 1990, fewer than one in three of the world’s middle-income economies has made it to high income; the rest are stuck. The region has perhaps fifteen to twenty years to get rich before it grows old.

• Singapore did climb that ladder by hosting — taking in large amounts of foreign investment to make goods and services for foreign markets. But it is now hitting a limit.

• The markets everyone leaned on are being weaponised. ASEAN still trades with itself only about a fifth as much as it trades with the world — 21 per cent, against the European Union’s 60 — and about three-quarters of our exports depend on external demand, just as the great powers begin wielding access to their markets as instruments of coercion. A region that produces mainly for markets it does not control can be squeezed at will.

• And the ground under our own strategy is shifting too. Our hub model carries an assumption: that the gradient between Singapore and its neighbours — in competence, in institutions, in trust — is permanent. It is not. Penang firms today do nano-level vision inspection that the world’s chipmakers buy. A Penang chip designer, SkyeChip, listed this year ninety-five times oversubscribed — the largest Malaysian IPO in sixteen years. Vietnam is climbing the ladder. For the region, this is great news. For a Singapore whose business model is to be the main place in the region where things work, it is a deadline.

• Because a hub, unlike an owner, can be bypassed. Indonesia or Vietnam, at even half their potential, has the demographic weight to become the heart of Southeast Asia. And we have to outrun potential resurgent nationalisms that could close doors around us. A Singapore that is merely a well-run waypoint — hosting, brokering, never owning anything together with its neighbours — will find that the region learns, in time, to route around it.

• So we should help build a Southeast Asian market of genuine middle-class consumers — we do not have one at scale today — because a market we help build is far less likely to be closed to us.

• And we need Singaporeans and Singaporean firms to own a real piece of the value chains that serve it. To be essential to the region, and to share in what the region earns.

• We must build a deeper, more structural integration with Southeast Asia.

2. The conviction that stops us

• Part of what stops us is a posture.

• In my maiden speech I asked why Singapore and Malaysia could not build an Airbus together — one enterprise, owned on both sides, the way France and Germany anchored theirs.

• I know the truer hesitations. It is not necessarily that our neighbours cannot execute — Penang’s equipment firms and Selangor’s chip designers have put that to rest. The real reasons are older: memories of past issues, from water to the railway lands; a reflex to keep control of anything that matters; and a fear of bets stranded across a border if politics turns.

• But if one is sceptical that the gradient between Singapore and our neighbours will last — I am — then joint industrial policy is exactly what a country builds while the gradient still favours it.

3. Why Malaysia, why now

• I believe the strongest path to owning things together runs through our closest neighbour, Malaysia.

• Malaysia’s industrial strategy now deliberately targets the design end of semiconductors, setting up the region’s first IC-design park in Selangor.

• The integration is happening anyway — by drift. Two hundred and forty-five million checkpoint crossings last year, three-quarters of them by land.

• New instruments in front of us: the Johor-Singapore Special Economic Zone, and the RTS Link.

• If we get them right, we can prove a model of structural bilateral integration that we can extend.

• I will discuss three points.

4. First — make the Zone real

• First, on the JS-SEZ.

• This economic zone lets two governments run, inside a bounded space, an experiment.

• The Zone has been a blank slate many have piled their hopes onto: some ideas put to me were high-tech food-growing zones, an ASEAN Friendship Hospital in Johor, an integrated medical hub on the Shenzhen–Hong Kong model.

• But hopes need us to bring the Zone into greater focus.

• First: where, exactly, is the Zone? Nine flagship areas have been announced, described at the level of districts; I have not seen a consolidated boundary map. If one exists, we should publish it.

• Second: what does a Singapore company receive inside the JS-SEZ, over and above the new federal baseline? Malaysia’s New Incentive Framework took effect for manufacturing on 1 March. If the federal incentives are as good as the Zone’s, there is nothing special about the Zone.

• Third, I believe we should soon sort out, with our Malaysian counterparts, one SOP to enter the Zone and one rulebook.

• Right now there are multiple agencies and points of contact. On the Malaysian side, there is the Iskandar Regional Development Authority, Invest Johor, MIDA, and the Invest Malaysia Facilitation Centre Johor (IMFC-J). On the Singapore side, we have the EDB one-stop centre. We need policy clarity and joint rules of the road over how companies enter the Zone, whether from Malaysia or Singapore, so that the private sector can plan for it.

• With a joint rulebook, we should measure joint success. In my view that means EDB or MTI should be responsible for total KPIs over the JS-SEZ, not just the Singapore-originated investments alone.

• Of course, a large degree of self-interested thinking is inevitable and even desirable. The instinct in parts of our Government may be to keep the high-value activity here and let the rest go. This is not wrong. But if we want the unfolding of a richer, more complex, more diverse value chain within a 60km radius than would currently be possible in 10 or 20 years, we will need to take a more collaborative approach.

• What gets measured gets managed. I believe we should grade ourselves and the Ministry on the SEZ’s success.

5. Second — semiconductors: co-own the upstream stack

• Next, we face a strategic question.

• If the Zone is meant to be more than just a new method of foreign direct investment, but to foster a vibrant set of Singaporean and Malaysian businesses, in pursuit of broadening the middle class, does it build on the current set of bilateral strengths?

• The foremost candidate for such an industrial deepening is semiconductors.

• But here, using the instrument of the Zone may be an impedance mismatch, as in my view Penang’s semiconductor cluster is unlikely to relocate beyond the Klang Valley. So we will need a broader set of instruments.

• What can we hope for from semiconductors as joint industrial policy?

• In Singapore, we host. Our IC-design strength is mostly the design centres of foreign firms on our soil. We have not grown a chip-design champion of our own — and we had an indigenous foundry once, Chartered Semiconductor, and sold it.

• Meanwhile Malaysia is building some of what we lack. Its National Semiconductor Strategy puts indigenous IC design — about half of a chip’s value-added — at the centre, with RM25 billion behind it and a 60,000-engineer training goal. Selangor’s IC-design park, the largest in Southeast Asia, turns out hundreds of designers a year; the Penang design house whose listing I described came out of this push; and Singapore’s own state-linked capital is already backing Malaysian design start-ups.

• We have more reason to complement each other than to compete. Singapore hosts what the region’s designers require: wafer fabs to prototype on, advanced packaging, capital, and customers. They hold what we require: design talent, by the hundreds, at a fraction of our cost. Neither side has a complete, owned upstream stack alone.

• First, I believe MTI should foster a design-to-fab-to-packaging chain that runs through Singapore — access and equity as one instrument: structured prototyping on our fabs and packaging lines, tied to a stake for our investors, public and private.

  • Since we sold Chartered, we have no fabs of our own. So first, we should allow RIE funds to lease or rent Singapore-based fab lines, so we can put real silicon in front of the region’s designers.

  • While those fabs are still under construction, we should use supplemental investments to expand directable fab capacity — prioritising Singaporean businesses, but open to Malaysian ones as well.

  • This, I think, is the best way to validate the viability of a chip-design ecosystem while giving it the best chance of success — iterative prototyping feedback inside the same regional corridor — especially if one is understandably hesitant about a full-scale US$15-20 billion 2nm fab rebuild.

• Second, the talent pipeline: our universities, NTU and NUS, should seek to set up an embedded institute in the Selangor cluster carrying a joint credential, with firms operating on both sides of the Zone sponsoring net-new training places whose employment options are exercisable in Johor, Selangor or Singapore. Producing new engineers for the region.

• Third, I believe we should recognise in law a Malaysia-Singapore business entity, defined by a minimum stake on each side — 30-30, 40-40, 50-50 — and give it closer-to-local treatment in both countries’ grants, financing and procurement. When people from both countries own part of the same success, each has reason to grow its own capability rather than poach it. We should seek to create rails that work for a recognised category of bilateral joint-firms across the two countries, and crowd in the private sector.

• Fourth, in service of crowding in, we should reactivate the Malaysia-Singapore Business Development Fund. It was set up in 2004 for exactly this, enhanced in 2023, relaunched in 2024. As far as I know, it has not been used. Give it a fresh purpose: competitive seed awards into the first recognised Malaysia-Singapore ventures — many small bets, fast answers.

6. Third — the RTS

• Next, and third, on the RTS.

• Integration will arrive as a train, in 2027, up to ten thousand passengers an hour each way.

• Walk our heartland shops today and you can feel the dread coming. The provision shop, the TCM shop, the noodle stall, the barber, the tailor. They read the same reports we do. There is gallows humour in those shops now about the RTS and what it will do to Singapore retail — and a question: when the RTS opens, what happens to us?

• DBS puts the leakage at S$1.5 to 2.1 billion a year — three to four per cent of retail sales, everyday food and personal services hit hardest. Eleven million Singaporean trips into Johor in the first seven months of last year alone.

• The Government’s answer so far is to make retail more attractive at home — visual-merchandising programmes, placemaking grants, neighbourhood-centre upgrades, vouchers to spend at home. I support these initiatives. But we should be honest with ourselves: for a generation of retailers, it will make little difference.

• I believe we can offer a different deal. Johor is planning the e-ART as a dispersal network out of Bukit Chagar, and I speculate that transit-oriented development will be done in the vicinity of their 32 stations. If so, I propose we invest in that plan: as part of the JS-SEZ bargain, Singapore takes an equity stake in the transit-oriented developments the line creates — Bukit Chagar and the thirty-two e-ART stations — and negotiates, in the same deal, reserved positions for our small retailers inside those developments — in the podium of these malls.

• This has happened before. When Singapore and Malaysia resolved, in 2010, the twenty-year impasse over the 1990 Points of Agreement on the railway lands, it was not settled in cash but in co-ownership: Khazanah and Temasek formed a joint company, sixty-forty, and built Marina One and DUO in the city centre. I am proposing a similar instrument.

• The footfall those developments capture is largely from Singapore, so the deal has logic on both sides: Johor gains a committed capital partner for a network it is building anyway; we gain a share of where our own spending lands — and a place in it for the retailers that spending leaves behind.

• Thus, we can give every exposed small retailer who rents rather than owns their premises — on the order of forty thousand provision shops, eateries and personal-care operators — a tradeable entitlement: a priority claim on a reserved position in those developments, to take up or assign to another small operator; or, for those who would rather not move, a cash floor drawn now or set against rent — enough to fund a real relocation or a year of rent. It goes to the tenant, not the owner of the unit: the renter carries the lost footfall with nothing to fall back on.

• Retail is a more protected part of Malaysia’s economy, so MFA and MTI would need to negotiate this within the same bargain. Malaysia has already carved foreign firms into Forest City, so it is not unprecedented.

• We speak about the stakeholder economy. We can seek this compact, if it is possible, for our small retailers. This is a better deal than the fait accompli they currently await.

7. What we must decide

• Speaker, in closing.

• I don’t pretend any of this is inevitable or easy.

• Foreign economic relations are always challenging, with reduced control and increased unpredictability.

• But we are in a unique moment, with the threat and leverage of market closure from the biggest powers foremost on our minds.

• And we are also reaching the limits of our growth on 750 square kilometres.

• It would be a shame if the JS-SEZ and the tenor of our future cooperation with Malaysia were predominantly FDI-led, instead of being in service of tackling the true strategic challenges of the decade.

  • The creation of a true middle class in Southeast Asia.

  • An integration of our country, to be indispensable to the future economic geometries of our neighbours.

  • An imperative to increase the complexity and diversity of our value chains.

  • And the fostering of a stakeholder economy, and the search for a better bargain for our pioneering generations.

• This is the model of integration I believe we should seek with the region — one that best maximises the fifteen to twenty years Southeast Asia has before it ages out of its demographic dividend.

• Thank you, Sir.

To ask the Coordinating Minister for Public Services and Minister for Defence (a) whether the Ministry will extend driver training and civilian licensing to national servicemen in vocations with periods of low operational activity; (b) how many national servicemen obtain civilian driving licences through NS annually; and (c) whether those who pass the SAF driving test may convert their qualification on the same probationary terms as new civilian drivers, in place of the mileage requirement.

Digital Development and Information (MDDI)

To ask the Minister for Digital Development and Information following the US order barring foreign access to Anthropic’s Fable and Mythos models (a) whether the Government assesses that Singapore needs continued frontier AI access; (b) if so, what is the Government’s strategy to secure such access against further US restrictions; and (c) if not, what alternatives will maintain sufficient capability, and what is the acceptable lag behind the frontier.

To ask the Minister for Digital Development and Information (a) whether the Ministry will abolish the guideline that Chinese films for general release be in Mandarin and allow dialect films on general release in their original dialect with subtitles; and (b) whether the Speak Mandarin Campaign rationale for the guideline still applies, given that dialect use at home has fallen below 12%.

Education (MOE)

To ask the Minister for Education (a) how many secondary students currently take a Southeast Asian language as a third language; (b) what share of total third-language enrolment they form; (c) whether such languages can be offered within mainstream schools rather than only at the central language centre; and (d) whether access to Southeast Asian languages such as Vietnamese, Bahasa Indonesia, and Thai will be expanded and made more accessible.

Foreign Affairs (MFA)

To ask the Minister for Foreign Affairs whether the Government will engage Malaysia to establish an affordable long-stay or retirement-residency pathway for Singaporeans who wish to age in Malaysia and access more affordable eldercare there, in view that the revised Malaysia My Second Home scheme now targets investors rather than retirees through high fixed deposits and property purchase.

Health (MOH)

To ask the Coordinating Minister for Social Policies and Minister for Health (a) whether the Health Sciences Authority’s (HSA) expedited and abridged registration routes apply to medicines approved by China’s National Medical Products Administration (NMPA) and not by any of HSA’s six drug regulatory reference agencies; (b) given that those agencies were justified as receiving first-wave filings, how will HSA ensure timely access to innovative therapies approved in China; and (c) whether NMPA will be assessed for recognition as a reference agency.

National Development (MND)

To ask the Minister for National Development (a) whether HDB has assessed the four-storey mixed-use Serangoon North Village, comprising Blocks 151 to 154 on Serangoon North Avenue 1, for redevelopment given its adjacency to the future Cross Island Line station; (b) what weight new MRT connectivity and surrounding new development carry in prioritising sites for redevelopment; and (c) whether en bloc redevelopment will be considered.

Sustainability and the Environment (MSE)

To ask the Minister for Sustainability and the Environment (a) of the average of about 4,500 cases of feedback received per year by NEA for improper disposal of bulky waste, how many are in private estates; (b) whether the Ministry has reviewed the adequacy of affordable bulky-waste disposal options for private estate households; and (c) whether NEA will pilot (i) designated disposal points or (ii) periodic free collection for private estates.

Trade and Industry (MTI)

To ask the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Trade and Industry (a) what is the precise land boundary of the Johor-Singapore Special Economic Zone (JS-SEZ); (b) in view of Malaysia’s revised New Incentive Framework effective 1 March 2026, what incentives do Singapore companies investing in the JS-SEZ receive over and above this federal framework; and (c) whether the JS-SEZ retains distinct value for Singapore firms.

Transport (MOT)

To ask the Minister for Transport regarding Johor’s elevated Autonomous Rapid Transit (e-ART) feeder network for passenger dispersal from Bukit Chagar Rapid Transit System (RTS) terminus (a) what is the Government’s strategy for the dispersal of up to 10,000 RTS passengers per hour in each direction; and (b) whether Singapore will seek meaningful participation in transit-oriented development plans at the e-ART stations, to promote usage of the RTS and its wider transit networks.

The Access Problem Is Already Here

It is becoming clear that access to frontier technology is a source of geopolitical leverage, with geoblocking of frontier AI (e.g. Claude in China), limited previews of advanced AI capabilities (e.g. Claude Mythos), and restricted product surfaces for global consumption (e.g. rollout of Google’s NotebookLM). Even the engineers within these frontier AI labs are worried about falling behind because they cannot access one another’s tools.

More than a productivity frontier, it also determines questions of national security. Consider Anthropic’s Claude Mythos model, which is expert in finding zero-day (i.e. previously undiscovered) security vulnerabilities autonomously. It was only distributed in limited preview to US firms (under Project Glasswing). OpenAI did the same with its Daybreak initiative. These are not just productivity questions — they include national security.

While China remains a major source of open-weight models, the lab that is perceived to be leading is the closed-source lab from Bytedance — meaning even the open-weight alternative may not remain the path to the frontier.

Last week in Parliament, I spoke about this. This was rooted in my experience with Claude Code, which has made my coding and other tasks much more efficient — but which also made tangible to me how much a country’s competitive position now depends on which tools its people can access.

The Subsidy Moment

Beyond geopolitics, there is also the possibility that we are living in an unsustainably private-money and VC-subsidised moment. I recall the case of Uber’s strategy: an era of cheap rides subsidised with VC money, capturing the market, with prices rising once the market had consolidated.

For instance, I find that it is worth it to pay for Claude Code through a Max plan which currently costs about $200 USD a month, as it makes my coding and other tasks more efficient. It however seems heavily subsidised, and the equivalent in API costs has to be significantly more. If frontier AI pricing corrects to true cost within two years, and prices of frontier AI remain substantially high, Singapore’s entire diffusion model — which assumes cheap, abundant access trickling down from Champions to the broader economy — prices out everyone below the enterprise tier.

Not everyone will be able to access premium AI models. The gap between those with access and those without will be enormous. And if open-source models go closed-weight, this will reduce the alternative pathway.

What the ESR Misses

The Economic Strategy Review report was released yesterday. There is a lot of discussion on AI, but it is silent on the most consequential risk facing Singapore’s AI ambitions: whether we will continue to have access to frontier AI at all.

No mention of supply-side risk to frontier AI access — the entire strategy treats frontier model availability as a given input, never as a variable that could be constrained. The ESR treats Singapore as a consumer and deployer of frontier capabilities produced elsewhere, not as an orchestrator of AI capability flows. Its Thrust 8 (resilience) identifies energy, supply chains, food, and climate as domains requiring strategic buffers and diversification — but does not extend this logic to AI compute/model access, which, if we are to take the AI Hub framing seriously, is this country’s critical emerging dependency.

The ESR is written entirely within the assumption that the current era of abundant access continues — that frontier AI is a commodity input Singapore can procure, and the differentiator is what you do with it. If that assumption breaks, the entire three-tier deployment model (Champions → sector-level solutions → economy-wide diffusion) is compromised at the foundation. The “best problems to solve” framing only works if you also have access to the best tools to solve them with.

It is a major omission. And as the examples above show, the problem is not theoretical.

What Can Be Done

Anton Leicht of the Carnegie Endowment has a useful treatment of this problem. He argues that frontier AI access will be constrained by three compounding forces: security concerns that motivate withholding (as we saw with Mythos and Daybreak), compute scarcity that makes serving frontier models genuinely zero-sum, and the eventual instrumentalisation of access controls by the U.S. government for broader strategic purposes. Critically, he points out that efficiency gains do not resolve this — they cheapen last-generation capabilities, not frontier ones.

Leicht proposes four responses, which I find broadly right. First, reduce the justification for restriction — harden cyber and biosecurity infrastructure so the case for withholding frontier models from countries like Singapore is weaker. Second, build datacenters at scale to alleviate the compute crunch. Third, build compute in exchange for access — offer hyperscalers favourable terms for regional buildout in return for contractual frontier access guarantees. Fourth, retain some independent capability to build as a contingency, because if the first three fail, a country without any domestic frontier capacity has no fallback. On fallback capacity, AI Singapore and the NSCC’s efforts need to provide a strategic buffer, and should be resourced accordingly.

On the third point — access for compute — this is where I think Singapore has some cards, and where Leicht and I converge. In Parliament last week, I made the case that Singapore Inc builds good data centres, and that we are among the world’s leaders in water reuse and integrated water management — which is a binding constraint on data centre expansion across water-scarce Southeast Asia. If we position ourselves as the infrastructure partner of choice for this region, that is real leverage — something we bring to the table in exchange for access, for pricing, and for presence. When a company like Anthropic or OpenAI approaches us, we should be their preferred regional partner in rolling out and scaling their data centre buildout, as well as all the infrastructure needed to make these data centres work.

It will likely be an ongoing goal of middle powers to proliferate, within a broader network of states, the production of frontier technology and capabilities such as frontier AI models. Whether it can be done is unknown, but there will be serious attempts to try. In any case, there will need to be continued foreign policy engagement to maintain ecosystem access — with both the US and China.

Many AI researchers and AI users I have spoken to, both Singaporean and foreign, have inequality of AI access as their number one worry. If we don’t have a frontier AI access resilience plan — sitting alongside the existing frameworks for energy, food, and supply chains - we are building an AI hub on an assumption we do not control.

Speaker, I declare my interest as a director of a company that makes AI-enabled applications and consults on the same.

Two Moments

In the three and a half years since ChatGPT’s release, I have had two moments of awe and dread.

The first was in November 2022. GPT-3.5 could iterate on software features, generate ideas, write code. Five years ago, it was received wisdom that everyone should learn to code. Today, coding ability is cheap and abundant. Computer science graduates — even from top schools like Stanford — are finding it difficult to find jobs. GPT-2 was a toy that generated amusing limericks. Three years later, its successors made an entire profession’s scarcity disappear. We used to talk about prompt engineering in 2023 and 2024. That talk has died down too.

The second was in November 2025, when Anthropic released Claude Code — a reliable AI agent paired with a frontier model. I could leave the computer running overnight, and there would be work done at the end. It is a different experience from chatting with a chatbot. The chatbot engages you in back-and-forth — refining your ideas, indulging your whims, steel-manning your speeches. The agent, unless it needs clarification, just goes and does things. It may be off by a bit, but you give your input and it takes another 5 or 50 minutes before it comes back with the problem solved. A very smart junior colleague.

And now we have AI agents — Claude Code, Codex — tools that have made me, if I may borrow internet lingo, Claudepilled. I use Claude Code for my own work. I can give it the most wishy-washy specification, and it returns a wonderful data workflow or website layout. For someone who could never build a pretty website to save his life, it is liberating. There is a spirit of play in working with these tools that I think every Singaporean deserves to experience.

It is an exhausting world it heralds. Software engineers pulling 80-hour weeks while running multiple AI agents overnight — so that someone, human or machine, is always on the clock. Jobseekers — especially recent graduates in white-collar work — applying to hundreds of jobs without a single interview. Job portals like LinkedIn have become memory holes for resumes, where the lived experience is like shooting an application into the void.

The pace of change humbles us all. I am suspicious of any assertion that starts with “AI will never…”, because the shelf-life of those predictions tends to be measured in months.

What concerns me is not the destination, but who gets left behind on the way there, and whether we are building the institutions to ensure no one does.

I have three propositions. First, that access to premium AI — and especially to AI agents — must be universal, not gated by course enrolment or union membership.

Second, that we must treat the handful of companies building frontier AI with the same strategic seriousness we bring to bilateral relations with countries — because their decisions on pricing, access, and deployment now shape our productivity frontier as directly as any trade agreement.

Third, that we must buy time for workers by upgrading our retrenchment framework for AI-speed displacement.

I. Model Access as a Right

Sir, I believe access to premium AI — and especially AI agents — is a right, not a privilege. Intelligence, in the sense of uplift, should not stratify according to wealth. I spend a couple of hundred dollars a month on these tools because they are game-changing. But for those who cannot afford to, it bakes in inequality from the start. Does it simply disqualify them from the off?

The Government has partially adopted the 2024 suggestions of my colleague Gerald Giam to provide universal premium AI model access. The SkillsFuture premium-AI access scheme — six months of free tools for Singaporeans who enrol in selected courses - is a step in the right direction. Likewise, NTUC’s subsidies, covering 21 AI tools.

These are good starts. But they are unnecessarily gated behind course enrollment and union membership. And critically, they likely will not cover AI agents — the tier where the real productivity gap will open.

Why does this matter? AI agents are expensive to run. We may hope agent access follows the cost curve of internet bandwidth or compute — but there is no necessary reason it should. It is an empirical question.

Anthropic’s CEO said in January that 80 per cent of its revenue comes from enterprise customers, driven by API calls on a pay-per-token model. If agents remain enterprise-grade by default, then individual citizens — jobseekers, freelancers, retirees — are locked out of the tier where the real productivity gains are being made.

Three possible directions. One: negotiate sovereign access — a bulk licensing agreement with frontier AI providers for volume-discounted agent access for all citizens. Two: if agent access is employer-provisioned in the market, make it universally so — require companies above a certain size to provide agent-grade AI to all employees, the way we require CPF. Three: if frontier agents remain too costly, identify a minimal viable agentic tier and fund that universally.

Will the Government make premium AI access a universal entitlement, rather than gate it behind course completion or union membership?

II. Companies with Sovereign-Grade Consequences

Sir, I learnt recently that even AI engineers at the global top two or three frontier AI labs — are worried about falling behind because they cannot use Claude Code. And having just returned from China, I learn first-hand that one cannot use Claude Code there at all — Anthropic blocks API calls from mainland China, Hong Kong, and Macau entirely.

If even the engineers building frontier AI are desperate for access to one another’s tools — and if entire countries can be locked out — then access is not a convenience. It is a strategic capability. And the question for Singapore is whether we will secure it, or whether we will be price-takers forever.

There are perhaps three to five companies in the world whose decisions on pricing, access, and deployment will shape every economy’s AI trajectory. When Anthropic or OpenAI decides what to charge for agent-tier access, or whom to serve, that decision shapes Singapore’s productivity frontier as directly as any trade agreement.

We should therefore treat this class of companies — frontier AI firms that have crossed a threshold of systemic importance — with the same strategic seriousness we bring to bilateral relations with countries. Not because they are sovereign — they lack the durability and legitimacy of states, and remain subject to home-state law. But because their decisions carry sovereign-grade consequences for our economy, and we should engage them accordingly.

What does that mean in practice? Four things.

First, negotiate access at the sovereign level. In the possible future where frontier AI agent costs go up, not down, Singapore should seek bulk licensing agreements for agent-tier access the way we negotiate energy supply — not individual subscriptions, not course-gated subsidies. This means accepting that frontier AI access may be a permanently higher line item in national expenditure, and procuring it systematically, because the alternative — citizens priced out of the tools that define productivity — is worse.

Second, we trade based on what we have. Nvidia CEO Jensen Huang has described the AI stack as a five-layer cake: energy, chips, infrastructure, models, applications. In my view: we do not have energy at scale. We do not have frontier model capability. At the application layer, there is little moat outside of the knowledge agglomerations we can build for ourselves — we would be competing with some of the highest cost bases in the world.

But Singapore Inc builds good data centres. And we are among the world’s leaders in water reuse and integrated water management — which is a binding constraint on data centre expansion across water-scarce regions in Southeast Asia. If we position ourselves as the infrastructure partner of choice for this region, that is real leverage — something we bring to the table in exchange for access, for pricing, and for presence.

When a company like Anthropic or OpenAI approaches us, we should be their preferred regional bilateral partner in rolling out and scaling their data centre buildout regionally, as well as all the infrastructure needed to make these data centres work.

Third, attract real technological presence. We should seek frontier AI companies establishing development offices here — not predominantly sales offices, which was the experience with the FAANG companies in the 2010s. And I would prefer we be quality-conscious. Most AI companies are not frontier AI companies. We need targeted strategy and engagement with frontier AI companies specifically.

Fourth, get Singaporeans inside these labs. Once you are in the frontier AI ecosystem, it becomes much easier to circulate within that group of companies. I would welcome the Government doing some fact-finding — engaging our local and overseas Singaporeans already in these roles, understanding how they or their colleagues got hired, and disseminating that to our students and technical researchers. Right now, anecdotally, half a million to million-US-dollar salaries (excluding equity) in the US for AI researchers are fairly common, and it’s clearly in our interest to figure out how to get more Singaporeans into this tight labour market. I would really like to see the Skills Framework for frontier AI lab researcher!

III. Buying Time

Speaker, my last point is about the transition. Let me start with a person.

In Hangzhou, a quality assurance supervisor named Zhou joined a tech company in late 2022 at 25,000 yuan a month — about S$4,800 — reviewing AI model outputs for accuracy and safety. In 2025, his employer decided an AI model could do his job. They offered him a reassignment at roughly 40 per cent less pay. He refused. They terminated him. Zhou went to arbitration and won. The company sued and lost. The company appealed — and lost again, at the Hangzhou Intermediate People’s Court. The ruling was published on 28 April this year, three days before International Workers’ Day.

The court’s reasoning is worth our attention. The company argued that AI had made Zhou’s role obsolete — a “major change in objective circumstances” justifying dismissal under China’s Labor Contract Law. The court disagreed. AI adoption, it held, is a deliberate business strategy, not an unforeseeable event. A company that chooses to automate cannot unilaterally shift the full cost of that decision onto the worker. The company had not shown the contract was impossible to perform, and the reassignment at 40 per cent less pay was not a reasonable alternative. The court added that companies should prioritise retraining workers and helping them transition to higher-level roles.

The principle — that a deliberate business decision should not externalise its full cost onto the worker — deserves serious consideration in Singapore.

If a Singaporean Zhou were retrenched tomorrow under our existing framework, would he win? Our existing Tripartite Advisory on Managing Excess Manpower and Responsible Retrenchment — TAMEM — is advisory, not statutory. An employer can lawfully automate a role and terminate the worker without first attempting to redeploy or reskill them — and the public purse, through SkillsFuture and Workforce Singapore, picks up the cost of that worker’s transition. There is no AI-specific notice period. There is no statutory redeployment-first obligation. There is no individual cause of action for the worker to challenge the reason for her termination.

The data suggests we are entering the zone where this matters. MOM’s own Q4 2025 Labour Market Report records 14,490 retrenchments in 2025 — up from 12,930 the year before. PMET retrenchment incidence reached 10.1 per 1,000 resident employees — above the pre-recessionary norm of 8.0 set during 2015 to 2019. Retrenchments were concentrated in Financial Services, Information and Communications, and Professional Services — the most AI-exposed sectors. Information and Communications employment declined outright in 2025.

The Government announced the Tripartite Jobs Council on 30 April. I welcome its intent. But it creates no new powers, no new obligations on employers, and no new rights for displaced workers. How does the Government intend for this Council to work?

Too often, what workers experience is not a frank conversation about AI-driven restructuring but a Performance Improvement Plan — a process that, in many cases, is a bit of wayang designed to paper over a predetermined outcome. I foresee that such potentially misleading reasons may be given, and workers must have the power to be able to challenge this.

I propose three directions. First, a 90-day mandatory transition notice before AI-driven role elimination. Second, a redeployment-first obligation — retraining or reassignment before AI-driven termination. These provisions will slow the velocity of AI disruption. And velocity is what determines whether adjustment is possible. Third, for workers to be able to substantively challenge the reasons of their termination if they feel they are misleading, so that these AI restructuring protections will be real.

IV. Conclusion

Speaker, in closing.

Finland gave people unconditional cash as income. They were happier, less stressed — and the great majority still walked into the employment office and asked for work. The American pollster David Shor polled Americans this year: three to one, across every political persuasion, they chose job creation over direct transfers.

People, when offered the choice between a universal basic income and employment, invariably choose employment. Not because they are irrational. Because a job is where you are needed — and being needed is not something a universal basic income can replace.

So no jobless growth — yes. But more than that: no growth where the gains are captured disproportionately by capital and the burden of adjustment falls on labour. Universal access, so intelligence is not rationed by wealth. Strategic engagement, so we are not price-takers in our own future. And a retrenchment framework where the company that decides to automate bears the cost of that decision before the worker does.

I do not think the awe and dread goes away. But in a country that builds for its workers, there is hope for a brighter future.

Thank you.

Speaker,

We are asked today to approve the merger of two agencies. I would use this occasion to ask whether the system they inherit is the right one.

We often speak of skills upgrading and credentials. The real question is simpler: are we building real capabilities for our workers?

Here’s where I think the Government has done well.

Workforce Singapore’s Place-and-Train Career Conversion Programmes are — by the Government’s 2024 evaluation — a success. Close to eighteen thousand mid-career Singaporeans were placed between 2017 and 2022. Wages rose by up to six and a half per cent by year four. Employment retention improved by four percentage points. And the biggest gains went to non-PMET and mature workers — the groups the credit-based system has struggled to reach.

I also would like to acknowledge the 38 Skills Frameworks - co-built with industry, unions, and professional bodies. They are a useful compilation of the skills and competencies expected for each role in these sectors. But as those who’ve been hiring managers know: what’s in the frameworks sets necessary but insufficient bars. You still need interviews and competency tests to actually hire well.

This success of this place-and-train, employer-anchored programme contrasts with other parts of the system which are not doing so well, such as the credit-based, individual-based SkillsFuture programme.

(The Principal-Agent Problem with SkillsFuture)

The credit-based side of the system has struggled on both integrity and take-up. In 2017, a syndicate fraud extracted nearly $40 million through fake enrolments. The Auditor-General later found millions more in overpayments and uncollected levies. On demand: the SkillsFuture Level-Up Programme — the flagship of mid-career upskilling, offering a $4,000 top-up — had reached only 28,000 out of 1.2 million eligible citizens by end-2024. That is two per cent.

I don’t think this is an execution failure, but a flaw in the policy idea itself.

The SkillsFuture system of the last decade is an example of the individual-credit system: the government funds individuals to purchase courses from a permissive provider market. Suppliers capture the funds; fraud is possible; links with entry-level capability are weak. The largest meta-analysis of active labour-market programmes — Card, Kluve, and Weber, 2018, with 207 estimates across 200-plus studies — found classroom training shows weak or negative short-run effects, with gains emerging only at the two- to three-year mark, and concentrated on the long-term unemployed.

The populations best served by these programmes are the displaced and long-term jobless — not mid-career workers who need to shore up against job precarity or climb the wage ladder.

In France, they tried this model. In 2015, under President Hollande, they launched the Compte Personnel de Formation — a Personal Training Account. Training hours attached to the person, not the job. The 2018 Macron reform converted those hours to euros — €500 a year, capped at €5,000, with higher caps for the lower-qualified. Then in 2019 they built an app — Mon Compte Formation — a consumer-grade marketplace where any worker could browse, book, and pay for any accredited course in a few taps. Employers and unions were cut out entirely. Twenty-one million accounts were activated. More than two million training purchases a year. It was one of the boldest individual-credit experiments of any major economy.

The result is instructive. TRACFIN — France’s financial intelligence unit — recorded a five-fold rise in suspected fraud in a single year, from €8 million in 2020 to €43 million in 2021. Cold-callers and fictitious providers followed the money. France spent the next four years walking it back — banning cold-calling, imposing co-payments that have since been raised twice, capping the most-abused course categories. France had the digital infrastructure. It had the regulators. It had the financial intelligence unit. What it did not have was any party other than the state itself bearing consequences for training quality. The principal-agent problem is not solved by transparency, digitisation, or individual choice.

The chain of transmission of consequences for an individual credit system, from ministry to agency to provider to learner to employer, is such that nobody bears the consequences of low-quality training. It is a principal-agent problem. No one is a principal. The Career Conversion Programmes work because an employer is the principal before training begins. The individual-credit channel, by design, lacks that principal, and no amount of enforcement can substitute for it.

It seems SkillsFuture has unfolded in a similar way.

Can we redesign the system so that employers — not individuals purchasing courses — become the accountable parties? Not individual choice, which is what we have, but structured employer accountability: sectoral associations and firms bearing reputational and financial consequences for training quality. This would sharpen the Skills Frameworks too - employers with skin in the game will push for a fuller accounting of what a job actually requires — not just entry criteria, but the tacit knowledge needed to stay and grow.

When funds are provisioned individually, the government defaults to input-side accountability: ensuring providers are accredited, claims meet thresholds, and participants receive a certification. Whether the credential improves a worker’s employability is not measurable at the point of purchase — only in labour outcomes, years later. The system optimises for what it can count, not what it should produce.

I think it is desirable to have sectoral associations and firms lead the upskilling journey directly, to solve the principal-agent problem, and consequently, invest in deep, long-duration training.

(Policy Space to solve the Principal Agent Problem)

How do other economies solve the principal-agent problem?

Germany’s apprenticeship system operates within one of Europe’s most mobile credentialed labour markets, their IHK [Industrie- und Handelskammer] or Chambers of Industry and Commerce certification is portable. The goal is workers who are chosen repeatedly at a premium, not workers who cannot leave. German apprentices earn ~15% more than the untrained two decades after entry, with lower unemployment risk and faster re-employment.

Economic skill-formation literature identifies three conditions for firms to invest in deep, long-duration training:

First, wage compression — sectoral bargaining that narrows pay differentials within a sector so rivals cannot simply poach trained workers at a premium.

Second, portable credentials — standardised, externally certified occupational profiles, so a worker’s skill is legible to the whole labour market and the worker is willing to invest their own time.

Third, industry co-governance of curriculum — so that what is taught tracks what industry actually needs.

Singapore has the second of these, roughly. SkillsFuture certifications approximate portable credentials. Industry Transformation Maps and Trade Associations do consultative work that touches co-governance, but it is advisory, not binding — no sectoral employer body exercises a sign-off or veto on SkillsFuture curriculum, and no named individual’s reputation moves with and is staked on the employment outcomes.

As I understand it, NTUC mainly bargains at the enterprise level rather than at the collective sector level.

So I think we have neither true industry co-governance of curriculums, nor do we have sectoral bargaining to achieve wage compression.

Some will say Singapore is too small for German-style sectoral institutions. Switzerland — population nine million — sustains deep sectoral bargaining and apprenticeship in pharma, watchmaking, and machine tools. Size is not the binding constraint. Institutional architecture is.

I have two proposals.

First, sectoral bargaining. NTUC’s current architecture is attuned to individual employer engagement. That is not the right vehicle for deep tacit-knowledge sectors. These sectors need binding sectoral wage scales — not just floors, but scales that compress the wage distribution.

Right now, a firm that invests in deep training risks losing that worker to a competitor the day after certification. Wage compression fixes this — it narrows pay gaps so poaching is not worth it. The return on training stays with the firm that trained. That is why German firms fund three-year apprenticeships at their own expense.

The Progressive Wage Model lifts wages for lower-wage workers, and it does so well. But it sets floors, not scales. It says to the worker: train, and you move up. What we need is a structure that says to the employer: train deeply, because you will keep the return.

Not every sector is suitable. Sectoral bargaining fits sectors with deep tacit knowledge — semiconductor back-end, aerospace MRO, petrochemicals, marine and offshore — perhaps not faster-moving industries like AI.

Second, co-governance with consequences. Named industry entities and individuals should have sign-off and veto on SkillsFuture curricula — not as advisors, but as accountable parties whose reputations move with employment outcomes. We must also lower the accreditation barriers that keep the most credible practitioners out. The Advanced Certificate in Learning and Performance requires 71 hours of coursework — screening out the domain experts we need and screening in those with time to spare.

(What would be suitable for other faster-moving industries - where sectoral bargaining cannot be done?)

For faster-moving industries — AI, software, frontier hardware — the fixes above may not work. Skills change too fast; firms are too few and too mobile. What works in these sectors is something different: knowledge spreading through people working near each other. That is how Shenzhen and Silicon Valley were built — rapid knowledge diffusion through firms, suppliers, and people solving problems together, carrying what they learned into the next job.

We cannot build a Shenzhen-scale agglomeration on 750 square kilometres. But we can do two things.

(Industrial commons here)

One, engineer knowledge diffusion through people, not papers.

To produce an industrial commons here, first, we will need to revive the engineering society ethos. If we are serious about capability over credentials, the most basic question is: do our workers and engineers know how things work? We need to know how things work — at the level of teardown and re-assembly — because that is the foundation of any serious industrial capability. The model is Munro & Associates in Michigan, which has spent close to four decades disassembling competitor vehicles down to the last fastener and producing the detailed cost, design, and process reports that the global automotive industry treats as authoritative. Japan’s National Institutes of Technology teach fifteen-year-olds to disassemble electromechanical systems in formal “Reverse Engineering” courses. The US military reverse-engineered the Iranian Shahed drone and fielded its own version in Venezuela at $35,000 per unit — versus $1.3 million for a Tomahawk cruise missile. Understanding how things are built is not a hobby. It is a strategic capability. There is no reason it cannot exist here as public infrastructure.

I propose we establish physical teardown facilities at our ITEs and polytechnics — not as one-off workshops, but as a vertical curriculum progressing from guided disassembly to design analysis to cost modelling. We should reverse-engineer frontier hardware - EVs, batteries, solar, drones. Structured public reports should feed the industrial commons. Such facilities could also be housed at A*STAR’s centres, which already run model factories and joint industry labs. Partnered with ITEs and polytechnics, with structured access for SMEs, they would form a strong starting point.

For ordinary citizens, the National Library Board’s MakeIT at Libraries — its free maker-space programme run with IMDA, offering 3D printing, digital cutting, robotics, and coding classes in selected regional libraries — teaches the basics well. I have observed 3D printing and robotics classes there, and the Starter Sessions are well-designed. But the curriculum stops there, with no intermediate or advanced progression. If we are serious about life-long learning, MakeIT needs a vertical curriculum — Stage 2 and Stage 3 modules, project-based, progressing from operating the machines to designing with them and using them more intensely — not just a wider menu of first lessons.

Our industrial clusters are well-designed. But co-location is necessary, not sufficient. Knowledge does not diffuse simply because firms share a postcode. It diffuses through people. Tacit production knowledge — the working understanding of why a process line behaves the way it does, what failure modes to watch for, which suppliers to trust — does not transfer through papers or seminars. It transfers through people, on the floor, over months. Taiwan’s ITRI is the clearest example: between 1973 and 2008, thirteen thousand ITRI staff moved into Taiwanese industry, many of them seeding what became TSMC, UMC, and the wider Hsinchu semiconductor cluster. Engineer circulation, not patents or licensing, was the primary transmission mechanism.

To speed up the rate of knowledge diffusion, I also propose an Industrial Commons Rotation: a statutory obligation on large firms — GLCs and major anchor MNCs — to second mid-senior technical staff into SMEs within the same sectoral cluster for six- to eighteen-month rotations, with reciprocal SME-to-large-firm flows so the small firms’ problem-solving feeds back into the larger firms’ processes. We can do this as a pilot in the tacit-knowledge sectors I named earlier — semiconductor back-end, aerospace MRO, petrochemicals, marine and offshore. If we want an industrial commons, we must make the people circulate.

Teacher rotation through industry should be a statutory requirement. Polytechnic and ITE instructors currently can take industry attachments as a form of voluntary continuing professional development, but the mechanism is discretionary, not structural. I propose a pilot: twelve months in industry for every sixty months of teaching.

This is the first task: making the knowledge already inside Singapore circulate.

(Industrial commons there)

The second task is to go to where the knowledge is being created.

The Overseas Markets Immersion Programme, launched in 2024, is the right vehicle in form. In substance, it is far too small. The initial target was 250 individuals over two years; about 120 had been supported by early 2026. Salary support of up to seventy per cent for nine months, capped at $5,000 a month, with a minimum salary threshold of $4,000 a month that effectively restricts it to PMETs.

If I had to name one programme that could be reframed tomorrow at low cost and high return, it is OMIP. Three changes:

First, expand it by an order of magnitude — from a 250-person pilot to a 5,000-person annual cohort within five years.

Second, remove the minimum salary threshold for technical and operational roles in priority sectors, so ITE-trained engineers and polytechnic graduates can be deployed to cutting-edge manufacturing clusters in China, Japan, and Europe — not only PMETs to regional roles.

Third, reframe the strategic purpose. OMIP is currently designed as outbound business development support — helping Singapore companies expand into new markets. . It should also be inbound knowledge acquisition — sending Singaporeans to where manufacturing knowledge is being created, to bring it back. The architecture is broad enough to hold both, if we choose to use it that way.

Conclusion

Sir, in closing. The deepest lesson of the last decade of skills policy — here and abroad — is this: the state cannot substitute for the firm as the principal in a worker’s training. We have spent ten years and considerable public money trying. The next ten years should be spent designing the system in which sectors and firms — and the workers themselves, through their unions — are forced to care about the answer.

Sectoral co-governance with named accountability. Sectoral bargaining where tacit knowledge is deep. Engineered knowledge diffusion where it is not. And an order-of-magnitude expansion of how we send Singaporeans to where cutting-edge knowledge actually lives.

Capability is tacit knowledge. It deepens inside sectors and firms — which is why we need sectoral architecture that holds workers there long enough for it to form. And it circulates through an industrial commons — which is why we need engineers, instructors, and Singaporeans abroad moving through that commons, carrying knowledge with them. The state is an orchestrator, it builds the architecture in which both happen.

Thank you.

To ask the Coordinating Minister for Public Services and Minister for Defence (a) what proportion of full-time national servicemen (NSFs) are in stay-out postings without lodging or meals; (b) whether the Ministry considers the current purchasable $81 monthly transport pass adequate for NSFs earning $790 per month; and (c) whether the Ministry will provide by default free public transport for NSFs, as Austria does for their conscripts.

To ask the Coordinating Minister for Public Services and Minister for Defence (a) whether SAF full-time national servicemen at non-camp locations without cookhouse facilities like the Central Manpower Base (CMPB), MINDEF and Defence Science and Technology Agency receive meal allowances during duty hours; (b) if so, what are the current rates; and (c) whether the Ministry will publish these rates on the CMPB website, as is currently done for SCDF and SPF national servicemen.

Education (MOE)

To ask the Minister for Education (a) what prerequisite skills must primary school students demonstrate before AI is first introduced for usage; (b) what is the rationale for the Primary 4 entry point; (c) what is the implementation roadmap for AI in primary curricula, including age cohorts and approved tools; and (d) what guidelines, training and workload support will teachers receive to distinguish productive AI use from shortcut substitution.

Health (MOH)

To ask the Coordinating Minister for Social Policies and Minister for Health (a) whether the Ministry has assessed the utility of recommending and subsidising fertility screening, including biomarkers such as the Follicle-Stimulating Hormone (FSH) and Anti-Mullerian Hormone (AMH), at age 30 for women and age 35 for men; and (b) whether the Ministry will add universal fertility screening to the Healthier SG screening programme, given that early detection enables less invasive interventions.

To ask the Coordinating Minister for Social Policies and Minister for Health (a) what is the trend in age-of-diagnosis for colorectal, breast, lung and stomach cancers among Singapore residents over the past 10 years; (b) whether the refresh by the Screening Test Review Committee 2026 explicitly reviewed these age-of-diagnosis trends; and (c) whether the Ministry will consider lowering subsidised screening age thresholds in light of rising incidence among Singaporeans below current threshold ages.

To ask the Coordinating Minister for Social Policies and Minister for Health (a) of all COVID-19 cases identified by contact tracing between March 2020 and 13 February 2023, how many (i) were identified with TraceTogether and (ii) would not have been identified through conventional contact tracing methods; (b) what was the total TraceTogether programme cost over its lifetime; and (c) whether the Ministry will publish a retrospective cost-effectiveness evaluation of TraceTogether to inform future digital tracing efforts.

To ask the Coordinating Minister for Social Policies and Minister for Health (a) how many applications to access PRECISE, SG10K and HELIOS data have been received and approved, broken down by public-sector researchers, private-sector firms and local startups, and average time to access; (b) how many approved applications have produced publications, patents or commercial products; and (c) whether the Ministry will publish a public registry of approved projects and outcomes, as the UK Biobank does.

Home Affairs (MHA / ICA)

To ask the Coordinating Minister for National Security and Minister for Home Affairs (a) what are the principal regulatory levers under consideration for the proposed blind box regulations in relation to sealed packs of trading card game (TCG) products; (b) whether requiring retailers to open sealed packs and sell cards as individually identified items is among the options; and (c) what consultation has been conducted with TCG retailers, collectors and youth-serving organisations.

To ask the Coordinating Minister for National Security and Minister for Home Affairs (a) how many children of Singaporeans await Permanent Residency or citizenship decisions; (b) what is the average processing time; (c) whether the Ministry is aware some of these children are on rolling visitor visas; and (d) whether the Ministry will expedite such cases, given the Government expects to take in between 25,000 and 30,000 new citizens annually over the next five years.

National Development (MND)

To ask the Minister for National Development (a) what is the rationale for the 12-month disqualification cap under Section 43B of the Animals and Birds Act 1965 (ABA); (b) whether the Ministry will raise the maximum and introduce lifetime disqualification for the most serious cases; and (c) when the ongoing ABA review will be completed.

To ask the Minister for National Development since introducing the 15-month wait-out exemption for seniors above 55 downsizing from private property to 4-room or smaller resale flats (a) how many appeals have been received from senior households seeking 5-room flats; (b) how many appeals have been approved; (c) what is the policy rationale for capping at 4-room flats; and (d) whether HDB will calibrate rules by household size or caregiving needs.

Social and Family Development (MSF / ECDA)

To ask the Minister for Social and Family Development (a) whether ECDA has independently validated Singapore Preschool Accreditation Framework (SPARK) certification against measurable child developmental outcomes including vocabulary, executive function and school readiness; (b) what proportion of SPARK assessment is based on operator-prepared documentation versus direct observation of classroom practice, and whether such observation is conducted unannounced; and (c) whether ECDA will commission such validation and assessment, and publish the findings.

To ask the Minister for Social and Family Development (a) what is the basis for ECDA’s sizing of operator-level funding for Anchor and Partner Operator preschools; (b) whether enrolment is a criterion; (c) if so, whether non-citizen and non-permanent resident (PR) children count toward enrolment; (d) what proportion of enrolment in the past three years have been non-citizens and non-PRs; and (e) whether the Ministry will restrict operator-level subsidies to citizen and PR enrolment.

Trade and Industry (MTI)

To ask the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Trade and Industry (a) what is the current occupancy rates of Biopolis and the wider one-north area, compared with Biopolis’ 2003 launch; (b) what proportion of Biopolis tenants pay subsidised or grant-supported rent versus market rent; (c) whether A*STAR has plans to relocate from Biopolis; and (d) what is the Ministry’s assessment of Biopolis’ long-term viability as a biomedical research hub.

To ask the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Trade and Industry (a) what is the policy basis for providing the Electric Vehicle Early Adoption Incentive (EEAI) but declining equivalent capital subsidies for residential rooftop solar panel installation; (b) what are the (i) take-up rates of the EEAI and (ii) proportion of private households that have installed solar panels; and (c) whether the Ministry will introduce comparable capital grants or property tax rebates for residential solar panels.

7-8 April 2026 sittings | 10 Parliamentary Questions

Sitting on 7 April 2026 - Oral

To ask the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Trade and Industry given Australia’s 2025 review of the Prohibiting Energy Market Misconduct Act found retailers systematically raise prices faster than they lower them, and recommended symmetrical cost-pass-through obligations requiring retailers to both pass on cost decreases and justify price increases against underlying costs, whether the Government will adopt similar safeguards to protect energy consumers during and after the Strait of Hormuz disruption.

To ask the Minister for Sustainability and the Environment (a) whether Singapore’s strategic food reserves meet the Government’s adequacy targets; (b) given that nearly half of globally traded urea and sulphur transit the Strait of Hormuz, whether the Ministry has assessed the impact on Singapore’s food import prices; and (c) what measures have been taken since the closure on 2 March 2026 to buffer possible future food price increases.

To ask the Prime Minister and Minister for Finance given US private credit defaults reached a record 9.2% in 2025 and the Bank of England, European Central Bank (ECB), and the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) have each initiated supervisory reviews of private credit risk exposure (a) whether MAS has assessed the aggregate exposure of Singapore-domiciled financial institutions to US private credit; (b) whether MAS has conducted or plans to conduct equivalent stress tests; and (c) if not, why not.

Sitting on 7 April 2026 - Written

To ask the Prime Minister and Minister for Finance in view that both A\*STAR’s Quantum Innovation Centre and the Centre for Quantum Technologies (CQT) at NUS claim alignment with the National Quantum Strategy, which designated CQT as the national flagship centre (a) what specific capabilities does the Quantum Innovation Centre provide that CQT does not; (b) what is their combined annual funding; and (c) what mechanisms prevent duplication between them.

To ask the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Trade and Industry (a) what proportion of Business Expenditure on R&D (BERD) is attributable to Government-linked companies (GLCs); (b) whether any GLCs currently undertake significant R&D activities aligned with strategic domains identified under RIE2025 or RIE2030; (c) what is the Government’s assessment of the implications for Singapore’s innovation output when large domestic enterprises account for a relatively small share of national R&D activity.

Sitting on or after 8 April 2026 - Oral

To ask the Minister for Manpower (a) why has the $60,000 cap on CPF balances earning the additional 1% interest remained unchanged since 2008 when other major CPF parameters are revised regularly; (b) whether the Ministry will consider pegging growth of this cap to growth of Full Retirement Sum (FRS); and (c) how much interest do CPF members forgo annually because the cap has not tracked FRS growth.

To ask the Acting Minister for Transport in view that the Strait of Hormuz crisis has shown foreign carriers prioritising their home governments’ interests, and that Singapore no longer has a nationally aligned shipping line following the divestment of Neptune Orient Lines in 2016, what arrangements are being put in place to ensure essential supply lines to Singapore are maintained during a regional conflict or naval disruption.

To ask the Minister for National Development (a) whether the asset-conversion framework under which Past Reserves fund Selective En bloc Redevelopment Scheme (SERS) land acquisitions will extend to Voluntary Early Redevelopment Scheme (VERS); (b) since SERS sites are selected for high redevelopment potential whereas VERS sites are selected by age, how the Government satisfies itself that VERS acquisitions are value-neutral rather than net drawdowns; and (c) whether the President’s Office has been consulted on this extension.

Sitting on or after 8 April 2026 - Written

To ask the Coordinating Minister for Social Policies and Minister for Health (a) how many applications for egg freezing by women above 37 have been received since the age limit was reviewed and how many were approved; (b) what criteria the approving authority uses to assess these applications and whether these criteria are published; and (c) whether the Ministry will consider removing the age limit.

To ask the Coordinating Minister for Social Policies and Minister for Health (a) of the more than 800 women who have frozen their eggs under elective egg freezing (EEF), how many have used them for in-vitro fertilisation (IVF) in Singapore; (b) whether the Ministry tracks Singaporean women undergoing IVF abroad, and if so, what trends have been observed since June 2023; and (c) whether the Ministry will consider removing the marriage requirement for use of frozen eggs in IVF.

Mr Speaker, I wish to discuss our Co-Curricular Activity system.

A resident in my ward shared her son’s story with me. He started playing tennis when he was seven. His primary school did not offer tennis as a CCA, so his parents arranged training outside — once a week with a private coach, twice a week in a small group programme. Both parents work full-time. For six years, he trained largely on his own. He never had the chance to play alongside peers his age. His dream, all through primary school, was simple: to join a secondary school with a strong tennis team, and finally be part of one.

He applied through DSA to his dream school. The school took a handful of boys — all top-ranked players in their age group. He was not selected for DSA. He did not give up. He worked hard for his PSLE, and earned his place on merit.

Then came the CCA trial for tennis. He made it to the final round — but was not selected. At this school, trials are conducted before students submit their CCA choices. He was advised not to list tennis. The school explained that there was no room — space constraints, grading considerations.

So the boy chose rugby. It was one of the few CCAs with vacancies and open to beginners. Rugby trains three times a week. With that and a heavier Secondary 1 workload, he had to give up competitive tennis. He can still hit a ball on weekends. But he cannot train seriously.

His mother told me: it was heartbreaking to watch her son give up the sport he loves. Not because he was not good enough — but because the system would not give him the chance to become good enough.

Mr Speaker, I believe this is a system problem, not a talent problem.

I.

Each January, Secondary One students submit a ranked list of CCA preferences. For popular CCAs — sports, performing arts — schools conduct trials or auditions. Students who do not pass are asked to remove that CCA from their choices. Some fail multiple trials. They are allocated to whatever remains.

This is not unreasonable on its own. Resources are finite. But consider what makes CCA different from everything else in our education system. CCA is compulsory. Students must participate for four to five years. Under LEAPS 2.0, that participation is graded — and those grades translate into bonus points for post-secondary admission.

We have spent the last decade making the rest of our system more open. Mid-year exams removed. PSLE T-scores replaced with broader bands. Streaming dissolved into Subject-Based Banding. Each reform carries the same signal: less sorting, more room. CCA has not received that same attention.

II.

In 2020, the Ministry piloted the removal of CCA selection trials across eight primary schools. The pilot seems a success. Today, about two-thirds of primary schools operate without trials. When I asked the Minister about this on 12 February, the reply confirmed these results — but did not address secondary schools, where LEAPS 2.0 applies and stakes are highest.

There is a model already operating in Singapore — in our international schools. At Singapore American School, students who miss the competitive team are not turned away — they join a developmental programme and continue training. No student is excluded. It is an established system, on Singapore soil, showing that open participation and competitive excellence reinforce each other.

This principle is not foreign to local schools. Hwa Chong’s track and field programme — the first school to win all four divisions at the National Schools Championships in a single year — requires no prior experience and welcomes anyone with a passion for the sport. It fields athletes across every event category: sprints, jumps, throws, walks, cross-country, pole vault. A 2008 report on the National Schools Championships observed that while a rival school matched Hwa Chong in first-place finishes, Hwa Chong’s depth across the field — finishers in every event accumulating points — was what secured the divisional title. Broad participation is not the enemy of competitive excellence. At Hwa Chong, it is the competitive strategy.

Internationally, the pattern holds at scale. Durham University fields 16,000 students across 550 teams — 75% of its student body — and is the top-ranked team sport university in Britain. In the US, 8 million high schoolers play athletics; at college level, over 2 million play club sport alongside half a million NCAA varsity athletes. The base of the pyramid and the peak are not in competition. They are the same structure.

Norway’s sports federation has codified this. Its Children’s Rights in Sport provisions, adopted in 1987, guarantee every child the right to choose which sport they wish to participate in. Selection determines competitive squads — but no child is excluded. That system, in a country of 5.6 million people — our size — has produced 445 Winter Olympic medals, more than any nation on earth.

III.

I want to turn to Direct School Admission, because DSA and CCA are entangled.

DSA now covers 141 of 148 secondary schools. Sports is the single largest talent category. When a tennis CCA has 20 spots and half are reserved for DSA students, the remaining places must absorb the entire non-DSA cohort — through trials and leftover places. That boy in my ward trained for six years and earned his school place on merit. But the system had already given away half the seats before he arrived.

The question is straightforward: who has access to the preparation that DSA rewards? Competitive sport at age twelve requires years of coaching, tournament entry fees, and parents with the time and means to support it. In 2024, a basketball coach was investigated by CPIB for allegedly charging parents $30,000 to $50,000 per child to secure DSA placements. That is not an isolated bad actor — it is a market responding to a system where the stakes are high and the pathways narrow.

IV.

Does early selection identify future talent? Sports science is settling on this question — and it is not a close call.

In December 2025, a study was published in major journal Science, synthesising the developmental histories of over 34,000 top-level performers: Olympic medallists, Nobel laureates, elite chess players, classical music composers. Their central finding: young standouts and adult world-class performers are largely different people — approximately 90% are different individuals. Early specialisation produces early results. But adult world-class performance is predicted by the opposite pattern: limited early discipline-specific practice, extensive multidisciplinary engagement, and gradual initial progress. World-class athletes averaged involvement in two other sports over nine years during childhood.

A companion meta-analysis supported it: the predictors of junior elite success were the precise opposite of the predictors of senior world-class success. Many talent promotion programs select youth based on current performance, which is often a result of: Biological Maturation: early puberty; Relative Age Effect: being born earlier in the selection year; and Early Specialization: high volumes of sport-specific practice at a young age. These advantages typically diminish or reverse by adulthood.

It further recommended that since current performance is a poor predictor of future potential. Selection should consider “side-entry” athletes and prioritize those with sustainable development patterns (such as moderate main-sport practice combined with other sports). Also, that program success should be measured not by junior medals, but by how many athletes transition to senior international excellence.

This matters because our CCA system — trials at age twelve, a four-year lock-in, LEAPS points tied to competitive results — is structurally an early-selection model. It may produce results in the National School Games. But a system optimised for junior results, by the best available science, is not selecting for true adult world-class performers.

I would like to highlight Singapore’s National Youth Sports Institute. NYSI’s Junior Sports Academy exposes Primary 4 to 5 students to four different sports over two years. NYSI’s Head of Sport Science has stated publicly that broad-based sporting experience produces equal or better outcomes through cross-transfer of skills. NYSI even hosted a dialogue with one of the principal authors of that 2025 Science study, Professor Arne Gullich in 2019 to discuss these principles.

So the gap is not between what we know and what we do not know. It is between what our own institutions endorse and what our CCA system requires. Let us close the gap between rhetoric and reality.

V.

Sir, I propose reform in three areas.

First, open every door within the school. Extend the primary school pilot to secondary schools. Let trials determine who makes the competitive squad — not who gets to participate. Every student should be able to join at least one of their top CCA choices. Where a CCA conducts selection trials, those trials should sort students into a competitive squad and a developmental programme — not into participants and the excluded. Students in the developmental tier train on fundamentals, fitness, and game understanding, with the opportunity to trial for the competitive squad each year. This is not a radical idea. It is how Singapore American School already operates on our own soil. It is how Hwa Chong’s track and field programme built the depth that won them all four divisions. And it is what sports science tells us produces better senior-level athletes.

Schools should also survey incoming Secondary One students on their CCA preferences — and publish the aggregate results. If sixty students want badminton and a school caps it at twenty, that gap should be visible. Where demand consistently exceeds supply, schools should adjust. Some may move quickly — splitting sessions, or expanding squads within the year. Others may take two to three years to reallocate resources from persistently under-subscribed CCAs. Either pace is fine. What matters is having a credible adjustment mechanism.

And because CCA choices at thirteen are often made under constraint — a student allocated their third or fourth preference, or a student who discovers a genuine passion through the developmental tier — I propose that students be allowed to change CCAs at the end of Sec One and end of Sec Two without penalty under LEAPS. This ensures commitment is meaningful.

Second, open doors beyond the school. We need systematic cross-school access. The Strategic Partnership CCA programme today serves 232 students from 86 schools across four sports. I welcome the expansion. But a programme serving 232 out of roughly 40,000 Sec One students each year is a proof of concept.

I propose three concrete steps. One: double SP-CCA from four sports to eight within two years. Two: publish a sport-by-sport availability map — showing which sports are offered at which schools — so that gaps are visible and planning is data-driven. Three: publish a five-year SP-CCA expansion roadmap with clear targets, and invite schools to form voluntary geographic clusters of four to six schools, pooling CCA offerings so students can cross-attend.

If tennis is available at only thirty schools, it should be an SP-CCA candidate. The boy in my ward — the one who trained for six years — would have had a path. This also creates natural opportunities for the kind of social mixing across school types that hon. member David Hoe has spoken about.

We should also recognise sport pursued outside school. SportSG already runs ActiveSG Academies and Clubs — affordable, structured programmes in football, basketball, tennis, athletics, and other sports, designed for children and youth. Could students participating in a structured external programme — ActiveSG, a National Sports Association, or a registered academy — be eligible for CCA recognition, subject to verification by the school?

And at primary level, could we double or triple Junior Sports Academy intake — this fully MOE-funded, non-competitive, multi-sport program— given demand already exceeds supply?

Third, build the infrastructure to keep these doors open. If we ask schools to offer a developmental tier alongside competition, we need people to run it. Today, every coach on a school field must hold full National Registry of Coaches membership. Since July 2024, provisional membership has been discontinued. A new coach must now complete SG-Coach Theory, a sport-specific Technical Level 1 course, Foundational Sport Science, and Standard First Aid certification. These are appropriate standards for competitive coaching. But we should consider whether a lighter certification pathway — suited to teaching fundamentals rather than competitive technique — might widen the coaching pool. Parent volunteers, older club players, retired coaches, polytechnic and ITE sport graduates who complete coaching practicals but cannot coach in schools without full certification, even NSFs with sporting backgrounds could contribute meaningfully at the developmental level if the credentialing framework made room for them.

Norway’s 9,500 sports clubs are almost entirely volunteer-run — three-quarters of all coaches are unpaid volunteers operating under a tiered credentialing system. A country our size sustains developmental-level coaching across every sport because its framework makes room for volunteers, not only professionals.

CoachSG’s own framework already includes an Exploration stage with a Community Coach programme. I propose CoachSG create a new NROC tier — an Assistant Coach or Recreational Coach credential — completable in eight to sixteen hours at nominal cost, covering Safe Sport, first aid, values-based coaching, and inclusive session design. Holders could lead developmental CCA sessions under periodic supervision by fully certified coaches.

Two further changes are needed to align the system’s incentives with its stated developmental purpose.

Review the LEAPS 2.0 Achievement domain. When bonus points depend on competition results and school representation, schools have a structural incentive to limit CCA places to students who boost competitive outcomes. Replacing competition-based indicators with measures of growth, effort, and consistency would realign LEAPS with its developmental purpose.

And require MOE to collect and publish socioeconomic data on DSA applications and outcomes — household income quartile, participation in paid preparatory programmes. When my hon. colleague Eileen Chong asked for this data, the Minister said MOE does not collect it. I would respectfully suggest that this is a question worth answering. If DSA in sport systematically advantages families who can afford years of private coaching, then it is not a merit pathway — it is a wealth pathway with a merit label.

It is a core concern of the Workers’ Party that wealth does not compound unfairness or widen social gaps through our education system - points eloquently elaborated over the years by my hon. colleagues Gerald Giam and Jamus Lim.

VI.

Mr Speaker, let me return to that family.

That resident also has a younger daughter, at a different school. Her primary school runs recreational sports CCAs. No trials. The girl had never held a badminton racket in her life. She signed up for badminton because she was curious. She was allocated her first choice. She is learning. She is happy and she belongs.

Two children in the same family. Two completely different experiences. The difference is not talent or effort. It is whether the school opens the door or closes it.

That thirteen-year-old boy did everything he could. He trained for six years. He earned his place in a secondary school that was strong in tennis. He showed up for the trial. And the system told him: there is no room. He is now in his prime physical developmental years — and he is playing a sport he didn’t choose, while the sport he loves slips further away with each passing term.

His mother told me: (quote) I will always wonder whether, if the school had been more open, my son might have improved and eventually earned a place on the team. It is something we will never have the chance to find out. (end quote)

We have an opportunity to make a system that is genuinely open — to extend to CCAs the same generosity of spirit that has guided every other recent reform in our schools.

Sir, I so move.

(Hongmeiren)

Speaker,

Last week was Lunar New Year. I had the pleasure of sampling a Xiangshan Hongmeiren mandarin orange. The texture was extraordinary — the vesicles of the orange so sweet, the skin almost paper thin. It has been described as “eating jelly”, or “jelly growing on a tree”. Twelve to fifteen percent sugar content, low acidity, no floating skin.

It inspired me to investigate its history. The Hongmeiren was once Ehime No. 28, developed over fifteen years at the Ehime Prefectural Fruit Tree Experiment Station in Japan, prized for its jelly-like texture and ultra-premium positioning.

But due to a lack of IP protection, it was lost. A handful of scion cuttings were carried to Xiangshan county - Zhejiang province in China - in 2001. Today, the Hongmeiren has expanded to over 1 million mu across fifteen Chinese provinces — dwarfing Japan’s 300 hectares by over a hundredfold. Fifteen years of breeding, gone like that. It is one of the most consequential agricultural IP losses in modern Japanese history, alongside the Shine Muscat grape and strawberry leakages.

And that reminded me of something closer to home.

(Mirxes)

“It is well known that our R&D ecosystem over the last thirty years has not produced impressive commercial outcomes. Tens of billions of spending since 1990. More than thirty years. Where are the deep tech commercial successes? The report card of significant commercial outcomes — high-value IPOs, globally competitive companies — is bare.”

That is what I would have said, up to May 23rd, 2025.

On that day, Mirxes, a micro RNA cancer diagnostics biotech company incubated over many years of A*STAR research at Biopolis, IPO’d on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, raising HK$1.09 billion with China-linked cornerstone investors. Finally, a billion dollar IPO. Coincidentally, also about fifteen years of effort — like the Japanese breeding the Ehime No. 28.

But the story is more complicated. Mirxes listed in Hong Kong, not Singapore, because SGX had no equivalent of HKEX’s pathway for pre-revenue biotech. Its cornerstone investors were Chinese entities holding over forty percent of the IPO. Its manufacturing now is in Zhejiang province. Its growth market is China. The initial science came from Singapore. Commercialisation leaked offshore.

If this is success, what does failure look like?

Now - this is not the fault of the Chinese. They optimised rationally within the realities of the system. This is our failure to capture value. Our responsibility to anticipate, to get it right. To make sure Singaporean taxpayers reap the rewards of tens of billions ploughed into R&D.

Mirxes highlights two facts. First, the system does not produce a strong pipeline — that Mirxes is the only billion dollar IPO or commercially significant R&D company after thirty years of continual investment tells you something. Second, even when a success emerges, the system is naively vulnerable to value-chain leakage.

“To lose one billion-dollar IPO may be regarded as a misfortune. To lose more is carelessness.” I will return to this later.

I welcome the Budget’s commitment to $37 billion under RIE2030 and the expansion of Startup SG Equity into growth capital — these are steps in the right direction. But the question is not whether we are spending enough; it is whether the system converts that spending into commercial outcomes for Singapore.

(System)

Why does the system produce these two outcomes - (a) a limited pipeline of commercially viable R&D companies, and (b) a failure to take advantage of successes when they come? The structural flaw is that agencies like EDB and the statutory boards are structured as grant-givers, not as investors or ecosystem builders.

If you are a grant-giver, your job is to mark the market — to benchmark, to do due diligence against market rates. If you mark the market, you are then subjected to the audit process — every decision scrutinised against whether you followed the benchmark. If you are a civil servant in that position, there is absolutely no reason to stick your neck out. Zero incentive for upside. Only downside risk from audit.

So of course you end up with super-conservative civil servants who say, “I don’t want to do any innovation.” You end up with long meetings where senior officials agonise over five thousand or ten thousand dollars because they are worried about compliance. Worse, annual KPI cycles force officers to judge five-to-seven-year bets on a twelve-month horizon — so promising ventures get culled before they can prove themselves. Meanwhile, you miss the forest for the trees.

To take an ecosystem approach to funding so that the day-to-day operational environment for R&D startups is the best it can be. To design policy to capture R&D upside.

Our agencies are structured to avoid losing money, not to make it. That is why thirty years of spending has not produced thirty years of returns.

I agree with the Prime Minister that R&D is a core imperative. Productivity gains, moving up the value chain — all this matters. But there must be an honest reckoning with thirty years of limited commercial outcomes, and value chain leakage.

The R&D ecosystem needs three things: money, speed, and a market.

First, Money.

I tried to count Singapore’s government-linked startup funds. I stopped at twenty. There are eight sub-schemes under the Startup SG umbrella alone. SGInnovate. Xora Innovation under Temasek. Vertex Holdings with seven sub-funds. NRF, ASTAR, IMDA, MAS run their own programmes. Not an exhaustive list.

Of course, each was created for a reason. Each has a logic. But the aggregate effect is a landscape so fragmented that no single entity has the mandate, the capital concentration, or the institutional authority to make the kind of large, decisive, fast bets that define successful deep tech commercialisation elsewhere.

The SG Growth Capital merger of SEEDS and EDBI is a step in the right direction. But the deeper question is whether we have the institutional courage to truly consolidate — to give one or two entities the capital, the mandate, and critically the permission to fail at scale, rather than spreading accountability so thin that no one is responsible for ecosystem outcomes. The pruning must go deeper.

France has a public investment bank called Bpifrance — a single institution combining innovation investment, SME lending, loan guarantees, export credit insurance, and strategic equity stakes. In 2024, Bpifrance deployed €60 billion. Its officers proactively contact companies with programmes. It is commercially viable, with 2024 net income of €896 million.

Under François Hollande and economic adviser Emmanuel Macron in 2012, France merged four fragmented investment bodies — one for SME loans, guarantees, innovation - one for venture capital - one for strategic equity - and one for regional equity — into a single entity: Bpifrance (Banque Publique d’Investissement). Export credit insurance was added later in 2017. It now employs about 3,500 staff, centralising innovation investment, economy-wide strategic investment, SME financing, loan guarantees, export support, and regional business development.

The diagnosis that prompted Bpifrance’s creation was plain: despite strong science and underlying dynamism, France’s entrepreneurial culture was weak — risk-averse and fearful of failure. Bpifrance also organised learning expeditions and export programmes to help French companies internationalise.

Bpifrance became the anchor investor across French tech — not just deep tech. Its 10-year assessment found that 80% of French startups that raised funds between 2013 and 2021 received Bpifrance support, and two-thirds of French VC funds have Bpifrance as an LP. Bpifrance deliberately accepts below-market returns (targeting ~7% annually rather than 10%+) to take risks that private investors won’t - training a generation of entrepreneurs and building an ecosystem from scratch.

I believe we need an equivalent policy investment bank. An institution outside the civil service, incentivised to take risk, freed from line-item accountability. Staffed with ecosystem builders, not risk-averse civil servants. We need to take a portfolio approach, thinking in ten-year cycles. Ten-year cohorts. Ten-year mandates. They need the right incentives. We had this in the early years with DBS and Temasek — both have since drifted from that mission, and today no institution fills the gap.

The WP has argued before for an EXIM bank; the French example shows a mandate wider still — innovation investment, SME lending, export credit, strategic equity, all under one roof.

It is often said we have a lot of capital in Singapore. But we have the wrong type of capital for R&D commercialisation. Capital tied to government or corporates. Excessive obsession with business metrics way too early. Startups forced to jump through a thousand hoops for small cheques. Family offices largely uninterested in our R&D ecosystem. My colleague Jamus Lim has proposed requiring a modest domestic allocation as a condition for family office tax incentives, which I support.

What does success look like twenty-five years from now? A flywheel, where private capital is sophisticated enough to understand deep tech. Patient capital writing experimental cheques. Less metric-obsessed early on. That is the ecosystem we should be building toward.

Second, Speed.

Funders and regulators need to appreciate that two extra days of approvals or one month of delayed cash flow is life or death for a startup. You do not understand what it takes if you have not tried it yourself.

Fast capital deployment does not just save companies — it trains a generation of entrepreneurs who won’t waste sixty percent of their time fundraising. We should make peace with the fact that roughly eighty percent of bets on startups, made in good faith, will back a losing venture. That is the power law in action. The real gain is often the entrepreneur’s second and third startup. But if the first attempt feels like pulling teeth, they drop out, and the compounding of iterated learning across business formation is lost.

Speed is not just about money. It is about people.

MOM uses income as its proxy for talent — the Tech.Pass at 22500 a month, the ONE Pass at 30000. This may work for hot fields. It seldom works for deep tech which due to their call-option nature, are unfashionable before they are fashionable. A strong biotech engineer in Thailand earns a quarter of Singapore wages. To bring them here, a startup must triple their salary — not because their skills are worth less, but because MOM’s threshold demands it. That is startup cash burnt on regulatory compliance, not R&D. We are asking founders to choose between the talent they need and the runway they cannot afford to lose.

The assumption that salary equals value breaks down where it matters most. Deep tech talent is scarce, specialised, and often transient. An eighteen-month engagement with a materials engineer, or a combustion engine specialist can redefine a company’s trajectory. The visa framework should reflect that reality.

I propose a segmented approach: a company-driven deep tech visa, tied not to income but to the company’s credentials. A monthly review committee of mixed Singaporean and international entrepreneurs evaluating deep tech companies — there are perhaps fifty to eighty serious ones formed here each year. Companies meeting the criteria enter a special segment: flexibility for 3-5 visas in year one, with annual portfolio reviews assessing whether the company is growing. Easy entry, progressively stricter requirements on each renewal, all strictly performance-based. Is the company growing? Are Singaporeans being hired and trained alongside foreign specialists? If yes, renew. If not, exit.

Traditional organisations — banks, established corporates — can afford strict income rules. There is enough local talent. But deep tech startups need radical fluidity, and the visa regime most suited to them should follow the company, not the person.

We should also aim to make visa decisions snappy. It is fine to say no to people. But let’s have the courtesy to do it fast, within a matter of weeks. Let’s not waste our companies’ time.

Third, a market and offtake.

Money and speed are necessary but insufficient if no one is buying. The system must be designed for offtake — structured so that when R&D produces something, there is a buyer on the other end.

Singapore hosts regional headquarters, not global ones. Decision-making centres remain in New York, London, Paris, Shanghai. Regional postings run three to four years. When the regional executive who championed an innovation pilot rotates home, continuity goes with them. Corporate incentive structures often reward launching initiatives, not seeing them through — creating structural discontinuity.

Tax incentives should require backing from both regional and global headquarters. If there is no interlocutor in New York or Shanghai who has signed off, no incentive. This ensures a direct link to decision-making and prevents projects from being forgotten when executives rotate home.

Beyond that, we should attach strategic buyer offtake commitments to grants. Require MNCs to pilot, evaluate, or procure from at least one local startup or SME as part of grant conditions.

And the government itself must practise innovation procurement. Europe and China give SMEs quotas of contracts to help them gain scale. We must do the same.

(IP Protection)

I said I would return to the question of protecting value. Money, speed, and a market can build a pipeline. But pipeline alone is not enough if the value leaks out.

Three countries have dealt with this question, and they are not peripheral economies — they are among the most successful R&D ecosystems in the world.

Israel protects at inception. Under the Law for the Encouragement of Industrial Research and Development, the Israel Innovation Authority attaches binding conditions to all public R&D funding. IP developed with public grants cannot be transferred outside Israel without explicit prior approval. Unauthorised transfer is a criminal offence. No known prosecution has occurred. But the deterrent is powerful.

Taiwan protects through structure. ITRI spun off TSMC in 1987 by transferring fabs, equipment, technologies, and ninety-eight professionals to a new Taiwanese entity — with significant government ownership. The critical feature was not any single restriction but a system: government ownership stakes in spin-offs, personnel who were Taiwanese nationals, incorporation in Taiwan, government funding giving the state structural leverage over deployment.

South Korea designates core protected technologies. Under the Industrial Technology Protection Act, South Korea designates more than seventy technologies across thirteen fields as National Core Technologies — semiconductors, displays, batteries — and requires prior approval for any export or M&A involving these technologies. Maximum prison sentences for overseas technology leakage reach eighteen years, with punitive damages at five times actual losses.

Singapore needs equivalent mechanisms for conditionality.

Some say we should adopt - Golden shares. IP retention conditions, protected technologies. Domestic manufacturing requirements tied to public funding.

My view is: the necessary and plausibly sufficient policy to adopt is an IP conditionality regime, designed for a small open economy. Legislate that IP developed with public R&D funding cannot be permanently transferred offshore without prior approval from a designated authority — enforceable domestically against Singapore-domiciled entities and individuals.

Ultimately we will be judged on the competitiveness of our ecosystem. An SGX that rewards R&D. SEZs that can scale up manufacturing at lower cost. Company-driven R&D manpower policies. Risk capital from a consolidated policy investment bank like BpiFrance. Trade architecture that companies actually use — not headline ATIGA numbers or scarcely used FTAs, but reduced non-tariff barriers and the ability to incorporate once in Singapore and operate across key Southeast Asian markets.

When companies reach a certain size, the siren song of redomicile will prove irresistible for many. The competition shifts — to building a growth-capital ecosystem deep enough and catalysing a Southeast Asian market large enough that staying makes more sense than leaving.

So sunset such an IP conditionality regime once the ecosystem is strong enough.

This will crowd-in private R&D and take the burden of sustaining our headline R&D numbers off the Singaporean taxpayer.

Yes, fewer R&D startups may form under these IP conditions. But I say, better to have fewer startups with real upside capture, than sexy headlines, nice PR pieces in CNA, and nothing to show for it. And it shifts R&D accountability to where it belongs — not on public servants approving a grant, but on the system retaining the value.

You may be very proud of your Ehime No. 28. But unless you take preparatory measures — unless you design for the upside — one day you will find your R&D being sold as a Hongmeiren mandarin. Incubated in Singapore, harvested in Zhejiang and HK.

Thank you Sir.

Sustainability & Environment (MSE) - 1 Question

1. Affordability Impact of Beverage Container Return Scheme ⭐ ORAL

Question: Given that the Beverage Container Return Scheme is projected to add 25 to 60 cents to prices of bottled and canned drinks of which only 10 cents is refundable, what assessment was made of the affordability impact on lower-income households before confirming the April 2026 launch.

SMS Dr Janil Puthucheary’s Answer (grouped reply to 5 oral and 1 written question on BCRS):

The scheme was first proposed by a Recycle Right Citizens’ Workgroup in 2019 to increase household recycling rates and reduce contamination in the recycling bins. The BCRS aims to increase the recycling of beverage containers using an Extended Producer Responsibility concept. This is the second such scheme to be introduced in Singapore, building on our experience with the e-waste recycling programme. The scheme features a deposit paid at the point of purchase to incentivise consumers to return their containers.

In designing the scheme, we studied the experiences of other jurisdictions. Schemes in Norway, Denmark and Lithuania have achieved high collection rates, and one common factor was having an industry-led, not-for-profit entity run the scheme. The scheme operator, BCRS Ltd, was formed by the industry and is governed by a Board that has both large and small producer representatives, comprising Coca-Cola Singapore Beverages, F&N Foods, Pokka, Wanin Industries and Chia Khim Lee Food Industries. Licensed by NEA, they are required to report the amount of 10-cent deposits collected from producers and refunded to consumers in their annual report for public accountability.

All regulated beverage containers will attract a 10-cent deposit, which is fully refundable. Such containers will bear a deposit mark for easy identification. All producers will also need to pay a producer fee of three to four cents per container to BCRS Ltd. This fee covers the logistics to collect and recycle the containers and is comparable to fees in other jurisdictions.

From our engagements with stakeholders, producers of about 80% of beverage containers can incorporate the deposit mark and barcode requirements directly on their containers. Beyond the once-off implementation cost, these producers should see costs per container close to the producer fee of three to four cents, which should keep compliance costs low for most drinks sold.

Some producers may need to, or may choose to, place a sticker on their containers instead of changing the design. The cost of stickering will vary, depending on the quantity and how supply chains are organised. Some can do so for about three cents per container if done at source overseas and at scale. For small quantities done locally, the cost to the producer would be higher.

We appreciate that some producers may find the transition more challenging. NEA and BCRS Ltd have been engaging both large and small producers regularly and providing practical support. Responding to feedback from producers that they needed more time, we extended the transition period from three months to six months. We also introduced a transition grant of $2,500 to help smaller businesses.

Consumer pricing of beverages is a complex and commercial decision. Consumer demand patterns and marketing strategies will also affect the price. We have designed the scheme to be run as efficiently as possible, with a low cost to producers. Any cost pass-through to consumers will likely be further moderated by price competition among industry players, as consumers have a wide variety of choices. This has been the experience in some jurisdictions, where studies found that the introduction of deposit return schemes did not have a significant direct impact on beverage prices or beverage sales.

At launch in April, the public can return empty plastic and metal beverage containers bearing the deposit mark at over 1,000 Reverse Vending Machines located across Singapore to obtain a 10-cent refund. These RVMs will be located at larger supermarkets and other publicly accessible locations with high footfall, such as void decks of HDB blocks and some hawker centres. 90% of residents in HDB housing estates will live within a five-minute walk to one of these return points. BCRS Ltd will provide more details on the RVM locations in the coming weeks.

We aim to double the number of return points to 2,000 RVMs within the first year. At launch, we will deploy ambassadors on the ground to guide the public on how to use the RVMs. We recognise that some seniors and vulnerable members of the community may require additional assistance to adapt to the scheme. NEA and BCRS Ltd, together with our community partners, are committed to providing additional support to better address their needs.

My Supplementary Questions:

The deposit rate is fully refundable at 10 cents, but media reports have put the projected price increase at 25 to 60 cents. So the difference is about 15 to 50 cents of permanent compliance costs, which the vending machine will not return. What assessment has been made of this non-refundable portion as a share of income for lower-income households?

Second, the only current confirmed refund method is EZ-Link. Can the Senior Minister of State confirm that a cash refund or cash voucher option will be available at all return points from Day 1?

Third, a lot of parallel importers face $40,000 a month of fees under the scheme. With the transition grant at $2,500, that is quite disproportionate. These parallel importers are the companies that bring the cheapest drinks onto the market. Has the Ministry assessed the risk that this scheme eliminates the discount beverage segment entirely?

And finally, the Senior Minister of State has said they will monitor to see if price increases go beyond three to four cents. But as we all know, price increases are sticky. What will the Government do if the price increases go beyond three to four cents?

SMS Puthucheary’s Response:

On the first point, the 25 to 60 cents was a media report from a handful of producers. Our assessment is that 80% of the market will have a three to four cent increase. [SMS Puthucheary later issued a clarification correcting one instance where he misstated this as “3% to 4%” — all instances should read “three to four cents per container.”]

Indeed, there will be smaller producers who, because of their supply chain or the size of their operations, will have higher challenges and we are prepared to be flexible and supportive. The grant that we sized already covers about one-quarter of the producers and especially those that have put to market of less than 50,000 units.

For the refund methodology, EZ-Link SimplyGo is available as a refund methodology and there will be further refund methodologies. We are not, at this point, planning for cash or cash voucher as forms of refund. We are hoping to use digital means and BCRS Ltd will be announcing the other means for refund in the future.

We have indeed engaged with a variety of importers, including some of the smallest. The smallest producer that we have directly engaged has a put to market of 1,000 units. We are trying to understand their challenges, and we are trying to find ways to help them participate in this scheme while remaining viable as a business.

Was there a fourth question?

My follow-up: What will the Government do if price increases —

SMS Puthucheary: We will monitor. It depends on what is the behaviour. If there is evidence of collusion or profiteering, there are mechanisms for that to be reported and dealt with. We will look to see what are the factors that have led to that.

Education (MOE) - 3 Questions

2. Central Kitchen Meal Model and Food Safety ⭐ ORAL

Question: (a) How many days after adopting the Central Kitchen Meal Model did the River Valley Primary School gastroenteritis outbreak occur; (b) whether central kitchen operators must meet Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Points (HACCP) standards and the three-zone hygiene system as required in Japan; and (c) whether the Ministry will publish food safety audit results for all such operators.

MOS Jasmin Lau’s Answer (grouped reply to Q14-20 on school canteens and food safety):

As parents and Members of this House, we all understand how important school meals are for our children’s growth and well-being. MOE is fully committed to ensuring that every student has access to affordable, nutritious and balanced meals.

Today, 95% of our schools continue with the traditional stallholder approach. However, we face a real challenge. An increasing number of schools are struggling to fill their vacant canteen stalls, leaving students, especially those with dietary needs, very limited options. In some cases, these students may have to eat the same dish for weeks.

MOE provides substantial support to stallholders. Stallholders pay very low rentals of between $5 and $15 per month, and we waive these during school holidays. We also seek preferential electricity tariffs through demand aggregation and pass these savings directly to stallholders. But the challenges go deeper than just costs. School canteens have a small customer base and limited business hours.

We did not start the Central Kitchen Meal Model to replace the traditional canteen model. We wanted to explore alternative models to help schools that were struggling to attract stallholders and had severe shortages. We started with a pilot at Yusof Ishak Secondary School, which relocated from Bukit Batok to Punggol and did not have existing stallholders. After seeing positive results, we tried out a range of Central Kitchen Meal Models in 13 additional schools. We have no intention to scale this to all schools, nor do we have a target in mind.

We are taking an open and flexible approach. Some schools are using hybrid models, where operators both deliver pre-ordered meals and prepare fresh food onsite. In several schools, students can still choose and watch their meals being prepared at live cooking stations, alongside pre-ordered options.

Food prepared by central kitchens is not inherently unsafe or less safe. Central kitchens are licensed by the Singapore Food Agency (SFA). They are subjected to more frequent inspections, as they have a larger scale of food processing or preparation. Central kitchens are graded under the Safety Assurance for Food Establishment framework. In the event of a major food lapse, they will be downgraded and inspected even more frequently.

MOE will continue to work with SFA, the Communicable Diseases Agency (CDA) and the operators to strengthen food safety management systems. This covers everything from preparation at the central kitchens to transportation, storage and eventually, when the food is served to the students.

The number of gastroenteritis incidents in schools have averaged six cases a year in the past three years across all food service models. SFA, CDA and MOE are still investigating the causes for both the River Valley Primary School and North View Primary School incidents. River Valley Primary School currently uses one of our Central Kitchen Meal Model operators, while North View Primary School has traditional stallholders.

Where food safety breaches are detected, whether at central kitchens or individual stalls, SFA takes immediate enforcement action and requires rectifications. Operations may be suspended or terminated for severe food safety breaches or ongoing disease transmission. We have taken a cautious approach by limiting each operator to serving just four or five schools. This helps to contain the impact of any operational issues and allows us to observe different operators’ performance and have back-up options ready.

[Note: The Leader of the House moved a motion to extend Question Time to allow this topic to be completed — a procedural rarity reflecting the level of public interest.]

My Supplementary Questions:

First, since 2005, Japan has employed diet and nutrition teachers — professionals who hold both a nutritionist qualification and teaching licence — in schools to create menus, oversee food safety and teach nutrition in the classroom. Will the Government consider making similar nutrition and safety roles accredited professionals?

Second, I quote The Straits Times on the River Valley Primary case: “Some parents told ST that their children had noticed the chicken on the pizza tasting a bit strange. A few parents said their children were fine after consuming the pizza as they had picked the chicken off. A pupil told his mother that the chicken did not smell good but he ate it anyway and had diarrhoea the next day.” So, what is the status of the investigation into the chicken? If it was the chicken, how did it make it past the food hygiene officer?

MOS Lau’s Response:

On dietary teachers, in Singapore, we work closely with the Health Promotion Board to ensure that the food we provide to students from preschool to secondary school has good nutritional value and meets the needs of our students. We also have food hygiene officers in our schools with the Central Kitchen Meal Models, and they do make checks on the way that the food is handled to make sure that the food is safe.

On the second question, I would suggest that the Member wait for the investigation results before talking more about the River Valley Primary case.

Social & Family Development (MSF) - 2 Questions

3. ComCare Denials for Non-Compliance with Employment Action Plans ⭐ ORAL

Question: In the past three years, how many ComCare applications were denied citing non-compliance with employment action plans; whether applicants are given the opportunity to provide evidence of their engagement with partner agencies before such denials; and whether the Ministry will ensure applicants are heard before being denied on such grounds.

MOS Zhulkarnain Abdul Rahim’s Answer:

ComCare Short-to-Medium Term Assistance (SMTA) helps clients with their basic living expenses as they work on improving their financial situation. Our Social Service Office (SSO) officers work closely with clients to develop suitable action plans to achieve this.

Clients are informed from the very outset that they must adhere to these action plans. However, should they face genuine difficulties meeting them or if they need more time, the action plans can be reviewed.

Based on the household’s adherence to action plans and progress towards self-reliance, the amount and duration of the SMTA may be adjusted while ensuring dependants’ basic needs are being met. The MSF family coaches will also get them help from the community, for example, with the provision of milk and diapers, if necessary.

We do not track the number of applicants who were not given ComCare because they did not comply with their action plans.

My Supplementary Question:

It has been represented to me — and these are the facts, as I understand them — that a young married constituent with young children, unemployed and living in a rental flat, was denied ComCare because he did not follow up with e2i. But he has WhatsApp records that e2i messaged him on 15 December, asking him if he was still looking for work and he replied “yes” on the same day. He followed up on 24 December, asking about jobs with hours compatible with sending his children to school. And as far as I can tell, e2i did not respond to either message. The SSO rejection letter arrived before anyone asked him for evidence of his engagement.

So, without pre-judging things, my question is, does SSO take e2i’s word, or other employment partner agencies’ word, unconditionally, before rejecting an applicant for non-engagement? Is the applicant given a chance to present their side?

MOS Zhulkarnain’s Response:

For each family and each applicant, they face various unique circumstances and challenges. For this particular case, SSO is aware and is currently considering the appeal. And actually, for this particular family, it is a known family and the family coach has helped the family in other ways as well, including provision of food rations, infant milk powder and diapers.

Having said that, this cessation of financial assistance or tapering off of it, is not something that SSO takes very lightly. SSO reviews it with the help of the Social Assistance Officer (SAO), who has embarked and partnered with the applicant family on the action plan. The SAO will contact the applicants for an interview and at the stage of assessment of the SMTA, the SAO will also get information from the family coach, from other sources of information as well, to ensure that they look at the entire assistance required by the family.

Rest assured that every applicant for SMTA will be able to get financial assistance by SSOs and we will look at how to help them meet their basic living needs and journey with them on this journey for self-reliance so that they can improve their financial situation.

4. Enabling Employment Credit Uptake and Barriers (Written)

Question: Of the employers eligible for the Enabling Employment Credit, what proportion have utilised it; what are the main barriers preventing greater uptake; and given the target of 40% employment rate for persons with disabilities by 2030 versus the current 32.7%, what additional measures are planned to close this gap.

Mr Masagos Zulkifli’s Answer:

Employers who hire resident persons with disabilities earning less than $4,000 per month are eligible for the Enabling Employment Credit, and will be automatically enrolled in the scheme based on their Central Provident Fund (CPF) contributions to these employees.

The Member may refer to the written reply we had given on 14 October 2025 on addressing challenges that prevent special needs young adults from securing and retaining employment, which mentions the barriers faced by employers in hiring persons with disabilities and measures put in place to support them and persons with disabilities.

The Taskforce on Assurance for Families with Persons with Disabilities, announced in December 2025, will also study and develop recommendations to further strengthen support for employers and build resilience for persons with disabilities in the workplace.

Taken together, these measures will support our continued efforts to raise the employment rate of resident persons with disabilities aged 15 to 64 to 40% by 2030, from 34.7% for the period of 2024 to 2025.

For reference, the October 2025 written reply the Minister refers to (to a question by Dr Charlene Chen) outlined barriers including employers’ limited awareness of inclusive hiring benefits and lack of in-house capabilities for job accommodations, and persons with disabilities needing additional training and job coaching. Measures cited included the Open Door Programme (customised job coach support and job redesign grants), the Enabling Employment Credit (wage offsets), a new Employer Development Grant from 2025, and SG Enable’s Enabling Business Hub. SG Enable is taking a sectoral approach across six key sectors: F&B, retail, ICT, health and social services, transport and storage, and financial services.

Finance (MOF) - 4 Questions

5. Exposure of Singapore’s Reserves to Section 892 of US Tax Code ⭐ ORAL

Question: Whether the Ministry has assessed the exposure of Singapore’s reserves to the proposed changes to section 892 of the US tax code; whether Singapore has made representations to the US Treasury before the 13 February 2026 comment deadline; and whether the Ministry retains confidence that GIC’s and Temasek’s US investments are adequately protected from this regulatory change.

Mr Jeffrey Siow’s Answer:

The Government expects our investment entities to operate on a commercial basis and to fully comply with the laws and regulations of the jurisdictions they invest in. We also expect them to closely monitor regulatory changes in overseas jurisdictions, and to adjust their portfolios accordingly should these affect our investment returns or risks.

As with other investors and interested parties, GIC and Temasek may provide feedback or comments on proposed regulatory or tax changes introduced by the United States or other foreign governments, where relevant.

Separately, the Singapore Government maintains regular and constructive engagement with the US Treasury on a broad range of issues, including developments in financial and tax regulations.

The Government retains confidence that our investment entities have the capabilities and risk-management frameworks to assess and manage the implications of regulatory changes, and to take appropriate steps to protect Singapore’s investment interests.

6. Reference Data for Determining Baby Bonus Quantum ⭐ ORAL

Question: Whether the Ministry publishes official estimates of child-raising expenditures by age band, as the United States has since 1960; what reference data determines Baby Bonus quantum; and whether Baby Bonus cashflow fit has been evaluated against cost peaks in the first 36 months, particularly for lower-income households facing immediate infant care expenses.

Ms Indranee Rajah’s Answer:

The Government is strongly committed to supporting Singaporeans to realise their marriage and parenthood aspirations. We provide a suite of generous financial support for families with children, in the form of cash and cash-like payouts, grants, education and healthcare subsidies, and tax benefits.

We do not publish estimates of child-raising expenditure. Such standalone estimates would not be useful as child-raising expenditure varies greatly depending on a family’s needs, parents’ expectations and choices.

Instead, in determining the quantum and cashflow for the Baby Bonus Scheme, we consider data such as household income and expenditure, including child-related expenditure, as well as feedback from parents. For example, in 2023, in response to parents’ feedback, we enhanced the Baby Bonus quantum and adjusted the payout structure to provide parents with sustained financial support until their child enters primary school.

We recognise that the costs incurred by parents is higher when the child is younger. Hence, a larger portion of the Baby Bonus Cash Gift is paid to parents upfront to support the higher initial costs at birth and infancy, with regular payouts thereafter until the child turns 6.5 years old.

Over and above the Baby Bonus Cash Gift, other support is provided within the first 36 months of a child’s birth. Families also receive support through the Child Development Account (CDA) First Step Grant given at the child’s birth, as well as Government co-matching of parents’ savings into the CDA. CDA moneys can be used for approved child-related expenses such as infant care, preschool and medical fees.

The Government has also kept preschools affordable by providing subsidies to parents of Singapore Citizen children and imposing fee caps at Government-supported Anchor Operator (AOP) and Partner Operator (POP) preschools.

Currently, all Singapore Citizen children enrolled in a licensed preschool are eligible for a Basic Subsidy of up to $300 per month for childcare and up to $600 per month for infant care. To further lower costs, eligible families receive additional means-tested subsidies, with more for lower-income. We enhanced these additional subsidies in 2020, by raising the income ceiling from $7,500 to $12,000, and increasing subsidy amounts across all eligible income tiers.

We have also progressively reduced fee caps in AOP and POPs. Fee caps were lowered for both full-day infant care and full-day childcare in 2023. They were further reduced for full-day childcare last year and at the start of this year.

In addition, lower-income families benefit from further support through other targeted schemes such as Child Care Financial Assistance and Start-Up Grant. All these help defray the costs of the child at a younger age.

We will continue to review our measures to strengthen support for parents in managing the costs of raising children.

7. Higher Income Tax from Working Mother’s Child Relief Change ⭐ ORAL

Question: Based on the Year of Assessment (YA) 2025 data, how many working mothers with children born from 2024 paid higher income tax following change from percentage-based to fixed-dollar Working Mother’s Child Relief; what is the projected additional tax revenue over the next decade as the affected cohort grows; and whether this projected revenue is consistent with the objective of encouraging higher-order births.

Ms Indranee Rajah’s Answer:

The Working Mother’s Child Relief (WMCR) is part of a broader package to support Singaporeans in their marriage and parenthood journey. We have over the years significantly increased financial support such as the Baby Bonus Cash Gift and the Child Development Account First Step Grant, and enhanced parental leave provisions. We also introduced the new Shared Parental Leave scheme and the Large Families Scheme last year. All in, we expect these initiatives to cost the Government close to $7 billion in FY2026, up from over $4 billion in FY2020.

About 9,500 working mothers paid higher income tax in YA 2025 than they would have under the old WMCR basis. The change in basis of the WMCR to a fixed dollar relief was to provide equal support for children of the same child order regardless of the mother’s income, which improves the progressivity of our support. We are unable to project the additional tax revenue from the WMCR change over the next 10 years, as this is dependent on many variables that could change over time, such as the working mother’s income, the other qualifying reliefs, and number of children she may eventually have.

However, we expect the cost of the marriage and parenthood initiatives to far exceed any additional tax revenue from the WMCR change.

8. Commercial Viability of RIE-funded Deep Tech Projects (Written)

Question: What proportion of Research, Innovation and Enterprise (RIE) funded deep tech projects achieve commercial viability; whether the Ministry has studied Israel’s model where innovation grants are repaid only upon commercialisation success; and whether RIE2030 will introduce similar outcome-linked funding mechanisms.

Mr Gan Kim Yong’s Answer (for the Prime Minister):

Investing in deep tech is a complex endeavour that takes years. There is no single or simple metric of commercial viability that applies. The Government uses a range of indicators for RIE-funded projects such as Intellectual Property (IP) licensing, capability and knowledge building, growing start-ups, and catalysing private sector investment. For example, in RIE2025, of the Corporate Laboratories that support partnerships between public researchers and companies to co-develop technologies for industry, about 80% are expected to generate licensing revenue from jointly-created IP.

Singapore keeps abreast of good practices in deep tech commercialisation from other countries, including Israel. The objectives behind our support schemes and mechanisms for deep tech commercialisation have broad similarities to those of other countries, but the governance and funding structures have been adapted to meet the needs of our RIE ecosystem.

We capture value from RIE through various means, including licensing revenue generated when commercial partners license IP from research institutions, or returns from equity stakes when startups built around these technologies achieve commercial success. In addition, research collaborations with both global and local industry partners help anchor them in Singapore, thereby contributing to a more dynamic and competitive economy.

9. Employment Outcomes for SPED Graduates (Written)

Question: What proportion of Special Education (SPED) school graduates in 2022, 2023 and 2024 were placed into employment within one year of graduation; of these graduates, what proportion remained in employment as of end 2025; and whether the Ministry will publish annual SPED graduate employment data comparable to the Graduate Employment Survey for universities.

Mr Desmond Lee’s Answer:

Students in Special Education (SPED) schools have moderate-to-severe Special Educational Needs and require specialised support and curriculum customisation to cater to their diverse needs. As the range of needs is broad and diverse in SPED, students in SPED learn essential knowledge, skills and attributes that can help them live independently to the best of their ability.

Of the approximately 500 SPED graduates each year from 2022 to 2024, about half were placed into employment in open or supported settings, enrolled in internship programmes, or progressed to institutes of higher learning within six months of graduation. Those employed found jobs in sectors such as retail, horticulture and hospitality. SPED graduates with higher needs may proceed to services such as sheltered workshops and day activity centres to develop skills for community living.

The Ministry of Education works with the Ministry of Social and Family Development and SG Enable to study the outcomes and experiences of persons with disabilities, which are reported through publications such as the Disability Trends Report 2024, which reports holistically on a range of outcomes, including employment.

The recently launched inter-agency Taskforce on Assurance for Families with persons with disabilities will study how to better support persons with disabilities, including SPED graduates, to achieve positive and sustained employment outcomes. More information on the Taskforce’s findings and recommendations will be shared in due course.

10. Findings from 2020 Pilot to Remove CCA Selection Trials ⭐ ORAL

Question: What have been the findings of the 2020 pilot to remove CCA selection trials; how many schools have adopted the no-trial model; and whether the Ministry will require schools to offer both recreational and competitive CCA tiers so that students wishing to participate for leisure and development are not excluded by selection.

Mr Desmond Lee’s Answer:

Co-Curricular Activities (CCA) are an integral part of a holistic education aimed at developing our students’ character, skills and values.

The Primary Schools in the pilot study were able to allocate students to their CCA choices without selection trials.

Today, about two-thirds of primary schools do not conduct CCA selection trials. Most of the remaining schools conduct trials only for a few CCAs that are oversubscribed, keeping the enrolment manageable to ensure a quality learning experience for students.

Schools customise their CCA offerings to best fit their student profiles and available resources. Many already provide recreational options. Schools also work with SportSG to provide additional recreational sports opportunities such as the Sports Education Programme and the recently launched School Sports Fiesta as enrichment beyond regular CCAs. Students also have many opportunities to learn and play a range of sports during Physical Education classes and during unstructured play at recess.

We will continue to strengthen our CCA system, to ensure meaningful development opportunities for all students.

Manpower (MOM) - 1 Question

11. Definition and Measurable Indicators for “Good Jobs” under Economic Strategy Review ⭐ ORAL

Question: (a) What is the Ministry’s operational definition of a “good job” as used in the Economic Strategy Review; (b) what measurable indicators will the Ministry use to track whether the strategy is creating such jobs; and (c) whether the Ministry will adopt a multi-dimensional job quality framework comparable to that published by the OECD.

SMS Dr Koh Poh Koon’s Answer:

We use wages as a key operational measure to track if proposed investments create good jobs, since this is the most objective indicator of job quality. This enables comparisons across sectors, firms, occupations and workers.

Having said that, the notion of a “good job” varies across individuals, shaped by their circumstances and aspirations. It often includes factors such as wage growth, opportunities for career development, fair and safe workplaces and personal fulfilment.

There are multiple dimensions to good jobs, and no single, universally accepted framework for measuring job quality. Hence, we chose to measure a range of more objectively measurable labour market indicators and regularly benchmark our labour market performance internationally across key dimensions that cover job creation and job quality, such as: (1) labour market participation; (2) labour underutilisation; and (3) earnings.

These are broadly aligned with the OECD framework and across these domains, Singapore generally ranks favourably relative to OECD economies.

Local workers have experienced sustained and inclusive wage growth. From 2021 to 2025, real gross monthly income at the median grew by 7.4%. At the 20th percentile, income grew even faster, by 10.1% over the same period.

Two-thirds of private sector establishments provided structured training to employees. Fewer employees experienced discrimination at work, decreasing from 8.5% in 2021 to 6% in 2023. Our Workplace Safety and Health performance ranked amongst top performing countries, with a five-year average workplace fatality rate of 1.1 per 100,000 workers in 2024.

My Supplementary Questions:

The ESR mid-term update factsheet uses the phrase “good jobs” six times without defining it. What is the issue with creating a job quality framework like the OECD has done?

Second, our wage share of GDP remains lower than many OECD countries — I believe it is in the mid-40s, where OECD countries are in the 50s. Will the Government track this as part of the definition of a “good job”?

Third, the ESR says it will uplift and transform roles like electricians and care workers. But a commitment that cannot be proven true or false is not really an accountable commitment. Would the Ministry set clear benchmarks in terms of pay, progression and working conditions, so that Parliament can actually determine if uplift has occurred?

SMS Koh’s Response:

On job quality, we do track multiple parameters and dimensions across our workforce and the labour market. But fundamentally, workers want to see their wages go up from year to year. Well-paying jobs are those that pay above the median wage of the resident workforce. By creating more of such jobs and helping more Singaporeans to upskill to take them on, we will grow the median wage of our workforce over time.

On wage share, there are multiple dimensions to track and we will continue to measure multiple dimensions of job quality, that could include looking at wage share over time. We will consider relevant dimensions included in other international frameworks, including the OECD’s job quality framework.

On trades and skilled roles, this is an area still under deliberation by the ESR, so I would not jump the gun. When the ESR releases its final report, there will be a better treatment of the questions regarding trades and skilled roles.

Home Affairs (MHA) - 1 Question

12. OCHA Directive on Moneylending Ads Targeting Migrant Domestic Workers ⭐ ORAL

Question: Whether the Ministry has considered issuing an Implementation Directive under the Online Criminal Harms Act requiring social media platforms to detect and remove unlicensed moneylending advertisements targeting migrant domestic workers; and why the approach taken for impersonation scams has not been extended to illegal moneylending advertisements that facilitate harassment of workers and their employers.

Mr K Shanmugam’s Answer:

The Police work with online platforms like Meta and TikTok to strengthen upstream measures to prevent unlicensed moneylending through pre-emptive detection and blocking of accounts. Between 2023 and 2025, the Police flagged more than 10,900 online accounts and advertisements involved in unlicensed moneylending to online platforms for termination.

Implementation Directives under the Online Criminal Harms Act are issued when there is an urgent need to put in place a specific measure to address the proliferation of an offence or possible immediate impact. The Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) has issued Implementation Directives when there was limited cooperation from the platforms involved. In the context of unlicensed moneylending, the existing collaboration between the Police and online platforms is assessed to be adequate to deal with the issues.

Defence (MINDEF) - 1 Question

13. NSF Enlistment Numbers Breakdown (Written)

Question: How many Full-time National Servicemen were enlisted in each of the last 10 years, broken down by the SAF, SPF, and SCDF; and in each of those years, how many Full-time National Servicemen were serving in their second year of national service.

Mr Chan Chun Sing’s Answer:

As the enlistment numbers vary from year-to-year, it is more meaningful to compare the annual average enlistment numbers over longer time periods, as follows.

(Rounded to the nearest 100) Annual Average (2016 to 2020) Annual Average (2021 to 2025) Full-Time National Servicemen Enlisted to the SAF 19,100 17,300 Full-Time National Servicemen Enlisted to the SPF 2,400 2,200 Full-Time National Servicemen Enlisted to the SCDF 1,900 1,800

The percentage of enlistees who progress to complete their two-year term has consistently exceeded 95%. The small numbers who are unable to complete the two-year term are mostly due to medical reasons.

National Development (MND) - 1 Question

14. Residential Noise Thresholds Review (Written)

Question: What is the status of the review on quantitative noise thresholds for residential boundary noise, which the Community Advisory Panel recommended in 2022; whether the review has considered WHO guidelines of 50 to 55 decibels and lower thresholds in Germany, Korea and Japan; and whether the Ministry will clarify that NEA’s industrial noise standards do not apply to household disputes.

Mr Chee Hong Tat’s Answer:

We had completed the review in May 2024 and replied to a similar Parliamentary Question in October 2024. The Member may also refer to the Municipal Services Office’s website, as well as the Second Reading of the Community Disputes Resolution (Amendment) Bill in 2024, for more details.

The National Environment Agency’s industrial noise standards are set for a different purpose, and do not apply to neighbour noise disputes.

For reference, the October 2024 PQ the Minister refers to was Assoc Prof Jamus Lim’s question on implementing distinct quantitative noise thresholds for the evening period (7pm-10pm). In that exchange, Minister Desmond Lee confirmed that the Ministry had accepted most of the Community Advisory Panel’s six recommendations but had no plans to set quantitative noise thresholds — following consultations with external experts who cited operational challenges with absolute, across-the-board thresholds, as residents respond to noise differently and neighbourhoods have different perceptions of acceptable ambient noise levels.

Transport (MOT) - 1 Question

15. Bus ETA Accuracy Standards and January 2026 Failure (Written)

Question: What accuracy standards apply to the bus Expected Time of Arrival (ETA) system; what has been the measured accuracy rate over the past three years; whether the Ministry is satisfied with the ETA system contractor’s performance, given inaccuracies reported well before the January 2026 failure; and what monitoring measures will prevent recurrence.

Mr Jeffrey Siow’s Answer:

The Expected Time of Arrival (ETA) system is expected to predict actual bus arrival times within a three-minute range, at least 95% of the time. There is some inherent variation in bus arrival times, due to variable dwell times at preceding bus stops, and traffic speeds due to congestion, accidents or roadworks.

In the past three years the actual performance of the system has met the prescribed performance target. The ETA failure in January was due to a defect in the software on the buses that was triggered by a server failure. The defect has since been fixed, and the system’s performance is stabilising.

Since 2024, we have begun to upgrade the ETA system to improve arrival time predictions, and provide more real time information to commuters. The Land Transport Authority (LTA) is closely monitoring the reliability and accuracy of the ETA system and has taken remedial actions to prevent a recurrence.

(Opening)

Speaker, “an industrial policy in finance” may seem a contradiction in terms.

But it is not.

(Eurodollar)

The most consequential 20th century financial industrial policy was built by the British, on the then-undisputed reserve asset, the US dollar.

Once, in 1933, the US imposed Regulation Q, capping interest rates American banks could pay. By the late 1960s, the ceiling was 4% while 3-month T-Bills approached 7%. Dollars held offshore, especially in London, escaped this cap. This offshore dollar market became known as the Eurodollar market.

The British did four things. First, deliberate forbearance - choosing not to regulate offshore dollar deposits. Second, active defence - when G-10 central banks proposed international regulation in the 1970s, the Bank of England blocked it. Third, direct participation - central banks provided official deposits of 20% of net market, and currency swaps with domestic banks. Fourth, after the 1974 banking crises, the G-10 Basel communiqué constructed an implicit lender-of-last-resort guarantee.

The result: London became the global centre for dollar financing. By the mid-1980s, there were more Eurodollars than dollars. The Eurodollar market increased the appeal of dollar holdings, deepening liquidity for American borrowing. This privileged position, London held for many decades.

What is instructive was that the British reinvented London’s proposition amidst the decline of sterling. Nostalgia is not a strategy. They re-positioned for their emerging present.

Today, we have another emerging present. Then, interest rate caps created a push factor for the world’s reserve asset to move offshore. Today’s push factor is not yield. It is custody risk - the question of whether your reserves are still yours when politics turns. And the emerging reserve asset seeking an offshore home is not dollars. It is gold.

(Gold and Push Factors)

Two forces are driving this shift.

First, access to funds has become conditional on political alignment. In 2022, Western nations froze over $300 billion in Russian sovereign assets. We rightly condemn the invasion of Ukraine — but the knock-on effect on Western financial centrality is real. Trust in those systems has diminished.

Second, market participants are pricing in US asset risk in a way they did not before the 2020s — some call it a ‘Sell America’ dynamic.

Central banks are responding with their feet. Gold purchases have exceeded 1,000 tonnes annually for three consecutive years—more than double the 2010-2021 average. The World Gold Council’s 2025 survey shows 73% of central banks expect fewer US dollar holdings over five years. Ninety-five percent expect to increase gold over 2025-2026.

What makes this structural is the price insensitivity - there are few good alternatives for a reserve asset. Central banks bought at $2,000 an ounce, at $3,000 an ounce, at $4,000 an ounce. Gold crossed $5,000 in January.

These are sovereigns seeking safety over returns.

But if gold is becoming a reserve asset, it will need to be financialised. Later, I will describe what that means in five pillars.

(Today and tomorrow)

First, let us assess some major gold hubs of today. London, New York, and Dubai.

(London)

London is the central gold pricing venue and is one of the major custodians for the world’s central banks, via the BoE vaults. It offers unmatched liquidity for gold, especially for the 400oz “large bars” used by central banks.

It is the home of the London Bullion Market Association (or LBMA), which controls the global “good delivery” standard. This certificate is important for liquidity among major financial centres.

In February 2022, after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the G7 immobilised $300 billion in Russian central bank reserves within weeks. The LBMA suspended all six Russian refiners from the Good Delivery list. The message: custody and market access are conditional on political alignment.

Central banks have responded. In 2024, India repatriated 100 tonnes of gold from the Bank of England to domestic vaults—its largest movement since 1991. Germany, Hungary, Turkey, and the Netherlands have done the same over the past decade. The repatriation trend is accelerating.

(New York)

The case of New York is a puzzle. In the lead up to Liberation Day in April 2025, as tariff fears spiked, the exchange-for-physical basis, which is the spread between New York COMEX futures and London OTC gold, blew out to $60 per ounce - the widest since the 2020 Covid panic. This led to COMEX vaults in New York hitting a record 43 million ounces. For a moment, most of the world’s financialised gold was in New York rather than its typical home in London. New York had custody over both today’s reserve asset and tomorrow’s, simultaneously.

Consider the counterfactual. A Fed gold repo window, accepting COMEX gold warrants as collateral. Strong financing terms could have made New York the permanent home for monetary gold, since much of it was already in COMEX vaults.

Now, it is true that the Fed conventionally runs repo backstops on Treasuries, agency debt and agency MBS. But that is already an expanded listing over pure Treasuries, pre-2008. So why not COMEX gold warrants? They had the moment — and did not act.

There is no appetite — not yet — to backstop gold in New York. Deep markets, but no lender of last resort.

Asset holders must also weigh IEEPA (International Emergency Economic Powers Act) tail risk — the executive powers used to impose tariffs in February 2025 could be turned on foreign-held assets.

Today, only the US can offer a sovereign repo on gold as they have the reserve currency.

So if they do not backstop gold, financialization will likely not proceed on single sovereign rails.

(Dubai)

Dubai is closest to what we could build. Aggressive infrastructure: vaults, multiple refineries, direct African sourcing, and the natural catchment of India. It is estimated that Dubai handles upwards of 15% of global physical gold trade. In 2023, the UAE overtook the UK to become the world’s second-largest gold trading hub.

Dubai offers proximity to supply and demand, but also to Gulf conflict dynamics. Singapore offers a trusted node to multiple parties.

Dubai has captured volume partly through more permissive sourcing standards. That is not our game — our competitive advantage is rigor, and any visible compliance failure on money-laundering would destroy the credibility we hope to sell.

But this is not zero-sum competition. The shift to gold is large enough for multiple hubs.

And the market interest already exists.

DPM Gan said in response to my January PQ about critical minerals financing, that the government will act “when there is sufficient market interest.” The interest is here. In the second quarter of 2025, gold investment in Singapore surged 37% year-on-year. SPDR Gold Shares recorded SGD 309 million in net inflows in the first half of 2025—the highest of any Singapore-listed ETF. The Singapore Mint launched its Lion Bullion line in September, explicitly citing strong investor demand. Private vaults are expanding: The Reserve opened last year with capacity for 15,500 tonnes.

The market is here. And so is the chance.

(The Landscape)

In that same PQ I posed to MTI in January I also asked why our framework for metal warrant financing is underutilised. The response from the ministry framed it in terms of the base metals, by referring to the LME ecosystem - which handles the 6 primary base metals - copper, zinc, aluminum, nickel, lead, tin. But not gold.

I had in mind gold, not base metals. Gold operates through the LBMA — different rules, different warehousing, different settlement — and requires purpose-built architecture.

Singapore’s gold infrastructure is minimal. We have one LBMA-approved refinery—Metalor, Swiss-owned. CPF members investing in gold through SPDR Gold Shares will see that gold held in London and New York vaults.

What is puzzling is that Singapore seems to be on the other side of the trend. The World Gold Council’s central-bank gold statistics for May 2025 state that year-to-date 2025, Singapore was the second-largest net seller at ~10 tonnes (behind Uzbekistan), and that MAS sold 5 tonnes in May.

Keep in mind that this was when gold was about 3300 USD per troy oz. Gold today trades at 5000 USD per troy oz, 50% higher than where it was sold, if this report is true. MAS’s own disclosures confirm this: gold holdings fell by 849,000 troy ounces from January 2025 to January 2026.

Could the government confirm whether this is true? If so, why does it hold such a contrarian view relative to most global central banks? Does it have a framework for thinking about gold’s role in tomorrow’s reserve system?

(The Five Pillars)

Sir, let me describe what an industrial policy in gold would look like, in five elements.

First, a Sovereign Guarantee.

The core asset Singapore can offer is not location or tax rates. It is legal predictability - the credible commitment that asset treatment follows established judicial process, not executive discretion.

We have already done it once before.

In January 2020, Singapore enacted the International Organisations (Immunities and Privileges) (Bank for International Settlements) Order. It states that property and assets entrusted to the BIS [Bank for International Settlements], (quote) “wherever located, by whomsoever held and in whatever format, are immune from search, requisition, confiscation, expropriation or any other form of seizure, taking or foreclosure, by any form of legal process.” (end quote)

That is the gold standard - forgive the expression - for custody protection. The question is: why only BIS?

Singapore should consider a Reserves Custody Protection Act - or an amendment to the MAS Act - establishing that custody arrangements are governed by Singapore law and due process, immunising it from executive discretion. The principle is legal certainty.

We should be a top choice for jurisdictions seeking diversified custody. Sovereign guarantees are best implemented via sovereign vaults in the same vein as the Bank of England, rather than outsourcing capacity to private parties, as Zurich has done.

Second, a Sovereign Anchor.

If 73% of central banks expect to increase gold holdings, Singapore should be among them - not among the sellers. MAS reserves held in Singapore vaults create the base load that foreign participants need to see. The Eurodollar market had central banks providing 20% of net demand. We should do the same.

Third, Refining, Sourcing, Verification.

It is one thing to have custody, but to have trusted custody requires the above.

Recasting connects markets. Western central banks hold 400-ounce bars. Asian retail buys kilobars. To connect these markets, you need recasting capacity. You need refineries. Singapore has only one. Dubai built multiple refineries with no mining industry. We should expand refining capacity and establish direct relationships with miners in Africa, Australia, Indonesia, and strengthen existing ones with the bullion banks. Precious metals streaming — providing upfront capital to miners in exchange for future production at agreed prices — is one proven vehicle for building those relationships.

Assaying builds trust. Tungsten has nearly identical density to gold - counterfeits exist. In 2020, China’s Kingold was accused of pledging gilded-copper “gold” as collateral for 20bn yuan in loans, turning “gold receipts” into a major credit-fraud event. Robust verification through X-ray Fluorescence (or XRF) and ultrasound should be part of the chain, if possible, non-destructively to preserve provenance, but if necessary, destructively by recasting. Not just “is it stored?” but “is it real?” Singapore should build a reputation for rigorous verification that makes our warehouse receipts bankable.

And in our warehouses or vaults, we need strong verification standards, to be able to financialize a wide net of gold collateral, the LBMA-approved and those outside the LBMA system alike. Digital warehouse receipts issued under Singapore standards should be legally enforceable claims.

Fourth, our own standard.

The LBMA sets the global Good Delivery standard. It is valuable. We should emulate it. Create a Singapore Bullion Standards Authority. Launch an Asian Good Delivery standard accepted by major exchanges. Competition between standards is healthy. We should aim to make our standard inter-operable with LBMA, possibly as a custody wrapper on top of LBMA.

To illustrate - within CME, gold receives different treatment depending on standard. COMEX warrants are valid collateral for customer accounts, while London LBMA bullion is not.

We would be selling liquidity: the guarantee that gold with the Singapore custody stamp can be used as collateral, that banks will lend against it, that it trades on major exchanges.

Beyond custody: liquid markets for price discovery, and financing against verified collateral. We can be a multicurrency hub for gold financing - swapping it for USD, RMB, or other currencies of choice.

Fifth, we should revive the GOFO — the Gold Forward Offered Rate — and the derivatives architecture it enables.

GOFO was the benchmark interest rate at which banks lent gold. The LBMA published it daily until 2015, when it was discontinued — not because the market no longer needed it, but as collateral damage from the LIBOR scandal.

Its main practical use was enabling interest rate swaps on gold. Consider a gold producer hedging future production over five years. The conventional instrument is a long-dated forward — locking in a price to sell gold years from now. The problem is that if gold moves from $3,000 to $5,000, the mark-to-market between counterparties swings accordingly, and that exposure sits unsettled for years. The result is large, volatile collateral calls and significant counterparty credit risk.

An interest rate swap solves this by separating the hedge into two components. The price exposure is hedged with short-dated instruments that settle frequently — so credit exposure resets regularly and never accumulates over years. The cost-of-carry component is hedged via the swap, which is long-dated but insensitive to the spot price, keeping its mark-to-market small and stable.

The combined position achieves the same economic result as the forward, but with a fraction of the counterparty exposure. That means smaller collateral calls, lower capital requirements for banks, and a more efficient market overall.

Reviving a GOFO-equivalent benchmark would restore the infrastructure needed for a functioning XAU IRS market — giving producers and banks a cleaner, less capital-intensive way to manage long-dated gold exposure - including non-dollar currency pairs.

This would give banks the pricing infrastructure to build gold financing capabilities here.

Even if gold’s share of reserves stabilises rather than continues to climb, the infrastructure I describe is not wasted. Sovereign vaults, verified warehouse receipts, and derivatives architecture serve any asset class where custody, provenance, and financing matter — critical minerals, rare earths, tokenised commodities. Gold is the use case with the most immediate demand, but the platform outlasts any single price cycle.

(Close)

Sir, in closing.

Financial hubs are not natural phenomena. They are built. The British built the Eurodollar market through deliberate policy — forbearance, defence, direct participation, implicit guarantees — at a moment when sterling was in decline and the world’s reserve asset was looking for an offshore home.

Our financial centre was built too on deliberate pillars — rule of law, institutional trust, regulatory predictability. For decades, that was enough. Today, not anymore.

Hedge funds we incubated are opening in Dubai. Family offices we courted are diversifying there. Dubai’s financial centre doubled its hedge fund count to over a hundred in a single year. They moved on gold, years ago. They will move on the next thing before we have formed a committee to study it. It is not the nature of the standards, but the structural bet.

We won a windfall when Hong Kong shut itself down during COVID. That was luck. And luck is a depreciating asset.

Jobs, institutional knowledge, relevance — those are the stakes.

Rule of law, institutions, trust — these are necessary conditions. They are no longer sufficient ones. Other cities have learned to offer versions of the same, combined with speed we have not matched.

Gold is not the whole answer. But it is the question: can Singapore still see a structural shift in the global financial system and build for it — or have we become the kind of country that convenes a review after the opportunity has passed?

Because that is the real risk. That the instinct is lost. (...) That this country becomes mediocre.

Because once you become mediocre, derivative, content to be a fast-adopter, there is no bottom to that market.

Thank you, Sir.

Education (MOE) - 2 Questions

To ask the Minister for Education (a) how many days after adopting the Central Kitchen Meal Model did the River Valley Primary School gastroenteritis outbreak occur; (b) whether central kitchen operators must meet Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Points (HACCP) standards and the three-zone hygiene system as required in Japan; and (c) whether the Ministry will publish food safety audit results for all such operators. (Q.*1275)

To ask the Minister for Education (a) what proportion of Special Education (SPED) school graduates in 2022, 2023 and 2024 were placed into employment within one year of graduation; (b) of these graduates, what proportion remained in employment as of end 2025; and (c) whether the Ministry will publish annual SPED graduate employment data comparable to the Graduate Employment Survey for universities. (Q.906)

Social and Family Development (MSF) - 3 Questions

To ask the Minister for Social and Family Development (a) whether the Ministry publishes official estimates of child-raising expenditures by age band, as the United States has since 1960; (b) what reference data determines Baby Bonus quantum; and (c) whether Baby Bonus cashflow fit has been evaluated against cost peaks in the first 36 months, particularly for lower-income households facing immediate infant care expenses. (Q.*1349)

To ask the Minister for Social and Family Development (a) in the past three years, how many ComCare applications were denied citing non-compliance with employment action plans; (b) whether applicants are given the opportunity to provide evidence of their engagement with partner agencies before such denials; and (c) whether the Ministry will ensure applicants are heard before being denied on such grounds. (Q.*1350)

To ask the Minister for Social and Family Development (a) of the employers eligible for the Enabling Employment Credit, what proportion have utilised it; (b) what are the main barriers preventing greater uptake; and (c) given the target of 40% employment rate for persons with disabilities by 2030 versus the current 32.7%, what additional measures are planned to close this gap. (Q.925)

Finance (MOF) - 1 Question

To ask the Prime Minister and Minister for Finance (a) whether the Ministry has assessed the exposure of Singapore’s reserves to the proposed changes to section 892 of the US tax code; (b) whether Singapore has made representations to the US Treasury before the 13 February 2026 comment deadline; and (c) whether the Ministry retains confidence that GIC’s and Temasek’s US investments are adequately protected from this regulatory change. (Q.*1258)

Sustainability and the Environment (MSE) - 1 Question

To ask the Minister for Sustainability and the Environment given that the Beverage Container Return Scheme is projected to add 25 to 60 cents to prices of bottled and canned drinks of which only 10 cents is refundable, what assessment was made of the affordability impact on lower-income households before confirming the April 2026 launch. (Q.*1276)

Home Affairs (MHA) - 1 Question

To ask the Coordinating Minister for National Security and Minister for Home Affairs (a) whether the Ministry has considered issuing an Implementation Directive under the Online Criminal Harms Act requiring social media platforms to detect and remove unlicensed moneylending advertisements targeting migrant domestic workers; and (b) why the approach taken for impersonation scams has not been extended to illegal moneylending advertisements that facilitate harassment of workers and their employers. (Q.*1339)

National Development (MND) - 1 Question

To ask the Minister for National Development (a) what is the status of the review on quantitative noise thresholds for residential boundary noise, which the Community Advisory Panel recommended in 2022; (b) whether the review has considered WHO guidelines of 50 to 55 decibels and lower thresholds in Germany, Korea and Japan; and (c) whether the Ministry will clarify that NEA’s industrial noise standards do not apply to household disputes. (Q.875)

Trade and Industry (MTI) - 1 Question

To ask the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Trade and Industry (a) what proportion of Research, Innovation and Enterprise (RIE) funded deep tech projects achieve commercial viability; (b) whether the Ministry has studied Israel’s model where innovation grants are repaid only upon commercialisation success; and (c) whether RIE2030 will introduce similar outcome-linked funding mechanisms. (Q.876)

Health (MOH) - 5 Questions

1. Dual-Regulation Framework for IP Insurers ⭐ ORAL

Question: Given that the Monetary Authority of Singapore primarily regulates solvency, whether the Ministry intends to establish a dual-regulation framework to oversee the (i) healthcare outcomes (ii) panel selection criteria and (iii) loss-ratio efficiency of private insurers to ensure they align with national health goals.

Minister Ong Ye Kung’s Answer:

On Mr Kenneth Tiong’s question relating to the regulation of IP insurers, the Ministry of Health (MOH) and the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) work closely together in exercising regulatory oversight of IP insurers, to ensure that policyholders’ interests are protected and the products are sustainable.

MOH’s key role is to oversee the development and operation of the public healthcare system and ensure universal access to healthcare. For individuals who prefer private healthcare and purchase private insurance, we try not to micro-manage or prescribe market practices. Instead, we set requirements pertaining to the key parameters of IPs and riders, such as co-payment and deductible requirements, to ensure that the schemes are sustainable. We only step in when we see a serious market failure emerging, which is why we have intervened in this case, to tighten the design of IP riders.

Doctor panels are an example of cost-management measures put in place by insurers in response to rising private healthcare bills and claims. MOH has been and will continue working with key stakeholders including insurers, healthcare providers, medical professionals and consumer representatives through the Multilateral Healthcare Insurance Committee (MHIC) on these matters, to strike a balance between the interests of all stakeholders.

My Supplementary Question:

MOH itself notes a trend of escalating cost and premiums alongside tightening claims in practices. MAS can act on unfair claims handling, but MAS is primarily a financial regulator. MOH’s direct levers seem strongest when policies are MediSave-linked.

So, my question is, what enforceable levers does MOH have to ensure that insurer conduct advances healthcare affordability and access? And where does MOH remain dependent on MAS?

Also, it appears to me that no one is cleanly accountable for insurer behaviour as a health system actor. Does the Minister believe that this is a gap that requires filling?

Minister’s Response to Supplementary:

The IP rider has become a problem and we are taking action. And I think that is an action that shows our accountability that when something is not sustainable, not working in the best interest of the patients and people, we will take action.

Between MAS and MOH, I think we have plenty of levers and we will work together to make sure that insurers are operating in a way that is ethical, that is viable but at the same time in the interest of patients and the people we serve. And I think we have more than enough levers to do so.

But we should not be tempted to become micromanaging, because it is the worst thing to do to say that we leave it to the market, but we micromanage all their actions and behaviour. I think that is the worst thing, the worst of both worlds. Then, you might as well nationalise it. But we already have a huge nationalised system in public healthcare. So, for private healthcare, control the important levers, control the key parameters, but let the market operate.

2. Shingles Vaccination & Dementia Prevention ⭐ ORAL

Question: Given findings that shingles vaccination reduces dementia, including the May 2025 Nature study showing Zostavax causally reduces diagnoses by 20% and the July 2024 Nature Medicine study showing Shingrix is associated with 164 added dementia-free days, whether the Ministry will (i) include dementia prevention savings into cost-benefit analyses for shingles vaccines and (ii) consider extending shingles vaccine subsidies to persons aged 50-59.

Minister Ong Ye Kung’s Answer:

The two cited studies are based on observational data that suggest a potential association between shingles vaccination and reduced risk of dementia. Additional research is required to establish causality and the underlying biological mechanisms, to determine the vaccine’s effect on dementia risk. The Ministry of Health (MOH) will continue to monitor the emergence of such scientific evidence. In the meantime, we will maintain the age criterion for Shingles vaccination subsidies, on the basis that the incidence of shingles rises steeply after age 60, approximately three to four times that of individuals aged 50 to 59 years.

3. Private Equity-Backed Nursing Home Market Share (Written)

Question: Following the Competition and Consumer Commission of Singapore’s clearance of the recent merger between Singapore’s two largest private nursing home operators (a) what is the combined market share of private equity-backed nursing home operators; (b) what percentage of the Ministry’s Build-Own-Lease operating subventions currently flow to such operators versus Voluntary Welfare Organisations; and (c) what safeguards exist against future price increases in an increasingly consolidated market.

Minister Ong Ye Kung’s Answer:

The two merging private nursing home operators will account for around 10% of the total nursing home market. The Competition and Consumer Commission of Singapore has assessed that the merger does not result in a substantial loss of competition in the provision of nursing home services. One of the key reasons is that under the Build-Own-Lease model, Government fully funds the capital costs of development and appoints both private and non-private operators for the facility through competitive tenders, which lowers the barrier to entry for nursing home operators and supports the diversity of options. The distribution of Government operating subvention to private operators is generally proportionate to their subsidised market share.

4. Japan/Korea as HSA Reference Agencies (Written)

Question: (a) What specific technical or regulatory barriers prevent the inclusion of Japan’s Pharmaceuticals and Medical Devices Agency and South Korea’s Ministry of Food and Drug Safety as reference agencies for therapeutic product registration; (b) to what extent does such exclusion delay the registration of medicines optimised for regional populations; and (c) whether the Ministry will conduct a feasibility study on recognising such World Health Organisation Listed Authorities as HSA’s reference agencies, to accelerate drug access.

Minister Ong Ye Kung’s Answer:

The Health Sciences Authority (HSA) currently recognises six reference agencies - US Food and Drug Administration (US FDA), European Medicines Agency (EMA), Health Canada, Therapeutic Goods Administration (TGA) of Australia, Swissmedic, and Medicines and Health Products Regulatory Agency (MHRA) of the United Kingdom.

This current six reference jurisdictions comprise major markets which typically receive first-wave filings from pharmaceutical companies, of which HSA has established collaborative evaluation process and joint review with. This includes aligned scientific standards for quality, safety and efficacy, as well as access to comprehensive scientific assessment and evaluation reports in English that HSA can rely upon for its verification process. Through these arrangements, we could offer an expedited 60 working day turning around time for therapeutic product registration, which is fast by international standards.

HSA continuously reviews its regulatory framework to ensure patients in Singapore have optimal access to safe and effective therapeutic products. Hence, HSA is in talks with other WHO-Listed Authorities, including Japan and South Korea, to explore closer regulatory cooperation initiatives.

5. Healthier SG Capitation vs CHAS Co-payments (Written)

Question: (a) Whether the shift in model from the Community Health Assist Scheme’s means-tested co-payments to Healthier SG’s capitation model signals a departure from the Ministry’s philosophy of shared responsibility in healthcare financing; and (b) without market-based price signals to moderate demand under the capitation model, what specific mechanisms will prevent buffet syndrome and ensure Healthier SG’s long-term fiscal sustainability.

Minister Ong Ye Kung’s Answer:

What the Member might be asking is why many preventive care services under Healthier SG are fully subsidised, while other healthcare services, including those under the Community Health Assist Scheme (CHAS), require co-payment by patients.

The key reason is that we want to encourage cost effective preventive care. Hence for preventive care services where we hope that as many people take it up as possible under Healthier SG, we have given full subsidies to the target population segment. Subsidies for all other healthcare services, including acute hospital care or chronic care, continue to be means-tested and require co-payment, to instill some discipline in healthcare provision and consumption, because unnecessary consumption of healthcare and over-servicing can lead to rapid cost escalation, a financially unsustainable healthcare system and poorer health outcomes in the long term.

Finance (MOF) & Trade/Industry (MTI) - 4 Questions

6. Temasek’s Risk-Return Framework & Ecosystem Building ⭐ ORAL

Question: (a) Whether the Government will review Temasek’s risk-return framework to explicitly value strategic ecosystem building alongside commercial returns; (b) whether the Government has assessed the impact of Temasek’s recent deprioritisation of direct early-stage local investments on Singapore’s ability to nurture nascent high-potential industries; and (c) if so, whether alternative capital support mechanisms will be introduced to fill this gap.

Senior Minister of State Jeffrey Siow’s Answer:

This question was addressed in the reply to Parliamentary Questions 12 to 14 on the Order Paper for 12 January 2026.

The Government’s mandate for Temasek is that it should deliver good, sustainable long-term returns. The Government ensures that Temasek has a competent board to oversee its management but does not otherwise influence or direct Temasek’s individual investment decisions. […]

The Government expects Temasek to ensure that its overall portfolio of investments, including its Singapore-based Temasek Portfolio Companies (TPCs), achieves good commercial outcomes. Temasek actively and constructively engages its TPCs. From time to time, Temasek will work with the TPCs on strategic reviews and initiatives to strengthen their foundations for future growth. Temasek’s Singapore portfolio has been able to contribute steady returns to Temasek’s overall portfolio and to Singapore’s economic growth over the long term.

Beyond exercising the appropriate oversight over its investments, there is no requirement for Temasek to pursue specific strategic or economic development strategies. Efforts to develop industry ecosystems or to enhance the financing for early-stage startups are led by the Government, rather than by Temasek. For example, Enterprise Singapore has a Startup SG Equity scheme, through which the Government co-invests with third-party investors in Singapore-based deep tech startups to catalyse the deep tech ecosystem.

And from time to time, Temasek may participate in the Government’s initiatives, but it does so on commercial terms, strictly consistent with its mandate.

7. CapitaLand-Mapletree Merger & SME Tenant Safeguards (Written)

Question: (a) Whether the Competition and Consumer Commission of Singapore is evaluating the reported potential CapitaLand-Mapletree merger and will mandate a formal Phase 1 or Phase 2 review; (b) if so, how will the relevant market be defined to ensure accurate assessment; and (c) whether additional safeguards to protect SME tenants from possible abuse of dominant position in lease renewals will be considered.

Deputy Prime Minister Gan Kim Yong’s Answer:

(Grouped with Q38 and Q40 from Mr David Hoe)

Tenancy mix and turnover in commercial developments are the result of commercial decisions made by both property owners and tenants. These decisions are influenced by market factors, such as consumer demand preferences and prevailing economic conditions.

With regard to competition concerns arising from mergers and acquisitions, Singapore adopts a voluntary merger notification regime. Under this regime, merger parties are not required to notify the Competition and Consumer Commission of Singapore (CCS) of their merger transactions under the Competition Act to balance between effective regulatory oversight and keeping compliance costs low. Instead, merger parties are expected to self-assess whether their transaction may give rise to potential competition concerns. Nevertheless, CCS is empowered to step in if it obtains information suggesting that a merger may result in potential competition issues. Merger parties may approach CCS for pre-notification discussions or seek guidance on whether their merger may be anti-competitive.

In the cases of the acquisition of The Clementi Mall and the reported potential CapitaLand-Mapletree merger, the parties concerned have not formally notified CCS for a merger assessment. CCS will continue to monitor both developments.

Separately, apart from competition oversight under the Competition Act, the Government has put in place measures to support fair and balanced lease negotiations between property owners and tenants. The Government worked with the Fair Tenancy Industry Committee (FTIC) to publish a Code of Conduct for Leasing of Retail Premises in Singapore. Since February 2024, all qualifying retail lease agreements must comply with the Code of Conduct under the Lease Agreements for Retail Premises Act. The Code sets out leasing principles to prevent the inclusion of unreasonable clauses in lease agreements, such as prohibiting landlords from charging a markup on electricity costs. In the event of disagreements over the lease negotiations or terms, the parties may bring their cases to the Singapore Mediation Centre for mediation or adjudication.

8. Tax Resident Transitions Among Singapore Citizens (Written)

Question: For each year over the past decade (a) how many Singapore citizens have transitioned from being tax residents to non-residents and vice versa; (b) what is the breakdown (i) by gender and (ii) by five-year age groups; and (c) what proportion of Singapore citizen tax residents in 2014 have remained so in 2024, as broken down by gender and age.

Senior Minister of State Jeffrey Siow’s Answer:

Singapore Citizens who reside in Singapore except for temporary absences are assessed as tax residents. We do not have data on Singapore Citizens who have transitioned from being tax residents to non-residents and vice versa.

There were about 1.6 million Singapore Citizens with tax filing records in the Year of Assessment (YA) 2020. Of these, about 1.4 million had tax filing records in YA 2024. Those who dropped out could have done so due to a variety of reasons, such as death, retirement, unemployment, or relocation overseas. Of the 1.4 million, about 55% were male and 45% were female. The breakdown by age group is as follows:

Age Group % of 1.4M who remained <25 <1% 25-29 5% 30-34 13% 35-39 13% 40-44 13% 45-49 12% 50-54 13% 55-59 11% 60-64 9% 65-69 6% >69 4%

Notes: (1) Figures rounded to nearest percentage point. (2) Age based on tax resident’s age in YA 2024.

Key observation: 200,000 Singapore citizens dropped out of the tax filing system between YA 2020 and YA 2024 (from 1.6M to 1.4M). The Ministry does not track whether this is due to death, retirement, unemployment, or relocation overseas.

9. Digital Warehouse Receipts & Metal Warrant Financing (Written)

Question: (a) Why digital Singapore-based warehouse receipts remain underutilised for financing critical minerals despite the 2021 Electronic Transactions Act (ETA) amendments; (b) whether the Ministry will operationalise section 16Q of the ETA to accredit trusted issuers; and (c) how does Singapore’s framework for metal warrant financing compare to systems already operational in Dubai and the UK.

Deputy Prime Minister Gan Kim Yong’s Answer:

Most critical minerals traded by Singapore-based companies are stored and financed through the London Metal Exchange (LME) ecosystem, including LME-approved warehouses in Singapore and overseas. Banks which are LME members recognise and accept LME’s digital warehouse receipts as collateral in trade financing.

We understand that some companies may store metals in non-LME warehouses in Singapore, due to lower storage costs or to hold the metals for end-use rather than trading. These warehouses typically issue physical receipts, as they and the banks do not have the economies of scale and hence, the commercial incentive to adopt separate local digital receipt platforms.

Metal warrant financing in Dubai and the UK similarly relies on internationally recognised exchange-based systems such as the LME. EnterpriseSG engages the industry regularly and will review the need to accredit trusted issuers if and when there is sufficient market interest.

Defence (MINDEF) - 1 Question

10. Paya Lebar Air Base Relocation Review ⭐ ORAL

Question: (a) Whether the Ministry has conducted a strategic review of the decision to relocate Paya Lebar Air Base in light of recent global conflicts demonstrating the vulnerability of concentrated air assets to mass drone attacks and long-range munitions; and (b) whether such consolidation of the RSAF’s assets into fewer air bases significantly increases operational risks during a first-strike scenario.

Coordinating Minister Chan Chun Sing’s Answer:

As a small island with no strategic depth and hinterland to absorb an attack, the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) needs to develop operational concepts and solutions that are uniquely suited to our security needs, while taking into consideration the competing needs for Singapore’s limited land and finite human resources.

Broadly speaking, our circumstances require us to have a robust intelligence and effective threat detection and early warning systems at range, so that the SAF can mount timely and decisive responses with a suite of diversified capabilities across multiple layers and distances where necessary.

Even then, we may not be able to prevent all threats from reaching our shores. For this reason, our critical infrastructures and facilities are hardened against potential attacks, and our key assets can be dispersed in peace time and especially during contingencies. We have also factored in reserve capacities to ensure resilience for scenarios where some of our assets may be destroyed or damaged.

The decision to relocate Paya Lebar Air Base to free up land for national development purposes was a carefully considered one, taking into account the factors I have just mentioned, as well as then-emerging and now-evolving threats.

There are certainly trade-offs involved. We have undertaken a series of additional measures to manage the risks and challenges. For example, in terms of available airbases and runways, we have invested significant resources in expanding Tengah Air Base and Changi Air Base, and lengthening the contingency runway at Pulau Sudong. Tengah Air Base and Changi Air Base are also being upgraded with better detection, response and resilience capabilities, including against the emerging threats posed by drones.

The SAF will continually assess our operational, infrastructure and capability requirements, taking into consideration the threats on the horizon and available technologies, while carefully weighing the costs and risks to Singapore. For good reason which Members will appreciate, many of our efforts are conducted out of the public eye and not disclosed.

My Supplementary Question:

Eleven days ago, the United States conducted “Operation Absolute Resolve” in Venezuela. In two-and-a-half hours, US forces struck four air bases with Kamikaze drones, destroyed Venezuela’s Russian-supplied Buk-M2E air defences and eliminated aircraft on the ground.

By 2030, I believe these sorts of capabilities will become more widely distributed. So, what is the Ministry’s assessment of our post-2030 postures, survivability against this type of strike? And does the Ministry believe that there are concentration risks to be mitigated?

Minister’s Response:

I will make two points in response to the Member’s comment.

First, I have said that based on our geography, the risk of any strike on Singapore is always very high because we lack hinterland or depth – which is why our operational concepts are quite unique for our own operational needs. And I think I will not need to go into details on how we execute our operational concepts.

My second comment is in response to, not just Mr Kenneth Tiong’s, but I sense many other Members’ interest in the latest evolving technologies on the battlefield. Much has been said about drones warfare. It is not something new. It is something that we have been looking at for many years, even since I was an active member of the SAF.

Maybe to illustrate this point, I will just share a little vignette which Members may be aware of. In 2017’s National Day Parade (NDP) – I wonder whether Members will remember the 2017 NDP – many people were impressed by the SAF’s dynamic display. The most memorable scene from the 2017 NDP was the final act towards the end of the parade and ceremony, where we had our fireworks. Members may recall there was a display put up where we had 300 drones in the sky performing and forming a heart shape.

To many, this was a wonderful conclusion to a very nice NDP. To the informed observers who are in this line of business, we already knew what that meant for the nature of warfare.

Education (MOE) - 1 Question

11. Transfer of Non-Pedagogical Tasks from Teachers ⭐ ORAL

Question: Whether the Ministry will consider mandating the transfer of non-pedagogical administrative tasks, such as the management of parental consent forms, monetary collections, and event logistics, from teachers to school administrative and operations personnel to align with the Ministry’s objective of reducing teacher workload.

Minister Desmond Lee’s Answer:

All schools have dedicated administrative teams that help with administrative tasks like collection of money and logistical aspects of organising events. Schools also use technology for tasks like management of consent forms from parents. Schools are expected to tap on such support to reduce administrative workload for teachers. Given differing school operating contexts, the Ministry of Education does not mandate which specific administrative duties in a school needs to be transferred. This is to allow individual school leaders, who best understand the needs of the school and the capabilities of his colleagues, to have the flexibility in balancing workload across different colleagues.

National Development (MND) - 2 Questions

12. Fire-Rated PMD Charging Cabinets Pilot (Written)

Question: Given the rising incidence of Personal Mobility Device battery fires in residential settings, whether the Government will consider piloting fire-rated outdoor charging cabinets in HDB void decks or multi-storey carparks, similar to facilities deployed in New York City and Taiwan, with subsidised electricity rates to incentivise residents to charge devices in these safer communal facilities.

Minister Chee Hong Tat’s Answer:

Agencies such as the Land Transport Authority (LTA), Singapore Civil Defence Force (SCDF) and Housing and Development Board (HDB) work closely to monitor Active Mobility Device (AMD) ownership, charging and usage patterns in Singapore. We also study new operating models and regulatory developments on AMD charging and parking in other jurisdictions.

As different jurisdictions have different contexts and circumstances, we should carefully assess if the overseas practices are applicable here in Singapore. Taking the example of AMD charging facilities in public areas, there will be trade-offs for residents such as having less space for other uses in HDB multi-storey car parks and void decks.

The key factor to improving safety is to prevent AMD-related fires in the first place, instead of where the device is charged. It is more effective to ensure AMDs in Singapore meet prescribed technical and safety requirements. If the devices are non-compliant, shifting the charging and parking to public areas would still lead to fire incidents that pose safety risks to residents.

AMD users should only purchase compliant devices, refrain from modifying their devices, and adopt safe charging practices. This is the main safeguard against fire risks from AMDs. The Ministry of Transport (MOT) and LTA thus take a strict enforcement approach towards the import, sale and use of non-compliant AMDs, and are looking to strengthen regulations on the online sale of AMDs later this year.

13. Animal Management Contractor Protocols (Written)

Question: In light of the death of a dog captured at Seletar West Farmway 8 (a) whether the Ministry will review the “acceptable parameters” of force, as outlined in the AVS statement of 16 November 2025, and training standards for animal management contractors; and (b) whether the Ministry will formalise collaboration with animal welfare groups to ensure humane handling while maintaining public safety.

Minister Chee Hong Tat’s Answer:

This question was addressed in the Ministry of National Development’s reply to the question asked by Ms Lee Hui Ying on 12 January 2026.

Minister of State Alvin Tan’s Answer (12 Jan, responding to Ms Lee Hui Ying):

Since 2018, the Animal and Veterinary Service (AVS) has worked with its partners on the Trap-Neuter-Rehome/Release-Manage (TNRM) programme to manage the free-roaming dog population in Singapore.

Our TNRM partners play key roles, including conducting trapping and sterilisation operations. Upon identification of an unsterilised free-roaming dog, AVS will work with the TNRM partner responsible for the designated area to commence trapping operations.

In situations that present risk to public safety, AVS will intervene swiftly. For instance, in the case of the recent trapping operation at Seletar West Farmway 8 on 14 November 2025, AVS’ animal management contractor was activated to trap and remove three free-roaming dogs, which were confirmed by several victims to have been involved in multiple chasing and biting incidents. The operation was carried out safely under the supervision of AVS staff and is in line with existing protocols under TNRM. This includes complying with the World Organisation for Animal Health (WOAH) standards on Stray Dog Population Control to ensure that uncovered wire loops or ropes were not used during the trapping process and giving due consideration to personnel and animal safety in determining the restraint procedures.

AVS will continue to work closely with TNRM partners in the management of free-roaming dogs to safeguard both public safety and the well-being of the dogs. AVS colleagues and I visited our partners last week to discuss ways we can better collaborate moving forward. For instance, we intend to review joint protocols and further improve communication and coordination. These build on existing collaboration channels such as TNRM rehoming efforts, outreach and AVS-led adoption drives.

Foreign Affairs (MFA) - 1 Question

14. Consular SOPs for Overseas Crises ⭐ ORAL

Question: (a) What are the Ministry’s standard operating procedures, if any, for providing emergency consular aid and ensuring the safety of Singaporeans during overseas crises such as the (i) Brown University shooting on 13 December 2025, (ii) Bondi Beach shooting on 14 December 2025 and (iii) Taipei knife attack on 19 December 2025; and (b) what assistance, if any, was rendered by our overseas missions following the Brown University shooting.

Minister Vivian Balakrishnan’s Answer:

(Grouped with Q83 from Mr Lee Hong Chuang)

When a crisis or major incident occurs overseas, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) mounts an appropriate consular response. First, we determine the nature and severity of the incident. Second, we disseminate relevant information and updates to Singaporeans who may potentially be involved. Third, we provide consular assistance to Singaporeans in distress. This includes contacting eRegistered Singaporeans to check on their well-being, liaising with local authorities, issuing Document of Identity for lost passports, and facilitating the return of Singaporeans back home if necessary. We may also issue Travel Notices and Advisories for Singaporeans to avoid travel to that region. That said, every incident is unique and circumstances in the foreign country vary widely – so our responses must be customised accordingly.

Let me cite some examples from recent incidents. During the floods in Hat Yai, our Crisis Response Team was deployed overseas to reach Singaporeans and help bring them home. MFA also helped facilitate the departure of 11 Singaporeans from Iran during the Israel-Iran conflict in June 2025.

When the attacks at Brown University, Bondi Beach, and Taipei occurred, our Missions took immediate action, including contacting Singaporeans that eRegistered, posting updates and advice, and liaising with local authorities to ensure the well-being of our citizens.

We encourage Singaporeans to eRegister when they travel, as this allows MFA to reach out and render prompt consular assistance where needed. We also urge Singaporeans to stay vigilant and take precautions for their personal safety while abroad, purchase comprehensive travel insurance, and refer to MFA’s Travel Advisories and Notices.

Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) - 1 Question

15. Prevention of Corruption Act Amendment ⭐ ORAL

Question: Whether, following Public Prosecutor v China Railway Tunnel Group, the Government will amend the Prevention of Corruption Act to (i) broaden the legal test for corporate attribution beyond the “directing mind and will” doctrine in common law or (ii) introduce a “failure to prevent” offence similar to the UK Bribery Act, ensuring large corporations cannot evade liability for corruption by senior management.

Coordinating Minister Chan Chun Sing’s Answer:

The Prevention of Corruption Act is a key instrument in our fight against corruption. CPIB regularly and proactively reviews the Act. This is to ensure that our laws remain robust and effective against the ever-evolving corruption threat.

CPIB is looking into potential legislative gaps associated to the case cited by the Member in his query. If there is a need to come back to parliament, we will do so.

Other Interventions During Question Time

13 Jan: Local Food Sourcing Requirements (Supplementary to “30 by 30” Question)

Context: Senior Minister of State Zaqy Mohamad was answering questions about the revised food security targets (from “30 by 30” to specific fibre and protein targets by 2035).

My Question:

The Senior Minister of State spoke about enhancing demand offtake. Given that our local farms face structural disadvantages against cheaper imports, has the Ministry considered any form of minimum local sourcing requirements for major retailers and food service operators, even a modest starting quota, so as to create guaranteed demand and help farms achieve commercial viability?

This could be a 1% quota for major food importers and supermarkets like NTUC Fairprice and Sheng Siong. You can call it “1 by 30”, if you would like.

SMS Zaqy Mohamad’s Response:

As a principle, we go with free market principles. Ultimately, I do not think it is in the interest of consumers or the Government to fund or subsidise food products, just as we do not do it for energy costs nor petrol. What we really want is to help our local farmers connect them through organisations such as through Singapore Agro-Food Enterprises Federation Limited (SAFEF). We are working very hard to connect them with many of our retailers, hoteliers, restaurant caterers – and many today are already supporting our local farms.

As an example, while Greenphyto was just launched last month, a year ago, they have already started to reach out and they are already selling to about 75 retailers here in Singapore.

I spoke about Kok Fah Technology Farm, I spoke about Green Harvest, traditional farms, new farms. I think what is key is really to be competitive with the market to provide an offering that Singaporeans would consider. I know supermarkets such as Fairprice, for example, tell me they have got a whole section dedicated just for local produce.

We can encourage Singaporeans to support. I think ultimately it is also encouraging and building awareness with our consumers that local farm produce is fresher. Today, most of them are pesticide free. So, we give you slightly different offerings for a slightly different premium. But I think for things like vegetables, even bean sprouts, the reason why they have a pretty good hold on the market is because consumers also want freshness and there is a segment of market that wish for that.

We hope that with helping our businesses build new capabilities, improve yields, lower their cost of production, we hope that in the long term that helps them be more competitive in the market. I hope that our consumers will also be able to discern the advantages of supporting local and buying local.

Certainly on our part, whether it is through procurement, whether it is through encouraging retailers, hoteliers, I think we will continue to do our part to encourage them to buy local produce, so that we can support local farmers. It is in our interest, on the record, to ensure that our local farms, our local producers thrive, progress and play a big part in our Singapore Food Story 2.

Note: The “1 by 30” local sourcing quota proposal was rejected on free market principles.

Mr Speaker,

I support the principles underlying this Bill. A population-scale set of longitudinal medical records is the “means of production” for more timely interventions, accurate diagnoses, and preventive health at large. The contribution of data to the National Electronic Health Record will create a valuable dataset - and that value should flow to all Singaporeans.

But before I move on to the question of value, I wish to state my belief: A Bill that compels contribution must also come with robust safeguards.

From my conversations with practitioners, and from my reading of the Bill, I have three sets of concerns:

“A” the disproportionate cybersecurity burden on small providers;

“B” the uploading of sensitive medical information despite patient objections;

and “C” the insurance loophole that may render our privacy protections ineffective.

I will then speak to a broader question: if we are building a national health data asset, who benefits - and how do we ensure it catalyses a dynamic ecosystem rather than becoming captured by a single monopoly provider?

(Cybersecurity Liability and the Burden on Small Providers)

First, to the cybersecurity obligations imposed on healthcare providers.

The Bill designates all HCSA licensees - from tertiary hospitals employing thousands, to single-doctor GP clinics in HDB heartlands - as “relevant persons” under Section 64. All face the same statutory obligations: to implement reasonable controls for secure processing under Section 66(1)(a), reasonable safeguards against unauthorised access under Section 66(1)(b), and cybersecurity protections under Section 68.

The penalties for non-compliance are severe. Section 66(6) provides for fines up to $200,000 or two years’ imprisonment for individuals, and up to $1 million for other entities.

Now, the Bill does use the word “reasonable” - and this does imply proportionality.

But I have spoken with doctors who run small operations. They worry that when a breach occurs - and breaches are a matter of “when,” not “if” - the enforcement spotlight will fall on them. Did they have sufficient firewalls? Was their antivirus updated? Were their staff trained adequately? They fear being “hung out to dry.”

The structural problem is this: small providers are compelled to contribute data to a centralised system they do not control. Yet they bear liability for breaches that may originate from factors beyond their control.

I wish to speak for some of my constituents who are senior GPs still practising in the heartlands. Many are approaching retirement. They are not tech-savvy. They will struggle with the digitalisation requirements this Bill will impose.

If the transition is too abrupt, many of these senior GPs may feel forced to retire early, or sell their independent clinics to large corporate chains. We have seen this pattern before. The rapid digitalisation in other sectors - including banking a decade ago - moved too fast for some of our elderly residents, resulting in scam losses.

Without proper support, this Bill may accelerate consolidation in the primary care sector. We will see more chains. The end state of a modern, integrated health information system is desirable. But the transition must be managed carefully.

So I ask:

One. Will the Ministry issue clear, tiered guidance on what constitutes “reasonable” safeguards for practices of different sizes? A safe harbour framework, if you will.

Two. Will the Ministry consider providing or subsidising cybersecurity insurance for small providers? If the government is making NEHR contribution compulsory, should small practitioners shoulder the entire financial risk of a breach?

Three. Will there be a transition period with educational enforcement - rather than immediate punitive action - to allow smaller providers to build up their cybersecurity capabilities?

Four. Could the Ministry offer transitional support for senior practitioners nearing retirement - even something as simple as sending personnel to help digitalise records?

(Data Privacy and the Limits of Access Restrictions)

Second, to the question of sensitive medical conditions that patients seek to keep private.

There is a group of patients who pay cash, wanting to keep their records - perhaps with sexually transmitted infections, mental health conditions, or abortion records - off the system. Many foreigners also do not want to be on the NEHR.

Under this Bill, that option will no longer exist.

Section 29 provides for “access restrictions” - Class 1 restrictions that prevent all access, and Class 2 restrictions that restrict access for specific purposes or persons. This appears protective.

But Section 30(7) states clearly: “To avoid doubt, an access restriction does not prevent or restrict the contribution of health information.”

The data is uploaded and is stored centrally. Any access restriction is a viewing control - it masks who can see the data. It does not exclude the data from NEHR.

If the burden of proof is on the custodian of NEHR to have a robust data privacy model, let us examine the custodian.

Synapxe, the custodian of NEHR, was rebranded from IHIS, which was responsible for allowing the 2018 compromise of 1.5 million SingHealth patient records. The Committee of Inquiry found that IHIS staff lacked adequate cybersecurity awareness, that key staff failed to take appropriate action even when there were clear signs of an ongoing attack, and that the CISO’s response was - I quote - “clearly lacking, and displayed an alarming lack of concern.”

I have perceived among some doctors a legacy of mistrust toward Synapxe.

So I ask:

One. How is MOH going to police unjustified access of NEHR, where rogue elements read the medical histories of unrelated people? What assurance can MOH give us that our health data is safe with Synapxe?

Two. If such unauthorised access occurs, does proactive monitoring exist or will the system rely solely on whistleblowers and complaints?

Three. What is the technical architecture for access-restricted data? Is it encrypted separately? Is it stored in a segregated environment? Or is it simply flagged in the same database, such that a breach would expose it alongside unrestricted records?

Four. What is the access model for NEHR data? In Taiwan, the National Health Insurance system uses a dual-card approach: the patient must present their Health IC smart card, the doctor uses their professional IC card, and both are required for access, with written patient consent. This dual-authorisation prevents rogue access because no single party can retrieve records alone. Will Singapore’s NEHR access model include such safeguards?

Five. Will MOH consider specific carve-outs for defined sensitive conditions, where patients can opt out of contribution entirely - not just access?

(The Insurance Loophole and Downstream Coercion)

Mr Speaker, I commend the drafters of this Bill for their attention to the concern regarding the use of medical information for insurance underwriting.

Section 6 defines “excluded purposes” to include deciding whether to insure an individual, continuing or renewing insurance, and processing insurance claims. Section 19(2) prohibits specified users from accessing NEHR for any excluded purpose. Section 38(5) imposes enhanced penalties - up to $200,000 and seven years’ imprisonment - for accessing records for excluded purposes.

Section 11(2) provides that nothing in Part 2 allows access to health information “on the basis that the individual consents.” Section 16(2) reinforces this: consent under the Personal Data Protection Act does not make access permissible.

So, insurers cannot access NEHR directly. Healthcare providers cannot access NEHR on behalf of insurers. And a patient’s consent cannot be used to circumvent these protections.

Is it watertight? Let me offer two possible scenarios.

Scenario One. Section 17(1) provides that an individual may access and collect their own accessible health information. A Singaporean applies for insurance. The insurer’s application form includes a new requirement: “Please attach a complete printout of your National Electronic Health Record.” No printout, no policy.

Once the data leaves the system through legitimate patient access, it is beyond the Bill’s reach.

Scenario Two. According to Section 3.1.2.2 of the Draft Guidelines on Appropriate Use and Access to National Electronic Health Record, released by MOH in 2023:

(quote) “In the event that such information was previously transcribed from NEHR into the patient’s clinical notes, it would be treated as part and parcel of the medical record belonging to the healthcare institution.” (end quote)

Meanwhile, Integrated Plan insurers are increasingly requiring doctors to sign contracts containing “Inspection and Right to Audit” clauses. These clauses grant insurers the right to inspect full medical records to verify claims.

The result is that doctors check NEHR for relevant history - past abortions, IVF treatment, mental health conditions, STIs - and note it in their files for clinical safety. Because of these audit clauses, insurers then gain access to this sensitive, transcribed NEHR data, even if it is irrelevant to the current claim. A patient going in for gallbladder surgery may find their insurer reviewing their psychiatric history.

So I ask:

One. Does MOH agree that requiring a patient to provide a complete NEHR printout as a condition of insurance coverage would defeat the legislative intent of Section 6’s excluded purposes provision?

Two. If so, will the Government work with MAS to issue regulations or guidelines explicitly prohibiting insurers from requiring NEHR records, or NEHR-derived information, as a condition of coverage, claim processing, or policy renewal?

Three. Does the Minister intend for Section 3.1.2.2 in the 2023 guidelines to allow insurers, through audit clauses in Integrated Plan contracts, to access NEHR-derived information that would otherwise be prohibited under Section 6 of this Bill?

Four. If an insurer is found to utilise either pathway, what enforcement mechanisms exist? Will this be a matter for MAS, MOH, or both?

(Competition and Consumer Value)

Mr Speaker, I now wish to speak to a broader question:

This Bill will create, for the first time, a comprehensive national health database. Social determinants such as postal code, education, marital status. Clinical outcomes such as blood pressure readings over decades, medications prescribed. And soon, perhaps, genomic data from the SG100K project.

This is a formidable dataset. It is a “means of production” - not just of population health outcomes, but of significant economic value. So how do we ensure that value from this national health data infrastructure flows to citizens?

Globally, startups are experimenting with patient-centric data models - where individuals can choose to share their data for research and receive compensation. A monopoly may not experiment with such models. But a contestable market will. Some players will try patient-centric approaches. The best models will emerge.

To create the conditions for competition to discover it, that requires open APIs, interoperability standards, and a contestable application layer.

(The Synapxe Question: Contestability and the Original Vision)

Mr Speaker, let me turn to the System Operator.

Section 8 provides that the Minister may designate a System Operator to operate, administer, and maintain the national electronic records system. In practice, this will be Synapxe.

Synapxe - formerly known as IHiS - today employs approximately 3,500 people. It serves as the technology backbone for our entire public healthcare system.

When IHiS was set up in 2008, I believe the original vision was that it would operate on contestable principles. MOH would issue tenders. IHiS would compete - win some, lose some. It would have enough work to survive, but face enough competition to stay efficient.

This model was what worked for MINDEF and ST Engineering. Dr Goh Keng Swee, speaking at NTUC Income’s 1977 annual meeting, articulated the principle. He said:

(quote) “We do not own and run enterprises on ideological grounds... We expect government-owned enterprises to be efficient, to make money and to expand whenever feasible. [...] If a government-owned enterprise loses money, it is allowed to go bankrupt and this has happened, fortunately, in very few instances.” (end quote)

This was the discipline of contestability. Government-linked enterprises were to be subject to market forces.

But Mr Speaker, the current model for Synapxe has drifted from this vision. Today, MOH relies almost exclusively on Synapxe to implement its technology integrations. There is capture and cost inflation. An engineer is hired at $5,000 a month; that engineer’s services are sold to public healthcare clusters at significantly higher rates. This markup is of questionable value for taxpayers. It crowds out innovation. The market is not contestable.

I believe a different model is possible and necessary.

(A Proposal: Returning to Contestable Principles)

My vision for Synapxe is different. It would return to the original contestable principles surrounding IHiS’s creation.

First, I would seek to separate Synapxe into two entities.

The first entity would be a core infrastructure company. It would handle standards-setting, data exchange protocols, security baselines, and the NEHR plumbing. This stays government-owned and lean - perhaps a few hundred people. It runs the pipes and sets the protocols, but does not compete at the application layer.

The second entity would be a commercial services company. It would handle system integration, consulting, and vendor management. This gets spun off - perhaps privatised, perhaps converted into a GLC that must compete commercially, both domestically and internationally.

Second, MOH must reacquire in-house capacity to be an intelligent buyer of technology services. Before or concurrent with any Synapxe restructuring, MOH needs a technical unit of 50 to 100 people. Not administrators - but engineers, data architects, security specialists. People who can evaluate bids, write specifications, and challenge cost claims. Without this capacity, the ministry cannot escape capture.

Third, I would legislate interoperability standards and open API requirements for all Health Data Intermediaries, including any entity that emerges from Synapxe. The goal is to ensure that the application layer - the layer where innovation happens - is open and contestable.

I think all this can be done in a few years.

(Three Outcomes from a Reformed Model)

Mr Speaker, with such contestability - and with opening for opt-in mechanisms where citizens can choose to share their data for specific purposes and receive compensation - I believe the NEHR can be the means of production for three outcomes:

“A” Better population-scale health outcomes. This is the primary purpose and I support it fully.

“B” A fair stake in data monetisation for each citizen. If value is being extracted from their data, we should create conditions where citizens can likely share in it - not just bear the risk.

“C” An ecosystem catalyst for health-based startups. With open APIs and interoperability, Singapore can become a hub for health technology innovation. Startups can build on the NEHR platform. SMEs can compete for contracts. We can export health-tech capabilities regionally.

The NEHR can become a flywheel for a more dynamic Singapore health technology ecosystem - one that benefits the government, citizens, and entrepreneurs alike. Not merely a government-only-benefits asset.

(Closing)

Mr Speaker, in conclusion.

I support the principle of a unified national health record. It can improve care, reduce waste, and enable the precision medicine of tomorrow.

But a Bill that compels contribution must also come with robust safeguards.

Those compelled to contribute must be protected from disproportionate liability - through tiered guidance, safe harbours, and transitional support.

Privacy controls must be real. If access restrictions do not exclude data from NEHR, then a breach exposes everything regardless of restrictions.

Possible loopholes must be closed. The self-access provision in Section 17, combined with the transcription guidelines, creates pathways for insurers to circumvent the excluded purposes protection.

And if we are building a national data asset, we must ensure it is governed by contestable principles - not captured by a monopoly provider. The original vision for IHiS was discipline through competition. We should return to it.

I look forward to the Ministry’s reply on my structural concerns.

Thank you, Mr Speaker. I support the Bill.

Mr Speaker,

I support the principles of the Public Sector (Governance) (Amendment) Bill, but I would like to place some significant concerns on the record.

(A Lesson in Trust)

Let me begin with a story this House knows well.

In January 2021, Singaporeans learned that police had access to TraceTogether data under the Criminal Procedure Code. This contradicted earlier assurances that the data was (quote) “purely for contact tracing, period.” (end quote) The then-Minister in charge of Smart Nation acknowledged he had been “blindsided”—he had not considered existing law when making those assurances.

The backlash was significant. Not because Singaporeans oppose law enforcement, but because they felt misled about how their data would be used. The backlash led to the expedited passage in February 2021 of the COVID-19 (Temporary Measures) (Amendment) Bill, restricting access to 7 serious offence categories.

The lesson is that trust must be built through demonstrably robust processes. Once faith in a data-sharing framework is broken, it is expensive to rebuild.

I raise this because the Bill before us creates a new framework for sharing citizen data—this time, with private entities. The question is whether we have learned from the TraceTogether episode.

(What the Bill Does)

The original PSGA, passed in 2018, allowed government agencies to share data with one another under Ministerial direction.

This Amendment expands that framework significantly: data can now flow to private companies, contractors, and vendors. And it introduces a power to re-identify anonymised information.

(The Core Question)

Mr Speaker, of course data sharing creates value. Examples abound - like the Social Service Net -when MSF shares client data with Family Service Centres and VWOs, we see coordinated assistance and faster assessments.

But this Bill creates a fundamental asymmetry.

The Government gains the capability to share any data with any private entity. Private entities gain access to government-held data. What do citizens gain?

Under this Bill, a citizen has no right to know when their data is shared with a private company. No mechanism to find out which companies hold their data. And no way to ensure they benefit from the value that data creates.

TraceTogether failed on transparency—citizens did not know police could access their data. Why risk the same failure mode again with this Bill on a larger scale, with more actors including those outside government, and less visibility?

If this Bill expands what the Government can do with citizen data, should it not also expand what citizens can do—to track, to benefit from, and to govern that sharing?

(Three Asks)

Mr Speaker, I ask for three commitments that would complete this framework.

One: A Public Register.

All data sharing directions issued to private entities should be published—the categories of data shared, the recipient, the purpose, the duration.

This is not a per-transaction notification. It is the disclosure of Ministerial directions, made in small numbers. Australia’s Data Availability and Transparency Act 2022 includes such a register. It creates accountability without undue operational burden.

TraceTogether’s problem was that citizens could not know how their data was used. A register solves this.

Question 1: Will the Government commit to publishing a register of all data sharing directions issued to private entities?

Two: Citizen Benefit

When data flows from government to the private sector, it creates value for those two players. Agencies gain efficiency. Private entities gain data access and improve their services. Where is the mechanism ensuring citizens share in that value?

I mean concrete improvements: service quality guarantees, cost reductions passed to users, transparency about outcomes, and also something I believe in, which is benefit-sharing from any future monetisation of their data.

Question 2: What benefits will Singaporeans see from this framework? How will these be tracked and reported? WIll there be any part of the government that advocates directly for citizens gaining a share of these data benefits?

Three: Public Review

The original PSGA allowed sharing between government agencies. This Amendment opens the door to the private sector—powers of a different order.

Australia’s framework includes a review that quote “must start by, and be completed within, 12 months (or a longer period agreed by the Minister) of the third anniversary of the commencement of the Act.”. This is a sound legislative principle: The grant of novel powers should have built-in moments for reassessment.

The backlash to TraceTogether led to emergency legislation limiting police access. Would it not be better to commit to a review now than to legislate in a possible crisis of confidence later?

So, Question 3: Will the Minister commit to a formal public review within five years—including the directions issued, the data shared, and whether safeguards have been adequate.

(Two Further Concerns)

Mr Speaker, beyond these three asks, I wish to flag two concerns about organisational accountability.

First, a data governance gap.

The public consultation promised “robust safeguards” through “data governance requirements” on external partners—I quote: requirements “similar to what public sector agencies have to meet.”

What does the Bill deliver? Individual criminal liability for employees who misuse data.

What does the Bill not deliver? Any organisational requirements. No security certification. No audit trails. No breach notification duties.

So, Question 4: Where are the data governance requirements promised in the consultation? If they are to come by regulation or procurement contract terms, will the Minister commit to that today?

Second, a liability gap for non-personal data.

Under PDPA, for data breaches involving personal data, organisations face financial penalties of up to 10% of annual turnover. . Individuals also face liability.

Under this Bill, for non-personal data shared with private entities, only individual employees can be prosecuted. If an organisation systematically exploits non-personal government data beyond its authorised purpose, the entity that designed the business model and profited faces no direct liability.

Accountability must reach the benefiting entity. If organisations can profit from misuse while only individuals bear risk, the incentive structure is incorrect.

Question 5: Will the Government commit to organisational accountability mechanisms, especially for non-personal data which is not covered by PDPA? Why has it not chosen to hold organisations accountable here?

Mr Speaker, I am on the whole supportive of the bill’s enabling of data sharing with private sector actors. In any case, deeper public-private collaboration is inevitable. Data will flow to where it creates value.

But we should learn the lessons of TraceTogether.

TraceTogether taught us that non-transparency about data-sharing has costs. This Bill should learn that lesson. Transparency is what makes data sharing sustainable in the long-term.

So I’ve asked for three commitments: a public register, a mechanism to track and report citizen benefit, and a formal review within five years.

And I’ve flagged two gaps in organisational accountability that should be addressed.

I trust the points collectively raised today will spare us a future ‘blindsiding’.

Thank you, Mr Speaker.

Health (MOH) - 5 Questions

To ask the Coordinating Minister for Social Policies and Minister for Health given that the Monetary Authority of Singapore primarily regulates solvency, whether the Ministry intends to establish a dual-regulation framework to oversee the (i) healthcare outcomes (ii) panel selection criteria and (iii) loss-ratio efficiency of private insurers to ensure they align with national health goals.

To ask the Coordinating Minister for Social Policies and Minister for Health given findings that shingles vaccination reduces dementia, including the May 2025 Nature study showing Zostavax causally reduces diagnoses by 20% and the July 2024 Nature Medicine study showing Shingrix is associated with 164 added dementia-free days, whether the Ministry will (i) include dementia prevention savings into cost-benefit analyses for shingles vaccines and (ii) consider extending shingles vaccine subsidies to persons aged 50-59.

To ask the Coordinating Minister for Social Policies and Minister for Health following the Competition and Consumer Commission of Singapore’s clearance of the recent merger between Singapore’s two largest private nursing home operators (a) what is the combined market share of private equity-backed nursing home operators; (b) what percentage of the Ministry’s Build-Own-Lease operating subventions currently flow to such operators versus Voluntary Welfare Organisations; and (c) what safeguards exist against future price increases in an increasingly consolidated market.

To ask the Coordinating Minister for Social Policies and Minister for Health (a) what specific technical or regulatory barriers prevent the inclusion of Japan’s Pharmaceuticals and Medical Devices Agency and South Korea’s Ministry of Food and Drug Safety as reference agencies for therapeutic product registration; (b) to what extent does such exclusion delay the registration of medicines optimised for regional populations; and (c) whether the Ministry will conduct a feasibility study on recognising such World Health Organisation Listed Authorities as HSA’s reference agencies, to accelerate drug access.

To ask the Coordinating Minister for Social Policies and Minister for Health (a) whether the shift in model from the Community Health Assist Scheme’s means-tested co-payments to Healthier SG’s capitation model signals a departure from the Ministry’s philosophy of shared responsibility in healthcare financing; and (b) without market-based price signals to moderate demand under the capitation model, what specific mechanisms will prevent buffet syndrome and ensure Healthier SG’s long-term fiscal sustainability.

Finance (MOF) & Trade/Industry (MTI) - 4 Questions

To ask the Prime Minister and Minister for Finance (a) whether the Government will review Temasek’s risk-return framework to explicitly value strategic ecosystem building alongside commercial returns; (b) whether the Government has assessed the impact of Temasek’s recent deprioritisation of direct early-stage local investments on Singapore’s ability to nurture nascent high-potential industries; and (c) if so, whether alternative capital support mechanisms will be introduced to fill this gap.

To ask the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Trade and Industry (a) whether the Competition and Consumer Commission of Singapore is evaluating the reported potential CapitaLand-Mapletree merger and will mandate a formal Phase 1 or Phase 2 review; (b) if so, how will the relevant market be defined to ensure accurate assessment; and (c) whether additional safeguards to protect SME tenants from possible abuse of dominant position in lease renewals will be considered.

To ask the Prime Minister and Minister for Finance for each year over the past decade (a) how many Singapore citizens have transitioned from being tax residents to non-residents and vice versa; (b) what is the breakdown (i) by gender and (ii) by five-year age groups; and (c) what proportion of Singapore citizen tax residents in 2014 have remained so in 2024, as broken down by gender and age.

To ask the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Trade and Industry (a) why digital Singapore-based warehouse receipts remain underutilised for financing critical minerals despite the 2021 Electronic Transactions Act (ETA) amendments; (b) whether the Ministry will operationalise section 16Q of the ETA to accredit trusted issuers; and (c) how does Singapore’s framework for metal warrant financing compare to systems already operational in Dubai and the UK.

Defence (MINDEF) - 1 Question

To ask the Coordinating Minister for Public Services and Minister for Defence (a) whether the Ministry has conducted a strategic review of the decision to relocate Paya Lebar Air Base in light of recent global conflicts demonstrating the vulnerability of concentrated air assets to mass drone attacks and long-range munitions; and (b) whether such consolidation of the RSAF’s assets into fewer air bases significantly increases operational risks during a first-strike scenario.

Education (MOE) - 1 Question

To ask the Minister for Education whether the Ministry will consider mandating the transfer of non-pedagogical administrative tasks, such as the management of parental consent forms, monetary collections, and event logistics, from teachers to school administrative and operations personnel to align with the Ministry’s objective of reducing teacher workload.

National Development (MND) - 2 Questions

To ask the Minister for National Development given the rising incidence of Personal Mobility Device battery fires in residential settings, whether the Government will consider piloting fire-rated outdoor charging cabinets in HDB void decks or multi-storey carparks, similar to facilities deployed in New York City and Taiwan, with subsidised electricity rates to incentivise residents to charge devices in these safer communal facilities.

To ask the Minister for National Development in light of the death of a dog captured at Seletar West Farmway 8 (a) whether the Ministry will review the “acceptable parameters” of force, as outlined in the AVS statement of 16 November 2025, and training standards for animal management contractors; and (b) whether the Ministry will formalise collaboration with animal welfare groups to ensure humane handling while maintaining public safety.

Foreign Affairs (MFA) - 1 Question

To ask the Minister for Foreign Affairs (a) what are the Ministry’s standard operating procedures, if any, for providing emergency consular aid and ensuring the safety of Singaporeans during overseas crises such as the (i) Brown University shooting on 13 December 2025, (ii) Bondi Beach shooting on 14 December 2025 and (iii) Taipei knife attack on 19 December 2025; and (b) what assistance, if any, was rendered by our overseas missions following the Brown University shooting.

Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) - 1 Question

Redirected from MinLaw.

To ask the Prime Minister whether, following Public Prosecutor v China Railway Tunnel Group, the Government will amend the Prevention of Corruption Act to (i) broaden the legal test for corporate attribution beyond the “directing mind and will” doctrine in common law or (ii) introduce a “failure to prevent” offence similar to the UK Bribery Act, ensuring large corporations cannot evade liability for corruption by senior management.

I will speak today on Section 92K of the Finance (Income Taxes) Bill, which is part of the government’s emerging strategy to improve the attractiveness of Singapore’s equity market. It provides time-limited tax incentives for both primary and secondary listings.

Before I begin, let me preface by saying I will use the term “SGX” as shorthand for SGX’s equities business. The SGX as a whole is a multi-asset exchange that has great strengths in FX, commodities and other derivatives, and I think those parts of the business, including BidFX and iron ore, have been doing a good job.

(Section 92K)

On Section 92K, my overall view is that these measures, a time-limited experiment in tax incentives, are in themselves unlikely to move the needle on improving the SGX’s competitiveness, for good or bad. Although I have general reservations about some of the bill’s principles, on balance, since it is tightly-scoped by being both limited in time and capped in subsidy, I support the bill to give this government latitude to experiment.

92K introduces a tax rebate to encourage companies to list their shares on the SGX. Companies that list their ordinary shares on a Singapore stock exchange between 19 February 2025 and 31 December 2027, new listings or re-listings, both primary and secondary listings, will qualify. Shares must be offered to the public in conjunction with the listing.

The company receives a tax rebate for 5 years. 20% of corporate tax for periods with a primary listing, and 10% for a secondary listing. These are capped at 6 million dollars a year if the market capitalization is at or above 1 billion dollars on listing date, and 3 million dollars a year if it is below that figure.

The company must remain listed throughout the entire 5-year period, and must apply for approval by 31 December 2027.

The principles of 92K that I have reservations about are -

First, the extension of rebates towards secondary listings. From the companies’ perspective, academic research shows secondary listings work primarily when listing in the US, where companies gain from purported superior governance standards or valuation premiums. It is debatable if Singapore offers either advantage. The advantages are not of secondary listings in general, but of the US in particular.

I can understand why SGX might want to encourage secondary listings. They are a prelude to secondary offerings. In FY2025, SGX had 6 new listings, raising 25.7 million. This was dwarfed by secondary offerings, which was a hundred times larger at 4.3 billion. SGX’s function as a capital-raising venue for already listed companies is currently much more significant than its listings. SGX Chairman Koh Boon Hwee has argued for the need to take calculated “first-mover” risks to build liquidity. Presumably, anchoring more secondary listings is one of those “first-mover” risks.

But from Singapore’s perspective: I do not see much benefit in giving incentives to attract secondary listings, especially combined with a disclosure-based regime which may result in a bigger slate of lower quality companies. At the point of entry, many may just make the number of listings and market cap look better, while not creating broad local employment since their operations are overseas. Some may disagree on the basis that these secondary listings may improve liquidity and generate turnover, but how much of this is sticky multi-year liquidity, and how much is transient event-driven volume? I ask, what is the basis of the Government’s belief that it will lead to high–quality liquidity?

For me, the bigger philosophical questions from first principles - why would a company want to do a secondary listing in Singapore? Why would Singapore benefit overall from more secondary listings in a disclosure-based regime? - remain inadequately answered.

Overall, I would rather we focus on attracting quality primary listings over extending incentives to secondary listings. But since the trial is limited in time and scope, we will support the bill’s scope in toto. We hope the results will be published and guide future market development.

The bill addresses three key tactical problems regarding secondary listings:

(a) Many secondary listings come “by introduction”, meaning no new shares sold, which leaves little local free float and tends to depress local turnover. HKEX, Hong Kong’s exchange, warns that secondary listings can suffer from “failure to develop or sustain an active trading market,” which is why they flag such stocks prominently with an “S” marker.

SGX currently has 29 secondary listings. Multiple high-profile SGX secondary listings were by way of introduction (meaning no new shares) - this includes the 2010 listing of Prudential, and the 2022 SGX listing of electric-vehicle company NIO, which GIC is now suing for securities fraud in the Southern District of New York. These secondaries have had thin local trading versus their primary venues, with exception of the Jardine group. So far, secondary listings have been a mixed bag.

I will return to this point about poor quality listings later. But tactically, 92K insists that shares must be offered to the public, ensuring some float. So listings by introduction are excluded from rebates. This is prudent.

And while this is not in the bill, I note that MAS has the GEMS Research Development Grant, which provides a top-up per research report, more if it covers pre-IPO and new-listed names. This will help strengthen the value-proposition of a listing here in Singapore, even if we cannot offer much valuation premium.

(b) The tax rebates are also tied to the profitability of the company. If the companies are loss-making, they will not qualify for the rebates. If it were not the case, we could be attracting rebate tourism from dubious companies.

(c) Last and most importantly, these measures are time-limited, until the end of 2027.

The second principle I have reservations on is this whole idea of giving listing incentives at all.

I could not find much evidence that having listing incentives will improve the quality of companies or long term performance. In fact, the converse was more likely true. The Québec Stock Savings Plan, which offered taxpayers generous tax write-offs for investments in new public stock issues of companies - drove a short-term surge in small-company primary issues, but many issuers later disappeared or posted weaker earnings; the impact on capitalization was short-lived and overall stimulus effects were limited.

For listing incentives, from the companies’ perspective, it may be unsustainable once incentives end, and these companies may fail or simply delist when that time comes.

What we are likely to see is a short-term pop in the numbers, because without answers to permanent questions around liquidity, disclosure quality, investor depth, and regulatory credibility, strong secular headwinds remain.

Some say that it is a chicken and egg problem building liquidity and investor depth. I understand this view, but I believe that raising the quality of listed companies is preconditional to building this two-sided market.

Other jurisdictions are not focusing on financial incentives. Hong Kong is focused on raising corporate governance standards, enforcement, and improving processing efficiency, which is in my view, a more correct approach.

Hong Kong’s listing rules have historically been stricter than SGX in areas such as independence of directors, remuneration disclosures, and related party transactions, and their regulators have been much more aggressive in enforcement actions including against directors. Hong Kong recently introduced a new Corporate Governance Code with stricter requirements—limiting independent non-executive directors to 6 listed directorships, mandatory continuing professional training, board skills matrices, and performance reviews. They are raising standards without using financial incentives.

On 29th October, SGX RegCo announced it would remove the financial watch list and introduce more flexible listing rules under a “disclosure-based approach.”

This is paradoxical to me. The watchlist itself was disclosure - it flagged financially distressed companies to investors. Removing it doesn’t increase disclosure; it removes a critical warning signal. What SGX calls a “disclosure-based approach” actually means more disclosure for poor companies while keeping them listed and trading, but less disclosure and actionable information for the market as a whole.

I therefore disagree with the removal of the watchlist. Industry players supporting its removal may of course benefit from more trading volume, even if low-quality. Their incentives may not align with retail investor protection. Taiwan’s 54% retail participation versus our 21% shows what happens when retail investors have confidence—confidence built on quality signals like watchlists and Investor Protection Centers.

(Positive Vision)

I will now move on to a few remarks on the principles that should underlie our stock market.

At its core, a stock market strikes a ‘domestic bargain‘: savers get high-quality asset appreciation, and local enterprises get capital and exit opportunities. All other functions - such as foreign capital allocating to Singapore, or overseas companies listing in Singapore - are extensions of this core.

Four structural realities constrain our equity market:

First, the “ASEAN gateway” strategy is becoming obsolete. It may have worked for Singapore when other Southeast Asian countries did not have a strong local market. But today, Thailand and Vietnam have their own mature and highly liquid markets, with domestic brand recognition. ASEAN companies no longer have as many compelling reasons to list on the SGX vis-a-vis their home exchanges.

Second, our regulatory reach is limited over other foreign markets. This means for foreign companies we are exposed to information asymmetry and governance risks we cannot adequately mitigate, such as for the fraud-accused NIO.

Third, passive capital demands quality indexes. The tidal force of passive investment is a secular supertrend. Sovereign wealth funds like Norway’s world-leading GPFG [Government Pension Fund Global] have demonstrated that low-cost passive investing outperforms the active management approach. I believe passive strategies will form the basis of significant portfolio allocations going forward.

But passive investment requires something fundamental: high-quality indexes or baskets worth buying. Investors must be able to trust that the basket of stocks they’re purchasing represents genuine value, not a random collection of mediocre companies.

By lowering listing standards and removing investor protections like the financial watch list, the risk is that the quality of the SGX and STI is allowed to degrade precisely when global capital is demanding higher quality for passive allocation.

Let us not forget that active-management, to weed out mediocrity, is an expensive endeavour. You will pay an active manager above-and-beyond to do due-diligence to separate wheat from chaff. And these active management fees are a drag on any future returns.

You cannot attract passive capital by diluting the quality of your index. Any slackening in market-shaping and maintaining quality standards cuts directly against one of the most important structural trends in modern finance. I am bearish on any cutting of standards.

Fourth, passive capital also demands coherent indexes. Without quality and coherence, we cannot articulate what our market represents.

Big allocators need clarity about what each allocation represents in their portfolio. But look at the STI: Financials ~54%, Real Estate Investment Trusts or REITs ~16.4%, Industrials ~9.8%, Telecom ~7.5%, Utilities ~4.9%. Almost entirely defensive.

There is also leakage. Secondary listings like Jardine Matheson and Hongkong Land (both managed from Hong Kong) comprise 5% of the Index but represent neither Singapore operations nor “Singapore Inc”’s core capital-formation interests.

Defensiveness and leakage are headwinds in building a future coherent story to ultimately increase the SGX’s valuation premium.

What would a future coherent story look like?

Not mimicking NASDAQ’s high-beta growth. Not remaining purely defensive. But rather: a foundation of quality SMEs - profitable, well-run, the “domestic bargain” in action - complemented by selective growth engines from a robust R&D industrial policy.

The local stock market is currently dominated by GLCs [Government-Linked Companies]. However, Singapore has a long-tail of well-run, profitable SMEs which do require growth-capital. They aren’t super-growth companies but they deserve capital and can anchor our index.

We need to meet our economy where it is. SGX should become an exchange that looks out for growing SMEs and cultivates a pipeline for listing. This should include overhauling the sponsor-based Catalist board to be replaced by a non-trading, capacity-building “incubation board” which graduates to OTC-style boards as a prelude to mainboard listing. SMEs are the companies that would benefit most from a supportive exchange ecosystem, including the long-tail of research needed to cover them.

The second layer would be selective growth from R&D. Commercial offshoots from our RIE masterplans in Pharmaceuticals, Advanced Manufacturing, and Deep Tech should be able to list at an earlier stage to access domestic capital. The collapse of Tessa Therapeutics in 2023 - despite raising over $200 million US Dollars - illustrates the brittleness of relying solely on late-stage venture funding without domestic capital market support. Without opining on the commercial validity of that specific decision, I believe capital-intensive R&D ventures could benefit from accessible public markets. Earlier-stage listings would build local investor familiarity with science-based companies, and allow incremental capital raising as milestones are met, and would perhaps have improved the odds for some of the first-generation Biopolis companies which failed. That is why I support SGX Regco’s amending of admission requirements for life science companies.

(Substantiation Sought)

With your indulgence, Mr Speaker, before I end, as this bill touches upon the stock market, I would like to correct some statements about the Workers’ Party’s stock market proposals.

Minister Chee Hong Tat, at a DBS-hosted fireside chat on 22nd October 2025, said (quote)

“Over the past year, we have worked closely with the industry to come up with proposals that could enhance the liquidity and competitiveness of Singapore’s equities market. We decided not to go for quick fixes, such as asking GIC or Temasek to pump-prime the market by mandating them to invest a certain amount in local equities. I explained in Parliament previously, in response to similar calls by the Workers’ Party, that I do not believe such superficial measures will be effective and sustainable. It is what the Chinese call 治标不治本 [Zhìbiāo bù zhìběn], solutions that may sound good in theory but actually do not solve the underlying problems facing our equities market.” (end quote)

I am not sure what “calls” the Minister is referring to. I have looked around and asked my colleagues but drawn a blank. My colleague Louis Chua did speak in this year’s COS about our stock market, but he suggested two things: letting more of Temasek’s GLCs list on SGX and strengthening corporate governance standards. He did not suggest what the Minister has called “pump-priming”.

But I did manage to find this exchange while digging in the Hansard, a PQ from 2nd July 2024.

(quote) asked the Prime Minister and Minister for Finance whether the Government will review its investment mandates with GIC to consider the suggestion from some industry players for GIC to allocate part of its investments to securities listed on the Singapore Exchange to revitalise our local stock exchange. (end quote)

The source of that pump-priming question was MP Liang Eng Hwa, who is not a WP MP.

So, respectfully, I would like to ask the Minister to please clarify and source his comments.

Thank you, Mr Speaker. I support the Bill.