7-8 April 2026 sittings | 10 Parliamentary Questions

Sitting on 7 April 2026 - Oral

To ask the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Trade and Industry given Australia’s 2025 review of the Prohibiting Energy Market Misconduct Act found retailers systematically raise prices faster than they lower them, and recommended symmetrical cost-pass-through obligations requiring retailers to both pass on cost decreases and justify price increases against underlying costs, whether the Government will adopt similar safeguards to protect energy consumers during and after the Strait of Hormuz disruption.

To ask the Minister for Sustainability and the Environment (a) whether Singapore’s strategic food reserves meet the Government’s adequacy targets; (b) given that nearly half of globally traded urea and sulphur transit the Strait of Hormuz, whether the Ministry has assessed the impact on Singapore’s food import prices; and (c) what measures have been taken since the closure on 2 March 2026 to buffer possible future food price increases.

To ask the Prime Minister and Minister for Finance given US private credit defaults reached a record 9.2% in 2025 and the Bank of England, European Central Bank (ECB), and the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) have each initiated supervisory reviews of private credit risk exposure (a) whether MAS has assessed the aggregate exposure of Singapore-domiciled financial institutions to US private credit; (b) whether MAS has conducted or plans to conduct equivalent stress tests; and (c) if not, why not.

Sitting on 7 April 2026 - Written

To ask the Prime Minister and Minister for Finance in view that both A\*STAR’s Quantum Innovation Centre and the Centre for Quantum Technologies (CQT) at NUS claim alignment with the National Quantum Strategy, which designated CQT as the national flagship centre (a) what specific capabilities does the Quantum Innovation Centre provide that CQT does not; (b) what is their combined annual funding; and (c) what mechanisms prevent duplication between them.

To ask the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Trade and Industry (a) what proportion of Business Expenditure on R&D (BERD) is attributable to Government-linked companies (GLCs); (b) whether any GLCs currently undertake significant R&D activities aligned with strategic domains identified under RIE2025 or RIE2030; (c) what is the Government’s assessment of the implications for Singapore’s innovation output when large domestic enterprises account for a relatively small share of national R&D activity.

Sitting on or after 8 April 2026 - Oral

To ask the Minister for Manpower (a) why has the $60,000 cap on CPF balances earning the additional 1% interest remained unchanged since 2008 when other major CPF parameters are revised regularly; (b) whether the Ministry will consider pegging growth of this cap to growth of Full Retirement Sum (FRS); and (c) how much interest do CPF members forgo annually because the cap has not tracked FRS growth.

To ask the Acting Minister for Transport in view that the Strait of Hormuz crisis has shown foreign carriers prioritising their home governments’ interests, and that Singapore no longer has a nationally aligned shipping line following the divestment of Neptune Orient Lines in 2016, what arrangements are being put in place to ensure essential supply lines to Singapore are maintained during a regional conflict or naval disruption.

To ask the Minister for National Development (a) whether the asset-conversion framework under which Past Reserves fund Selective En bloc Redevelopment Scheme (SERS) land acquisitions will extend to Voluntary Early Redevelopment Scheme (VERS); (b) since SERS sites are selected for high redevelopment potential whereas VERS sites are selected by age, how the Government satisfies itself that VERS acquisitions are value-neutral rather than net drawdowns; and (c) whether the President’s Office has been consulted on this extension.

Sitting on or after 8 April 2026 - Written

To ask the Coordinating Minister for Social Policies and Minister for Health (a) how many applications for egg freezing by women above 37 have been received since the age limit was reviewed and how many were approved; (b) what criteria the approving authority uses to assess these applications and whether these criteria are published; and (c) whether the Ministry will consider removing the age limit.

To ask the Coordinating Minister for Social Policies and Minister for Health (a) of the more than 800 women who have frozen their eggs under elective egg freezing (EEF), how many have used them for in-vitro fertilisation (IVF) in Singapore; (b) whether the Ministry tracks Singaporean women undergoing IVF abroad, and if so, what trends have been observed since June 2023; and (c) whether the Ministry will consider removing the marriage requirement for use of frozen eggs in IVF.

Mr Speaker, I wish to discuss our Co-Curricular Activity system.

A resident in my ward shared her son’s story with me. He started playing tennis when he was seven. His primary school did not offer tennis as a CCA, so his parents arranged training outside — once a week with a private coach, twice a week in a small group programme. Both parents work full-time. For six years, he trained largely on his own. He never had the chance to play alongside peers his age. His dream, all through primary school, was simple: to join a secondary school with a strong tennis team, and finally be part of one.

He applied through DSA to his dream school. The school took a handful of boys — all top-ranked players in their age group. He was not selected for DSA. He did not give up. He worked hard for his PSLE, and earned his place on merit.

Then came the CCA trial for tennis. He made it to the final round — but was not selected. At this school, trials are conducted before students submit their CCA choices. He was advised not to list tennis. The school explained that there was no room — space constraints, grading considerations.

So the boy chose rugby. It was one of the few CCAs with vacancies and open to beginners. Rugby trains three times a week. With that and a heavier Secondary 1 workload, he had to give up competitive tennis. He can still hit a ball on weekends. But he cannot train seriously.

His mother told me: it was heartbreaking to watch her son give up the sport he loves. Not because he was not good enough — but because the system would not give him the chance to become good enough.

Mr Speaker, I believe this is a system problem, not a talent problem.

I.

Each January, Secondary One students submit a ranked list of CCA preferences. For popular CCAs — sports, performing arts — schools conduct trials or auditions. Students who do not pass are asked to remove that CCA from their choices. Some fail multiple trials. They are allocated to whatever remains.

This is not unreasonable on its own. Resources are finite. But consider what makes CCA different from everything else in our education system. CCA is compulsory. Students must participate for four to five years. Under LEAPS 2.0, that participation is graded — and those grades translate into bonus points for post-secondary admission.

We have spent the last decade making the rest of our system more open. Mid-year exams removed. PSLE T-scores replaced with broader bands. Streaming dissolved into Subject-Based Banding. Each reform carries the same signal: less sorting, more room. CCA has not received that same attention.

II.

In 2020, the Ministry piloted the removal of CCA selection trials across eight primary schools. The pilot seems a success. Today, about two-thirds of primary schools operate without trials. When I asked the Minister about this on 12 February, the reply confirmed these results — but did not address secondary schools, where LEAPS 2.0 applies and stakes are highest.

There is a model already operating in Singapore — in our international schools. At Singapore American School, students who miss the competitive team are not turned away — they join a developmental programme and continue training. No student is excluded. It is an established system, on Singapore soil, showing that open participation and competitive excellence reinforce each other.

This principle is not foreign to local schools. Hwa Chong’s track and field programme — the first school to win all four divisions at the National Schools Championships in a single year — requires no prior experience and welcomes anyone with a passion for the sport. It fields athletes across every event category: sprints, jumps, throws, walks, cross-country, pole vault. A 2008 report on the National Schools Championships observed that while a rival school matched Hwa Chong in first-place finishes, Hwa Chong’s depth across the field — finishers in every event accumulating points — was what secured the divisional title. Broad participation is not the enemy of competitive excellence. At Hwa Chong, it is the competitive strategy.

Internationally, the pattern holds at scale. Durham University fields 16,000 students across 550 teams — 75% of its student body — and is the top-ranked team sport university in Britain. In the US, 8 million high schoolers play athletics; at college level, over 2 million play club sport alongside half a million NCAA varsity athletes. The base of the pyramid and the peak are not in competition. They are the same structure.

Norway’s sports federation has codified this. Its Children’s Rights in Sport provisions, adopted in 1987, guarantee every child the right to choose which sport they wish to participate in. Selection determines competitive squads — but no child is excluded. That system, in a country of 5.6 million people — our size — has produced 445 Winter Olympic medals, more than any nation on earth.

III.

I want to turn to Direct School Admission, because DSA and CCA are entangled.

DSA now covers 141 of 148 secondary schools. Sports is the single largest talent category. When a tennis CCA has 20 spots and half are reserved for DSA students, the remaining places must absorb the entire non-DSA cohort — through trials and leftover places. That boy in my ward trained for six years and earned his school place on merit. But the system had already given away half the seats before he arrived.

The question is straightforward: who has access to the preparation that DSA rewards? Competitive sport at age twelve requires years of coaching, tournament entry fees, and parents with the time and means to support it. In 2024, a basketball coach was investigated by CPIB for allegedly charging parents $30,000 to $50,000 per child to secure DSA placements. That is not an isolated bad actor — it is a market responding to a system where the stakes are high and the pathways narrow.

IV.

Does early selection identify future talent? Sports science is settling on this question — and it is not a close call.

In December 2025, a study was published in major journal Science, synthesising the developmental histories of over 34,000 top-level performers: Olympic medallists, Nobel laureates, elite chess players, classical music composers. Their central finding: young standouts and adult world-class performers are largely different people — approximately 90% are different individuals. Early specialisation produces early results. But adult world-class performance is predicted by the opposite pattern: limited early discipline-specific practice, extensive multidisciplinary engagement, and gradual initial progress. World-class athletes averaged involvement in two other sports over nine years during childhood.

A companion meta-analysis supported it: the predictors of junior elite success were the precise opposite of the predictors of senior world-class success. Many talent promotion programs select youth based on current performance, which is often a result of: Biological Maturation: early puberty; Relative Age Effect: being born earlier in the selection year; and Early Specialization: high volumes of sport-specific practice at a young age. These advantages typically diminish or reverse by adulthood.

It further recommended that since current performance is a poor predictor of future potential. Selection should consider “side-entry” athletes and prioritize those with sustainable development patterns (such as moderate main-sport practice combined with other sports). Also, that program success should be measured not by junior medals, but by how many athletes transition to senior international excellence.

This matters because our CCA system — trials at age twelve, a four-year lock-in, LEAPS points tied to competitive results — is structurally an early-selection model. It may produce results in the National School Games. But a system optimised for junior results, by the best available science, is not selecting for true adult world-class performers.

I would like to highlight Singapore’s National Youth Sports Institute. NYSI’s Junior Sports Academy exposes Primary 4 to 5 students to four different sports over two years. NYSI’s Head of Sport Science has stated publicly that broad-based sporting experience produces equal or better outcomes through cross-transfer of skills. NYSI even hosted a dialogue with one of the principal authors of that 2025 Science study, Professor Arne Gullich in 2019 to discuss these principles.

So the gap is not between what we know and what we do not know. It is between what our own institutions endorse and what our CCA system requires. Let us close the gap between rhetoric and reality.

V.

Sir, I propose reform in three areas.

First, open every door within the school. Extend the primary school pilot to secondary schools. Let trials determine who makes the competitive squad — not who gets to participate. Every student should be able to join at least one of their top CCA choices. Where a CCA conducts selection trials, those trials should sort students into a competitive squad and a developmental programme — not into participants and the excluded. Students in the developmental tier train on fundamentals, fitness, and game understanding, with the opportunity to trial for the competitive squad each year. This is not a radical idea. It is how Singapore American School already operates on our own soil. It is how Hwa Chong’s track and field programme built the depth that won them all four divisions. And it is what sports science tells us produces better senior-level athletes.

Schools should also survey incoming Secondary One students on their CCA preferences — and publish the aggregate results. If sixty students want badminton and a school caps it at twenty, that gap should be visible. Where demand consistently exceeds supply, schools should adjust. Some may move quickly — splitting sessions, or expanding squads within the year. Others may take two to three years to reallocate resources from persistently under-subscribed CCAs. Either pace is fine. What matters is having a credible adjustment mechanism.

And because CCA choices at thirteen are often made under constraint — a student allocated their third or fourth preference, or a student who discovers a genuine passion through the developmental tier — I propose that students be allowed to change CCAs at the end of Sec One and end of Sec Two without penalty under LEAPS. This ensures commitment is meaningful.

Second, open doors beyond the school. We need systematic cross-school access. The Strategic Partnership CCA programme today serves 232 students from 86 schools across four sports. I welcome the expansion. But a programme serving 232 out of roughly 40,000 Sec One students each year is a proof of concept.

I propose three concrete steps. One: double SP-CCA from four sports to eight within two years. Two: publish a sport-by-sport availability map — showing which sports are offered at which schools — so that gaps are visible and planning is data-driven. Three: publish a five-year SP-CCA expansion roadmap with clear targets, and invite schools to form voluntary geographic clusters of four to six schools, pooling CCA offerings so students can cross-attend.

If tennis is available at only thirty schools, it should be an SP-CCA candidate. The boy in my ward — the one who trained for six years — would have had a path. This also creates natural opportunities for the kind of social mixing across school types that hon. member David Hoe has spoken about.

We should also recognise sport pursued outside school. SportSG already runs ActiveSG Academies and Clubs — affordable, structured programmes in football, basketball, tennis, athletics, and other sports, designed for children and youth. Could students participating in a structured external programme — ActiveSG, a National Sports Association, or a registered academy — be eligible for CCA recognition, subject to verification by the school?

And at primary level, could we double or triple Junior Sports Academy intake — this fully MOE-funded, non-competitive, multi-sport program— given demand already exceeds supply?

Third, build the infrastructure to keep these doors open. If we ask schools to offer a developmental tier alongside competition, we need people to run it. Today, every coach on a school field must hold full National Registry of Coaches membership. Since July 2024, provisional membership has been discontinued. A new coach must now complete SG-Coach Theory, a sport-specific Technical Level 1 course, Foundational Sport Science, and Standard First Aid certification. These are appropriate standards for competitive coaching. But we should consider whether a lighter certification pathway — suited to teaching fundamentals rather than competitive technique — might widen the coaching pool. Parent volunteers, older club players, retired coaches, polytechnic and ITE sport graduates who complete coaching practicals but cannot coach in schools without full certification, even NSFs with sporting backgrounds could contribute meaningfully at the developmental level if the credentialing framework made room for them.

Norway’s 9,500 sports clubs are almost entirely volunteer-run — three-quarters of all coaches are unpaid volunteers operating under a tiered credentialing system. A country our size sustains developmental-level coaching across every sport because its framework makes room for volunteers, not only professionals.

CoachSG’s own framework already includes an Exploration stage with a Community Coach programme. I propose CoachSG create a new NROC tier — an Assistant Coach or Recreational Coach credential — completable in eight to sixteen hours at nominal cost, covering Safe Sport, first aid, values-based coaching, and inclusive session design. Holders could lead developmental CCA sessions under periodic supervision by fully certified coaches.

Two further changes are needed to align the system’s incentives with its stated developmental purpose.

Review the LEAPS 2.0 Achievement domain. When bonus points depend on competition results and school representation, schools have a structural incentive to limit CCA places to students who boost competitive outcomes. Replacing competition-based indicators with measures of growth, effort, and consistency would realign LEAPS with its developmental purpose.

And require MOE to collect and publish socioeconomic data on DSA applications and outcomes — household income quartile, participation in paid preparatory programmes. When my hon. colleague Eileen Chong asked for this data, the Minister said MOE does not collect it. I would respectfully suggest that this is a question worth answering. If DSA in sport systematically advantages families who can afford years of private coaching, then it is not a merit pathway — it is a wealth pathway with a merit label.

It is a core concern of the Workers’ Party that wealth does not compound unfairness or widen social gaps through our education system - points eloquently elaborated over the years by my hon. colleagues Gerald Giam and Jamus Lim.

VI.

Mr Speaker, let me return to that family.

That resident also has a younger daughter, at a different school. Her primary school runs recreational sports CCAs. No trials. The girl had never held a badminton racket in her life. She signed up for badminton because she was curious. She was allocated her first choice. She is learning. She is happy and she belongs.

Two children in the same family. Two completely different experiences. The difference is not talent or effort. It is whether the school opens the door or closes it.

That thirteen-year-old boy did everything he could. He trained for six years. He earned his place in a secondary school that was strong in tennis. He showed up for the trial. And the system told him: there is no room. He is now in his prime physical developmental years — and he is playing a sport he didn’t choose, while the sport he loves slips further away with each passing term.

His mother told me: (quote) I will always wonder whether, if the school had been more open, my son might have improved and eventually earned a place on the team. It is something we will never have the chance to find out. (end quote)

We have an opportunity to make a system that is genuinely open — to extend to CCAs the same generosity of spirit that has guided every other recent reform in our schools.

Sir, I so move.

(Hongmeiren)

Speaker,

Last week was Lunar New Year. I had the pleasure of sampling a Xiangshan Hongmeiren mandarin orange. The texture was extraordinary — the vesicles of the orange so sweet, the skin almost paper thin. It has been described as “eating jelly”, or “jelly growing on a tree”. Twelve to fifteen percent sugar content, low acidity, no floating skin.

It inspired me to investigate its history. The Hongmeiren was once Ehime No. 28, developed over fifteen years at the Ehime Prefectural Fruit Tree Experiment Station in Japan, prized for its jelly-like texture and ultra-premium positioning.

But due to a lack of IP protection, it was lost. A handful of scion cuttings were carried to Xiangshan county - Zhejiang province in China - in 2001. Today, the Hongmeiren has expanded to over 1 million mu across fifteen Chinese provinces — dwarfing Japan’s 300 hectares by over a hundredfold. Fifteen years of breeding, gone like that. It is one of the most consequential agricultural IP losses in modern Japanese history, alongside the Shine Muscat grape and strawberry leakages.

And that reminded me of something closer to home.

(Mirxes)

“It is well known that our R&D ecosystem over the last thirty years has not produced impressive commercial outcomes. Tens of billions of spending since 1990. More than thirty years. Where are the deep tech commercial successes? The report card of significant commercial outcomes — high-value IPOs, globally competitive companies — is bare.”

That is what I would have said, up to May 23rd, 2025.

On that day, Mirxes, a micro RNA cancer diagnostics biotech company incubated over many years of A*STAR research at Biopolis, IPO’d on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, raising HK$1.09 billion with China-linked cornerstone investors. Finally, a billion dollar IPO. Coincidentally, also about fifteen years of effort — like the Japanese breeding the Ehime No. 28.

But the story is more complicated. Mirxes listed in Hong Kong, not Singapore, because SGX had no equivalent of HKEX’s pathway for pre-revenue biotech. Its cornerstone investors were Chinese entities holding over forty percent of the IPO. Its manufacturing now is in Zhejiang province. Its growth market is China. The initial science came from Singapore. Commercialisation leaked offshore.

If this is success, what does failure look like?

Now - this is not the fault of the Chinese. They optimised rationally within the realities of the system. This is our failure to capture value. Our responsibility to anticipate, to get it right. To make sure Singaporean taxpayers reap the rewards of tens of billions ploughed into R&D.

Mirxes highlights two facts. First, the system does not produce a strong pipeline — that Mirxes is the only billion dollar IPO or commercially significant R&D company after thirty years of continual investment tells you something. Second, even when a success emerges, the system is naively vulnerable to value-chain leakage.

“To lose one billion-dollar IPO may be regarded as a misfortune. To lose more is carelessness.” I will return to this later.

I welcome the Budget’s commitment to $37 billion under RIE2030 and the expansion of Startup SG Equity into growth capital — these are steps in the right direction. But the question is not whether we are spending enough; it is whether the system converts that spending into commercial outcomes for Singapore.

(System)

Why does the system produce these two outcomes - (a) a limited pipeline of commercially viable R&D companies, and (b) a failure to take advantage of successes when they come? The structural flaw is that agencies like EDB and the statutory boards are structured as grant-givers, not as investors or ecosystem builders.

If you are a grant-giver, your job is to mark the market — to benchmark, to do due diligence against market rates. If you mark the market, you are then subjected to the audit process — every decision scrutinised against whether you followed the benchmark. If you are a civil servant in that position, there is absolutely no reason to stick your neck out. Zero incentive for upside. Only downside risk from audit.

So of course you end up with super-conservative civil servants who say, “I don’t want to do any innovation.” You end up with long meetings where senior officials agonise over five thousand or ten thousand dollars because they are worried about compliance. Worse, annual KPI cycles force officers to judge five-to-seven-year bets on a twelve-month horizon — so promising ventures get culled before they can prove themselves. Meanwhile, you miss the forest for the trees.

To take an ecosystem approach to funding so that the day-to-day operational environment for R&D startups is the best it can be. To design policy to capture R&D upside.

Our agencies are structured to avoid losing money, not to make it. That is why thirty years of spending has not produced thirty years of returns.

I agree with the Prime Minister that R&D is a core imperative. Productivity gains, moving up the value chain — all this matters. But there must be an honest reckoning with thirty years of limited commercial outcomes, and value chain leakage.

The R&D ecosystem needs three things: money, speed, and a market.

First, Money.

I tried to count Singapore’s government-linked startup funds. I stopped at twenty. There are eight sub-schemes under the Startup SG umbrella alone. SGInnovate. Xora Innovation under Temasek. Vertex Holdings with seven sub-funds. NRF, ASTAR, IMDA, MAS run their own programmes. Not an exhaustive list.

Of course, each was created for a reason. Each has a logic. But the aggregate effect is a landscape so fragmented that no single entity has the mandate, the capital concentration, or the institutional authority to make the kind of large, decisive, fast bets that define successful deep tech commercialisation elsewhere.

The SG Growth Capital merger of SEEDS and EDBI is a step in the right direction. But the deeper question is whether we have the institutional courage to truly consolidate — to give one or two entities the capital, the mandate, and critically the permission to fail at scale, rather than spreading accountability so thin that no one is responsible for ecosystem outcomes. The pruning must go deeper.

France has a public investment bank called Bpifrance — a single institution combining innovation investment, SME lending, loan guarantees, export credit insurance, and strategic equity stakes. In 2024, Bpifrance deployed €60 billion. Its officers proactively contact companies with programmes. It is commercially viable, with 2024 net income of €896 million.

Under François Hollande and economic adviser Emmanuel Macron in 2012, France merged four fragmented investment bodies — one for SME loans, guarantees, innovation - one for venture capital - one for strategic equity - and one for regional equity — into a single entity: Bpifrance (Banque Publique d’Investissement). Export credit insurance was added later in 2017. It now employs about 3,500 staff, centralising innovation investment, economy-wide strategic investment, SME financing, loan guarantees, export support, and regional business development.

The diagnosis that prompted Bpifrance’s creation was plain: despite strong science and underlying dynamism, France’s entrepreneurial culture was weak — risk-averse and fearful of failure. Bpifrance also organised learning expeditions and export programmes to help French companies internationalise.

Bpifrance became the anchor investor across French tech — not just deep tech. Its 10-year assessment found that 80% of French startups that raised funds between 2013 and 2021 received Bpifrance support, and two-thirds of French VC funds have Bpifrance as an LP. Bpifrance deliberately accepts below-market returns (targeting ~7% annually rather than 10%+) to take risks that private investors won’t - training a generation of entrepreneurs and building an ecosystem from scratch.

I believe we need an equivalent policy investment bank. An institution outside the civil service, incentivised to take risk, freed from line-item accountability. Staffed with ecosystem builders, not risk-averse civil servants. We need to take a portfolio approach, thinking in ten-year cycles. Ten-year cohorts. Ten-year mandates. They need the right incentives. We had this in the early years with DBS and Temasek — both have since drifted from that mission, and today no institution fills the gap.

The WP has argued before for an EXIM bank; the French example shows a mandate wider still — innovation investment, SME lending, export credit, strategic equity, all under one roof.

It is often said we have a lot of capital in Singapore. But we have the wrong type of capital for R&D commercialisation. Capital tied to government or corporates. Excessive obsession with business metrics way too early. Startups forced to jump through a thousand hoops for small cheques. Family offices largely uninterested in our R&D ecosystem. My colleague Jamus Lim has proposed requiring a modest domestic allocation as a condition for family office tax incentives, which I support.

What does success look like twenty-five years from now? A flywheel, where private capital is sophisticated enough to understand deep tech. Patient capital writing experimental cheques. Less metric-obsessed early on. That is the ecosystem we should be building toward.

Second, Speed.

Funders and regulators need to appreciate that two extra days of approvals or one month of delayed cash flow is life or death for a startup. You do not understand what it takes if you have not tried it yourself.

Fast capital deployment does not just save companies — it trains a generation of entrepreneurs who won’t waste sixty percent of their time fundraising. We should make peace with the fact that roughly eighty percent of bets on startups, made in good faith, will back a losing venture. That is the power law in action. The real gain is often the entrepreneur’s second and third startup. But if the first attempt feels like pulling teeth, they drop out, and the compounding of iterated learning across business formation is lost.

Speed is not just about money. It is about people.

MOM uses income as its proxy for talent — the Tech.Pass at 22500 a month, the ONE Pass at 30000. This may work for hot fields. It seldom works for deep tech which due to their call-option nature, are unfashionable before they are fashionable. A strong biotech engineer in Thailand earns a quarter of Singapore wages. To bring them here, a startup must triple their salary — not because their skills are worth less, but because MOM’s threshold demands it. That is startup cash burnt on regulatory compliance, not R&D. We are asking founders to choose between the talent they need and the runway they cannot afford to lose.

The assumption that salary equals value breaks down where it matters most. Deep tech talent is scarce, specialised, and often transient. An eighteen-month engagement with a materials engineer, or a combustion engine specialist can redefine a company’s trajectory. The visa framework should reflect that reality.

I propose a segmented approach: a company-driven deep tech visa, tied not to income but to the company’s credentials. A monthly review committee of mixed Singaporean and international entrepreneurs evaluating deep tech companies — there are perhaps fifty to eighty serious ones formed here each year. Companies meeting the criteria enter a special segment: flexibility for 3-5 visas in year one, with annual portfolio reviews assessing whether the company is growing. Easy entry, progressively stricter requirements on each renewal, all strictly performance-based. Is the company growing? Are Singaporeans being hired and trained alongside foreign specialists? If yes, renew. If not, exit.

Traditional organisations — banks, established corporates — can afford strict income rules. There is enough local talent. But deep tech startups need radical fluidity, and the visa regime most suited to them should follow the company, not the person.

We should also aim to make visa decisions snappy. It is fine to say no to people. But let’s have the courtesy to do it fast, within a matter of weeks. Let’s not waste our companies’ time.

Third, a market and offtake.

Money and speed are necessary but insufficient if no one is buying. The system must be designed for offtake — structured so that when R&D produces something, there is a buyer on the other end.

Singapore hosts regional headquarters, not global ones. Decision-making centres remain in New York, London, Paris, Shanghai. Regional postings run three to four years. When the regional executive who championed an innovation pilot rotates home, continuity goes with them. Corporate incentive structures often reward launching initiatives, not seeing them through — creating structural discontinuity.

Tax incentives should require backing from both regional and global headquarters. If there is no interlocutor in New York or Shanghai who has signed off, no incentive. This ensures a direct link to decision-making and prevents projects from being forgotten when executives rotate home.

Beyond that, we should attach strategic buyer offtake commitments to grants. Require MNCs to pilot, evaluate, or procure from at least one local startup or SME as part of grant conditions.

And the government itself must practise innovation procurement. Europe and China give SMEs quotas of contracts to help them gain scale. We must do the same.

(IP Protection)

I said I would return to the question of protecting value. Money, speed, and a market can build a pipeline. But pipeline alone is not enough if the value leaks out.

Three countries have dealt with this question, and they are not peripheral economies — they are among the most successful R&D ecosystems in the world.

Israel protects at inception. Under the Law for the Encouragement of Industrial Research and Development, the Israel Innovation Authority attaches binding conditions to all public R&D funding. IP developed with public grants cannot be transferred outside Israel without explicit prior approval. Unauthorised transfer is a criminal offence. No known prosecution has occurred. But the deterrent is powerful.

Taiwan protects through structure. ITRI spun off TSMC in 1987 by transferring fabs, equipment, technologies, and ninety-eight professionals to a new Taiwanese entity — with significant government ownership. The critical feature was not any single restriction but a system: government ownership stakes in spin-offs, personnel who were Taiwanese nationals, incorporation in Taiwan, government funding giving the state structural leverage over deployment.

South Korea designates core protected technologies. Under the Industrial Technology Protection Act, South Korea designates more than seventy technologies across thirteen fields as National Core Technologies — semiconductors, displays, batteries — and requires prior approval for any export or M&A involving these technologies. Maximum prison sentences for overseas technology leakage reach eighteen years, with punitive damages at five times actual losses.

Singapore needs equivalent mechanisms for conditionality.

Some say we should adopt - Golden shares. IP retention conditions, protected technologies. Domestic manufacturing requirements tied to public funding.

My view is: the necessary and plausibly sufficient policy to adopt is an IP conditionality regime, designed for a small open economy. Legislate that IP developed with public R&D funding cannot be permanently transferred offshore without prior approval from a designated authority — enforceable domestically against Singapore-domiciled entities and individuals.

Ultimately we will be judged on the competitiveness of our ecosystem. An SGX that rewards R&D. SEZs that can scale up manufacturing at lower cost. Company-driven R&D manpower policies. Risk capital from a consolidated policy investment bank like BpiFrance. Trade architecture that companies actually use — not headline ATIGA numbers or scarcely used FTAs, but reduced non-tariff barriers and the ability to incorporate once in Singapore and operate across key Southeast Asian markets.

When companies reach a certain size, the siren song of redomicile will prove irresistible for many. The competition shifts — to building a growth-capital ecosystem deep enough and catalysing a Southeast Asian market large enough that staying makes more sense than leaving.

So sunset such an IP conditionality regime once the ecosystem is strong enough.

This will crowd-in private R&D and take the burden of sustaining our headline R&D numbers off the Singaporean taxpayer.

Yes, fewer R&D startups may form under these IP conditions. But I say, better to have fewer startups with real upside capture, than sexy headlines, nice PR pieces in CNA, and nothing to show for it. And it shifts R&D accountability to where it belongs — not on public servants approving a grant, but on the system retaining the value.

You may be very proud of your Ehime No. 28. But unless you take preparatory measures — unless you design for the upside — one day you will find your R&D being sold as a Hongmeiren mandarin. Incubated in Singapore, harvested in Zhejiang and HK.

Thank you Sir.

Sustainability & Environment (MSE) - 1 Question

1. Affordability Impact of Beverage Container Return Scheme ⭐ ORAL

Question: Given that the Beverage Container Return Scheme is projected to add 25 to 60 cents to prices of bottled and canned drinks of which only 10 cents is refundable, what assessment was made of the affordability impact on lower-income households before confirming the April 2026 launch.

SMS Dr Janil Puthucheary’s Answer (grouped reply to 5 oral and 1 written question on BCRS):

The scheme was first proposed by a Recycle Right Citizens’ Workgroup in 2019 to increase household recycling rates and reduce contamination in the recycling bins. The BCRS aims to increase the recycling of beverage containers using an Extended Producer Responsibility concept. This is the second such scheme to be introduced in Singapore, building on our experience with the e-waste recycling programme. The scheme features a deposit paid at the point of purchase to incentivise consumers to return their containers.

In designing the scheme, we studied the experiences of other jurisdictions. Schemes in Norway, Denmark and Lithuania have achieved high collection rates, and one common factor was having an industry-led, not-for-profit entity run the scheme. The scheme operator, BCRS Ltd, was formed by the industry and is governed by a Board that has both large and small producer representatives, comprising Coca-Cola Singapore Beverages, F&N Foods, Pokka, Wanin Industries and Chia Khim Lee Food Industries. Licensed by NEA, they are required to report the amount of 10-cent deposits collected from producers and refunded to consumers in their annual report for public accountability.

All regulated beverage containers will attract a 10-cent deposit, which is fully refundable. Such containers will bear a deposit mark for easy identification. All producers will also need to pay a producer fee of three to four cents per container to BCRS Ltd. This fee covers the logistics to collect and recycle the containers and is comparable to fees in other jurisdictions.

From our engagements with stakeholders, producers of about 80% of beverage containers can incorporate the deposit mark and barcode requirements directly on their containers. Beyond the once-off implementation cost, these producers should see costs per container close to the producer fee of three to four cents, which should keep compliance costs low for most drinks sold.

Some producers may need to, or may choose to, place a sticker on their containers instead of changing the design. The cost of stickering will vary, depending on the quantity and how supply chains are organised. Some can do so for about three cents per container if done at source overseas and at scale. For small quantities done locally, the cost to the producer would be higher.

We appreciate that some producers may find the transition more challenging. NEA and BCRS Ltd have been engaging both large and small producers regularly and providing practical support. Responding to feedback from producers that they needed more time, we extended the transition period from three months to six months. We also introduced a transition grant of $2,500 to help smaller businesses.

Consumer pricing of beverages is a complex and commercial decision. Consumer demand patterns and marketing strategies will also affect the price. We have designed the scheme to be run as efficiently as possible, with a low cost to producers. Any cost pass-through to consumers will likely be further moderated by price competition among industry players, as consumers have a wide variety of choices. This has been the experience in some jurisdictions, where studies found that the introduction of deposit return schemes did not have a significant direct impact on beverage prices or beverage sales.

At launch in April, the public can return empty plastic and metal beverage containers bearing the deposit mark at over 1,000 Reverse Vending Machines located across Singapore to obtain a 10-cent refund. These RVMs will be located at larger supermarkets and other publicly accessible locations with high footfall, such as void decks of HDB blocks and some hawker centres. 90% of residents in HDB housing estates will live within a five-minute walk to one of these return points. BCRS Ltd will provide more details on the RVM locations in the coming weeks.

We aim to double the number of return points to 2,000 RVMs within the first year. At launch, we will deploy ambassadors on the ground to guide the public on how to use the RVMs. We recognise that some seniors and vulnerable members of the community may require additional assistance to adapt to the scheme. NEA and BCRS Ltd, together with our community partners, are committed to providing additional support to better address their needs.

My Supplementary Questions:

The deposit rate is fully refundable at 10 cents, but media reports have put the projected price increase at 25 to 60 cents. So the difference is about 15 to 50 cents of permanent compliance costs, which the vending machine will not return. What assessment has been made of this non-refundable portion as a share of income for lower-income households?

Second, the only current confirmed refund method is EZ-Link. Can the Senior Minister of State confirm that a cash refund or cash voucher option will be available at all return points from Day 1?

Third, a lot of parallel importers face $40,000 a month of fees under the scheme. With the transition grant at $2,500, that is quite disproportionate. These parallel importers are the companies that bring the cheapest drinks onto the market. Has the Ministry assessed the risk that this scheme eliminates the discount beverage segment entirely?

And finally, the Senior Minister of State has said they will monitor to see if price increases go beyond three to four cents. But as we all know, price increases are sticky. What will the Government do if the price increases go beyond three to four cents?

SMS Puthucheary’s Response:

On the first point, the 25 to 60 cents was a media report from a handful of producers. Our assessment is that 80% of the market will have a three to four cent increase. [SMS Puthucheary later issued a clarification correcting one instance where he misstated this as “3% to 4%” — all instances should read “three to four cents per container.”]

Indeed, there will be smaller producers who, because of their supply chain or the size of their operations, will have higher challenges and we are prepared to be flexible and supportive. The grant that we sized already covers about one-quarter of the producers and especially those that have put to market of less than 50,000 units.

For the refund methodology, EZ-Link SimplyGo is available as a refund methodology and there will be further refund methodologies. We are not, at this point, planning for cash or cash voucher as forms of refund. We are hoping to use digital means and BCRS Ltd will be announcing the other means for refund in the future.

We have indeed engaged with a variety of importers, including some of the smallest. The smallest producer that we have directly engaged has a put to market of 1,000 units. We are trying to understand their challenges, and we are trying to find ways to help them participate in this scheme while remaining viable as a business.

Was there a fourth question?

My follow-up: What will the Government do if price increases —

SMS Puthucheary: We will monitor. It depends on what is the behaviour. If there is evidence of collusion or profiteering, there are mechanisms for that to be reported and dealt with. We will look to see what are the factors that have led to that.

Education (MOE) - 3 Questions

2. Central Kitchen Meal Model and Food Safety ⭐ ORAL

Question: (a) How many days after adopting the Central Kitchen Meal Model did the River Valley Primary School gastroenteritis outbreak occur; (b) whether central kitchen operators must meet Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Points (HACCP) standards and the three-zone hygiene system as required in Japan; and (c) whether the Ministry will publish food safety audit results for all such operators.

MOS Jasmin Lau’s Answer (grouped reply to Q14-20 on school canteens and food safety):

As parents and Members of this House, we all understand how important school meals are for our children’s growth and well-being. MOE is fully committed to ensuring that every student has access to affordable, nutritious and balanced meals.

Today, 95% of our schools continue with the traditional stallholder approach. However, we face a real challenge. An increasing number of schools are struggling to fill their vacant canteen stalls, leaving students, especially those with dietary needs, very limited options. In some cases, these students may have to eat the same dish for weeks.

MOE provides substantial support to stallholders. Stallholders pay very low rentals of between $5 and $15 per month, and we waive these during school holidays. We also seek preferential electricity tariffs through demand aggregation and pass these savings directly to stallholders. But the challenges go deeper than just costs. School canteens have a small customer base and limited business hours.

We did not start the Central Kitchen Meal Model to replace the traditional canteen model. We wanted to explore alternative models to help schools that were struggling to attract stallholders and had severe shortages. We started with a pilot at Yusof Ishak Secondary School, which relocated from Bukit Batok to Punggol and did not have existing stallholders. After seeing positive results, we tried out a range of Central Kitchen Meal Models in 13 additional schools. We have no intention to scale this to all schools, nor do we have a target in mind.

We are taking an open and flexible approach. Some schools are using hybrid models, where operators both deliver pre-ordered meals and prepare fresh food onsite. In several schools, students can still choose and watch their meals being prepared at live cooking stations, alongside pre-ordered options.

Food prepared by central kitchens is not inherently unsafe or less safe. Central kitchens are licensed by the Singapore Food Agency (SFA). They are subjected to more frequent inspections, as they have a larger scale of food processing or preparation. Central kitchens are graded under the Safety Assurance for Food Establishment framework. In the event of a major food lapse, they will be downgraded and inspected even more frequently.

MOE will continue to work with SFA, the Communicable Diseases Agency (CDA) and the operators to strengthen food safety management systems. This covers everything from preparation at the central kitchens to transportation, storage and eventually, when the food is served to the students.

The number of gastroenteritis incidents in schools have averaged six cases a year in the past three years across all food service models. SFA, CDA and MOE are still investigating the causes for both the River Valley Primary School and North View Primary School incidents. River Valley Primary School currently uses one of our Central Kitchen Meal Model operators, while North View Primary School has traditional stallholders.

Where food safety breaches are detected, whether at central kitchens or individual stalls, SFA takes immediate enforcement action and requires rectifications. Operations may be suspended or terminated for severe food safety breaches or ongoing disease transmission. We have taken a cautious approach by limiting each operator to serving just four or five schools. This helps to contain the impact of any operational issues and allows us to observe different operators’ performance and have back-up options ready.

[Note: The Leader of the House moved a motion to extend Question Time to allow this topic to be completed — a procedural rarity reflecting the level of public interest.]

My Supplementary Questions:

First, since 2005, Japan has employed diet and nutrition teachers — professionals who hold both a nutritionist qualification and teaching licence — in schools to create menus, oversee food safety and teach nutrition in the classroom. Will the Government consider making similar nutrition and safety roles accredited professionals?

Second, I quote The Straits Times on the River Valley Primary case: “Some parents told ST that their children had noticed the chicken on the pizza tasting a bit strange. A few parents said their children were fine after consuming the pizza as they had picked the chicken off. A pupil told his mother that the chicken did not smell good but he ate it anyway and had diarrhoea the next day.” So, what is the status of the investigation into the chicken? If it was the chicken, how did it make it past the food hygiene officer?

MOS Lau’s Response:

On dietary teachers, in Singapore, we work closely with the Health Promotion Board to ensure that the food we provide to students from preschool to secondary school has good nutritional value and meets the needs of our students. We also have food hygiene officers in our schools with the Central Kitchen Meal Models, and they do make checks on the way that the food is handled to make sure that the food is safe.

On the second question, I would suggest that the Member wait for the investigation results before talking more about the River Valley Primary case.

Social & Family Development (MSF) - 2 Questions

3. ComCare Denials for Non-Compliance with Employment Action Plans ⭐ ORAL

Question: In the past three years, how many ComCare applications were denied citing non-compliance with employment action plans; whether applicants are given the opportunity to provide evidence of their engagement with partner agencies before such denials; and whether the Ministry will ensure applicants are heard before being denied on such grounds.

MOS Zhulkarnain Abdul Rahim’s Answer:

ComCare Short-to-Medium Term Assistance (SMTA) helps clients with their basic living expenses as they work on improving their financial situation. Our Social Service Office (SSO) officers work closely with clients to develop suitable action plans to achieve this.

Clients are informed from the very outset that they must adhere to these action plans. However, should they face genuine difficulties meeting them or if they need more time, the action plans can be reviewed.

Based on the household’s adherence to action plans and progress towards self-reliance, the amount and duration of the SMTA may be adjusted while ensuring dependants’ basic needs are being met. The MSF family coaches will also get them help from the community, for example, with the provision of milk and diapers, if necessary.

We do not track the number of applicants who were not given ComCare because they did not comply with their action plans.

My Supplementary Question:

It has been represented to me — and these are the facts, as I understand them — that a young married constituent with young children, unemployed and living in a rental flat, was denied ComCare because he did not follow up with e2i. But he has WhatsApp records that e2i messaged him on 15 December, asking him if he was still looking for work and he replied “yes” on the same day. He followed up on 24 December, asking about jobs with hours compatible with sending his children to school. And as far as I can tell, e2i did not respond to either message. The SSO rejection letter arrived before anyone asked him for evidence of his engagement.

So, without pre-judging things, my question is, does SSO take e2i’s word, or other employment partner agencies’ word, unconditionally, before rejecting an applicant for non-engagement? Is the applicant given a chance to present their side?

MOS Zhulkarnain’s Response:

For each family and each applicant, they face various unique circumstances and challenges. For this particular case, SSO is aware and is currently considering the appeal. And actually, for this particular family, it is a known family and the family coach has helped the family in other ways as well, including provision of food rations, infant milk powder and diapers.

Having said that, this cessation of financial assistance or tapering off of it, is not something that SSO takes very lightly. SSO reviews it with the help of the Social Assistance Officer (SAO), who has embarked and partnered with the applicant family on the action plan. The SAO will contact the applicants for an interview and at the stage of assessment of the SMTA, the SAO will also get information from the family coach, from other sources of information as well, to ensure that they look at the entire assistance required by the family.

Rest assured that every applicant for SMTA will be able to get financial assistance by SSOs and we will look at how to help them meet their basic living needs and journey with them on this journey for self-reliance so that they can improve their financial situation.

4. Enabling Employment Credit Uptake and Barriers (Written)

Question: Of the employers eligible for the Enabling Employment Credit, what proportion have utilised it; what are the main barriers preventing greater uptake; and given the target of 40% employment rate for persons with disabilities by 2030 versus the current 32.7%, what additional measures are planned to close this gap.

Mr Masagos Zulkifli’s Answer:

Employers who hire resident persons with disabilities earning less than $4,000 per month are eligible for the Enabling Employment Credit, and will be automatically enrolled in the scheme based on their Central Provident Fund (CPF) contributions to these employees.

The Member may refer to the written reply we had given on 14 October 2025 on addressing challenges that prevent special needs young adults from securing and retaining employment, which mentions the barriers faced by employers in hiring persons with disabilities and measures put in place to support them and persons with disabilities.

The Taskforce on Assurance for Families with Persons with Disabilities, announced in December 2025, will also study and develop recommendations to further strengthen support for employers and build resilience for persons with disabilities in the workplace.

Taken together, these measures will support our continued efforts to raise the employment rate of resident persons with disabilities aged 15 to 64 to 40% by 2030, from 34.7% for the period of 2024 to 2025.

For reference, the October 2025 written reply the Minister refers to (to a question by Dr Charlene Chen) outlined barriers including employers’ limited awareness of inclusive hiring benefits and lack of in-house capabilities for job accommodations, and persons with disabilities needing additional training and job coaching. Measures cited included the Open Door Programme (customised job coach support and job redesign grants), the Enabling Employment Credit (wage offsets), a new Employer Development Grant from 2025, and SG Enable’s Enabling Business Hub. SG Enable is taking a sectoral approach across six key sectors: F&B, retail, ICT, health and social services, transport and storage, and financial services.

Finance (MOF) - 4 Questions

5. Exposure of Singapore’s Reserves to Section 892 of US Tax Code ⭐ ORAL

Question: Whether the Ministry has assessed the exposure of Singapore’s reserves to the proposed changes to section 892 of the US tax code; whether Singapore has made representations to the US Treasury before the 13 February 2026 comment deadline; and whether the Ministry retains confidence that GIC’s and Temasek’s US investments are adequately protected from this regulatory change.

Mr Jeffrey Siow’s Answer:

The Government expects our investment entities to operate on a commercial basis and to fully comply with the laws and regulations of the jurisdictions they invest in. We also expect them to closely monitor regulatory changes in overseas jurisdictions, and to adjust their portfolios accordingly should these affect our investment returns or risks.

As with other investors and interested parties, GIC and Temasek may provide feedback or comments on proposed regulatory or tax changes introduced by the United States or other foreign governments, where relevant.

Separately, the Singapore Government maintains regular and constructive engagement with the US Treasury on a broad range of issues, including developments in financial and tax regulations.

The Government retains confidence that our investment entities have the capabilities and risk-management frameworks to assess and manage the implications of regulatory changes, and to take appropriate steps to protect Singapore’s investment interests.

6. Reference Data for Determining Baby Bonus Quantum ⭐ ORAL

Question: Whether the Ministry publishes official estimates of child-raising expenditures by age band, as the United States has since 1960; what reference data determines Baby Bonus quantum; and whether Baby Bonus cashflow fit has been evaluated against cost peaks in the first 36 months, particularly for lower-income households facing immediate infant care expenses.

Ms Indranee Rajah’s Answer:

The Government is strongly committed to supporting Singaporeans to realise their marriage and parenthood aspirations. We provide a suite of generous financial support for families with children, in the form of cash and cash-like payouts, grants, education and healthcare subsidies, and tax benefits.

We do not publish estimates of child-raising expenditure. Such standalone estimates would not be useful as child-raising expenditure varies greatly depending on a family’s needs, parents’ expectations and choices.

Instead, in determining the quantum and cashflow for the Baby Bonus Scheme, we consider data such as household income and expenditure, including child-related expenditure, as well as feedback from parents. For example, in 2023, in response to parents’ feedback, we enhanced the Baby Bonus quantum and adjusted the payout structure to provide parents with sustained financial support until their child enters primary school.

We recognise that the costs incurred by parents is higher when the child is younger. Hence, a larger portion of the Baby Bonus Cash Gift is paid to parents upfront to support the higher initial costs at birth and infancy, with regular payouts thereafter until the child turns 6.5 years old.

Over and above the Baby Bonus Cash Gift, other support is provided within the first 36 months of a child’s birth. Families also receive support through the Child Development Account (CDA) First Step Grant given at the child’s birth, as well as Government co-matching of parents’ savings into the CDA. CDA moneys can be used for approved child-related expenses such as infant care, preschool and medical fees.

The Government has also kept preschools affordable by providing subsidies to parents of Singapore Citizen children and imposing fee caps at Government-supported Anchor Operator (AOP) and Partner Operator (POP) preschools.

Currently, all Singapore Citizen children enrolled in a licensed preschool are eligible for a Basic Subsidy of up to $300 per month for childcare and up to $600 per month for infant care. To further lower costs, eligible families receive additional means-tested subsidies, with more for lower-income. We enhanced these additional subsidies in 2020, by raising the income ceiling from $7,500 to $12,000, and increasing subsidy amounts across all eligible income tiers.

We have also progressively reduced fee caps in AOP and POPs. Fee caps were lowered for both full-day infant care and full-day childcare in 2023. They were further reduced for full-day childcare last year and at the start of this year.

In addition, lower-income families benefit from further support through other targeted schemes such as Child Care Financial Assistance and Start-Up Grant. All these help defray the costs of the child at a younger age.

We will continue to review our measures to strengthen support for parents in managing the costs of raising children.

7. Higher Income Tax from Working Mother’s Child Relief Change ⭐ ORAL

Question: Based on the Year of Assessment (YA) 2025 data, how many working mothers with children born from 2024 paid higher income tax following change from percentage-based to fixed-dollar Working Mother’s Child Relief; what is the projected additional tax revenue over the next decade as the affected cohort grows; and whether this projected revenue is consistent with the objective of encouraging higher-order births.

Ms Indranee Rajah’s Answer:

The Working Mother’s Child Relief (WMCR) is part of a broader package to support Singaporeans in their marriage and parenthood journey. We have over the years significantly increased financial support such as the Baby Bonus Cash Gift and the Child Development Account First Step Grant, and enhanced parental leave provisions. We also introduced the new Shared Parental Leave scheme and the Large Families Scheme last year. All in, we expect these initiatives to cost the Government close to $7 billion in FY2026, up from over $4 billion in FY2020.

About 9,500 working mothers paid higher income tax in YA 2025 than they would have under the old WMCR basis. The change in basis of the WMCR to a fixed dollar relief was to provide equal support for children of the same child order regardless of the mother’s income, which improves the progressivity of our support. We are unable to project the additional tax revenue from the WMCR change over the next 10 years, as this is dependent on many variables that could change over time, such as the working mother’s income, the other qualifying reliefs, and number of children she may eventually have.

However, we expect the cost of the marriage and parenthood initiatives to far exceed any additional tax revenue from the WMCR change.

8. Commercial Viability of RIE-funded Deep Tech Projects (Written)

Question: What proportion of Research, Innovation and Enterprise (RIE) funded deep tech projects achieve commercial viability; whether the Ministry has studied Israel’s model where innovation grants are repaid only upon commercialisation success; and whether RIE2030 will introduce similar outcome-linked funding mechanisms.

Mr Gan Kim Yong’s Answer (for the Prime Minister):

Investing in deep tech is a complex endeavour that takes years. There is no single or simple metric of commercial viability that applies. The Government uses a range of indicators for RIE-funded projects such as Intellectual Property (IP) licensing, capability and knowledge building, growing start-ups, and catalysing private sector investment. For example, in RIE2025, of the Corporate Laboratories that support partnerships between public researchers and companies to co-develop technologies for industry, about 80% are expected to generate licensing revenue from jointly-created IP.

Singapore keeps abreast of good practices in deep tech commercialisation from other countries, including Israel. The objectives behind our support schemes and mechanisms for deep tech commercialisation have broad similarities to those of other countries, but the governance and funding structures have been adapted to meet the needs of our RIE ecosystem.

We capture value from RIE through various means, including licensing revenue generated when commercial partners license IP from research institutions, or returns from equity stakes when startups built around these technologies achieve commercial success. In addition, research collaborations with both global and local industry partners help anchor them in Singapore, thereby contributing to a more dynamic and competitive economy.

9. Employment Outcomes for SPED Graduates (Written)

Question: What proportion of Special Education (SPED) school graduates in 2022, 2023 and 2024 were placed into employment within one year of graduation; of these graduates, what proportion remained in employment as of end 2025; and whether the Ministry will publish annual SPED graduate employment data comparable to the Graduate Employment Survey for universities.

Mr Desmond Lee’s Answer:

Students in Special Education (SPED) schools have moderate-to-severe Special Educational Needs and require specialised support and curriculum customisation to cater to their diverse needs. As the range of needs is broad and diverse in SPED, students in SPED learn essential knowledge, skills and attributes that can help them live independently to the best of their ability.

Of the approximately 500 SPED graduates each year from 2022 to 2024, about half were placed into employment in open or supported settings, enrolled in internship programmes, or progressed to institutes of higher learning within six months of graduation. Those employed found jobs in sectors such as retail, horticulture and hospitality. SPED graduates with higher needs may proceed to services such as sheltered workshops and day activity centres to develop skills for community living.

The Ministry of Education works with the Ministry of Social and Family Development and SG Enable to study the outcomes and experiences of persons with disabilities, which are reported through publications such as the Disability Trends Report 2024, which reports holistically on a range of outcomes, including employment.

The recently launched inter-agency Taskforce on Assurance for Families with persons with disabilities will study how to better support persons with disabilities, including SPED graduates, to achieve positive and sustained employment outcomes. More information on the Taskforce’s findings and recommendations will be shared in due course.

10. Findings from 2020 Pilot to Remove CCA Selection Trials ⭐ ORAL

Question: What have been the findings of the 2020 pilot to remove CCA selection trials; how many schools have adopted the no-trial model; and whether the Ministry will require schools to offer both recreational and competitive CCA tiers so that students wishing to participate for leisure and development are not excluded by selection.

Mr Desmond Lee’s Answer:

Co-Curricular Activities (CCA) are an integral part of a holistic education aimed at developing our students’ character, skills and values.

The Primary Schools in the pilot study were able to allocate students to their CCA choices without selection trials.

Today, about two-thirds of primary schools do not conduct CCA selection trials. Most of the remaining schools conduct trials only for a few CCAs that are oversubscribed, keeping the enrolment manageable to ensure a quality learning experience for students.

Schools customise their CCA offerings to best fit their student profiles and available resources. Many already provide recreational options. Schools also work with SportSG to provide additional recreational sports opportunities such as the Sports Education Programme and the recently launched School Sports Fiesta as enrichment beyond regular CCAs. Students also have many opportunities to learn and play a range of sports during Physical Education classes and during unstructured play at recess.

We will continue to strengthen our CCA system, to ensure meaningful development opportunities for all students.

Manpower (MOM) - 1 Question

11. Definition and Measurable Indicators for “Good Jobs” under Economic Strategy Review ⭐ ORAL

Question: (a) What is the Ministry’s operational definition of a “good job” as used in the Economic Strategy Review; (b) what measurable indicators will the Ministry use to track whether the strategy is creating such jobs; and (c) whether the Ministry will adopt a multi-dimensional job quality framework comparable to that published by the OECD.

SMS Dr Koh Poh Koon’s Answer:

We use wages as a key operational measure to track if proposed investments create good jobs, since this is the most objective indicator of job quality. This enables comparisons across sectors, firms, occupations and workers.

Having said that, the notion of a “good job” varies across individuals, shaped by their circumstances and aspirations. It often includes factors such as wage growth, opportunities for career development, fair and safe workplaces and personal fulfilment.

There are multiple dimensions to good jobs, and no single, universally accepted framework for measuring job quality. Hence, we chose to measure a range of more objectively measurable labour market indicators and regularly benchmark our labour market performance internationally across key dimensions that cover job creation and job quality, such as: (1) labour market participation; (2) labour underutilisation; and (3) earnings.

These are broadly aligned with the OECD framework and across these domains, Singapore generally ranks favourably relative to OECD economies.

Local workers have experienced sustained and inclusive wage growth. From 2021 to 2025, real gross monthly income at the median grew by 7.4%. At the 20th percentile, income grew even faster, by 10.1% over the same period.

Two-thirds of private sector establishments provided structured training to employees. Fewer employees experienced discrimination at work, decreasing from 8.5% in 2021 to 6% in 2023. Our Workplace Safety and Health performance ranked amongst top performing countries, with a five-year average workplace fatality rate of 1.1 per 100,000 workers in 2024.

My Supplementary Questions:

The ESR mid-term update factsheet uses the phrase “good jobs” six times without defining it. What is the issue with creating a job quality framework like the OECD has done?

Second, our wage share of GDP remains lower than many OECD countries — I believe it is in the mid-40s, where OECD countries are in the 50s. Will the Government track this as part of the definition of a “good job”?

Third, the ESR says it will uplift and transform roles like electricians and care workers. But a commitment that cannot be proven true or false is not really an accountable commitment. Would the Ministry set clear benchmarks in terms of pay, progression and working conditions, so that Parliament can actually determine if uplift has occurred?

SMS Koh’s Response:

On job quality, we do track multiple parameters and dimensions across our workforce and the labour market. But fundamentally, workers want to see their wages go up from year to year. Well-paying jobs are those that pay above the median wage of the resident workforce. By creating more of such jobs and helping more Singaporeans to upskill to take them on, we will grow the median wage of our workforce over time.

On wage share, there are multiple dimensions to track and we will continue to measure multiple dimensions of job quality, that could include looking at wage share over time. We will consider relevant dimensions included in other international frameworks, including the OECD’s job quality framework.

On trades and skilled roles, this is an area still under deliberation by the ESR, so I would not jump the gun. When the ESR releases its final report, there will be a better treatment of the questions regarding trades and skilled roles.

Home Affairs (MHA) - 1 Question

12. OCHA Directive on Moneylending Ads Targeting Migrant Domestic Workers ⭐ ORAL

Question: Whether the Ministry has considered issuing an Implementation Directive under the Online Criminal Harms Act requiring social media platforms to detect and remove unlicensed moneylending advertisements targeting migrant domestic workers; and why the approach taken for impersonation scams has not been extended to illegal moneylending advertisements that facilitate harassment of workers and their employers.

Mr K Shanmugam’s Answer:

The Police work with online platforms like Meta and TikTok to strengthen upstream measures to prevent unlicensed moneylending through pre-emptive detection and blocking of accounts. Between 2023 and 2025, the Police flagged more than 10,900 online accounts and advertisements involved in unlicensed moneylending to online platforms for termination.

Implementation Directives under the Online Criminal Harms Act are issued when there is an urgent need to put in place a specific measure to address the proliferation of an offence or possible immediate impact. The Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) has issued Implementation Directives when there was limited cooperation from the platforms involved. In the context of unlicensed moneylending, the existing collaboration between the Police and online platforms is assessed to be adequate to deal with the issues.

Defence (MINDEF) - 1 Question

13. NSF Enlistment Numbers Breakdown (Written)

Question: How many Full-time National Servicemen were enlisted in each of the last 10 years, broken down by the SAF, SPF, and SCDF; and in each of those years, how many Full-time National Servicemen were serving in their second year of national service.

Mr Chan Chun Sing’s Answer:

As the enlistment numbers vary from year-to-year, it is more meaningful to compare the annual average enlistment numbers over longer time periods, as follows.

(Rounded to the nearest 100) Annual Average (2016 to 2020) Annual Average (2021 to 2025) Full-Time National Servicemen Enlisted to the SAF 19,100 17,300 Full-Time National Servicemen Enlisted to the SPF 2,400 2,200 Full-Time National Servicemen Enlisted to the SCDF 1,900 1,800

The percentage of enlistees who progress to complete their two-year term has consistently exceeded 95%. The small numbers who are unable to complete the two-year term are mostly due to medical reasons.

National Development (MND) - 1 Question

14. Residential Noise Thresholds Review (Written)

Question: What is the status of the review on quantitative noise thresholds for residential boundary noise, which the Community Advisory Panel recommended in 2022; whether the review has considered WHO guidelines of 50 to 55 decibels and lower thresholds in Germany, Korea and Japan; and whether the Ministry will clarify that NEA’s industrial noise standards do not apply to household disputes.

Mr Chee Hong Tat’s Answer:

We had completed the review in May 2024 and replied to a similar Parliamentary Question in October 2024. The Member may also refer to the Municipal Services Office’s website, as well as the Second Reading of the Community Disputes Resolution (Amendment) Bill in 2024, for more details.

The National Environment Agency’s industrial noise standards are set for a different purpose, and do not apply to neighbour noise disputes.

For reference, the October 2024 PQ the Minister refers to was Assoc Prof Jamus Lim’s question on implementing distinct quantitative noise thresholds for the evening period (7pm-10pm). In that exchange, Minister Desmond Lee confirmed that the Ministry had accepted most of the Community Advisory Panel’s six recommendations but had no plans to set quantitative noise thresholds — following consultations with external experts who cited operational challenges with absolute, across-the-board thresholds, as residents respond to noise differently and neighbourhoods have different perceptions of acceptable ambient noise levels.

Transport (MOT) - 1 Question

15. Bus ETA Accuracy Standards and January 2026 Failure (Written)

Question: What accuracy standards apply to the bus Expected Time of Arrival (ETA) system; what has been the measured accuracy rate over the past three years; whether the Ministry is satisfied with the ETA system contractor’s performance, given inaccuracies reported well before the January 2026 failure; and what monitoring measures will prevent recurrence.

Mr Jeffrey Siow’s Answer:

The Expected Time of Arrival (ETA) system is expected to predict actual bus arrival times within a three-minute range, at least 95% of the time. There is some inherent variation in bus arrival times, due to variable dwell times at preceding bus stops, and traffic speeds due to congestion, accidents or roadworks.

In the past three years the actual performance of the system has met the prescribed performance target. The ETA failure in January was due to a defect in the software on the buses that was triggered by a server failure. The defect has since been fixed, and the system’s performance is stabilising.

Since 2024, we have begun to upgrade the ETA system to improve arrival time predictions, and provide more real time information to commuters. The Land Transport Authority (LTA) is closely monitoring the reliability and accuracy of the ETA system and has taken remedial actions to prevent a recurrence.

(Opening)

Speaker, “an industrial policy in finance” may seem a contradiction in terms.

But it is not.

(Eurodollar)

The most consequential 20th century financial industrial policy was built by the British, on the then-undisputed reserve asset, the US dollar.

Once, in 1933, the US imposed Regulation Q, capping interest rates American banks could pay. By the late 1960s, the ceiling was 4% while 3-month T-Bills approached 7%. Dollars held offshore, especially in London, escaped this cap. This offshore dollar market became known as the Eurodollar market.

The British did four things. First, deliberate forbearance - choosing not to regulate offshore dollar deposits. Second, active defence - when G-10 central banks proposed international regulation in the 1970s, the Bank of England blocked it. Third, direct participation - central banks provided official deposits of 20% of net market, and currency swaps with domestic banks. Fourth, after the 1974 banking crises, the G-10 Basel communiqué constructed an implicit lender-of-last-resort guarantee.

The result: London became the global centre for dollar financing. By the mid-1980s, there were more Eurodollars than dollars. The Eurodollar market increased the appeal of dollar holdings, deepening liquidity for American borrowing. This privileged position, London held for many decades.

What is instructive was that the British reinvented London’s proposition amidst the decline of sterling. Nostalgia is not a strategy. They re-positioned for their emerging present.

Today, we have another emerging present. Then, interest rate caps created a push factor for the world’s reserve asset to move offshore. Today’s push factor is not yield. It is custody risk - the question of whether your reserves are still yours when politics turns. And the emerging reserve asset seeking an offshore home is not dollars. It is gold.

(Gold and Push Factors)

Two forces are driving this shift.

First, access to funds has become conditional on political alignment. In 2022, Western nations froze over $300 billion in Russian sovereign assets. We rightly condemn the invasion of Ukraine — but the knock-on effect on Western financial centrality is real. Trust in those systems has diminished.

Second, market participants are pricing in US asset risk in a way they did not before the 2020s — some call it a ‘Sell America’ dynamic.

Central banks are responding with their feet. Gold purchases have exceeded 1,000 tonnes annually for three consecutive years—more than double the 2010-2021 average. The World Gold Council’s 2025 survey shows 73% of central banks expect fewer US dollar holdings over five years. Ninety-five percent expect to increase gold over 2025-2026.

What makes this structural is the price insensitivity - there are few good alternatives for a reserve asset. Central banks bought at $2,000 an ounce, at $3,000 an ounce, at $4,000 an ounce. Gold crossed $5,000 in January.

These are sovereigns seeking safety over returns.

But if gold is becoming a reserve asset, it will need to be financialised. Later, I will describe what that means in five pillars.

(Today and tomorrow)

First, let us assess some major gold hubs of today. London, New York, and Dubai.

(London)

London is the central gold pricing venue and is one of the major custodians for the world’s central banks, via the BoE vaults. It offers unmatched liquidity for gold, especially for the 400oz “large bars” used by central banks.

It is the home of the London Bullion Market Association (or LBMA), which controls the global “good delivery” standard. This certificate is important for liquidity among major financial centres.

In February 2022, after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the G7 immobilised $300 billion in Russian central bank reserves within weeks. The LBMA suspended all six Russian refiners from the Good Delivery list. The message: custody and market access are conditional on political alignment.

Central banks have responded. In 2024, India repatriated 100 tonnes of gold from the Bank of England to domestic vaults—its largest movement since 1991. Germany, Hungary, Turkey, and the Netherlands have done the same over the past decade. The repatriation trend is accelerating.

(New York)

The case of New York is a puzzle. In the lead up to Liberation Day in April 2025, as tariff fears spiked, the exchange-for-physical basis, which is the spread between New York COMEX futures and London OTC gold, blew out to $60 per ounce - the widest since the 2020 Covid panic. This led to COMEX vaults in New York hitting a record 43 million ounces. For a moment, most of the world’s financialised gold was in New York rather than its typical home in London. New York had custody over both today’s reserve asset and tomorrow’s, simultaneously.

Consider the counterfactual. A Fed gold repo window, accepting COMEX gold warrants as collateral. Strong financing terms could have made New York the permanent home for monetary gold, since much of it was already in COMEX vaults.

Now, it is true that the Fed conventionally runs repo backstops on Treasuries, agency debt and agency MBS. But that is already an expanded listing over pure Treasuries, pre-2008. So why not COMEX gold warrants? They had the moment — and did not act.

There is no appetite — not yet — to backstop gold in New York. Deep markets, but no lender of last resort.

Asset holders must also weigh IEEPA (International Emergency Economic Powers Act) tail risk — the executive powers used to impose tariffs in February 2025 could be turned on foreign-held assets.

Today, only the US can offer a sovereign repo on gold as they have the reserve currency.

So if they do not backstop gold, financialization will likely not proceed on single sovereign rails.

(Dubai)

Dubai is closest to what we could build. Aggressive infrastructure: vaults, multiple refineries, direct African sourcing, and the natural catchment of India. It is estimated that Dubai handles upwards of 15% of global physical gold trade. In 2023, the UAE overtook the UK to become the world’s second-largest gold trading hub.

Dubai offers proximity to supply and demand, but also to Gulf conflict dynamics. Singapore offers a trusted node to multiple parties.

Dubai has captured volume partly through more permissive sourcing standards. That is not our game — our competitive advantage is rigor, and any visible compliance failure on money-laundering would destroy the credibility we hope to sell.

But this is not zero-sum competition. The shift to gold is large enough for multiple hubs.

And the market interest already exists.

DPM Gan said in response to my January PQ about critical minerals financing, that the government will act “when there is sufficient market interest.” The interest is here. In the second quarter of 2025, gold investment in Singapore surged 37% year-on-year. SPDR Gold Shares recorded SGD 309 million in net inflows in the first half of 2025—the highest of any Singapore-listed ETF. The Singapore Mint launched its Lion Bullion line in September, explicitly citing strong investor demand. Private vaults are expanding: The Reserve opened last year with capacity for 15,500 tonnes.

The market is here. And so is the chance.

(The Landscape)

In that same PQ I posed to MTI in January I also asked why our framework for metal warrant financing is underutilised. The response from the ministry framed it in terms of the base metals, by referring to the LME ecosystem - which handles the 6 primary base metals - copper, zinc, aluminum, nickel, lead, tin. But not gold.

I had in mind gold, not base metals. Gold operates through the LBMA — different rules, different warehousing, different settlement — and requires purpose-built architecture.

Singapore’s gold infrastructure is minimal. We have one LBMA-approved refinery—Metalor, Swiss-owned. CPF members investing in gold through SPDR Gold Shares will see that gold held in London and New York vaults.

What is puzzling is that Singapore seems to be on the other side of the trend. The World Gold Council’s central-bank gold statistics for May 2025 state that year-to-date 2025, Singapore was the second-largest net seller at ~10 tonnes (behind Uzbekistan), and that MAS sold 5 tonnes in May.

Keep in mind that this was when gold was about 3300 USD per troy oz. Gold today trades at 5000 USD per troy oz, 50% higher than where it was sold, if this report is true. MAS’s own disclosures confirm this: gold holdings fell by 849,000 troy ounces from January 2025 to January 2026.

Could the government confirm whether this is true? If so, why does it hold such a contrarian view relative to most global central banks? Does it have a framework for thinking about gold’s role in tomorrow’s reserve system?

(The Five Pillars)

Sir, let me describe what an industrial policy in gold would look like, in five elements.

First, a Sovereign Guarantee.

The core asset Singapore can offer is not location or tax rates. It is legal predictability - the credible commitment that asset treatment follows established judicial process, not executive discretion.

We have already done it once before.

In January 2020, Singapore enacted the International Organisations (Immunities and Privileges) (Bank for International Settlements) Order. It states that property and assets entrusted to the BIS [Bank for International Settlements], (quote) “wherever located, by whomsoever held and in whatever format, are immune from search, requisition, confiscation, expropriation or any other form of seizure, taking or foreclosure, by any form of legal process.” (end quote)

That is the gold standard - forgive the expression - for custody protection. The question is: why only BIS?

Singapore should consider a Reserves Custody Protection Act - or an amendment to the MAS Act - establishing that custody arrangements are governed by Singapore law and due process, immunising it from executive discretion. The principle is legal certainty.

We should be a top choice for jurisdictions seeking diversified custody. Sovereign guarantees are best implemented via sovereign vaults in the same vein as the Bank of England, rather than outsourcing capacity to private parties, as Zurich has done.

Second, a Sovereign Anchor.

If 73% of central banks expect to increase gold holdings, Singapore should be among them - not among the sellers. MAS reserves held in Singapore vaults create the base load that foreign participants need to see. The Eurodollar market had central banks providing 20% of net demand. We should do the same.

Third, Refining, Sourcing, Verification.

It is one thing to have custody, but to have trusted custody requires the above.

Recasting connects markets. Western central banks hold 400-ounce bars. Asian retail buys kilobars. To connect these markets, you need recasting capacity. You need refineries. Singapore has only one. Dubai built multiple refineries with no mining industry. We should expand refining capacity and establish direct relationships with miners in Africa, Australia, Indonesia, and strengthen existing ones with the bullion banks. Precious metals streaming — providing upfront capital to miners in exchange for future production at agreed prices — is one proven vehicle for building those relationships.

Assaying builds trust. Tungsten has nearly identical density to gold - counterfeits exist. In 2020, China’s Kingold was accused of pledging gilded-copper “gold” as collateral for 20bn yuan in loans, turning “gold receipts” into a major credit-fraud event. Robust verification through X-ray Fluorescence (or XRF) and ultrasound should be part of the chain, if possible, non-destructively to preserve provenance, but if necessary, destructively by recasting. Not just “is it stored?” but “is it real?” Singapore should build a reputation for rigorous verification that makes our warehouse receipts bankable.

And in our warehouses or vaults, we need strong verification standards, to be able to financialize a wide net of gold collateral, the LBMA-approved and those outside the LBMA system alike. Digital warehouse receipts issued under Singapore standards should be legally enforceable claims.

Fourth, our own standard.

The LBMA sets the global Good Delivery standard. It is valuable. We should emulate it. Create a Singapore Bullion Standards Authority. Launch an Asian Good Delivery standard accepted by major exchanges. Competition between standards is healthy. We should aim to make our standard inter-operable with LBMA, possibly as a custody wrapper on top of LBMA.

To illustrate - within CME, gold receives different treatment depending on standard. COMEX warrants are valid collateral for customer accounts, while London LBMA bullion is not.

We would be selling liquidity: the guarantee that gold with the Singapore custody stamp can be used as collateral, that banks will lend against it, that it trades on major exchanges.

Beyond custody: liquid markets for price discovery, and financing against verified collateral. We can be a multicurrency hub for gold financing - swapping it for USD, RMB, or other currencies of choice.

Fifth, we should revive the GOFO — the Gold Forward Offered Rate — and the derivatives architecture it enables.

GOFO was the benchmark interest rate at which banks lent gold. The LBMA published it daily until 2015, when it was discontinued — not because the market no longer needed it, but as collateral damage from the LIBOR scandal.

Its main practical use was enabling interest rate swaps on gold. Consider a gold producer hedging future production over five years. The conventional instrument is a long-dated forward — locking in a price to sell gold years from now. The problem is that if gold moves from $3,000 to $5,000, the mark-to-market between counterparties swings accordingly, and that exposure sits unsettled for years. The result is large, volatile collateral calls and significant counterparty credit risk.

An interest rate swap solves this by separating the hedge into two components. The price exposure is hedged with short-dated instruments that settle frequently — so credit exposure resets regularly and never accumulates over years. The cost-of-carry component is hedged via the swap, which is long-dated but insensitive to the spot price, keeping its mark-to-market small and stable.

The combined position achieves the same economic result as the forward, but with a fraction of the counterparty exposure. That means smaller collateral calls, lower capital requirements for banks, and a more efficient market overall.

Reviving a GOFO-equivalent benchmark would restore the infrastructure needed for a functioning XAU IRS market — giving producers and banks a cleaner, less capital-intensive way to manage long-dated gold exposure - including non-dollar currency pairs.

This would give banks the pricing infrastructure to build gold financing capabilities here.

Even if gold’s share of reserves stabilises rather than continues to climb, the infrastructure I describe is not wasted. Sovereign vaults, verified warehouse receipts, and derivatives architecture serve any asset class where custody, provenance, and financing matter — critical minerals, rare earths, tokenised commodities. Gold is the use case with the most immediate demand, but the platform outlasts any single price cycle.

(Close)

Sir, in closing.

Financial hubs are not natural phenomena. They are built. The British built the Eurodollar market through deliberate policy — forbearance, defence, direct participation, implicit guarantees — at a moment when sterling was in decline and the world’s reserve asset was looking for an offshore home.

Our financial centre was built too on deliberate pillars — rule of law, institutional trust, regulatory predictability. For decades, that was enough. Today, not anymore.

Hedge funds we incubated are opening in Dubai. Family offices we courted are diversifying there. Dubai’s financial centre doubled its hedge fund count to over a hundred in a single year. They moved on gold, years ago. They will move on the next thing before we have formed a committee to study it. It is not the nature of the standards, but the structural bet.

We won a windfall when Hong Kong shut itself down during COVID. That was luck. And luck is a depreciating asset.

Jobs, institutional knowledge, relevance — those are the stakes.

Rule of law, institutions, trust — these are necessary conditions. They are no longer sufficient ones. Other cities have learned to offer versions of the same, combined with speed we have not matched.

Gold is not the whole answer. But it is the question: can Singapore still see a structural shift in the global financial system and build for it — or have we become the kind of country that convenes a review after the opportunity has passed?

Because that is the real risk. That the instinct is lost. (...) That this country becomes mediocre.

Because once you become mediocre, derivative, content to be a fast-adopter, there is no bottom to that market.

Thank you, Sir.

Education (MOE) - 2 Questions

To ask the Minister for Education (a) how many days after adopting the Central Kitchen Meal Model did the River Valley Primary School gastroenteritis outbreak occur; (b) whether central kitchen operators must meet Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Points (HACCP) standards and the three-zone hygiene system as required in Japan; and (c) whether the Ministry will publish food safety audit results for all such operators. (Q.*1275)

To ask the Minister for Education (a) what proportion of Special Education (SPED) school graduates in 2022, 2023 and 2024 were placed into employment within one year of graduation; (b) of these graduates, what proportion remained in employment as of end 2025; and (c) whether the Ministry will publish annual SPED graduate employment data comparable to the Graduate Employment Survey for universities. (Q.906)

Social and Family Development (MSF) - 3 Questions

To ask the Minister for Social and Family Development (a) whether the Ministry publishes official estimates of child-raising expenditures by age band, as the United States has since 1960; (b) what reference data determines Baby Bonus quantum; and (c) whether Baby Bonus cashflow fit has been evaluated against cost peaks in the first 36 months, particularly for lower-income households facing immediate infant care expenses. (Q.*1349)

To ask the Minister for Social and Family Development (a) in the past three years, how many ComCare applications were denied citing non-compliance with employment action plans; (b) whether applicants are given the opportunity to provide evidence of their engagement with partner agencies before such denials; and (c) whether the Ministry will ensure applicants are heard before being denied on such grounds. (Q.*1350)

To ask the Minister for Social and Family Development (a) of the employers eligible for the Enabling Employment Credit, what proportion have utilised it; (b) what are the main barriers preventing greater uptake; and (c) given the target of 40% employment rate for persons with disabilities by 2030 versus the current 32.7%, what additional measures are planned to close this gap. (Q.925)

Finance (MOF) - 1 Question

To ask the Prime Minister and Minister for Finance (a) whether the Ministry has assessed the exposure of Singapore’s reserves to the proposed changes to section 892 of the US tax code; (b) whether Singapore has made representations to the US Treasury before the 13 February 2026 comment deadline; and (c) whether the Ministry retains confidence that GIC’s and Temasek’s US investments are adequately protected from this regulatory change. (Q.*1258)

Sustainability and the Environment (MSE) - 1 Question

To ask the Minister for Sustainability and the Environment given that the Beverage Container Return Scheme is projected to add 25 to 60 cents to prices of bottled and canned drinks of which only 10 cents is refundable, what assessment was made of the affordability impact on lower-income households before confirming the April 2026 launch. (Q.*1276)

Home Affairs (MHA) - 1 Question

To ask the Coordinating Minister for National Security and Minister for Home Affairs (a) whether the Ministry has considered issuing an Implementation Directive under the Online Criminal Harms Act requiring social media platforms to detect and remove unlicensed moneylending advertisements targeting migrant domestic workers; and (b) why the approach taken for impersonation scams has not been extended to illegal moneylending advertisements that facilitate harassment of workers and their employers. (Q.*1339)

National Development (MND) - 1 Question

To ask the Minister for National Development (a) what is the status of the review on quantitative noise thresholds for residential boundary noise, which the Community Advisory Panel recommended in 2022; (b) whether the review has considered WHO guidelines of 50 to 55 decibels and lower thresholds in Germany, Korea and Japan; and (c) whether the Ministry will clarify that NEA’s industrial noise standards do not apply to household disputes. (Q.875)

Trade and Industry (MTI) - 1 Question

To ask the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Trade and Industry (a) what proportion of Research, Innovation and Enterprise (RIE) funded deep tech projects achieve commercial viability; (b) whether the Ministry has studied Israel’s model where innovation grants are repaid only upon commercialisation success; and (c) whether RIE2030 will introduce similar outcome-linked funding mechanisms. (Q.876)

Health (MOH) - 5 Questions

1. Dual-Regulation Framework for IP Insurers ⭐ ORAL

Question: Given that the Monetary Authority of Singapore primarily regulates solvency, whether the Ministry intends to establish a dual-regulation framework to oversee the (i) healthcare outcomes (ii) panel selection criteria and (iii) loss-ratio efficiency of private insurers to ensure they align with national health goals.

Minister Ong Ye Kung’s Answer:

On Mr Kenneth Tiong’s question relating to the regulation of IP insurers, the Ministry of Health (MOH) and the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) work closely together in exercising regulatory oversight of IP insurers, to ensure that policyholders’ interests are protected and the products are sustainable.

MOH’s key role is to oversee the development and operation of the public healthcare system and ensure universal access to healthcare. For individuals who prefer private healthcare and purchase private insurance, we try not to micro-manage or prescribe market practices. Instead, we set requirements pertaining to the key parameters of IPs and riders, such as co-payment and deductible requirements, to ensure that the schemes are sustainable. We only step in when we see a serious market failure emerging, which is why we have intervened in this case, to tighten the design of IP riders.

Doctor panels are an example of cost-management measures put in place by insurers in response to rising private healthcare bills and claims. MOH has been and will continue working with key stakeholders including insurers, healthcare providers, medical professionals and consumer representatives through the Multilateral Healthcare Insurance Committee (MHIC) on these matters, to strike a balance between the interests of all stakeholders.

My Supplementary Question:

MOH itself notes a trend of escalating cost and premiums alongside tightening claims in practices. MAS can act on unfair claims handling, but MAS is primarily a financial regulator. MOH’s direct levers seem strongest when policies are MediSave-linked.

So, my question is, what enforceable levers does MOH have to ensure that insurer conduct advances healthcare affordability and access? And where does MOH remain dependent on MAS?

Also, it appears to me that no one is cleanly accountable for insurer behaviour as a health system actor. Does the Minister believe that this is a gap that requires filling?

Minister’s Response to Supplementary:

The IP rider has become a problem and we are taking action. And I think that is an action that shows our accountability that when something is not sustainable, not working in the best interest of the patients and people, we will take action.

Between MAS and MOH, I think we have plenty of levers and we will work together to make sure that insurers are operating in a way that is ethical, that is viable but at the same time in the interest of patients and the people we serve. And I think we have more than enough levers to do so.

But we should not be tempted to become micromanaging, because it is the worst thing to do to say that we leave it to the market, but we micromanage all their actions and behaviour. I think that is the worst thing, the worst of both worlds. Then, you might as well nationalise it. But we already have a huge nationalised system in public healthcare. So, for private healthcare, control the important levers, control the key parameters, but let the market operate.

2. Shingles Vaccination & Dementia Prevention ⭐ ORAL

Question: Given findings that shingles vaccination reduces dementia, including the May 2025 Nature study showing Zostavax causally reduces diagnoses by 20% and the July 2024 Nature Medicine study showing Shingrix is associated with 164 added dementia-free days, whether the Ministry will (i) include dementia prevention savings into cost-benefit analyses for shingles vaccines and (ii) consider extending shingles vaccine subsidies to persons aged 50-59.

Minister Ong Ye Kung’s Answer:

The two cited studies are based on observational data that suggest a potential association between shingles vaccination and reduced risk of dementia. Additional research is required to establish causality and the underlying biological mechanisms, to determine the vaccine’s effect on dementia risk. The Ministry of Health (MOH) will continue to monitor the emergence of such scientific evidence. In the meantime, we will maintain the age criterion for Shingles vaccination subsidies, on the basis that the incidence of shingles rises steeply after age 60, approximately three to four times that of individuals aged 50 to 59 years.

3. Private Equity-Backed Nursing Home Market Share (Written)

Question: Following the Competition and Consumer Commission of Singapore’s clearance of the recent merger between Singapore’s two largest private nursing home operators (a) what is the combined market share of private equity-backed nursing home operators; (b) what percentage of the Ministry’s Build-Own-Lease operating subventions currently flow to such operators versus Voluntary Welfare Organisations; and (c) what safeguards exist against future price increases in an increasingly consolidated market.

Minister Ong Ye Kung’s Answer:

The two merging private nursing home operators will account for around 10% of the total nursing home market. The Competition and Consumer Commission of Singapore has assessed that the merger does not result in a substantial loss of competition in the provision of nursing home services. One of the key reasons is that under the Build-Own-Lease model, Government fully funds the capital costs of development and appoints both private and non-private operators for the facility through competitive tenders, which lowers the barrier to entry for nursing home operators and supports the diversity of options. The distribution of Government operating subvention to private operators is generally proportionate to their subsidised market share.

4. Japan/Korea as HSA Reference Agencies (Written)

Question: (a) What specific technical or regulatory barriers prevent the inclusion of Japan’s Pharmaceuticals and Medical Devices Agency and South Korea’s Ministry of Food and Drug Safety as reference agencies for therapeutic product registration; (b) to what extent does such exclusion delay the registration of medicines optimised for regional populations; and (c) whether the Ministry will conduct a feasibility study on recognising such World Health Organisation Listed Authorities as HSA’s reference agencies, to accelerate drug access.

Minister Ong Ye Kung’s Answer:

The Health Sciences Authority (HSA) currently recognises six reference agencies - US Food and Drug Administration (US FDA), European Medicines Agency (EMA), Health Canada, Therapeutic Goods Administration (TGA) of Australia, Swissmedic, and Medicines and Health Products Regulatory Agency (MHRA) of the United Kingdom.

This current six reference jurisdictions comprise major markets which typically receive first-wave filings from pharmaceutical companies, of which HSA has established collaborative evaluation process and joint review with. This includes aligned scientific standards for quality, safety and efficacy, as well as access to comprehensive scientific assessment and evaluation reports in English that HSA can rely upon for its verification process. Through these arrangements, we could offer an expedited 60 working day turning around time for therapeutic product registration, which is fast by international standards.

HSA continuously reviews its regulatory framework to ensure patients in Singapore have optimal access to safe and effective therapeutic products. Hence, HSA is in talks with other WHO-Listed Authorities, including Japan and South Korea, to explore closer regulatory cooperation initiatives.

5. Healthier SG Capitation vs CHAS Co-payments (Written)

Question: (a) Whether the shift in model from the Community Health Assist Scheme’s means-tested co-payments to Healthier SG’s capitation model signals a departure from the Ministry’s philosophy of shared responsibility in healthcare financing; and (b) without market-based price signals to moderate demand under the capitation model, what specific mechanisms will prevent buffet syndrome and ensure Healthier SG’s long-term fiscal sustainability.

Minister Ong Ye Kung’s Answer:

What the Member might be asking is why many preventive care services under Healthier SG are fully subsidised, while other healthcare services, including those under the Community Health Assist Scheme (CHAS), require co-payment by patients.

The key reason is that we want to encourage cost effective preventive care. Hence for preventive care services where we hope that as many people take it up as possible under Healthier SG, we have given full subsidies to the target population segment. Subsidies for all other healthcare services, including acute hospital care or chronic care, continue to be means-tested and require co-payment, to instill some discipline in healthcare provision and consumption, because unnecessary consumption of healthcare and over-servicing can lead to rapid cost escalation, a financially unsustainable healthcare system and poorer health outcomes in the long term.

Finance (MOF) & Trade/Industry (MTI) - 4 Questions

6. Temasek’s Risk-Return Framework & Ecosystem Building ⭐ ORAL

Question: (a) Whether the Government will review Temasek’s risk-return framework to explicitly value strategic ecosystem building alongside commercial returns; (b) whether the Government has assessed the impact of Temasek’s recent deprioritisation of direct early-stage local investments on Singapore’s ability to nurture nascent high-potential industries; and (c) if so, whether alternative capital support mechanisms will be introduced to fill this gap.

Senior Minister of State Jeffrey Siow’s Answer:

This question was addressed in the reply to Parliamentary Questions 12 to 14 on the Order Paper for 12 January 2026.

The Government’s mandate for Temasek is that it should deliver good, sustainable long-term returns. The Government ensures that Temasek has a competent board to oversee its management but does not otherwise influence or direct Temasek’s individual investment decisions. […]

The Government expects Temasek to ensure that its overall portfolio of investments, including its Singapore-based Temasek Portfolio Companies (TPCs), achieves good commercial outcomes. Temasek actively and constructively engages its TPCs. From time to time, Temasek will work with the TPCs on strategic reviews and initiatives to strengthen their foundations for future growth. Temasek’s Singapore portfolio has been able to contribute steady returns to Temasek’s overall portfolio and to Singapore’s economic growth over the long term.

Beyond exercising the appropriate oversight over its investments, there is no requirement for Temasek to pursue specific strategic or economic development strategies. Efforts to develop industry ecosystems or to enhance the financing for early-stage startups are led by the Government, rather than by Temasek. For example, Enterprise Singapore has a Startup SG Equity scheme, through which the Government co-invests with third-party investors in Singapore-based deep tech startups to catalyse the deep tech ecosystem.

And from time to time, Temasek may participate in the Government’s initiatives, but it does so on commercial terms, strictly consistent with its mandate.

7. CapitaLand-Mapletree Merger & SME Tenant Safeguards (Written)

Question: (a) Whether the Competition and Consumer Commission of Singapore is evaluating the reported potential CapitaLand-Mapletree merger and will mandate a formal Phase 1 or Phase 2 review; (b) if so, how will the relevant market be defined to ensure accurate assessment; and (c) whether additional safeguards to protect SME tenants from possible abuse of dominant position in lease renewals will be considered.

Deputy Prime Minister Gan Kim Yong’s Answer:

(Grouped with Q38 and Q40 from Mr David Hoe)

Tenancy mix and turnover in commercial developments are the result of commercial decisions made by both property owners and tenants. These decisions are influenced by market factors, such as consumer demand preferences and prevailing economic conditions.

With regard to competition concerns arising from mergers and acquisitions, Singapore adopts a voluntary merger notification regime. Under this regime, merger parties are not required to notify the Competition and Consumer Commission of Singapore (CCS) of their merger transactions under the Competition Act to balance between effective regulatory oversight and keeping compliance costs low. Instead, merger parties are expected to self-assess whether their transaction may give rise to potential competition concerns. Nevertheless, CCS is empowered to step in if it obtains information suggesting that a merger may result in potential competition issues. Merger parties may approach CCS for pre-notification discussions or seek guidance on whether their merger may be anti-competitive.

In the cases of the acquisition of The Clementi Mall and the reported potential CapitaLand-Mapletree merger, the parties concerned have not formally notified CCS for a merger assessment. CCS will continue to monitor both developments.

Separately, apart from competition oversight under the Competition Act, the Government has put in place measures to support fair and balanced lease negotiations between property owners and tenants. The Government worked with the Fair Tenancy Industry Committee (FTIC) to publish a Code of Conduct for Leasing of Retail Premises in Singapore. Since February 2024, all qualifying retail lease agreements must comply with the Code of Conduct under the Lease Agreements for Retail Premises Act. The Code sets out leasing principles to prevent the inclusion of unreasonable clauses in lease agreements, such as prohibiting landlords from charging a markup on electricity costs. In the event of disagreements over the lease negotiations or terms, the parties may bring their cases to the Singapore Mediation Centre for mediation or adjudication.

8. Tax Resident Transitions Among Singapore Citizens (Written)

Question: For each year over the past decade (a) how many Singapore citizens have transitioned from being tax residents to non-residents and vice versa; (b) what is the breakdown (i) by gender and (ii) by five-year age groups; and (c) what proportion of Singapore citizen tax residents in 2014 have remained so in 2024, as broken down by gender and age.

Senior Minister of State Jeffrey Siow’s Answer:

Singapore Citizens who reside in Singapore except for temporary absences are assessed as tax residents. We do not have data on Singapore Citizens who have transitioned from being tax residents to non-residents and vice versa.

There were about 1.6 million Singapore Citizens with tax filing records in the Year of Assessment (YA) 2020. Of these, about 1.4 million had tax filing records in YA 2024. Those who dropped out could have done so due to a variety of reasons, such as death, retirement, unemployment, or relocation overseas. Of the 1.4 million, about 55% were male and 45% were female. The breakdown by age group is as follows:

Age Group % of 1.4M who remained <25 <1% 25-29 5% 30-34 13% 35-39 13% 40-44 13% 45-49 12% 50-54 13% 55-59 11% 60-64 9% 65-69 6% >69 4%

Notes: (1) Figures rounded to nearest percentage point. (2) Age based on tax resident’s age in YA 2024.

Key observation: 200,000 Singapore citizens dropped out of the tax filing system between YA 2020 and YA 2024 (from 1.6M to 1.4M). The Ministry does not track whether this is due to death, retirement, unemployment, or relocation overseas.

9. Digital Warehouse Receipts & Metal Warrant Financing (Written)

Question: (a) Why digital Singapore-based warehouse receipts remain underutilised for financing critical minerals despite the 2021 Electronic Transactions Act (ETA) amendments; (b) whether the Ministry will operationalise section 16Q of the ETA to accredit trusted issuers; and (c) how does Singapore’s framework for metal warrant financing compare to systems already operational in Dubai and the UK.

Deputy Prime Minister Gan Kim Yong’s Answer:

Most critical minerals traded by Singapore-based companies are stored and financed through the London Metal Exchange (LME) ecosystem, including LME-approved warehouses in Singapore and overseas. Banks which are LME members recognise and accept LME’s digital warehouse receipts as collateral in trade financing.

We understand that some companies may store metals in non-LME warehouses in Singapore, due to lower storage costs or to hold the metals for end-use rather than trading. These warehouses typically issue physical receipts, as they and the banks do not have the economies of scale and hence, the commercial incentive to adopt separate local digital receipt platforms.

Metal warrant financing in Dubai and the UK similarly relies on internationally recognised exchange-based systems such as the LME. EnterpriseSG engages the industry regularly and will review the need to accredit trusted issuers if and when there is sufficient market interest.

Defence (MINDEF) - 1 Question

10. Paya Lebar Air Base Relocation Review ⭐ ORAL

Question: (a) Whether the Ministry has conducted a strategic review of the decision to relocate Paya Lebar Air Base in light of recent global conflicts demonstrating the vulnerability of concentrated air assets to mass drone attacks and long-range munitions; and (b) whether such consolidation of the RSAF’s assets into fewer air bases significantly increases operational risks during a first-strike scenario.

Coordinating Minister Chan Chun Sing’s Answer:

As a small island with no strategic depth and hinterland to absorb an attack, the Singapore Armed Forces (SAF) needs to develop operational concepts and solutions that are uniquely suited to our security needs, while taking into consideration the competing needs for Singapore’s limited land and finite human resources.

Broadly speaking, our circumstances require us to have a robust intelligence and effective threat detection and early warning systems at range, so that the SAF can mount timely and decisive responses with a suite of diversified capabilities across multiple layers and distances where necessary.

Even then, we may not be able to prevent all threats from reaching our shores. For this reason, our critical infrastructures and facilities are hardened against potential attacks, and our key assets can be dispersed in peace time and especially during contingencies. We have also factored in reserve capacities to ensure resilience for scenarios where some of our assets may be destroyed or damaged.

The decision to relocate Paya Lebar Air Base to free up land for national development purposes was a carefully considered one, taking into account the factors I have just mentioned, as well as then-emerging and now-evolving threats.

There are certainly trade-offs involved. We have undertaken a series of additional measures to manage the risks and challenges. For example, in terms of available airbases and runways, we have invested significant resources in expanding Tengah Air Base and Changi Air Base, and lengthening the contingency runway at Pulau Sudong. Tengah Air Base and Changi Air Base are also being upgraded with better detection, response and resilience capabilities, including against the emerging threats posed by drones.

The SAF will continually assess our operational, infrastructure and capability requirements, taking into consideration the threats on the horizon and available technologies, while carefully weighing the costs and risks to Singapore. For good reason which Members will appreciate, many of our efforts are conducted out of the public eye and not disclosed.

My Supplementary Question:

Eleven days ago, the United States conducted “Operation Absolute Resolve” in Venezuela. In two-and-a-half hours, US forces struck four air bases with Kamikaze drones, destroyed Venezuela’s Russian-supplied Buk-M2E air defences and eliminated aircraft on the ground.

By 2030, I believe these sorts of capabilities will become more widely distributed. So, what is the Ministry’s assessment of our post-2030 postures, survivability against this type of strike? And does the Ministry believe that there are concentration risks to be mitigated?

Minister’s Response:

I will make two points in response to the Member’s comment.

First, I have said that based on our geography, the risk of any strike on Singapore is always very high because we lack hinterland or depth – which is why our operational concepts are quite unique for our own operational needs. And I think I will not need to go into details on how we execute our operational concepts.

My second comment is in response to, not just Mr Kenneth Tiong’s, but I sense many other Members’ interest in the latest evolving technologies on the battlefield. Much has been said about drones warfare. It is not something new. It is something that we have been looking at for many years, even since I was an active member of the SAF.

Maybe to illustrate this point, I will just share a little vignette which Members may be aware of. In 2017’s National Day Parade (NDP) – I wonder whether Members will remember the 2017 NDP – many people were impressed by the SAF’s dynamic display. The most memorable scene from the 2017 NDP was the final act towards the end of the parade and ceremony, where we had our fireworks. Members may recall there was a display put up where we had 300 drones in the sky performing and forming a heart shape.

To many, this was a wonderful conclusion to a very nice NDP. To the informed observers who are in this line of business, we already knew what that meant for the nature of warfare.

Education (MOE) - 1 Question

11. Transfer of Non-Pedagogical Tasks from Teachers ⭐ ORAL

Question: Whether the Ministry will consider mandating the transfer of non-pedagogical administrative tasks, such as the management of parental consent forms, monetary collections, and event logistics, from teachers to school administrative and operations personnel to align with the Ministry’s objective of reducing teacher workload.

Minister Desmond Lee’s Answer:

All schools have dedicated administrative teams that help with administrative tasks like collection of money and logistical aspects of organising events. Schools also use technology for tasks like management of consent forms from parents. Schools are expected to tap on such support to reduce administrative workload for teachers. Given differing school operating contexts, the Ministry of Education does not mandate which specific administrative duties in a school needs to be transferred. This is to allow individual school leaders, who best understand the needs of the school and the capabilities of his colleagues, to have the flexibility in balancing workload across different colleagues.

National Development (MND) - 2 Questions

12. Fire-Rated PMD Charging Cabinets Pilot (Written)

Question: Given the rising incidence of Personal Mobility Device battery fires in residential settings, whether the Government will consider piloting fire-rated outdoor charging cabinets in HDB void decks or multi-storey carparks, similar to facilities deployed in New York City and Taiwan, with subsidised electricity rates to incentivise residents to charge devices in these safer communal facilities.

Minister Chee Hong Tat’s Answer:

Agencies such as the Land Transport Authority (LTA), Singapore Civil Defence Force (SCDF) and Housing and Development Board (HDB) work closely to monitor Active Mobility Device (AMD) ownership, charging and usage patterns in Singapore. We also study new operating models and regulatory developments on AMD charging and parking in other jurisdictions.

As different jurisdictions have different contexts and circumstances, we should carefully assess if the overseas practices are applicable here in Singapore. Taking the example of AMD charging facilities in public areas, there will be trade-offs for residents such as having less space for other uses in HDB multi-storey car parks and void decks.

The key factor to improving safety is to prevent AMD-related fires in the first place, instead of where the device is charged. It is more effective to ensure AMDs in Singapore meet prescribed technical and safety requirements. If the devices are non-compliant, shifting the charging and parking to public areas would still lead to fire incidents that pose safety risks to residents.

AMD users should only purchase compliant devices, refrain from modifying their devices, and adopt safe charging practices. This is the main safeguard against fire risks from AMDs. The Ministry of Transport (MOT) and LTA thus take a strict enforcement approach towards the import, sale and use of non-compliant AMDs, and are looking to strengthen regulations on the online sale of AMDs later this year.

13. Animal Management Contractor Protocols (Written)

Question: In light of the death of a dog captured at Seletar West Farmway 8 (a) whether the Ministry will review the “acceptable parameters” of force, as outlined in the AVS statement of 16 November 2025, and training standards for animal management contractors; and (b) whether the Ministry will formalise collaboration with animal welfare groups to ensure humane handling while maintaining public safety.

Minister Chee Hong Tat’s Answer:

This question was addressed in the Ministry of National Development’s reply to the question asked by Ms Lee Hui Ying on 12 January 2026.

Minister of State Alvin Tan’s Answer (12 Jan, responding to Ms Lee Hui Ying):

Since 2018, the Animal and Veterinary Service (AVS) has worked with its partners on the Trap-Neuter-Rehome/Release-Manage (TNRM) programme to manage the free-roaming dog population in Singapore.

Our TNRM partners play key roles, including conducting trapping and sterilisation operations. Upon identification of an unsterilised free-roaming dog, AVS will work with the TNRM partner responsible for the designated area to commence trapping operations.

In situations that present risk to public safety, AVS will intervene swiftly. For instance, in the case of the recent trapping operation at Seletar West Farmway 8 on 14 November 2025, AVS’ animal management contractor was activated to trap and remove three free-roaming dogs, which were confirmed by several victims to have been involved in multiple chasing and biting incidents. The operation was carried out safely under the supervision of AVS staff and is in line with existing protocols under TNRM. This includes complying with the World Organisation for Animal Health (WOAH) standards on Stray Dog Population Control to ensure that uncovered wire loops or ropes were not used during the trapping process and giving due consideration to personnel and animal safety in determining the restraint procedures.

AVS will continue to work closely with TNRM partners in the management of free-roaming dogs to safeguard both public safety and the well-being of the dogs. AVS colleagues and I visited our partners last week to discuss ways we can better collaborate moving forward. For instance, we intend to review joint protocols and further improve communication and coordination. These build on existing collaboration channels such as TNRM rehoming efforts, outreach and AVS-led adoption drives.

Foreign Affairs (MFA) - 1 Question

14. Consular SOPs for Overseas Crises ⭐ ORAL

Question: (a) What are the Ministry’s standard operating procedures, if any, for providing emergency consular aid and ensuring the safety of Singaporeans during overseas crises such as the (i) Brown University shooting on 13 December 2025, (ii) Bondi Beach shooting on 14 December 2025 and (iii) Taipei knife attack on 19 December 2025; and (b) what assistance, if any, was rendered by our overseas missions following the Brown University shooting.

Minister Vivian Balakrishnan’s Answer:

(Grouped with Q83 from Mr Lee Hong Chuang)

When a crisis or major incident occurs overseas, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) mounts an appropriate consular response. First, we determine the nature and severity of the incident. Second, we disseminate relevant information and updates to Singaporeans who may potentially be involved. Third, we provide consular assistance to Singaporeans in distress. This includes contacting eRegistered Singaporeans to check on their well-being, liaising with local authorities, issuing Document of Identity for lost passports, and facilitating the return of Singaporeans back home if necessary. We may also issue Travel Notices and Advisories for Singaporeans to avoid travel to that region. That said, every incident is unique and circumstances in the foreign country vary widely – so our responses must be customised accordingly.

Let me cite some examples from recent incidents. During the floods in Hat Yai, our Crisis Response Team was deployed overseas to reach Singaporeans and help bring them home. MFA also helped facilitate the departure of 11 Singaporeans from Iran during the Israel-Iran conflict in June 2025.

When the attacks at Brown University, Bondi Beach, and Taipei occurred, our Missions took immediate action, including contacting Singaporeans that eRegistered, posting updates and advice, and liaising with local authorities to ensure the well-being of our citizens.

We encourage Singaporeans to eRegister when they travel, as this allows MFA to reach out and render prompt consular assistance where needed. We also urge Singaporeans to stay vigilant and take precautions for their personal safety while abroad, purchase comprehensive travel insurance, and refer to MFA’s Travel Advisories and Notices.

Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) - 1 Question

15. Prevention of Corruption Act Amendment ⭐ ORAL

Question: Whether, following Public Prosecutor v China Railway Tunnel Group, the Government will amend the Prevention of Corruption Act to (i) broaden the legal test for corporate attribution beyond the “directing mind and will” doctrine in common law or (ii) introduce a “failure to prevent” offence similar to the UK Bribery Act, ensuring large corporations cannot evade liability for corruption by senior management.

Coordinating Minister Chan Chun Sing’s Answer:

The Prevention of Corruption Act is a key instrument in our fight against corruption. CPIB regularly and proactively reviews the Act. This is to ensure that our laws remain robust and effective against the ever-evolving corruption threat.

CPIB is looking into potential legislative gaps associated to the case cited by the Member in his query. If there is a need to come back to parliament, we will do so.

Other Interventions During Question Time

13 Jan: Local Food Sourcing Requirements (Supplementary to “30 by 30” Question)

Context: Senior Minister of State Zaqy Mohamad was answering questions about the revised food security targets (from “30 by 30” to specific fibre and protein targets by 2035).

My Question:

The Senior Minister of State spoke about enhancing demand offtake. Given that our local farms face structural disadvantages against cheaper imports, has the Ministry considered any form of minimum local sourcing requirements for major retailers and food service operators, even a modest starting quota, so as to create guaranteed demand and help farms achieve commercial viability?

This could be a 1% quota for major food importers and supermarkets like NTUC Fairprice and Sheng Siong. You can call it “1 by 30”, if you would like.

SMS Zaqy Mohamad’s Response:

As a principle, we go with free market principles. Ultimately, I do not think it is in the interest of consumers or the Government to fund or subsidise food products, just as we do not do it for energy costs nor petrol. What we really want is to help our local farmers connect them through organisations such as through Singapore Agro-Food Enterprises Federation Limited (SAFEF). We are working very hard to connect them with many of our retailers, hoteliers, restaurant caterers – and many today are already supporting our local farms.

As an example, while Greenphyto was just launched last month, a year ago, they have already started to reach out and they are already selling to about 75 retailers here in Singapore.

I spoke about Kok Fah Technology Farm, I spoke about Green Harvest, traditional farms, new farms. I think what is key is really to be competitive with the market to provide an offering that Singaporeans would consider. I know supermarkets such as Fairprice, for example, tell me they have got a whole section dedicated just for local produce.

We can encourage Singaporeans to support. I think ultimately it is also encouraging and building awareness with our consumers that local farm produce is fresher. Today, most of them are pesticide free. So, we give you slightly different offerings for a slightly different premium. But I think for things like vegetables, even bean sprouts, the reason why they have a pretty good hold on the market is because consumers also want freshness and there is a segment of market that wish for that.

We hope that with helping our businesses build new capabilities, improve yields, lower their cost of production, we hope that in the long term that helps them be more competitive in the market. I hope that our consumers will also be able to discern the advantages of supporting local and buying local.

Certainly on our part, whether it is through procurement, whether it is through encouraging retailers, hoteliers, I think we will continue to do our part to encourage them to buy local produce, so that we can support local farmers. It is in our interest, on the record, to ensure that our local farms, our local producers thrive, progress and play a big part in our Singapore Food Story 2.

Note: The “1 by 30” local sourcing quota proposal was rejected on free market principles.

Mr Speaker,

I support the principles underlying this Bill. A population-scale set of longitudinal medical records is the “means of production” for more timely interventions, accurate diagnoses, and preventive health at large. The contribution of data to the National Electronic Health Record will create a valuable dataset - and that value should flow to all Singaporeans.

But before I move on to the question of value, I wish to state my belief: A Bill that compels contribution must also come with robust safeguards.

From my conversations with practitioners, and from my reading of the Bill, I have three sets of concerns:

“A” the disproportionate cybersecurity burden on small providers;

“B” the uploading of sensitive medical information despite patient objections;

and “C” the insurance loophole that may render our privacy protections ineffective.

I will then speak to a broader question: if we are building a national health data asset, who benefits - and how do we ensure it catalyses a dynamic ecosystem rather than becoming captured by a single monopoly provider?

(Cybersecurity Liability and the Burden on Small Providers)

First, to the cybersecurity obligations imposed on healthcare providers.

The Bill designates all HCSA licensees - from tertiary hospitals employing thousands, to single-doctor GP clinics in HDB heartlands - as “relevant persons” under Section 64. All face the same statutory obligations: to implement reasonable controls for secure processing under Section 66(1)(a), reasonable safeguards against unauthorised access under Section 66(1)(b), and cybersecurity protections under Section 68.

The penalties for non-compliance are severe. Section 66(6) provides for fines up to $200,000 or two years’ imprisonment for individuals, and up to $1 million for other entities.

Now, the Bill does use the word “reasonable” - and this does imply proportionality.

But I have spoken with doctors who run small operations. They worry that when a breach occurs - and breaches are a matter of “when,” not “if” - the enforcement spotlight will fall on them. Did they have sufficient firewalls? Was their antivirus updated? Were their staff trained adequately? They fear being “hung out to dry.”

The structural problem is this: small providers are compelled to contribute data to a centralised system they do not control. Yet they bear liability for breaches that may originate from factors beyond their control.

I wish to speak for some of my constituents who are senior GPs still practising in the heartlands. Many are approaching retirement. They are not tech-savvy. They will struggle with the digitalisation requirements this Bill will impose.

If the transition is too abrupt, many of these senior GPs may feel forced to retire early, or sell their independent clinics to large corporate chains. We have seen this pattern before. The rapid digitalisation in other sectors - including banking a decade ago - moved too fast for some of our elderly residents, resulting in scam losses.

Without proper support, this Bill may accelerate consolidation in the primary care sector. We will see more chains. The end state of a modern, integrated health information system is desirable. But the transition must be managed carefully.

So I ask:

One. Will the Ministry issue clear, tiered guidance on what constitutes “reasonable” safeguards for practices of different sizes? A safe harbour framework, if you will.

Two. Will the Ministry consider providing or subsidising cybersecurity insurance for small providers? If the government is making NEHR contribution compulsory, should small practitioners shoulder the entire financial risk of a breach?

Three. Will there be a transition period with educational enforcement - rather than immediate punitive action - to allow smaller providers to build up their cybersecurity capabilities?

Four. Could the Ministry offer transitional support for senior practitioners nearing retirement - even something as simple as sending personnel to help digitalise records?

(Data Privacy and the Limits of Access Restrictions)

Second, to the question of sensitive medical conditions that patients seek to keep private.

There is a group of patients who pay cash, wanting to keep their records - perhaps with sexually transmitted infections, mental health conditions, or abortion records - off the system. Many foreigners also do not want to be on the NEHR.

Under this Bill, that option will no longer exist.

Section 29 provides for “access restrictions” - Class 1 restrictions that prevent all access, and Class 2 restrictions that restrict access for specific purposes or persons. This appears protective.

But Section 30(7) states clearly: “To avoid doubt, an access restriction does not prevent or restrict the contribution of health information.”

The data is uploaded and is stored centrally. Any access restriction is a viewing control - it masks who can see the data. It does not exclude the data from NEHR.

If the burden of proof is on the custodian of NEHR to have a robust data privacy model, let us examine the custodian.

Synapxe, the custodian of NEHR, was rebranded from IHIS, which was responsible for allowing the 2018 compromise of 1.5 million SingHealth patient records. The Committee of Inquiry found that IHIS staff lacked adequate cybersecurity awareness, that key staff failed to take appropriate action even when there were clear signs of an ongoing attack, and that the CISO’s response was - I quote - “clearly lacking, and displayed an alarming lack of concern.”

I have perceived among some doctors a legacy of mistrust toward Synapxe.

So I ask:

One. How is MOH going to police unjustified access of NEHR, where rogue elements read the medical histories of unrelated people? What assurance can MOH give us that our health data is safe with Synapxe?

Two. If such unauthorised access occurs, does proactive monitoring exist or will the system rely solely on whistleblowers and complaints?

Three. What is the technical architecture for access-restricted data? Is it encrypted separately? Is it stored in a segregated environment? Or is it simply flagged in the same database, such that a breach would expose it alongside unrestricted records?

Four. What is the access model for NEHR data? In Taiwan, the National Health Insurance system uses a dual-card approach: the patient must present their Health IC smart card, the doctor uses their professional IC card, and both are required for access, with written patient consent. This dual-authorisation prevents rogue access because no single party can retrieve records alone. Will Singapore’s NEHR access model include such safeguards?

Five. Will MOH consider specific carve-outs for defined sensitive conditions, where patients can opt out of contribution entirely - not just access?

(The Insurance Loophole and Downstream Coercion)

Mr Speaker, I commend the drafters of this Bill for their attention to the concern regarding the use of medical information for insurance underwriting.

Section 6 defines “excluded purposes” to include deciding whether to insure an individual, continuing or renewing insurance, and processing insurance claims. Section 19(2) prohibits specified users from accessing NEHR for any excluded purpose. Section 38(5) imposes enhanced penalties - up to $200,000 and seven years’ imprisonment - for accessing records for excluded purposes.

Section 11(2) provides that nothing in Part 2 allows access to health information “on the basis that the individual consents.” Section 16(2) reinforces this: consent under the Personal Data Protection Act does not make access permissible.

So, insurers cannot access NEHR directly. Healthcare providers cannot access NEHR on behalf of insurers. And a patient’s consent cannot be used to circumvent these protections.

Is it watertight? Let me offer two possible scenarios.

Scenario One. Section 17(1) provides that an individual may access and collect their own accessible health information. A Singaporean applies for insurance. The insurer’s application form includes a new requirement: “Please attach a complete printout of your National Electronic Health Record.” No printout, no policy.

Once the data leaves the system through legitimate patient access, it is beyond the Bill’s reach.

Scenario Two. According to Section 3.1.2.2 of the Draft Guidelines on Appropriate Use and Access to National Electronic Health Record, released by MOH in 2023:

(quote) “In the event that such information was previously transcribed from NEHR into the patient’s clinical notes, it would be treated as part and parcel of the medical record belonging to the healthcare institution.” (end quote)

Meanwhile, Integrated Plan insurers are increasingly requiring doctors to sign contracts containing “Inspection and Right to Audit” clauses. These clauses grant insurers the right to inspect full medical records to verify claims.

The result is that doctors check NEHR for relevant history - past abortions, IVF treatment, mental health conditions, STIs - and note it in their files for clinical safety. Because of these audit clauses, insurers then gain access to this sensitive, transcribed NEHR data, even if it is irrelevant to the current claim. A patient going in for gallbladder surgery may find their insurer reviewing their psychiatric history.

So I ask:

One. Does MOH agree that requiring a patient to provide a complete NEHR printout as a condition of insurance coverage would defeat the legislative intent of Section 6’s excluded purposes provision?

Two. If so, will the Government work with MAS to issue regulations or guidelines explicitly prohibiting insurers from requiring NEHR records, or NEHR-derived information, as a condition of coverage, claim processing, or policy renewal?

Three. Does the Minister intend for Section 3.1.2.2 in the 2023 guidelines to allow insurers, through audit clauses in Integrated Plan contracts, to access NEHR-derived information that would otherwise be prohibited under Section 6 of this Bill?

Four. If an insurer is found to utilise either pathway, what enforcement mechanisms exist? Will this be a matter for MAS, MOH, or both?

(Competition and Consumer Value)

Mr Speaker, I now wish to speak to a broader question:

This Bill will create, for the first time, a comprehensive national health database. Social determinants such as postal code, education, marital status. Clinical outcomes such as blood pressure readings over decades, medications prescribed. And soon, perhaps, genomic data from the SG100K project.

This is a formidable dataset. It is a “means of production” - not just of population health outcomes, but of significant economic value. So how do we ensure that value from this national health data infrastructure flows to citizens?

Globally, startups are experimenting with patient-centric data models - where individuals can choose to share their data for research and receive compensation. A monopoly may not experiment with such models. But a contestable market will. Some players will try patient-centric approaches. The best models will emerge.

To create the conditions for competition to discover it, that requires open APIs, interoperability standards, and a contestable application layer.

(The Synapxe Question: Contestability and the Original Vision)

Mr Speaker, let me turn to the System Operator.

Section 8 provides that the Minister may designate a System Operator to operate, administer, and maintain the national electronic records system. In practice, this will be Synapxe.

Synapxe - formerly known as IHiS - today employs approximately 3,500 people. It serves as the technology backbone for our entire public healthcare system.

When IHiS was set up in 2008, I believe the original vision was that it would operate on contestable principles. MOH would issue tenders. IHiS would compete - win some, lose some. It would have enough work to survive, but face enough competition to stay efficient.

This model was what worked for MINDEF and ST Engineering. Dr Goh Keng Swee, speaking at NTUC Income’s 1977 annual meeting, articulated the principle. He said:

(quote) “We do not own and run enterprises on ideological grounds... We expect government-owned enterprises to be efficient, to make money and to expand whenever feasible. [...] If a government-owned enterprise loses money, it is allowed to go bankrupt and this has happened, fortunately, in very few instances.” (end quote)

This was the discipline of contestability. Government-linked enterprises were to be subject to market forces.

But Mr Speaker, the current model for Synapxe has drifted from this vision. Today, MOH relies almost exclusively on Synapxe to implement its technology integrations. There is capture and cost inflation. An engineer is hired at $5,000 a month; that engineer’s services are sold to public healthcare clusters at significantly higher rates. This markup is of questionable value for taxpayers. It crowds out innovation. The market is not contestable.

I believe a different model is possible and necessary.

(A Proposal: Returning to Contestable Principles)

My vision for Synapxe is different. It would return to the original contestable principles surrounding IHiS’s creation.

First, I would seek to separate Synapxe into two entities.

The first entity would be a core infrastructure company. It would handle standards-setting, data exchange protocols, security baselines, and the NEHR plumbing. This stays government-owned and lean - perhaps a few hundred people. It runs the pipes and sets the protocols, but does not compete at the application layer.

The second entity would be a commercial services company. It would handle system integration, consulting, and vendor management. This gets spun off - perhaps privatised, perhaps converted into a GLC that must compete commercially, both domestically and internationally.

Second, MOH must reacquire in-house capacity to be an intelligent buyer of technology services. Before or concurrent with any Synapxe restructuring, MOH needs a technical unit of 50 to 100 people. Not administrators - but engineers, data architects, security specialists. People who can evaluate bids, write specifications, and challenge cost claims. Without this capacity, the ministry cannot escape capture.

Third, I would legislate interoperability standards and open API requirements for all Health Data Intermediaries, including any entity that emerges from Synapxe. The goal is to ensure that the application layer - the layer where innovation happens - is open and contestable.

I think all this can be done in a few years.

(Three Outcomes from a Reformed Model)

Mr Speaker, with such contestability - and with opening for opt-in mechanisms where citizens can choose to share their data for specific purposes and receive compensation - I believe the NEHR can be the means of production for three outcomes:

“A” Better population-scale health outcomes. This is the primary purpose and I support it fully.

“B” A fair stake in data monetisation for each citizen. If value is being extracted from their data, we should create conditions where citizens can likely share in it - not just bear the risk.

“C” An ecosystem catalyst for health-based startups. With open APIs and interoperability, Singapore can become a hub for health technology innovation. Startups can build on the NEHR platform. SMEs can compete for contracts. We can export health-tech capabilities regionally.

The NEHR can become a flywheel for a more dynamic Singapore health technology ecosystem - one that benefits the government, citizens, and entrepreneurs alike. Not merely a government-only-benefits asset.

(Closing)

Mr Speaker, in conclusion.

I support the principle of a unified national health record. It can improve care, reduce waste, and enable the precision medicine of tomorrow.

But a Bill that compels contribution must also come with robust safeguards.

Those compelled to contribute must be protected from disproportionate liability - through tiered guidance, safe harbours, and transitional support.

Privacy controls must be real. If access restrictions do not exclude data from NEHR, then a breach exposes everything regardless of restrictions.

Possible loopholes must be closed. The self-access provision in Section 17, combined with the transcription guidelines, creates pathways for insurers to circumvent the excluded purposes protection.

And if we are building a national data asset, we must ensure it is governed by contestable principles - not captured by a monopoly provider. The original vision for IHiS was discipline through competition. We should return to it.

I look forward to the Ministry’s reply on my structural concerns.

Thank you, Mr Speaker. I support the Bill.

Mr Speaker,

I support the principles of the Public Sector (Governance) (Amendment) Bill, but I would like to place some significant concerns on the record.

(A Lesson in Trust)

Let me begin with a story this House knows well.

In January 2021, Singaporeans learned that police had access to TraceTogether data under the Criminal Procedure Code. This contradicted earlier assurances that the data was (quote) “purely for contact tracing, period.” (end quote) The then-Minister in charge of Smart Nation acknowledged he had been “blindsided”—he had not considered existing law when making those assurances.

The backlash was significant. Not because Singaporeans oppose law enforcement, but because they felt misled about how their data would be used. The backlash led to the expedited passage in February 2021 of the COVID-19 (Temporary Measures) (Amendment) Bill, restricting access to 7 serious offence categories.

The lesson is that trust must be built through demonstrably robust processes. Once faith in a data-sharing framework is broken, it is expensive to rebuild.

I raise this because the Bill before us creates a new framework for sharing citizen data—this time, with private entities. The question is whether we have learned from the TraceTogether episode.

(What the Bill Does)

The original PSGA, passed in 2018, allowed government agencies to share data with one another under Ministerial direction.

This Amendment expands that framework significantly: data can now flow to private companies, contractors, and vendors. And it introduces a power to re-identify anonymised information.

(The Core Question)

Mr Speaker, of course data sharing creates value. Examples abound - like the Social Service Net -when MSF shares client data with Family Service Centres and VWOs, we see coordinated assistance and faster assessments.

But this Bill creates a fundamental asymmetry.

The Government gains the capability to share any data with any private entity. Private entities gain access to government-held data. What do citizens gain?

Under this Bill, a citizen has no right to know when their data is shared with a private company. No mechanism to find out which companies hold their data. And no way to ensure they benefit from the value that data creates.

TraceTogether failed on transparency—citizens did not know police could access their data. Why risk the same failure mode again with this Bill on a larger scale, with more actors including those outside government, and less visibility?

If this Bill expands what the Government can do with citizen data, should it not also expand what citizens can do—to track, to benefit from, and to govern that sharing?

(Three Asks)

Mr Speaker, I ask for three commitments that would complete this framework.

One: A Public Register.

All data sharing directions issued to private entities should be published—the categories of data shared, the recipient, the purpose, the duration.

This is not a per-transaction notification. It is the disclosure of Ministerial directions, made in small numbers. Australia’s Data Availability and Transparency Act 2022 includes such a register. It creates accountability without undue operational burden.

TraceTogether’s problem was that citizens could not know how their data was used. A register solves this.

Question 1: Will the Government commit to publishing a register of all data sharing directions issued to private entities?

Two: Citizen Benefit

When data flows from government to the private sector, it creates value for those two players. Agencies gain efficiency. Private entities gain data access and improve their services. Where is the mechanism ensuring citizens share in that value?

I mean concrete improvements: service quality guarantees, cost reductions passed to users, transparency about outcomes, and also something I believe in, which is benefit-sharing from any future monetisation of their data.

Question 2: What benefits will Singaporeans see from this framework? How will these be tracked and reported? WIll there be any part of the government that advocates directly for citizens gaining a share of these data benefits?

Three: Public Review

The original PSGA allowed sharing between government agencies. This Amendment opens the door to the private sector—powers of a different order.

Australia’s framework includes a review that quote “must start by, and be completed within, 12 months (or a longer period agreed by the Minister) of the third anniversary of the commencement of the Act.”. This is a sound legislative principle: The grant of novel powers should have built-in moments for reassessment.

The backlash to TraceTogether led to emergency legislation limiting police access. Would it not be better to commit to a review now than to legislate in a possible crisis of confidence later?

So, Question 3: Will the Minister commit to a formal public review within five years—including the directions issued, the data shared, and whether safeguards have been adequate.

(Two Further Concerns)

Mr Speaker, beyond these three asks, I wish to flag two concerns about organisational accountability.

First, a data governance gap.

The public consultation promised “robust safeguards” through “data governance requirements” on external partners—I quote: requirements “similar to what public sector agencies have to meet.”

What does the Bill deliver? Individual criminal liability for employees who misuse data.

What does the Bill not deliver? Any organisational requirements. No security certification. No audit trails. No breach notification duties.

So, Question 4: Where are the data governance requirements promised in the consultation? If they are to come by regulation or procurement contract terms, will the Minister commit to that today?

Second, a liability gap for non-personal data.

Under PDPA, for data breaches involving personal data, organisations face financial penalties of up to 10% of annual turnover. . Individuals also face liability.

Under this Bill, for non-personal data shared with private entities, only individual employees can be prosecuted. If an organisation systematically exploits non-personal government data beyond its authorised purpose, the entity that designed the business model and profited faces no direct liability.

Accountability must reach the benefiting entity. If organisations can profit from misuse while only individuals bear risk, the incentive structure is incorrect.

Question 5: Will the Government commit to organisational accountability mechanisms, especially for non-personal data which is not covered by PDPA? Why has it not chosen to hold organisations accountable here?

Mr Speaker, I am on the whole supportive of the bill’s enabling of data sharing with private sector actors. In any case, deeper public-private collaboration is inevitable. Data will flow to where it creates value.

But we should learn the lessons of TraceTogether.

TraceTogether taught us that non-transparency about data-sharing has costs. This Bill should learn that lesson. Transparency is what makes data sharing sustainable in the long-term.

So I’ve asked for three commitments: a public register, a mechanism to track and report citizen benefit, and a formal review within five years.

And I’ve flagged two gaps in organisational accountability that should be addressed.

I trust the points collectively raised today will spare us a future ‘blindsiding’.

Thank you, Mr Speaker.

Health (MOH) - 5 Questions

To ask the Coordinating Minister for Social Policies and Minister for Health given that the Monetary Authority of Singapore primarily regulates solvency, whether the Ministry intends to establish a dual-regulation framework to oversee the (i) healthcare outcomes (ii) panel selection criteria and (iii) loss-ratio efficiency of private insurers to ensure they align with national health goals.

To ask the Coordinating Minister for Social Policies and Minister for Health given findings that shingles vaccination reduces dementia, including the May 2025 Nature study showing Zostavax causally reduces diagnoses by 20% and the July 2024 Nature Medicine study showing Shingrix is associated with 164 added dementia-free days, whether the Ministry will (i) include dementia prevention savings into cost-benefit analyses for shingles vaccines and (ii) consider extending shingles vaccine subsidies to persons aged 50-59.

To ask the Coordinating Minister for Social Policies and Minister for Health following the Competition and Consumer Commission of Singapore’s clearance of the recent merger between Singapore’s two largest private nursing home operators (a) what is the combined market share of private equity-backed nursing home operators; (b) what percentage of the Ministry’s Build-Own-Lease operating subventions currently flow to such operators versus Voluntary Welfare Organisations; and (c) what safeguards exist against future price increases in an increasingly consolidated market.

To ask the Coordinating Minister for Social Policies and Minister for Health (a) what specific technical or regulatory barriers prevent the inclusion of Japan’s Pharmaceuticals and Medical Devices Agency and South Korea’s Ministry of Food and Drug Safety as reference agencies for therapeutic product registration; (b) to what extent does such exclusion delay the registration of medicines optimised for regional populations; and (c) whether the Ministry will conduct a feasibility study on recognising such World Health Organisation Listed Authorities as HSA’s reference agencies, to accelerate drug access.

To ask the Coordinating Minister for Social Policies and Minister for Health (a) whether the shift in model from the Community Health Assist Scheme’s means-tested co-payments to Healthier SG’s capitation model signals a departure from the Ministry’s philosophy of shared responsibility in healthcare financing; and (b) without market-based price signals to moderate demand under the capitation model, what specific mechanisms will prevent buffet syndrome and ensure Healthier SG’s long-term fiscal sustainability.

Finance (MOF) & Trade/Industry (MTI) - 4 Questions

To ask the Prime Minister and Minister for Finance (a) whether the Government will review Temasek’s risk-return framework to explicitly value strategic ecosystem building alongside commercial returns; (b) whether the Government has assessed the impact of Temasek’s recent deprioritisation of direct early-stage local investments on Singapore’s ability to nurture nascent high-potential industries; and (c) if so, whether alternative capital support mechanisms will be introduced to fill this gap.

To ask the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Trade and Industry (a) whether the Competition and Consumer Commission of Singapore is evaluating the reported potential CapitaLand-Mapletree merger and will mandate a formal Phase 1 or Phase 2 review; (b) if so, how will the relevant market be defined to ensure accurate assessment; and (c) whether additional safeguards to protect SME tenants from possible abuse of dominant position in lease renewals will be considered.

To ask the Prime Minister and Minister for Finance for each year over the past decade (a) how many Singapore citizens have transitioned from being tax residents to non-residents and vice versa; (b) what is the breakdown (i) by gender and (ii) by five-year age groups; and (c) what proportion of Singapore citizen tax residents in 2014 have remained so in 2024, as broken down by gender and age.

To ask the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Trade and Industry (a) why digital Singapore-based warehouse receipts remain underutilised for financing critical minerals despite the 2021 Electronic Transactions Act (ETA) amendments; (b) whether the Ministry will operationalise section 16Q of the ETA to accredit trusted issuers; and (c) how does Singapore’s framework for metal warrant financing compare to systems already operational in Dubai and the UK.

Defence (MINDEF) - 1 Question

To ask the Coordinating Minister for Public Services and Minister for Defence (a) whether the Ministry has conducted a strategic review of the decision to relocate Paya Lebar Air Base in light of recent global conflicts demonstrating the vulnerability of concentrated air assets to mass drone attacks and long-range munitions; and (b) whether such consolidation of the RSAF’s assets into fewer air bases significantly increases operational risks during a first-strike scenario.

Education (MOE) - 1 Question

To ask the Minister for Education whether the Ministry will consider mandating the transfer of non-pedagogical administrative tasks, such as the management of parental consent forms, monetary collections, and event logistics, from teachers to school administrative and operations personnel to align with the Ministry’s objective of reducing teacher workload.

National Development (MND) - 2 Questions

To ask the Minister for National Development given the rising incidence of Personal Mobility Device battery fires in residential settings, whether the Government will consider piloting fire-rated outdoor charging cabinets in HDB void decks or multi-storey carparks, similar to facilities deployed in New York City and Taiwan, with subsidised electricity rates to incentivise residents to charge devices in these safer communal facilities.

To ask the Minister for National Development in light of the death of a dog captured at Seletar West Farmway 8 (a) whether the Ministry will review the “acceptable parameters” of force, as outlined in the AVS statement of 16 November 2025, and training standards for animal management contractors; and (b) whether the Ministry will formalise collaboration with animal welfare groups to ensure humane handling while maintaining public safety.

Foreign Affairs (MFA) - 1 Question

To ask the Minister for Foreign Affairs (a) what are the Ministry’s standard operating procedures, if any, for providing emergency consular aid and ensuring the safety of Singaporeans during overseas crises such as the (i) Brown University shooting on 13 December 2025, (ii) Bondi Beach shooting on 14 December 2025 and (iii) Taipei knife attack on 19 December 2025; and (b) what assistance, if any, was rendered by our overseas missions following the Brown University shooting.

Prime Minister’s Office (PMO) - 1 Question

Redirected from MinLaw.

To ask the Prime Minister whether, following Public Prosecutor v China Railway Tunnel Group, the Government will amend the Prevention of Corruption Act to (i) broaden the legal test for corporate attribution beyond the “directing mind and will” doctrine in common law or (ii) introduce a “failure to prevent” offence similar to the UK Bribery Act, ensuring large corporations cannot evade liability for corruption by senior management.

I will speak today on Section 92K of the Finance (Income Taxes) Bill, which is part of the government’s emerging strategy to improve the attractiveness of Singapore’s equity market. It provides time-limited tax incentives for both primary and secondary listings.

Before I begin, let me preface by saying I will use the term “SGX” as shorthand for SGX’s equities business. The SGX as a whole is a multi-asset exchange that has great strengths in FX, commodities and other derivatives, and I think those parts of the business, including BidFX and iron ore, have been doing a good job.

(Section 92K)

On Section 92K, my overall view is that these measures, a time-limited experiment in tax incentives, are in themselves unlikely to move the needle on improving the SGX’s competitiveness, for good or bad. Although I have general reservations about some of the bill’s principles, on balance, since it is tightly-scoped by being both limited in time and capped in subsidy, I support the bill to give this government latitude to experiment.

92K introduces a tax rebate to encourage companies to list their shares on the SGX. Companies that list their ordinary shares on a Singapore stock exchange between 19 February 2025 and 31 December 2027, new listings or re-listings, both primary and secondary listings, will qualify. Shares must be offered to the public in conjunction with the listing.

The company receives a tax rebate for 5 years. 20% of corporate tax for periods with a primary listing, and 10% for a secondary listing. These are capped at 6 million dollars a year if the market capitalization is at or above 1 billion dollars on listing date, and 3 million dollars a year if it is below that figure.

The company must remain listed throughout the entire 5-year period, and must apply for approval by 31 December 2027.

The principles of 92K that I have reservations about are -

First, the extension of rebates towards secondary listings. From the companies’ perspective, academic research shows secondary listings work primarily when listing in the US, where companies gain from purported superior governance standards or valuation premiums. It is debatable if Singapore offers either advantage. The advantages are not of secondary listings in general, but of the US in particular.

I can understand why SGX might want to encourage secondary listings. They are a prelude to secondary offerings. In FY2025, SGX had 6 new listings, raising 25.7 million. This was dwarfed by secondary offerings, which was a hundred times larger at 4.3 billion. SGX’s function as a capital-raising venue for already listed companies is currently much more significant than its listings. SGX Chairman Koh Boon Hwee has argued for the need to take calculated “first-mover” risks to build liquidity. Presumably, anchoring more secondary listings is one of those “first-mover” risks.

But from Singapore’s perspective: I do not see much benefit in giving incentives to attract secondary listings, especially combined with a disclosure-based regime which may result in a bigger slate of lower quality companies. At the point of entry, many may just make the number of listings and market cap look better, while not creating broad local employment since their operations are overseas. Some may disagree on the basis that these secondary listings may improve liquidity and generate turnover, but how much of this is sticky multi-year liquidity, and how much is transient event-driven volume? I ask, what is the basis of the Government’s belief that it will lead to high–quality liquidity?

For me, the bigger philosophical questions from first principles - why would a company want to do a secondary listing in Singapore? Why would Singapore benefit overall from more secondary listings in a disclosure-based regime? - remain inadequately answered.

Overall, I would rather we focus on attracting quality primary listings over extending incentives to secondary listings. But since the trial is limited in time and scope, we will support the bill’s scope in toto. We hope the results will be published and guide future market development.

The bill addresses three key tactical problems regarding secondary listings:

(a) Many secondary listings come “by introduction”, meaning no new shares sold, which leaves little local free float and tends to depress local turnover. HKEX, Hong Kong’s exchange, warns that secondary listings can suffer from “failure to develop or sustain an active trading market,” which is why they flag such stocks prominently with an “S” marker.

SGX currently has 29 secondary listings. Multiple high-profile SGX secondary listings were by way of introduction (meaning no new shares) - this includes the 2010 listing of Prudential, and the 2022 SGX listing of electric-vehicle company NIO, which GIC is now suing for securities fraud in the Southern District of New York. These secondaries have had thin local trading versus their primary venues, with exception of the Jardine group. So far, secondary listings have been a mixed bag.

I will return to this point about poor quality listings later. But tactically, 92K insists that shares must be offered to the public, ensuring some float. So listings by introduction are excluded from rebates. This is prudent.

And while this is not in the bill, I note that MAS has the GEMS Research Development Grant, which provides a top-up per research report, more if it covers pre-IPO and new-listed names. This will help strengthen the value-proposition of a listing here in Singapore, even if we cannot offer much valuation premium.

(b) The tax rebates are also tied to the profitability of the company. If the companies are loss-making, they will not qualify for the rebates. If it were not the case, we could be attracting rebate tourism from dubious companies.

(c) Last and most importantly, these measures are time-limited, until the end of 2027.

The second principle I have reservations on is this whole idea of giving listing incentives at all.

I could not find much evidence that having listing incentives will improve the quality of companies or long term performance. In fact, the converse was more likely true. The Québec Stock Savings Plan, which offered taxpayers generous tax write-offs for investments in new public stock issues of companies - drove a short-term surge in small-company primary issues, but many issuers later disappeared or posted weaker earnings; the impact on capitalization was short-lived and overall stimulus effects were limited.

For listing incentives, from the companies’ perspective, it may be unsustainable once incentives end, and these companies may fail or simply delist when that time comes.

What we are likely to see is a short-term pop in the numbers, because without answers to permanent questions around liquidity, disclosure quality, investor depth, and regulatory credibility, strong secular headwinds remain.

Some say that it is a chicken and egg problem building liquidity and investor depth. I understand this view, but I believe that raising the quality of listed companies is preconditional to building this two-sided market.

Other jurisdictions are not focusing on financial incentives. Hong Kong is focused on raising corporate governance standards, enforcement, and improving processing efficiency, which is in my view, a more correct approach.

Hong Kong’s listing rules have historically been stricter than SGX in areas such as independence of directors, remuneration disclosures, and related party transactions, and their regulators have been much more aggressive in enforcement actions including against directors. Hong Kong recently introduced a new Corporate Governance Code with stricter requirements—limiting independent non-executive directors to 6 listed directorships, mandatory continuing professional training, board skills matrices, and performance reviews. They are raising standards without using financial incentives.

On 29th October, SGX RegCo announced it would remove the financial watch list and introduce more flexible listing rules under a “disclosure-based approach.”

This is paradoxical to me. The watchlist itself was disclosure - it flagged financially distressed companies to investors. Removing it doesn’t increase disclosure; it removes a critical warning signal. What SGX calls a “disclosure-based approach” actually means more disclosure for poor companies while keeping them listed and trading, but less disclosure and actionable information for the market as a whole.

I therefore disagree with the removal of the watchlist. Industry players supporting its removal may of course benefit from more trading volume, even if low-quality. Their incentives may not align with retail investor protection. Taiwan’s 54% retail participation versus our 21% shows what happens when retail investors have confidence—confidence built on quality signals like watchlists and Investor Protection Centers.

(Positive Vision)

I will now move on to a few remarks on the principles that should underlie our stock market.

At its core, a stock market strikes a ‘domestic bargain‘: savers get high-quality asset appreciation, and local enterprises get capital and exit opportunities. All other functions - such as foreign capital allocating to Singapore, or overseas companies listing in Singapore - are extensions of this core.

Four structural realities constrain our equity market:

First, the “ASEAN gateway” strategy is becoming obsolete. It may have worked for Singapore when other Southeast Asian countries did not have a strong local market. But today, Thailand and Vietnam have their own mature and highly liquid markets, with domestic brand recognition. ASEAN companies no longer have as many compelling reasons to list on the SGX vis-a-vis their home exchanges.

Second, our regulatory reach is limited over other foreign markets. This means for foreign companies we are exposed to information asymmetry and governance risks we cannot adequately mitigate, such as for the fraud-accused NIO.

Third, passive capital demands quality indexes. The tidal force of passive investment is a secular supertrend. Sovereign wealth funds like Norway’s world-leading GPFG [Government Pension Fund Global] have demonstrated that low-cost passive investing outperforms the active management approach. I believe passive strategies will form the basis of significant portfolio allocations going forward.

But passive investment requires something fundamental: high-quality indexes or baskets worth buying. Investors must be able to trust that the basket of stocks they’re purchasing represents genuine value, not a random collection of mediocre companies.

By lowering listing standards and removing investor protections like the financial watch list, the risk is that the quality of the SGX and STI is allowed to degrade precisely when global capital is demanding higher quality for passive allocation.

Let us not forget that active-management, to weed out mediocrity, is an expensive endeavour. You will pay an active manager above-and-beyond to do due-diligence to separate wheat from chaff. And these active management fees are a drag on any future returns.

You cannot attract passive capital by diluting the quality of your index. Any slackening in market-shaping and maintaining quality standards cuts directly against one of the most important structural trends in modern finance. I am bearish on any cutting of standards.

Fourth, passive capital also demands coherent indexes. Without quality and coherence, we cannot articulate what our market represents.

Big allocators need clarity about what each allocation represents in their portfolio. But look at the STI: Financials ~54%, Real Estate Investment Trusts or REITs ~16.4%, Industrials ~9.8%, Telecom ~7.5%, Utilities ~4.9%. Almost entirely defensive.

There is also leakage. Secondary listings like Jardine Matheson and Hongkong Land (both managed from Hong Kong) comprise 5% of the Index but represent neither Singapore operations nor “Singapore Inc”’s core capital-formation interests.

Defensiveness and leakage are headwinds in building a future coherent story to ultimately increase the SGX’s valuation premium.

What would a future coherent story look like?

Not mimicking NASDAQ’s high-beta growth. Not remaining purely defensive. But rather: a foundation of quality SMEs - profitable, well-run, the “domestic bargain” in action - complemented by selective growth engines from a robust R&D industrial policy.

The local stock market is currently dominated by GLCs [Government-Linked Companies]. However, Singapore has a long-tail of well-run, profitable SMEs which do require growth-capital. They aren’t super-growth companies but they deserve capital and can anchor our index.

We need to meet our economy where it is. SGX should become an exchange that looks out for growing SMEs and cultivates a pipeline for listing. This should include overhauling the sponsor-based Catalist board to be replaced by a non-trading, capacity-building “incubation board” which graduates to OTC-style boards as a prelude to mainboard listing. SMEs are the companies that would benefit most from a supportive exchange ecosystem, including the long-tail of research needed to cover them.

The second layer would be selective growth from R&D. Commercial offshoots from our RIE masterplans in Pharmaceuticals, Advanced Manufacturing, and Deep Tech should be able to list at an earlier stage to access domestic capital. The collapse of Tessa Therapeutics in 2023 - despite raising over $200 million US Dollars - illustrates the brittleness of relying solely on late-stage venture funding without domestic capital market support. Without opining on the commercial validity of that specific decision, I believe capital-intensive R&D ventures could benefit from accessible public markets. Earlier-stage listings would build local investor familiarity with science-based companies, and allow incremental capital raising as milestones are met, and would perhaps have improved the odds for some of the first-generation Biopolis companies which failed. That is why I support SGX Regco’s amending of admission requirements for life science companies.

(Substantiation Sought)

With your indulgence, Mr Speaker, before I end, as this bill touches upon the stock market, I would like to correct some statements about the Workers’ Party’s stock market proposals.

Minister Chee Hong Tat, at a DBS-hosted fireside chat on 22nd October 2025, said (quote)

“Over the past year, we have worked closely with the industry to come up with proposals that could enhance the liquidity and competitiveness of Singapore’s equities market. We decided not to go for quick fixes, such as asking GIC or Temasek to pump-prime the market by mandating them to invest a certain amount in local equities. I explained in Parliament previously, in response to similar calls by the Workers’ Party, that I do not believe such superficial measures will be effective and sustainable. It is what the Chinese call 治标不治本 [Zhìbiāo bù zhìběn], solutions that may sound good in theory but actually do not solve the underlying problems facing our equities market.” (end quote)

I am not sure what “calls” the Minister is referring to. I have looked around and asked my colleagues but drawn a blank. My colleague Louis Chua did speak in this year’s COS about our stock market, but he suggested two things: letting more of Temasek’s GLCs list on SGX and strengthening corporate governance standards. He did not suggest what the Minister has called “pump-priming”.

But I did manage to find this exchange while digging in the Hansard, a PQ from 2nd July 2024.

(quote) asked the Prime Minister and Minister for Finance whether the Government will review its investment mandates with GIC to consider the suggestion from some industry players for GIC to allocate part of its investments to securities listed on the Singapore Exchange to revitalise our local stock exchange. (end quote)

The source of that pump-priming question was MP Liang Eng Hwa, who is not a WP MP.

So, respectfully, I would like to ask the Minister to please clarify and source his comments.

Thank you, Mr Speaker. I support the Bill.

Education — Student & Staff Mental Health

• To ask the Minister for Education: (a) given counsellor allocation relies on reported caseloads, how does MOE distinguish genuinely low need from demand suppressed by limited counsellor access; (b) what prospective metrics identify unmet need; and (c) whether educators’ own mental health needs are incorporated in the allocation.

• To ask the Minister for Education: (a) whether the Ministry will review counsellor reporting structures to enhance confidentiality and trust, including models where counsellors report to a dedicated mental health body rather than solely to principals; (b) whether training on counselling ethics can be provided for school principals; and (c) what steps will increase qualified professional-to-student ratios and safeguard counsellor autonomy.

Education — AI, SkillsFuture & Teacher Workload

• To ask the Minister for Education: (a) whether the Ministry will expand SkillsFuture Credit eligibility to include subscriptions for curated, high-quality AI productivity tools to facilitate hands-on learning; and (b) if not, why not.

• To ask the Minister for Education: (a) how does the Ministry account for the OECD Teaching and Learning International Survey 2024 findings showing that 75% of teachers use AI, but weekly work hours remain at around 47 since 2018 with rising stress levels; and (b) whether teacher workload reduction will be made a KPI alongside learning outcomes for AI adoption, with baselines, targets, timelines, and published results.

Education — Teacher Pipeline (PGDE)

• To ask the Minister for Education: for each of the last three years, (a) the median and 90th-percentile processing time for Postgraduate Diploma in Education (PGDE) applications from submission to final offer; (b) the share of candidates who passed the interview but withdrew before receiving an offer; and (c) whether prolonged timelines had compelled qualified candidates to seek alternative employment.

Transport — Roadworks, Dig-Once & Kovan–Serangoon Corridor

• To ask the Acting Minister for Transport: (a) in each of the past three years, how many kilometres of resurfaced roads were re-excavated and what was the estimated cost to taxpayers; (b) what binding powers the Road Opening Coordination Committee holds to compel a consolidated dig-once schedule; and (c) why the Common Services Tunnel model is not applicable to new HDB towns and major redevelopment zones.

• To ask the Acting Minister for Transport: given Kovan Wellspring BTO completion will increase peak traffic demands, (a) what are LTA’s plans on the congestion towards expressways along the Kovan–Serangoon corridor; (b) what bus and MRT capacity upgrades are planned to address current two-to-three train waits during morning rush in this area; and (c) what is the timeline for MRT-related relief and road improvements along the Kovan–Serangoon corridor.

Urban Development & Wildlife Management

• To ask the Minister for National Development: (a) under what conditions the protected-species status of a wildlife animal will be reconsidered when it causes repeated economic damage to private property; (b) what criteria are used to classify an animal as a pest; and (c) whether otters meet such criteria.

Finance, MAS & Financial Integrity

• To ask the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Trade and Industry: (a) whether the deployment of the Private Credit Growth Fund will be pulled back given rising global private-credit risks; and (b) whether GIC’s caution on the private-credit market will inform the Ministry’s stance on the deployment of the Fund, or are the views separately held.

• To ask the Prime Minister and Minister for Finance: (a) whether any individuals sanctioned by the US for alleged transnational criminal activities or convicted in Singapore’s largest money-laundering case had operated tax-exempt family offices locally; (b) what due-diligence checks MAS conducts before granting such incentives; and (c) what systemic reforms have been implemented to prevent criminal networks from exploiting Singapore’s family-office regime.

Community & State Land — Serangoon North View

• To ask the Minister for Law: whether the Government will designate a dog run on the state land parcel adjacent to Serangoon North View.

Manpower — Pay Practices & Sector Quotas

• To ask the Minister for Manpower: whether the Ministry will consider prohibiting employers from requesting last-drawn salary information during recruitment to promote wage determination based on skills and role requirements, prevent anchoring and indexing of offers to prior pay, and mitigate disadvantages from unfavourable starting salaries.

• To ask the Minister for Manpower: whether the Ministry will establish distinct (i) waste and cleaning and (ii) food and beverage sub-categories within the Services sector with differentiated dependency ratios and quotas, given their differing manpower requirements.

Social & Family Development — Inclusive Early-Childhood Support

• To ask the Minister for Social and Family Development: (a) what evaluation was done to conclude that cessation of the Integrated Childcare Programme (ICCP) that helped children with mild special needs was necessary in 2024; (b) what service gap was projected given that expansion of the Inclusive Support Programme (InSP) will only start from 2026; and (c) what like-for-like interim provisions are in place to ensure in-childcare support for affected children.

Health — Dental Services & MediSave

• To ask the Coordinating Minister for Social Policies and Minister for Health: (a) whether polyclinic dental services will be expanded to include fabricating, repairing and fitting of dentures instead of having patients referred to tertiary institutions; and (b) whether current MediSave rules preventing claims for dentures can be reviewed.

Mr Speaker, since serving as an MP, I have seen firsthand the impact of national policies on small, independent preschools in my division. As a parent of young children, I feel these issues acutely. Their voices warn of a serious problem: the quiet extinction of diversity in our preschools.

Many young parents may have read in CNA of a spate of preschool closures over the last few years—at least six reported in the past two years alone, and there are many that go unreported. I will explain why.

(The Landscape)

Mr Speaker, let us first understand the landscape. In 2013, the Early Childhood Development Agency—or ECDA—was formed under MSF to raise preschool standards. Under it, two major schemes now dominate the sector.

First, the Anchor Operator scheme or A-OPs. Five large, government-supported operators: PCF Sparkletots, NTUC My First Skool, E-Bridge, Skool4Kidz, and M.Y World. They receive significant grant funding and priority HDB site allocation in exchange for capping fees and meeting quality requirements.

Second, the Partner Operator scheme or P-OPs. These are mid-sized players with slightly higher fee caps but similar obligations.

Together, these two schemes have grown at a staggering rate. Today, over 53% of all preschools in Singapore are either an Anchor or Partner Operator. PCF and NTUC My First Skool alone account for at least 30% of all preschools. The Government has stated that over 65% of preschoolers are in government-supported preschools, with a target of around 80% by 2025.

There is another angle of competition, coming directly from MOE. MOE Kindergartens or MKs were launched in 2014, and are co-located within primary schools. A major draw for parents is priority under Phase 2A of P1 registration for the primary school which creates a “through-train” for P1 admission. There are now 56 MKs. You may know some of these primary schools: Temasek, Princess Elizabeth, Gongshang. This has pulled students away from independent preschools.

Independent operators face a pincer movement. From MSF and ECDA: anchor and partner operators who receive significant fiscal funding and preferential allocation to HDB sites with much lower rent. From MOE: kindergartens operating with the full backing of the national budget, no binding constraint of rental costs, and a compelling competitive advantage—an implicit pathway into the affiliated primary school. In this environment, even church kindergartens, who have been operating for decades, paying zero rent to use church premises, are also shutting down, halving from over 200 centres 10 years ago to over 100 today. As one operator told me: “Even zero rent also cannot survive.”

The direction of travel is clear: the “middle tier” of independent preschools is shrinking.

(The Problem)

Mr Speaker, I support making preschools affordable and raising educators’ wages. But the method of direct operator subsidies used to achieve them has inadvertently created a deeply distorted market.

The unfairness comes from the way subsidies are given.

There are two types of subsidies. The first is the parent-level subsidy, which many parents will know. The Basic Childcare Subsidy provides a transparent and fair offset of 150 to 300 dollars per month for any citizen child in an ECDA-licensed centre..

But the second far more opaque category of operator-level subsidy is largely implemented through direct fiscal transfers. On the MSF side, this is only available to A-Ops and P-Ops. On the MOE Kindergarten side, this comes directly from the MOE national budget. This is a direct transfer to these chosen government-supported operators, and no one else.

The Government’s method has thus not created a level playing field; it has created a trap. For independent operators, this trap has three walls.

First, they Cannot Remain. They face dwindling enrollment due to the breakneck expansion of A-Ops and MKs, which use unequal fiscal grants to offer lower fees. Simultaneously, these state-backed centers create a net talent drain by offering higher salaries, leaving independents to struggle with rising rental costs and a fight for survival.

Second, they Cannot Consolidate. Some say, “Join the Partner Operator scheme.” as this is the intended way for private operators to enter the government-supported umbrella . For many, this is a difficult choice. A. The consortium requirement means they must expose their books to one another. One lead holds the purse strings, and counterparty risk is high. B. The selection criteria is opaque - if rejected, ECDA provides no reason, and no feedback. C. There is commercial lock-in: once fees are capped under the P-OP scheme, exiting is near-impossible as parents will likely not accept a reversion to significantly higher fees.

Third, many Cannot Sell. For many operators in HDB sites, the inability to sell their businesses is a frustrating obstacle. Transfer of lease requires HDB and ECDA approval, but rejections are given without reasons. One operator’s sale was blocked with the vague, one-sentence justification that the new owner could not “ensure the continuity of care and education,” leaving them with no path of appeal.

Cannot remain. Cannot consolidate. Cannot sell.

The only path left is to shut down. And that is what many do. So this quiet extinction continues.

Mr Speaker, this is not right. Many private operators started with good intentions to provide a way of education for their kids, pouring their life savings and their passion into creating nurturing spaces. But today, many feel trapped.

(Three Questions for the Government)

Speaker, let me state plainly what many operators believe. They suspect the government wants to nationalize the sector. They ask three questions, and they deserve straight answers:

Question One: Does the government want standardized, cookie-cutter early education? Many feel the push for A-Ops and MKs penalizes operators who offer unique models—small teacher-child ratios, project-based learning, Montessori, Reggio Emilia, faith-based schools—that don’t fit the standard mold.

Question Two: Does the government wish to nationalize this sector? Because if the intention is not nationalization, why are these features present: A-OP share increasing, M-K count increasing, share of children served by A-OPs, P-OPs and MKs targeted to be 80% by 2025, and no articulated vision for the independent sector beyond its “managed-decline”?

Question Three: Is the government’s ideal outcome a kindergarten market dominated by MOE Kindergartens, with the pre-kindergarten market dominated by major anchor operators?

Mr Speaker, let me give a further example of why operators perceive a deep lack of fairness in the system, and raises questions about whether ECDA’s actions serve the entire sector equitably.

On 29 October 2022, MSF Minister Masagos announced significant pay rises for educators in A-Ops. However, long-standing ECDA rules require that fee increases for the following year must be notified by 1st September of the previous year. So fee notifications for 2023 had to be submitted by 1st September 2022.

This timing trapped private operators: they were locked out of adjusting fees to match the new wage benchmarks, yet were immediately exposed to talent poaching by A-Ops offering the pay rises.

I ask the Ministry to clarify if any transitional provisions were made for private operators caught by this announcement.

(The Human Cost)

Mr Speaker, the human cost of this system starts with our children and radiates outwards to their teachers, their parents, and finally, all of us as taxpayers.

At the centre are the children. While I have great admiration for those who work in A-Ops and MKs, which have good programs on STEM and public speaking, we must acknowledge these systems’ flaws. High teacher-child ratios mean less individual attention. Furthermore, MSF’s top-down directives to include neurodiverse children create chaotic environments. The typical A-Op setting, with its bright white lights, cluttered displays, and high noise levels, is often unsuited for the neurodiverse, and in turn, diverts resources from neurotypical children who must learn in a more disrupted environment.

The educational philosophy itself is also narrowing. MKs increasingly run a standardised program as their principals focus on P1 readiness and “school-ify” our young children. I do not blame them, if their KPIs are more for P1 results over preschool creativity, the push for P1 readiness will almost always win.

But we should have the space to “let children be children”. The accelerated roll-out of MKs with priority P1 admission, feeds parental anxiety and creates focus on academic readiness over holistic development. Mr Speaker, we should be preparing children not for Primary 1, but for life.

There is an immense cost placed upon our teachers, who are on the frontlines of a system breeding burnout. They navigate an unstable market, with centres shutting down left and right, and are increasingly pushed into “cookie-cutter” state-led models that kill their passion for teaching. They manage large K2 classes of 25 children, and find it hard to give individualised attention. They spend precious time dealing with paperwork and writing incident reports instead of teaching. And they operate in a “kiasi” culture, driven by conservative interpretations of ECDA circulars. This is a culture where pencils must be stored lying flat for safety, where operators are afraid to let children taste prata during cultural lessons. This high-stress, low-trust model is unsustainable. I am told by both teachers and operators that it is causing many teachers to burnout and leave the A-Op system, often after bonuses are paid. While I do not have official data, the anecdotal attrition estimates shared with me are concerningly high.

This brings us to the cost for parents: a severe diminution of choice. As independent operators close, parents lose access to the diversity that could offer a refuge from these systemic flaws.

Finally, there is a cost to all of us as taxpayers. The current funding model is entirely opaque. Without transparency on operator-level subsidies, it is impossible to assess the true cost and efficiency of these schemes. Worse, we may be funding wasteful competition. In some estates like Punggol and Jurong West, multiple A-Ops are clustered together in a small area, all “fighting for numbers” , displaying what they in China call involution or neijuan: a zero-sum game of wasteful competition.

(The Solution)

Mr Speaker, the fundamental problem is that MSF and MOE are relying on operators—A-Ops, P-Ops, MKs—to uplift the sector instead of genuinely implementing sector-wide reforms. Their three policy goals—affordability, increasing educator salaries, and quality assurance —are rolled out via chosen operators.

I will lay out a sector-wide reform without biasing towards particular operators.

First: we must “Fund the Child, Not the School”.

Let subsidies follow the child. Instead of funneling opaque grants to select operators, we can create a portable preschool voucher that bundles all public support into a transparent, per-child amount. Parents can use it at any licensed center.

This empowers parents to choose a preschool that best fits their child’s needs—be it PCF, Montessori, faith-based organizations, or play-based centers. It forces all schools, including state-backed giants, to compete fairly on quality, philosophy, service; without predetermining the winner’s business model.

In fact, this is not a radical leap, because ECDA moved from funding A-Ops based on centre capacity to a per-child funding model earlier this year. This principle should be expanded to all operators, not just A-Ops.

On fee control: The government may fear subsidy capture—that operators will absorb the voucher without lowering fees. Let me offer a different view. The surest way to keep fees in check is to keep the market open and contestable. A January 2024 study on childcare in Minnesota found that when you fund parents directly, the market finds a way to create more supply. They found that increased voucher funding led to more providers entering the market, an expansion of available slots, and only modest price increases.

This is what a healthy responsive market looks like. It is diversity—and the capacity of all to scale—that gives a market supply-elasticity. A system where operators “Cannot Remain, Cannot Consolidate, and Cannot Sell” would create inelasticity and potential future subsidy capture.

This is not a leap into the unknown. Australia runs a portable, per-child subsidy—the Child Care Subsidy—that follows the child to any approved service. It is paid to providers to reduce the bill, and is governed by a published rate cap that limits the total subsidised amount. Portable funding across operators , transparent reference prices, and quality assurance can coexist.

By contrast, the current system is highly susceptible to subsidy capture— with chosen operators capturing massive unequal subsidies that may not reach parents as choice or quality improvements. With vouchers, parents can control where the money goes.

This will fix the school-level market where subsidies distort operator competition.

Second: Embed Policy Goals in the Voucher.

Speaker, the government’s instinct is to solve every preschool problem—from teacher pay to special needs—by leaning on its chosen operators. This creates a two-tier system by design. Every preschool policy target begins to look for an operator-led solution.

There is a better way. We can use voucher supplements to achieve these policy targets while preserving a contestable market.

For teacher wages: instead of selective grants, we can offer a ‘wage supplement’ to the voucher for any centre that pays its teachers above certain benchmarks. The higher the pay, the larger the supplement. We can enforce this transparently using CPF data to verify wages and NIEC [National Institute of Early Childhood Development] standards to ensure teacher quality. It turns every operator into a potential partner in raising standards.

For special needs: the same principle applies. Instead of forcing top-down integration, we give every child with assessed needs a portable, ring-fenced voucher supplement, based on their assessed needs, such as specialized teachers, lower ratios, or sensory-friendly environments. This funding follows the child, empowering parents of neurodiverse children to choose centres with resources to provide proper support. It will also allow the emergence of specialized centres.

Some may point to Hong Kong, which once had a pure flat-rate voucher system, but moved away from it in 2017. Among the reasons given for moving away were ineffectiveness for raising teacher pay, addressing special needs, and helping low-income families. In my assessment, the HK system’s flaw lay more with the flat rate, than the voucher system itself. We can learn from this by using targeted funding supplements for these policy targets: lower-income families, special needs, teacher wages.

Three: Contestable Sites for Public Benefit.

Mr Speaker, Singapore has unique policy levers that many other systems, including Hong Kong’s, do not - such as our stock of preferential allocation sites at HDB estates and primary schools.

I believe we must make access to these locations fair and contestable. The principle should be simple: public sites for public benefit. We can open up tenders for new preschool sites in HDB estates and kindergarten spaces within our primary schools, making it a core contractual requirement that any winning bidder must adhere to a strict fee cap. This ensures the public subsidy on rent is passed on directly to parents as affordability.”

I propose two pilots. First, MSF and MND to run a sector-wide, open tender for the next batch of preschool sites in new HDB estates. Second, MOE to pilot this same open-tender model in a small number of primary schools—say, five initially—inviting all qualified operators to compete.

(What We Need From Government)

Mr Speaker, in closing, I ask this government for the following:

First, to answer the three questions:

• A. Does the government want standardized, cookie-cutter early education?

• B. Does the government want to nationalize this sector?

• C. Is the government’s ideal outcome an A-Op to MK nationalized model?

Second, fairness: to clarify ECDA’s actions in October 2022 regarding the wage announcement timing, and to commit to level-playing field policies going forward. This means dismantling the walls of the trap that operators find themselves in. Allow them to Consolidate by providing detailed P-Op selection criteria and right of appeal. Allow them to Sell their preschools.

Third, to implement the three-pillar reform: A portable voucher system to fund the child, not the school. A tiered voucher supplement system that embeds policy goals like better teacher pay and special needs support. And a fair and contestable process for allocating preferential sites, with fee caps as a firm condition.

Mr Speaker, this Government mentions how the world is becoming more uncertain. At this juncture, enforcing an educational monoculture is exactly the wrong philosophy toward an uncertain world. We need more diversity, not less.

I appeal to the Government’s sense of fairness and to parents’ lived experience: let us not allow this quiet extinction to continue. If we have five more years of this, I think there will be nothing left to save. Let us shift our focus from creating national champions to nurturing a vibrant and resilient preschool ecosystem for all our children.

Let us be pro-child, pro-teacher, pro-market, pro-diversity.

Thank you.

• To ask the Minister for Education (a) what assessment has the Ministry made of the long-term impact of MOE Kindergarten expansion on the economic viability and diversity of Singapore’s kindergarten sector; and (b) what is the current status of the Kindergarten Partner Operator scheme.

• To ask the Minister for Education (a) given that counsellor allocation relies on reported caseloads, how does the Ministry distinguish genuinely low need from demand suppressed by limited counsellor access; (b) what prospective metrics can identify unmet need; and (c) whether educators’ own mental health needs are incorporated in the allocation.

• To ask the Minister for Education (a) what is the Ministry’s operational definition of bullying, distinct from hurtful behaviour, fights or one-off comments; (b) whether this definition is standardised and implemented across all schools; and (c) if so, how incidents are consistently classified, recorded and addressed.

• To ask the Minister for Education (a) whether the Ministry will expand SkillsFuture Credit eligibility to include subscriptions for curated, high-quality AI productivity tools to facilitate hands-on learning; and (b) if not, why not.

• To ask the Minister for Education (a) whether the Ministry will review counsellor reporting structures to enhance confidentiality and trust, including models where counsellors report to a dedicated mental health body rather than solely to principals; (b) whether training on counselling ethics can be provided for school principals; and (c) what steps will increase qualified professional-to-student ratios and safeguard counsellor autonomy.

Social & Family Development (MSF / ECDA)

• To ask the Minister for Social and Family Development (a) whether the multi-stage process of the Assistive Technology Fund is fit for purpose for low-cost digital aids such as AirTags; (b) whether the Ministry will introduce a simplified fast-track process for such items; and (c) whether the low subsidy uptake for affordable devices such as AirTags indicates that the current system deters such applications.

Law & Dispute Resolution (MinLaw)

• To ask the Minister for Law (a) for each of the last three years, how many compulsory Community Mediation Centre attendances were directed through (i) authorised officer mediation direction, (ii) Community Disputes Resolution Tribunal order, (iii) Magistrate’s Complaint, (iv) police referral and (v) Community Relations Unit mediation direction; (b) whether residents may appeal to the Ministry to compel mediation; and (c) if so, the number of such appeals and successful outcomes.

National Development, Housing & Community (MND / HDB / NParks / CRU)

• To ask the Minister for National Development (a) what criteria distinguish a severe noise dispute qualifying for Community Relations Unit intervention; and (b) given that the one-year pilot in Tampines handled only five severe cases while not deploying noise sensors, what is the Ministry’s assessment of (i) the unit’s efficacy and (ii) whether its enforcement powers are operationally useful.

• To ask the Minister for National Development (a) over the past five years, how many HDB flat applications involving a minor Singaporean child were cancelled after the death of the sole citizen parent with a breakdown by (i) before unit selection, (ii) after selection but before key collection and (iii) after key collection; and (b) what compassionate appeal mechanism exists for the surviving Permanent Resident parent.

• To ask the Minister for National Development (a) under what conditions the protected-species status of a wildlife animal will be reconsidered when it causes repeated economic damage to private property; (b) what criteria are used to classify an animal as a pest animal; and (c) whether otters meet such criteria.

• To ask the Minister for National Development, in view of estimates of 13,000 to 60,000 free-roaming cats, (a) what population figure underpins planning for the Trap-Neuter-Rehome/Release-Manage (TNRM) Programme; (b) how the current sterilisation rate compares with estimated annual kitten births; (c) when sterilisation will outpace reproduction; and (d) what is the target sterilisation percentage for community cats.

Finance & Tax Policy (PMO / MOF)

• To ask the Prime Minister and Minister for Finance (a) whether the Government has assessed the fiscal prudence of offsetting grants such as the Refundable Investment Credit, as recipient multinational enterprises may subsequently relocate jobs citing high costs; and (b) if not, whether the Government will repeal or suspend BEPS 2.0 Pillar Two if major jurisdictions like the United States and China abstain from joining the framework, to avoid competitiveness and tax-base erosion.

Health & Social Policies (MOH)

• To ask the Coordinating Minister for Social Policies and Minister for Health (a) what public-health risks arise from non-prescribed performance-enhancing drug use such as human growth hormone, clenbuterol, trenbolone and anabolic steroids, particularly among youths; (b) what targeted education exists within gyms and Institutes of Higher Learning to counter normalisation; and (c) how these programmes’ effectiveness and behavioural outcomes are measured.

Transport & Infrastructure (MOT / LTA)

• To ask the Acting Minister for Transport (a) in each of the past three years, how many kilometres of resurfaced roads were re-excavated and what was the estimated cost to taxpayers; (b) what binding powers the Road Opening Coordination Committee holds to compel a consolidated dig-once schedule; and (c) why the Common Services Tunnel model is not applicable to new HDB towns and major redevelopment zones.

Digital Development & Libraries (MDDI / NLB)

• To ask the Minister for Digital Development and Information, in respect of Punggol’s Toy Library which offers educational toys for children to play with free of charge but does not lend toys, (a) what is the Ministry’s assessment of public demand for a national toy- and board-game-lending service to reduce costs and consumption; and (b) what feasibility studies have been conducted to examine integrating a toy-lending system into the National Library Board network.

(September 2025 Parliamentary Speech, by Kenneth Tiong)

Mr Speaker,

I am honoured to address this House as an MP representing the people of Aljunied GRC. This special constituency reminds us of that moment in 2011 when Singaporeans began to dream of a more plural political system, and I stand here today in service of that dream.

I wish to speak on one of the most important economic questions for our country today: what it will take for Singapore to build “inherent capacity.” By inherent capacity, I mean a rooted, high-value, local base of companies and industries. For fifty years, our prosperity has been built on attracting foreign direct investment within a world of free trade. This model served us well. But in a new era of geopolitical blocs and strategic industries, this dependence is a vulnerability. High-value work, hosted on our shores, can be repatriated at any time, leaving our workers exposed.

The ultimate defence for our workers is not a certificate from a course. It is being part of a deep industrial ecosystem. It is “tacit knowledge” - the unwritten secrets of an industry, learned not in a classroom, but in a coffee conversation after work, or overheard on the factory floor. The guarded tricks of building and tuning a foundation model, or advance notice of a new industry standard. It is this sticky, localised knowledge that gives our workers a genuine, defensible edge, justifying their wages and creating the conditions for our best entrepreneurs to thrive.

Of course, we must continue to upskill our people. But skills training alone, unmoored from a home industry, is not enough. A skill that can be learned anywhere can be performed anywhere, often at a lower cost. We must therefore build the “inherent capacity” to foster unique knowledge advantages.

Building this inherent capacity requires a resurrected “developmental state” for our time - a state that actively shapes an ecosystem to benefit our people.

There are three ways to do this: through R&D policy, industrial policy, and foreign economic policy. Today, with only 20 minutes, I will focus on the third pillar: how we engage with the world.

I would like to tell a story about economic integration.

Once, in the 1960s, American giants—Boeing, Lockheed, McDonnell-Douglas—dominated over 80 percent of the civil aviation market. Europe’s national champions - like Sud Aviation, Messerschmitt-Bölkow-Blohm and Hawker Siddeley - were confined mainly to national markets, and had a bleak future if they stayed alone. The industry dynamics favoured the American giants due to large economies of scale, enormous R&D commitments rising 20% yearly between 1930-70, and steep learning curves.

In their enlightened self-interest, they turned to a new policy instrument: a transnational industrial consortium. Airbus, founded in 1970, was designed to preserve the aviation industries of Germany, France, and the UK.

It’s important to note it was not a top-down creation of the European Community. It was driven from the bottom-up by the firms themselves.

Airbus is not a private creation. It arose from a group of state-backed enterprises, and was founded on commercial principles, learning the lessons from the commercial failure of Anglo-French Concorde. State-backing was necessary as the long-duration debt market in Europe was too small to finance this industry alone.

This political decision was made possible by two points of consensus: First, the knowledge that industrial policy was necessary to build inherent capacity - again, a rooted high-value local base of companies. Second, that national industrial policy would likely prove insufficient. Transnational projects would be needed to achieve the necessary scale and competitiveness.

It was sustained by three key points: political-will to provide financing until the consortium hit its first financial milestones; demand-assurance for guaranteed orders in the early years, and partner lock-in via specialisation and workshare agreements for different components.

Above all, it was a 50-50 split in equity holding between France and Germany.

This has proved highly successful for Europe. Today Airbus is the leading civil aviation company in the world, founded 55 years ago on a framework for positive integration - an integration that builds.

Now, let us turn to our own region, Southeast Asia.

The President’s Address and its addenda have told us of the multiple platforms we will pursue for economic growth. We are to deepen engagement in existing trading frameworks, from the CPTPP to our network of FTAs and Digital Economy Agreements. But we have spent years and decades cultivating these types of platforms without fostering that strong base of locally grown companies. Something is missing.

For decades, our diplomatic energy has been spent on the idea of “negative integration” - that is to say, integration by way of removal of trade barriers.

“Negative integration” has been duly implemented. In 2009, the ASEAN Trade in Goods Agreement (or ATIGA) came into force. ASEAN’s website states, I quote: “Through ATIGA, Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand have eliminated intra-ASEAN import duties on 99.65 percent of their tariff lines. Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar, and Viet Nam have reduced their import duties to 0-5 percent on 98.86 percent of their tariff lines. Today, focus is given to addressing non-tariff measures that could have non-tariff barrier effects on the region’s trade and business activities.” (end quote)

Yet a 2019 commissioned study by ASEAN’s Coordinating Committee for the Implementation of ATIGA, found that 10 years after ATIGA came into force, intra-ASEAN trade had not grown any faster than ASEAN’s total trade, stagnating at 25%. Moreover, for a large fraction of trade ATIGA offered no real advantage - either “Most-Favored Nation” rates at zero already meant there were no tariffs to cut, or the special ASEAN discount was so tiny it made no practical difference.

Decades of effort for negligible results. I am not against negative integration, but it clearly is not a sufficient ideal for Southeast Asian integration.

Against it, I believe Airbus exemplifies an ideal of “positive integration” in the industrial sense.

Our region tried a form of “positive integration” before, with the ASEAN Industrial Projects (AIPs) in the 1970s.

In 1977, five projects were designated: nitrogenous urea fertiliser for Malaysia and Indonesia, phosphatic fertiliser for the Philippines, soda ash for Thailand, and diesel engines for Singapore. The equity arrangement agreed in 1980 was fundamentally imbalanced - 60 percent for the host country, with the other four taking 10 percent each. The four non-Singapore projects were geared towards the agricultural industry, a reflection of national development priorities.

The AIPs failed, because national priorities overrode genuine complementation, and because the equity structure was fundamentally imbalanced. States will only enter enduring cooperation agreements when they do not fear that their partners will gain disproportionately.

The success of Airbus holds a mirror to these past failures and shows us a path forward.

Mr Speaker, critics will rightly point out that Europe in the 1960s and 70s is not Southeast Asia today. They will speak of deep-seated political sensitivities, of differing economic priorities, and of the cultural gulf that separates our nations. They are not wrong. These challenges are real and significant.

But I ask: are these differences greater than those that separated France and Germany just two decades after a world war? True partnership is not born from the absence of difficulty, but from the shared will to overcome it in the face of a greater common challenge - the squeeze of geoeconomic competition and knowing that going it alone is a losing game.

Three factors are critical.

First, it requires coalitions of the willing, not committees of the whole. Bilateral or trilateral consortiums of nations. Some must integrate faster, to demonstrate the benefits of a particular integration model.

Second, it demands balanced payoffs, like an equitable 50/50 or 60/40 structure. This ensures every nation has an equal stake in a shared success, bridging a trust deficit that erects non-tariff barriers. Defined payoffs, and the way they are structured, must be negotiated early on. These negotiations reveal the viability or lack thereof regarding long-term co-operation.

And third - today, the industrial bases built across Southeast Asia by foreign direct investment give us a foundation our predecessors never had, that allows us to build complementarity from a higher-base than the agricultural-industrial options available to the previous generation of policy-makers.

I am a believer that foreign investment has been a net positive for this region. Negative integration in ASEAN, via ATIGA and FTAs, has created a stable potential foundation for increased regional trade. But the world is changing - and we must now adapt to that changing world.

Positive industrial integration is not the only option available to us. But it is a necessary diversifier in a portfolio of international strategies. Above all we should not spend all our diplomatic capital deepening a model that is yielding diminishing returns. We need to build a future with real, defensible, and shared prosperity.

This is not a dream. I read with interest in March 2025, the call in the Malay Mail by the CEO of MIMOS Berhad, Malaysia’s national applied R&D centre, calling for strong industrial policy to create a semiconductor chip design ecosystem for Malaysia. To move beyond being a trusted manufacturer for global companies to become innovators.

When I read this call (and others like it), I hear a common developmental language across nations. But to channel these ambitions through national industrial policy is to face the full cost of global competition alone. Singapore should be the partner that de-risks these aspirations by opening a path to stronger, more resilient regional consortiums.

We are in the midst of a global investment cycle in many things. Healthcare, nuclear energy, renewable energy, photonics. Budgetary decisions from the ministry of finance should begin to inform industrial policy decisions of the ministry of trade and industry. We should head in broad strokes to what will be the big buckets of spending over the next 20 years - healthcare, the clean energy transition, maritime industrialisation, education.

To ensure these efforts build our local capacity, government support - like funding and early contracts - must come with conditions. Firms must be required to build deep roots here through local engineering teams, apprenticeships, joint-IP, and guaranteed work for our SMEs.

Mr Speaker, Singapore should champion the creation of new “Airbus-style” commercial consortiums with willing regional partners. In the 21st century, this need not be a bloated state-owned enterprise. But rather the principal client and industrial anchor for an entire ecosystem of SMEs, along with the safeguards to make sure that value flows down the value-chain. Airbus sustains tens of thousands of European SMEs. Similarly, every successful venture in Southeast Asia could allow an ecosystem of SMEs to thrive.

So how do we begin? Our strategy should be modular. We don’t necessarily need to build the entire metaphorical aircraft at once; we can start by mastering a single critical component - the engine, the avionics, the advanced materials. This ‘building block’ approach allows each partner to specialise, making us stronger together than apart. As we prove the model, we can integrate more partners, even from outside our region, to build more complex systems.

And what about scale - how might such a cooperation and integration model be replicated? Once done once, the private sector can increasingly take over. The same unfolding ladder of ideas from AIPs to AIJVs to ATIGA, from positive integration to negative integration. But we must recognise our current lack of inherent capacity. So the state must be the prime mover to catalyse and build it again and anew.

This requires a change in our government’s mindset. The state must be bigger in its ambition to build this inherent capacity and shape markets as only a state can. But it also needs to become smaller, by not competing directly with our own SMEs. Too many local entrepreneurs tell me that once they reach a certain size, their biggest competitor is the Singaporean state and those linked to it.

For too long, the state’s ambition has turned inward, often leading it to compete directly with our own SMEs. No more. Its role must be redefined - the greatest enabler of our local enterprises - not their competitor.

A government that acts as a market-shaper internationally but knows when to retreat domestically creates a fairer playing field for our and our children’s ventures to succeed.

I know that there are many Singaporeans who do not share the views of some - who think that Singapore should focus on doing small things and let big countries do big things. But my message to all is that every ambition has a price. If a nation wishes to be at the frontier, it needs to be prepared to pay that price to cross that bridge. And inherent capacity at the frontier, guarded by protectionist sentiment at the best of times, is today a contested ridge-line, with all nations reawakened to the necessity of inherent capacity. It remains possible, as it always was possible, to cross this bridge, as long as the political will allows. But it requires no illusions about the limits of different growth models. It requires both developmental will abroad, and restraint at home.

This generation must decide what our country’s position is in the whole scheme of human progress. But it is my belief that we are here to catalyse a brighter future.

Thank you, Mr Speaker. I support the Motion.

• To ask the Minister for Education (a) whether an annual School Safety Scorecard per school will be published with anonymised bullying report totals, substantiation percentages, numbers of suspensions, transfers and serious sanctions; (b) whether a national anonymous anti-bullying reporting line will be established with trained responders; and (c) whether the Ministry will mandate minimum anti-bullying policy standards across all schools.

• To ask the Minister for Education (a) what criteria warrant more than one full-time counsellor per school; (b) whether independent audits have assessed allocation adequacy; (c) if so, whether results will be published and when will allocations be revised; and (d) whether the Ministry will meet the American School Counsellor Association (ASCA) recommendation of 1:250 counsellor-to-student ratio.

• To ask the Minister for Education given evidence that each additional one-degree Celsius increase in temperature reduces learning by 1–2% with greater impact on lower-income students (a) what is the Ministry’s assessment of “thermal inequality” between air-conditioned and non-air-conditioned classrooms; and (b) what specific hardware standards such as cooling, ventilation and insulation will ensure equitable, cognitively optimal learning environment for all students.

• To ask the Minister for Education (a) what is the rationale for restricting the SkillsFuture Mid-Career Training Allowance to citizens aged 40 years and above since skills obsolescence affects all ages; (b) whether the Ministry will consider the reskilling needs of workers in their 30s; and (c) whether the Ministry will expand SkillsFuture to support postgraduate qualifications (i) in critical sectors or (ii) in general.

Early Childhood & MSF / ECDA

• To ask the Minister for Social and Family Development (a) what are the specific and objective criteria used by ECDA to evaluate Partner Operator applications for preschool services beyond broad principles of quality and affordability; and (b) what is ECDA's policy on providing detailed written feedback to unsuccessful applicants, including to outline specific shortcomings against these criteria, to help them meet the required criteria for future applications.

• To ask the Minister for Social and Family Development (a) for each financial year in the last five years, what is the total quantum of Government grants and subsidies provided directly to operators of preschools under the (i) Anchor Operator and (ii) Partner Operator schemes, separate from subsidies disbursed to parents; and (b) what does this amount to on a per-enrolled-student basis for each scheme.

• To ask the Minister for Social and Family Development (a) what is the total estimated annual imputed rental value of all properties ultimately allocated to ECDA's Anchor Operators and Partner Operators for preschool services for which market-rate rent is not charged; and (b) how does the Ministry factor this in-kind subsidy when evaluating the financial efficiency of these preferential allocation schemes.

• To ask the Minister for Social and Family Development (a) whether personal tracking devices such as Apple AirTags qualify for subsidies under the Assistive Technology Fund; (b) if so, how many caregivers of children with autism obtained such devices in each of the last three years; and (c) whether the Ministry will proactively provide a starter device upon diagnosis via early-intervention centres.

Manpower & Worker Protection (MOM)

• To ask the Minister for Manpower (a) whether the Ministry has any plan to audit employers which use Government traineeship grants to displace employees or serially replace former trainees rather than create new roles; (b) if so, what are the planned audit mechanisms; and (c) whether the Ministry has any plan to establish a public debarment list of errant companies to protect jobseekers from exploitative firms.

• To ask the Minister for Manpower (a) whether the Ministry will provide that settlements mediated by the Tripartite Alliance for Dispute Management automatically become court judgments, with penalties for employer defaults; (b) if not, why not; and (c) how is the requirement for workers to commence separate court enforcement proceedings when an employer defaults assessed to balance employee interests against defaulting employers.

Trade, Industry, SMEs, R&D & Open Data (MTI)

• To ask the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Trade and Industry (a) what is the Ministry's assessment of the effectiveness of the Fair Tenancy Code of Conduct in preventing exorbitant rental hikes for SMEs upon lease renewal; and (b) whether Government will legislate caps on renewal increases that are linked to the Consumer Price Index (CPI) in the absence of material alterations or capital improvements by the landlord.

• To ask the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Trade and Industry given the Lease Agreements for Premises Act and the Code of Conduct requiring landlords collecting gross-turnover rent to share biannual sales data (a) how does the Ministry monitor data granularity and compilation; and (b) whether the Ministry will mandate like-for-like standards (eg by trade category and floor/zone) and bar aggregation across non-equivalent categories or floor to ensure fair negotiation.

• To ask the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Trade and Industry (a) what oversight ensures (i) commercial rents by landlords such as JTC and HDB remain affordable for SME tenants and (ii) that tenant-mix diversity by gross-floor-area includes a substantial share of SMEs or local brands; and (b) if not, how does the Government reconcile SME support with allowing purely commercial operations.

• To ask the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Trade and Industry in respect of joint public-private R&D Corporate Laboratories (CLs) funded under the Research, Innovation and Enterprise (RIE) plans (a) what percentage of jointly-created Intellectual Properties generate (i) zero or (ii) only nominal licensing revenue for the Singapore public entity; and (b) how is the Government ensuring taxpayers secure commensurate returns for such CLs.

• To ask the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Trade and Industry (a) whether the Government will consider making national Earth-observation data from Singapore's satellites readily accessible to Singapore-based researchers, similar to the 2008 Landsat free-data policy and the European Copernicus Programme; and (b) if not, why not.

National Development, Urban Planning & Heritage (MND)

• To ask the Minister for National Development (a) whether risk assessment based on distant Sumatran quakes has been reviewed and updated following the recent seismic activity in Johor from the proximate Mersing Fault Zone; (b) what analysis assesses HDB blocks’ ability to withstand shaking from this nearer source; and (c) whether the Ministry will commit to targeted structural inspections for the most vulnerable older HDB estates.

• To ask the Minister for National Development (a) what proportion of Environmental Impact Assessments (EIA) in the last five years required Non-Disclosure Agreements (NDAs); (b) how does the Ministry reconcile genuine consultation with NDAs that hinder informed discourse and scrutiny; and (c) whether the Ministry will publish clear guidelines defining exceptional conditions justifying EIA NDAs, making transparency the default.

• To ask the Minister for National Development (a) what framework weighs the intangible civic and heritage value of a public library against the economic value of the land; (b) how is this value calculated and factored in the relocation of Ang Mo Kio and Geylang East public libraries; and (c) when does land optimisation yield to preserving non-commercial public spaces for knowledge and community purposes.

• To ask the Minister for National Development (a) whether the Ministry monitors commercial-vacancy durations and concentration by landlords; (b) whether prolonged vacancies reflect landlords asking high rents to protect valuations; (c) what is the Ministry’s assessment on the impact on (i) rental affordability and (ii) feasibility of a commercial vacancy tax; and (d) whether public disclosure of median rents and vacancy rates by building will be mandated.

Home Affairs & Public Safety (MHA / CNB / SCDF)

• To ask the Coordinating Minister for National Security and Minister for Home Affairs (a) what percentage of pre-2018 HDB units lack Home Fire Alarm Devices (HFADs); (b) what cost-benefit analysis supports not mandating HFADs for older units when it is compulsory for new HDB homes; (c) whether HFADs will be mandated for all units/corridors of older HDB blocks; and (d) whether linkage to centralised building systems will be considered for efficient evacuations.

• To ask the Coordinating Minister for National Security and Minister for Home Affairs (a) when and why did controlled shooting for crow management cease; (b) whether there is a timeline to review reinstatement; (c) whether crow-related public nuisance and safety threats in residential estates has escalated; and (d) if so, whether the Government has a framework to address such increased nuisance and threats.

Transport Safety (MOT / LTA / TSIB)

• To ask the Acting Minister for Transport in respect of the Transport Safety Investigation Bureau’s report on the East-West Line train derailment on 25 September 2024 (a) why was the operator permitted to extend the overhaul interval of the 37-year-old KHI train by 38% without LTA's approval; (b) what engineering assessments justified this; and (c) how will such safety decisions face direct regulatory oversight henceforth.

Sustainability & Environment / Food (MSE / SFA)

• To ask the Minister for Sustainability and the Environment (a) what is SFA’s definition of "local fish produce" including the minimum qualifying Singapore grow-out period; (b) what percentage of fish produce labelled "local" originates from fish stock imported at near-market size; and (c) what steps are taken to prevent importers from exploiting this loophole and to ensure that 30-by-30 statistics reflect genuine local production.

Culture, Community & Youth (MCCY / PA / SportSG)

• To ask the Acting Minister for Culture, Community and Youth (a) whether the Government will adjust the People's Association (PA) policy to grant elected opposition Members of Parliament fair and equitable access to community centre facilities for community engagement and welfare activities within their own constituencies; and (b) if so, when.

• To ask the Acting Minister for Culture, Community and Youth (a) whether leasing a high-traffic site at Yio Chu Kang Stadium to a major fast-food business aligns with SportSG’s mission to promote healthy living; (b) what health and nutritional criteria guided the tenancy evaluation; and (c) what is the Ministry’s assessment of making fast-food a convenient post-exercise option at Yio Chu Kang Stadium.

Let me be blunt: while I wish MAS well in their goals, I do not believe these measures (as proposed) will succeed in revitalising the stock market.

I believe that to rely on the existing set-ups (SIAS, a unitary SGX, Catalist) that have got us to this moribund Singapore stock market, is like pouring new wine into old skins - we will waste our efforts.

First, we need to ask ourselves: what is a domestic stock market for? - Is it for chasing listing numbers from overseas markets like China to list here? Or is it to incubate and grow local companies?

I believe we need to reset our ideas of what the stock market should be for. In my view, a stock market’s foundational goal should be to incubate and grow local companies. It’s a good-to-have to have overseas listings, but it cannot be the primary goal. In my view, the government, over the last 20 years, has lost sight of that the developmental purpose of a stock exchange.

At the same time, I do not think MAS is being entirely fair to SGX when it is enforcing a reorientation to local equities. I was a professional trader for 6 years in buy-side finance, trading global macro across many asset classes. I know SGX has developed great strengths in OTC FX, commodity derivatives such as onshore iron-ore futures. As a for-profit entity, it has fiduciary duties to seek out these opportunities, and it has done so well. I think it is a well-run derivatives exchange.

So that is why I believe that we will need new institutions (or “new skins”) to handle the responsibility of creating a vibrant Singapore stock market.

• Firstly, we should set up a new non-profit stock exchange to replace SGX’s stock market function, and allow SGX to focus on its profitable derivatives business. This reorganisation has been done before, in December 1999, when SGX was formed as a holding company out of Singapore International Monetary Exchange (SIMEX) and Stock Exchange of Singapore (SES).

• This non-profit exchange should have its core goal the “development and growth of local companies”.

• Second, I believe that there should be a new independent investor-protection centre, funded by a small levy on each trade. This will fund a “corporate governance SWAT team”, an in-house team of lawyers to avoid conflicts of interest, which can initiate class-action suits on behalf of aggrieved investors, and has its own legal costs capped by law when suing large corporations, giving it the muscle to challenge powerful entities. The law should be amended to allow this state of affairs. This will restore confidence and erase the original sin of Singapore’s poor listing quality of the China “S-Chips” from 2000s-2010s, on which many domestic investors in Singapore lost substantial money.

• Third, MAS should set up an independent securities regulator instead of currently, where it lets SGX RegCo (a wholly-owned subsidiary of SGX) do all regulatory functions.

• Fourth, this new non-profit stock exchange (besides its mainboard) should include a replacement for the sponsor-based Catalist board (where 86% of stocks trade below their Day 1 closing price!) with dedicated incubation and OTC-style boards that have a clear developmental mandate. By creating a venue for companies in an earlier development stage here, we can also cut down the red-tape for some classes of companies - such as administratively complex disclosure rules, requiring a director’s history going back 10 or even 20 years.

https://www.straitstimes.com/business/companies-markets/1-1-billion-allocated-to-three-fund-managers-to-boost-singapore-stock-market

Many countries and regions are actively trying to capitalise on this, like Hong Kong in the article below.

We all recognise that Singapore has a finite immigration budget. Our debates about immigration tend to circle around how we best utilise the finite immigration budget for the nation's long-term benefit. I believe at this juncture we should shift the balance of our scientific immigration budget more decisively towards attracting Early-Career Researchers (ECRs).

Singapore’s scientific ecosystem has an image problem (rightly or wrongly) of "throwing money around" and hiring "whales" (senior, established researchers). Many "whales" are great, uplifting those around them; but others, if perceived as not, can negatively affect Singapore's scientific image internationally through their interactions. Which “whales” engage with local students at poster sessions? Which “whales” try to keep day-to-day interactions with the Singaporean scientific community to a bare minimum? Let’s have more of the former, and less of the latter.

Focusing on Early-Career Researchers is a way to build talent organically and foster a different kind of R&D culture. The hit-and-miss nature of betting on a few big whales can be better supplemented with a portfolio strategy of many ambitious and mission-driven Early-Career Researchers, which reduces overall variance. This cuts across basic science, applied science, and commercialisation.

Many of those who are facing uncertainty in this current upheaval of the R&D landscape are Early-Career Researchers, who in their early career journey are affiliated predominantly to 1-2 labs - of which each lab through the vagaries of chance can be greatly or barely affected, disproportionately impacting their careers.

Personally, I believe we need to put more trust in the ideas of early career researchers. We must move away from CV-first hiring, and move towards a model where we fund proposals and ideas, perhaps through a blind-review mechanism of evaluated proposals. This will help us take calculated chances on those who may not have had the most linear or traditionally “perfect” CVs.

We will also need to address the drawback of Singapore being far from US/EU hubs for scientific equipment, reagents, and other materials (where it may take 3-4 months for these specialised goods to get here). We should streamline import/export processes for these sorts of goods to minimise the delay to what is strictly necessary.

I believe this country has a bright scientific future ahead, but we will need to make the necessary adjustments to get there.

https://www.facebook.com/share/p/1BhL4F6nVi/

My fellow Singaporeans,

Good evening. My name is Kenneth Tiong. I am running to be your MP in Aljunied GRC.

There's a feeling in the air. A feeling of unease. When I meet and talk with so many of you over the last few years, I feel your unease.

It’s the unease when the cost of food grows faster than our salaries. The unease when, with car-ownership out of reach, the cost of public transport climbs as its reliability falls. The unease when we miss out again on a BTO exercise, and see skyrocketing rents and HDB resale prices.

It's unease about the job market: if we get retrenched, how easily can we find another job? Unease when we send out hundreds of resumes on LinkedIn or Jobstreet without any response. Fearing the next restructuring, wondering if our skills will still be valued next year. Seeing our capable fresh grads struggling to find a job.

This unease cuts across race, language, religion, or age. We further worry for the future of Singapore, which faces two clear challenges:

First, the technology revolution. Is Singapore going to be a driver, or a passenger? The risk is we become content as “fast adopters” – consuming technology developed elsewhere, rather than driving, developing, producing it ourselves. This pushes our own talent overseas to where the action and revolution feels more real.

Second, a changing world order: protectionism, trade wars, real wars. Navigating this requires foresight, agility, thoughtfulness, and a focus on strengthening our own capabilities.

We often hear criticisms of Singaporeans - “taking the safe way out”, “not innovative enough”. When I hear that, I think - about how unfair it is to us.

Let me ask you - how inclined are you to take risks, if there is not much of a safety net if you fail? When you have to juggle high costs of living, mortgage payments, and childcare expenses? When the sandwiched generation must do caregiving both for aging parents and growing children without family care leave or flexible childcare leave?

All my life I have believed in Singaporeans’ ability to lead. It is the ethos of our society - hardworking, resourceful, ethical. Since Independence, the PAP has said Singapore has no resources except its people. We Singaporeans are exceptional. But we need people who believe in us and are prepared to support us to the hilt, to help pick us up to walk again when we fall. Singapore needs such politicians.

If elected, I will be such a politician.

The first shift we need is a real safety net, a stronger foundation. The Workers' Party has consistently pushed for this foundation:

- Unemployment support.

- Mandatory retrenchment benefits.

- A National Minimum Wage enforced by the state.

- Independent Unions, to speak up fearlessly for your workplace rights.

- Strong Workplace Fairness Laws, to protect all against discrimination, not just some.

It's about dignity, security, and giving our people the breathing room to look beyond mere survival. It’s about giving Singaporeans the bandwidth and stomach to take risks, to pursue ideas and dreams that drive us in our youth. To enable us to be who we can be rather than to settle.

Once that foundation is built, it will support the re-ignition of our Singaporean economic engine, remaking Singapore into a true technology and innovation leader. We need an economy that works for us, where we nurture our own dreams.

I have spent all my working life in the private sector, in finance, consulting and technology. I know the problems of our private sectors, and I deeply want to see us succeed. We must put the foundations in place for an innovation-driven economy.

On innovation, I don’t want to give you all motherhood statements. So let me be really specific about the sort of questions I intend to pursue.

Question one. Since 1990, we have invested tens of billions of dollars in R&D. Yet after more than 30 years and immense spending, where are the deep-tech success stories built directly on this R&D? Not one R&D company has gone for a billion-dollar IPO. Not one R&D company has achieved major global-scale commercial success.

This kind of 30-year track record in R&D is just not good enough for the people of Singapore. What has gone wrong in translating our R&D policies into world-beating enterprise? I will pursue this question relentlessly.

Question two. Where are our domestic growth engines of today? I struggle to see them. It’s not just about being a small country. Denmark has 5.9 million people, similar to Singapore. It has Lego, which many of us buy for our kids (as I do), and “kidults”. It has Novo Nordisk, makers of the obesity wonder drug Ozempic. What comparable giants built on foundational capabilities do we have?

This lack of comparable giants isn't accidental. It reflects an ideology. An establishment ideology that is willing, at the first signs of stormy-waters, to sell out strategic national assets built over decades to foreign players.

Chartered Semiconductor in 2009. Neptune Orient Lines in 2016. And last year, they tried to sell out again, with NTUC Income to Allianz. But fortunately, many people in Singapore stood up, and made their voices heard. Otherwise, I am sure this bad deal would have gone through.

What are the right policies? Growing Singaporean champions, or finding the highest foreign bidder for them?

For me, what was so troubling about the attempt to sell NTUC Income was the message: that nothing is sacred, that valuable domestic entities could be sold for short-term financial reasons, leaving less for future generations to build upon. That we have leaders who know the price of everything and the value of nothing.

That’s why I have little hope for Singapore's ability to create our own growth engines with the PAP calling all the shots.

I have a different view. We must grow our own domestic champions. We must champion the primacy of local enterprise. If Singaporeans are to lead globally, we need these instruments significantly rooted in our control.

So I ask you to reject an ideology that seems too ready to sell out, and instead embrace a philosophy focused on growing our own.

So if elected, I will champion three things:

First, making Singapore a leader in innovation, creating great jobs right here.

Second, strengthening economic security and fairness for every Singaporean family.

Third, fighting for strong family foundations: affordable public housing, the highest education standards for every child, and giving our Singaporean families, including lower-income citizens with foreign spouses, the support they need for family formation.

Allow me to say a few words in Mandarin.

"大家好，我是 张文杰。"

"我是一名科技领域的工作者，也是两个小小孩的父亲。”

我理解许多新加坡人，特别是年轻人，对未来有许多担忧。我希望新加坡不仅能够让人安居乐业，更是个大家可以实现梦想、开创事业的家园。

"当选后，我将推动三大核心工作："

"第一，提升新加坡的创新力，为国人创造更多高价值的本地工作。"

"第二，确保所有国人的经济稳定与社会公平，让人民生活更有保障。这是国家进步的基础。"

"第三，打造稳固的家庭后盾：包括负担得起的组屋，让孩子享有最好的教育，支持国人成家立业，包括给予跨国婚姻家庭应当的援助。"

This year, 2025, marks the quarter-mark of the 21st century. I humbly ask you, the people of Singapore, to lead. Lead us with your vote into a better age, with a more balanced political system. Vote the party building strong foundations for our shared future, the party always working for Singapore. Vote the Workers’ Party.